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DEDICATION
This work is dedicated to the oppressed and exploited
people of Namibia and to the success of their
struggle for national liberation.
TERMINOLOGY
In this study, a number of terms have been used. The terms
"African" and "black" have been used to describe all
Namibians with the exception of whites. For the sake of
clarity, however, it has been necessary to use the terms
"Africans", "Coloured", "Whites", "Homelands", and "Reserves"
when referring to South African legislation and policies
based on race.
Finally, the term "Colonial administration" as used in the
text refers to the administrative structure in Namibia set up
by the South African Government.
ABSTRACT
This thesis deals with the political economy of mining laws
and regulation in Namibia from 1884 to 1986. Mining laws and
regulations have played an important role in the exploitation
of Namibia's mineral resources since the colonial period.
They have also played an important role in the exploitations
by foreign mining companies of Namibia's mineral resources.
The study shows how this process has evolved.
Chapter I discusses the link between colonialism and
exploitation. It also shows the special interest of the
colonial administration in mineral development. The formal
and substantive rules governing the acquisition of mineral
rights are discussed in detail in Chapter II. An important
element in the exploitation of Namibia's mineral resources is
the international market. Chapter III examines the marketing
of Namibia's minerals. It shows that the colonial
administration is unable and unwilling to exercise control in
this area. Special attention is paid to the marketing of
diamonds as it illustrates very well the dominant position of
the mining companies. 	 Marketing of minerals is closely
linked with taxation. This is examined in Chapter IV. 	 The
chapter reveals that the inadequacies of the legislation
enables mining companies to achieve their objective,
maximisation of profits without corresponding benefits to
Namibia. The exploitation of Namibia's mineral resources has
a direct effect on the environment. Chapter V shows that the
spread of multinational mining companies and their operations
have a direct effect on the environment, health and safety of
mine employees and the community in surrounding areas. It
also shows that mining laws and regulations are inadequate to
cope with this problem.
South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia since the
termination of the mandate in 1966 has important legal
consequences. The legal status of the mining concessions
granted by South Africa before and after the termination of
the mandate are examined in Chapter VI in the light of the
United Nations action in this respect. In order to clarify
the options for independent Namibia, Chapter VII discusses
the experience of other developing countries in mineral
development and their relationship with multinational
companies. In Chapter VII, we recommend that mining laws and
regulations of an independent Namibia should reflect the
needs of the Namibian population.
xiv.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The social and economic structure of Namibia is heavily
distorted by colonialism mainly because foreign
multinational mining companies have dominated the political
economy of the territory. The illegal racist South African
actions have taken many forms: from illegal colonial
occupation and economic plunder to forced labour. Although
there have been many studies on Namibia, these have tended
to focus mainly on South Africa's illegal occupation and the
economic situation in the territory. There have been
relatively few attempts to identify and analyse in detail
mining laws and regulations and to assess the effect they
have on the political, economic and social structures of the
territory.
To understand the role of mining law in the regulation of
natural resources such as minerals, a formalistic conception
of law is inadequate. It is necessary to relate the legal
forms used in mining law generally to the concrete social
and economic setting in which they operate. This approach
will enable lawyers and non-lawyers alike to gain a better
understanding of what we describe as the political economy
of mining laws and regulations. In the contemporary world
the modern nation state regulates the enjoyment of property.
In this context, property has both legal and economic
meaning. Law tend to answer the following questions: What
things may be reduced to the status of property? How are
rival claims to property adjusted? If the state is obliged
to protect property, to what extent and in what manner may
XV.
it legitimately restrict, expropriate or nationalise
property? These questions raise economic and political
issues of fundamental importance, thus showing how the
normative questions raised by law cannot be studied in
isolation.
The main conclusion of our study is that the mining
legislation in Namibia has enabled foreign private mining
companies to plunder the territory's mineral resources while
the African population remains one of the poorest in Africa.
The issues are discussed in eight chapters.
Chapter I, begins with a brief discussion on the structure
and functions of the pre-capitalist institutions which
existed in Namibia before the colonial period. It explains
that the institutions existed to serve the needs of the
Namibian community as a whole. It also examines the
colonial institutions and how they affect the pre-colonial
concept of property rights and shows how most of the early
mining companies actually acquired their mineral 'rights'
through theft and fraud. Finally, it discusses how the
administration of the territory changed from Germany to
South Africa, and how the illegal South African regime
introduced apartheid into the territory. Legislation is
required to establish rules and regulations to control
mining activities. Chapter II discusses the legal framework
within which the orderly development and operations relating
to the activities of mineral exploitation are carried out in
Namibia. While the South African regime has always 'owned'
minerals in situ, once the minerals have been extracted,
xvi.
ownership is usually vested in the mining rights holder.
Thus, mining laws and regulations which regulate the
acquisition and tenure of mining rights are not designed to
protect the interests of Namibia.
While acknowledging that the private foreign investor has to
realise a fair return on his investment, mining companies
have consistently taken advantage of their privileged
position and of the inadequacies of the legislation. 	 This
is discussed	 in	 detail in	 Chapter	 III	 (marketing
arrangements) and Chapter IV (taxation). The study
concludes with an assessment in Chapter V of the mining
operations on the environment. The conclusions in Chapter V
stress the fact that there is a need for 	 effective
provisions in the mining legislation and regulations to cope
with environmental problems. There is also a need to
introduce legislation and regulations to control uranium
mining operations in Namibia.
The importance of mining projects to Namibia has long been
recognised. The development of large-scale industrial
projects is vital to the creation of employment and the
raising of revenues. However, the exploitation of mineral
resources presents considerable problems including those
associated with pollution. It is an obvious fact that
various phases of mining operations such as prospecting,
mining, and processing are all potential sources of damage
to the environment. In the case of uranium mining, it is
arguably the most critical of all mineral resources as
regards its effect on the safety and health of the community
xvii.
and the environment. Our discussion of environmental
safeguards reveals that mining companies have been mainly
concerned with the simplest and cheapest recovery of mineral
resources with little concern about the effects
	 such
operations have on the environment.
	 Furthermore, mining
legislation and regulations are not sufficiently developed
to cope with problems associated with pollution. The
problem is compounded by the fact that even existing laws
and regulations are not strictly enforced by the colonial
administration.
The chapter attempts to discuss and analyse the role played
by mining laws and regulations in environmental protection.
It also evaluates, under a section on minimum international
environmental standards, the experience of other mineral
producing countries and how independent Namibia could learn
from them. The comparative section shows that most mineral
producing countries seek a solution to the underlying
problem, namely how to manage mineral resources in such a
way that their exploitation does not pose a serious threat
to the environment and the safety and health of the
community. The mineral industry is regarded as of
particular importance to their economy and the welfare of
their people.	 As a result, its wise management 	 and
utilisation is considered to be imperative. The chapter
concludes by recommending that independent Namibia should
follow the example of other mineral producing countries by
adopting minimum international environmental standards.
Since the termination of the mandate in 1966 by the United
Nations General Assembly and the International Court of
Justice ruling in 1971, the territory's future has presented
a relatively straightforward question of self-determination.
It is submitted that any proper and objective analysis of
the mining legislation cannot be achieved without
	 a
discussion on the
	 legality of mineral rights 	 under
international law.
	 An attempt is made in Chapter VI
(international law and natural resources) and Chapter VII
(mining agreements in developing countries) to analyse and
assess the relationship between host developing countries
and private foreign investors in the exploitation of natural
resources.
The conclusion which emerges from the two chapters is that
since the Second World War, there have been fundamental
changes in which private property and property rights have
been acquired. The change has taken into account social,
political and economic pressures which have acted as
constraints upon traditional forms of ownership. In
addition, the whole pattern of world politics has
dramatically changed. Freedom, throughout history the
privilege of the few, has become the acknowledge birthright
of all nations. Political independence is seen as the first
step in a long and arduous struggle.
	 Most developing
countries are determined to achieve a more prosperous and
just future for all their peoples. They are committed to
pursuing policies designed to achieve specific targets for
economic growth as well as a more equitable distribution of
income and wealth.
Aspirations for greater human dignity were the main driving
force behind former colonies' struggle for national
independence. However, this cannot be achieved without
economic self-determination
solid material basis
dignity and social
independence	 is
which is necessary to provide a
for the wider enjoyment of human
justice.	 Therefore,	 political
meaningless
	 without	 economic
to it.self-determination which alone can give meaning
Mining agreements between private foreign investors and most
developing countries reflect these aspirations. We have
discussed in Chapter VII that developing countries have
taken steps to bring their mining industries in line with
their mineral policy objectives. They have, in particular,
reformed their mining laws and regulations with the
objective, inter alia, of achieving economic development and
social progress. Moreover, mining laws and regulations have
clarified and st:7engthened the conditions which private
foreign investors should meet before they can be allowed to
play any part in their mining industries. All this is aimed
at making mining laws and regulations relevant tools for the
economic development and social progress of their countries.
Contractual and statutory provisions are analysed in Chapter
VII. Although the main parties to the Master Agreement are
the host states and the foreign investor, the trend is to
employ a state holding company to be the legally prescribed
partner of a foreign investor or a group of investors.
Contractual regulation, codification and the combination of
the two are the three most visible legal approaches and are
discussed accordingly. The decision by the host state to
XX.
utilise one or the other form remains a matter of legal
tradition, convenience, and the relative institutional
development of the host country. Therefore, the structural
merits of each modality are theoretically explored.
Finally, concessions, joint ventures and service contracts
as forms of state participation are examined in greater
detail.
If Namibia is to draw a useful lesson from the experience of
other developing countries, it will be necessary to develop
a national minerals policy. However, it is pertinent to
note that the mere incorporation of the mining legislation
into the national economic policy would not automatically
bring about the desired results. Much will depend on the
other factors and practical constraints (e.g., political and
economic). The effectiveness of the legislation should be
governed by the criteria of public interest, particularly
that of national economic development and social progress.
This means that in order for the legislation to be
effective, it must reflect and be relevant to the economic
situation and political environment of the territory. It is
for these reasons that independent Namibia would need to
undertake a comprehensive revision of the current mining
laws and regulations.
The main objective of this study is to assist future
government planners, legislators and others who will be
responsible in formulating policy in the mining industry by
providing a practical framework for decision making. We
have, therefore,	 put
	 forward some suggestions and
recommendations in the hope that they would rectify some of
the inadequacies of the said laws and regulations. Whatever
policy the future government takes concerning mining, it
will have to be based on a full and systematic understanding
of the underlying mining laws and their political and
economic implications. At the same time, it is hoped that
the study will be of interest to all those who are concerned
with the problems of the country, as it provides insights
into the relationship between legislation and international
capital. The study also provides lawyers with information,
hitherto unavailable on current mining law, decisions and
comments on many issues affecting mining rights in Namibia.
It is also hoped that the study will be of interest to the
general public insofar as it illustrates how Namibia's
mineral resources are being plundered.
This study is based on information collected from various
primary sources such as legislation, cases, official reports
and newspapers. I have also drawn upon a growing body of
secondary source materials such as textbooks, specialised
studies and articles.
CHAPTER I — NAMIBIA'S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
AND THE GRANTING OF MINERAL RIGHTS
1	 INTRODUCTION
To understand the role of the mining legislation in Namibia's
colonial context, this chapter pays special attention to the
nature of the pre-capitalist mode of production in the
country. We will also examine the colonial capitalist mode
of production as restructured by capitalist penetration
during the nineteenth century. This will enable us to
explain the historical process by which capitalist mining
laws were imposed upon the indigenous society. We will also
analyse the impact of these laws on the indigenous social and
political institutions.
Whenever a colonial power moves into a new territory, it
inevitably effects immediate and profound changes in the
native social structure. This results in taking away the
indigenous peoples' independence and limiting or even
completely abrogating the powers of the native political
leadership. In Namibia, forces of colonialism established a
new territorial legal order that did not exist before. This
resulted in severe curtailment and in some cases, complete
obliteration of the pre-colonial order and its replacement by
a new system of controls subordinated to the colonial
administration.
During the early colonial period, fundamental change took
place through the medium of laws or legal institutions whose
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content is clearly contrary to the perceived and accepted
aboriginal social structure. Therefore, the imposition of
capitalist values in Namibia required the development of an
institutional framework within which they could be expressed.
This was necessary because colonialism had a specific
objective, to exploit the natural resources. The concept of
traditional (customary) property rights which existed during
the pre-colonial period was not an adequate framework for the
colonial exploitation of natural resources.
It was perceived that the exploitation of Namibia's natural
resources was possible only under a system of tenure that
gave the white settlers maximum freedom of control. Thus,
the stage was set for the imposition of capitalist laws and
institutions that were to have fundamental consequences for
mineral exploitation in Namibia.
	 This resulted in the
restructuring the flow of the pre-colonial natural resources
in a manner that produced great inequality in the
distribution of benefits between the international capital
and white settlers on the one hand, and the indigenous
population on the other.
2	 PHYSICAL FEATURES AND MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE TERRITORY
The territory of Namibia is very large. It covers an area of
824,269km2, almost four times the size of the United Kingdom.
Its northern border stretches eastwards from the Atlantic
Ocean and is shared in the first instance over a length of
some 1,000km with Angola and to a lesser extent Zambia. In
the east, it shares a border of approximately similar length
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with Botswana, and it touches Zimbabwe at the extreme east of
the Caprivi Strip. The border continues southwards, more or
less on a straight line until it reaches the Orange River,
which forms the southern border with South Africa.
Apart from a narrow strip along the Namib Desert, Namibia is
situated on a plateau. It is topographically divided into
three areas, namely: the Namib Desert, the Central Plateau,
and the Kalahari Desert. Due to its low rainfall, the Namib
Desert is one of the most inhospitable deserts in the world.
For a long time, it formed a natural barrier, preventing all
entrance to the interior from the coast. Indeed, this is one
of the reasons why the territory was among the last countries
in Africa to be colonised by the Europeans.	 The desert
varies from 80 to 130 kilometres in width. The place
contains enormous mineral resources such as diamonds,
uranium, zinc, tin, lead, salt, natural gas, and guano among
others. In addition, the coastline is very regular. The
only two important places suitable for harbours are Luderitz
Bay in the southern part of the country, and Walvis Bay in
the centre.
The Central plateau is a mountainous area with savannah and
bush. it contains most of the territory's base minerals such
as copper, zinc, lead, tin, silver, vanadium, cadmium,
wolfram, lithium, etc. The northern part of the plateau is
suited for agriculture, especially cattle ranching, while the
southern part is suited for Karakul sheep.
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TABLE 112	 NAMIBIAN MINERAL RESOURCES
MAJOR MINERALS
DIAMOND, URANIUM,
COPPER, ZINC, LEAD,
SILVER, TIN,
LITHIUM, CADMIUM,
SALT, ARSENIC,
PYRITE, VANADIUM
AND GERMANIUM
MINOR MINERALS
TANTALITE, BISMUTH,
MOLYBDENUM,
MANGANESE,
BERYLIUM, CAESIUM,
GRAPHITE,
TOURMALINE,
AMETHYST, TIGER'S
EYE, CHALCEDONY,
GOLD, KYMATE-
SILLIMANITE,
PHOSPHATES,
WOLFRAM, LIME AND
MARBLE, GREEN AND
ROSE QUARTZ,
HELIODOR, SMOKEY,
CITRINE, AGATE,
AMAZONITE,
JEREMEJEVITE,
TOPAZ, GALLIUM,
NIOBUIM, RUBIDIUM,
BORGHIUM,
TELLURIUM,
TELEMIUM, TUNGSTEN,
SILICA, MICA,
FELDSPAR, SULPHUR
AND SODA
ALLEGED DEPOSITS
NATURAL GAS, OIL,
COAL, FOUSPAR,
IRON AND PLATINUM
SOURCE:	 Leake S.Hangala, Structure of Namibian Mineral
Industry, p.17; UNIN Namibia: Perspectives for National
Reconstruction and Development, p.293; and Namibia foundation,
Mining in SWA/Namibia, pp.7-13
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Namibia is one of the largest producers of minerals in
Africa. The minerals are found both on land and offshore,
and can be divided into four categories: precious stones,
source materials, base metals, and industrial minerals.	 In
the exception of industrial minerals, each sector is
dominated by one giant company - CDM controls diamonds,
Rossing exploits uranium, and Tsumeb Corporation exploits
base metals.	 As Table 1:2 above indicates, the territory
produces a wide variety of minerals.
It is the world's leading producer of gem diamonds, has the
largest open-cast uranium mine in the world, and it is the
second largest producer of lithium and vanadium in the world.
It is also alleged that it has half of the world's reserves
of germanium (produced as a by-product of other minerals at
Tsumeb mines), and it is potentially one of the world's
leading producers of high grade industrial salt. Compared
with other Africa countries, it is one of the leading
producers of refined lead, second largest producer of
cadmium, and fourth largest producer of both zinc and silver.
In addition, a large gas deposit has been discovered, and it
is also reported that oil has been discovered in the northern
part of the country. 1
1
see Leake S.Hangala, (1985), Structure of Namibian
Mineral Industry University Printing Press Helsinki,
p.16
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3	 PRE—COLONIAL CUSTOMARY LAND USES AND MINERAL RIGHTS
While the rules of customary land law may have provided a
skeleton upon which mineral exploitation was regulated before
the colonial period, modern mining legislation fundamentally
departed from it in order to meet the needs of the miners and
the mining industry. Thus, a body of legal concepts
developed which is peculiar in its application to mining
activities and which are studied in detail in Chapter II.
The reader should not draw too close an analogy between the
modern mining law and customary land law because the current
mining law has acquired a status of its own. The reasons are
numerous. Mining activities today present many novel and
sometimes intricate questions that are based upon
developments in technology, multiple use of mineral bearing
lands, multiple methods of taxation, and techniques of
financing and operating mineral properties. Notwithstanding
these considerations, it is important that this chapter
should seek to present the law in historical perspective.
Therefore, in order to comprehend the adverse origins and
application of Namibian law on the subject of mining, it is
desirable to give a brief history of customary land law.
This will help the reader to comprehend different sources
from which mining law is derived and the extent to which the
various sources are important to the subject at hand.
Finally, this approach will help the general reader because
any genuine attempt to identify the major determinants of the
7
structure and nature of mining legislation in Namibia must
first consider the territory's historical past. As the
President of Swapo Cde., Sam Nujoma, pointed out, "Society is
only fully intelligible when it is studied in terms of its
history and of the economic, social, political and spiritual
factors which helped to form it".2
3.1 Characteristics of customary land tenure
During the pre-colonial period, a capital value or a rental
value was not applicable to land which was communally owned.
Land was regarded as the property of the whole community from
which it derived its livelihood and subsistence. As such, a
claim to the private ownership of special pieces of land
within the community was generally not recognised.
The main characteristic feature of customary land tenure was
that the principal source of individual property was derived
from labour e.g., the building of a house. A man's property
was that upon which he did some work, something which he
acquired by his own effort. That which occurred naturally
was regarded as something given by nature to all equally, the
earth, the trees, the minerals, etc. Every community had its
own piece of land into which strangers could not intrude
without first obtaining the permission of that particular
community. Communal land could be allotted to families.
Family lands were at the disposal of the head of the family,
2
see UNIN,	 (1986), Namibia:	 Perspectives	 for 
National Reconstruction and Development, UNIN, p.5
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and every member of the family had a right to a share in the
land - a right which was not forfeited even by prolonged
absence. The holder and his descendants had undisturbed
possession, except that they could not alienate the land so
as to deprive the whole community its ultimate control over
it. Communal tenure exhibited a remarkable resemblance
everywhere in its basic principle. In practically all cases
under customary law (before it became modified by alien
conceptions) the rights of an individual user, even though he
could consider himself the owner of the land, fell far short
of those of a full owner in the modern sense. Therefore, the
feature of communal land embodied an unbroken chain of
responsibility - the responsibility of the headman for his
people, of the head of a family for its members, and of every
individual of a community to the chief.
The main characteristics of individual responsibility to the
whole community was that it was the duty of every individual
to preserve the use of land for its members. An individual
user was restricted from full ownership, especially
alienation of land to outsiders, by the privileges which
other members of the community enjoyed on the same land.
This meant that once the individual was regarded as part of
the community, his interests became interwoven with those of
the community and he was under customary obligation to share
the land with the community. The chief and everybody under
him was accountable to his counsellors, headmen, family, and
to the community as a whole. In this sense, the chief and
his counsellors were regarded as guardians of the land on
behalf of the community. Therefore, as far as customary land
-9-
law was concerned, land was not saleable. Sale of freehold
rights over land is a comparatively modern innovation which
was not only unlawful but unthinkable in Namibia's history.
3.2 Pre-colonial mining activities
The history of mining in Namibia is largely the history of
copper exploitation, though over the years, deposits of other
minerals such as diamonds and uranium have been opened.
Minerals have been extracted from surface deposits for
centuries by Namibian small miners. One of the earliest
written references to copper mining in Namibia was published
by a Hungarian explorer in 1853. 3 The growth of the superior
social, economic and political organisation in the northern
part of Namibia caused the trade in and use of copper to
increase greatly.
Ancient methods of mining and prospecting were simple but
effective. During the early colonial years, European
prospectors directed their efforts almost exclusively towards
the "discovery" of ancient workings, and major copper mines
of today originated from them. Tsumeb mine is a good example
where Namibians smelted copper before the arrival of the
Europeans. 4 However, prior to the industrial revolution,
simple	 labour	 intensive	 operations,	 primitive
communications and marketing systems effectively limited
3
see Nicholas De Kun, (1965), The Mineral Resources
of Africa, Elsevier Publishing Company - London, p.32
4 ibid.
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output. It was only during the German colonial period that
Namibia rose to become one of the world's leading producers
of minerals. This resulted in the full exploitation of the
minerals when the enormous potential of the country came to
be fully appreciated.
4	 COLONIALISM, EXPLOITATION AND THE REPLACEMENT OF
TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS
The expansion of Europe was a process by which European
peoples made themselves heirs of the newly acquired
territories overseas. This was, at first, made possible by
their achievements in the science of navigation. This period
saw the expansion of,maritime trade into a world commerce.
It was under the advance in science and trade interests that
Africa was first explored and later conquered. The
acquisition of colonies by the European powers implied
consolidation in an economic sense as well. Industry and
trade began to be organised for national objects, and on a
national basis.
The concentration of economic resources was necessary for the
task of expansion of colonisation and world trade. The
colonists possessed not only the sovereign rights but also
property rights over the conquered territories.	 Every
privilege and position, economic, political, or religious
came from the colonists. In order to consolidate their
economic power, the laws and institutions of the colonies
became modelled on those of the metropolitan colonial powers.
They were sometimes modified in form and in function to meet
colonial needs.
The motives for the colonisation of Namibia were much the
same as in all cases in other former colonies, despite what
apologists for colonialism have said to the contrary. Among
these writers is Esterhuyse, who states that it "was not the
economic aspect but the spiritual need of the native tribes
which ... drew the attention of Western civilisation to the
Transgareip (i.e., Namibia)". 5 The desire for adventure and
"civilisation" was insignificant to the main reason for
colonisation. In addition, they were motives that influenced
individuals and religious institutions rather than
governments or trading companies. The first Europeans landed
on the shores of Namibia in the XVth Century. They were
Portuguese seafarers.
	
The	 inhospitable Namib Desert
constituted a formidable barrier to any explorations into the
interior until late in the 18th century. In the 19th
century, a succession of travellers, traders, hunters, and
missionaries, mostly British and Cape Dutch in origin,
explored the area.
Before Germany assumed formal control of the territory, there
were a number of trade contacts between outsiders (mainly
European traders) and Namibians. Trade between them and
Namibians was mainly in guano and copper. Rich guano
deposits were discovered during the early nineteenth
5
see J.H.Esterhuyse, (1968), South West
	 Africa
1880-1894, C.Struik (Pty) Ltd. Cape Town, p.7
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century. 6 It is reported that one island "had a guano
deposit of 72 feet deep and hundreds of thousands of tons of
guano were removed between 1843 and 1848". 7 The trade was
dominated by Europeans, there could be as many as three
hundred ships in one island alone collecting guano. Since
there were no legal regulations regarding the exploitation of
the guano deposits, serious disorders which sometimes led to
sporadic shooting among the Europeans were common.
From 1847 onwards, the monopoly of the guano trade became
dominated by one company called A and E de Pass. It is
interesting to learn that the exclusive mining right was
granted not by Namibians but by the Cape Government in South
Africa. The company was granted the sole right to exploit
the Namibian islands for the period of 21 years. 8 This
effectively eliminated free competition in the guano trade,
and the interests of the other traders turned to copper.
A number of companies were established with a view to
obtaining mining rights from the local chiefs. In 1854, a
company called Great Namaqualand Mining Company started
prospecting for copper in the territory. 9 In 1856, one of
the first copper mines to be operated by the Europeans
started production. Other companies such as the Walwich Bay
6 ibid., p.9
7	 ibid.
8 ibid.
9	 ibid., p.10
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Mining Company began copper prospecting activities in Central
Namibia, and in February, 1855, it started exploiting the
Matchless mine which still exists today. 10 Apart from the
trade in guano and copper, other trade activities included
cattle, ivory, and ostrich feathers. According to trade
statistics of import and export through Table Bay in South
Africa to the various Namibian harbours, it appears that the
Namibian trade was very profitable. It must be noted that
trade between Namibia and South Africa was much larger than
the figures provided below because they do not include the
trade carried on overland between South Africa and Namibia.
The trade figures are provided as follows:
Import Export
1850 R530 R4,496
1860 R19,290 R14,292
1870 R18,824 R40,982
1880 R48,940 R68,206 11
During the scramble for Africa, the ganglia of empire spread
inexorably from metropolis to colony. The greatest of all
was the British Empire, the most extensive sovereignty in
history. Britain even went to the extent of claiming Namibia
as her sphere of influence. This policy was clearly stated
by the Earl of Derby on 19th May, 1884 in these terms: "The
language we have held with regard to that territory is that
... we have claimed the right to exclude Foreign Powers on
10	 ibid.
1 1
	ibid., p.13
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the general ground of its nearness to our Settlements, and
the absence of any other claims". 12 Other colonial powers
such as Germany, France, Portugal and Spain contended with
Britain and among themselves but together establishing an
unprecedented world hegemony of the west.
During the struggle between Britain and Germany over Namibia,
a compromise was reached whereby Germany was to colonise
Namibia on condition that she supported Britain against
France over Egypt. Namibia's colonisation by Germany began
unofficially in 1883 when a German trader called Frans Adolf
Eduard Luderizt claimed the rest of the coastal region until
the territory was effectively colonised by Germany in 1884.
On 1st July 1890, Anglo-German agreement was reached to
define the inland boundaries of the territory. 13 During the
early years of German colonisation, the white settlers were
limited to a handful of imperial civil servants. It was only
in the early 1890s that white settlers were encouraged to
settle in large numbers.
The desire for wealth, on the part of those Germans who
emigrated to Namibia and of those in the government at home
was the most important reason for colonisation. A large
number of merchants, soldiers, poor families,and artisans who
hoped to improve their lot in Namibia where land and
12	 House of Commons Debates, 19th may, 1884, co1.646
13 The boundaries were defined in article three of the
agreement. See op.cit., H.Esterhuyse, South West Africa
1880-1894, p.168
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opportunity were more plentiful than in Germany opted to
emigrate to Namibia. The desire to obtain a more abundant
supply of natural resources which were not available in large
quantities in Germany and to make a profit induced the
formation of chartered companies and the development of other
forms of cooperative enterprise. The desire for wealth and
for more direct access to and control of mineral resources
formed a principal incentive to exploration and settlement.
Since its inception at the turn of the nineteenth century,
colonialism in Namibia spelled the domination of people of
colour. Throughout the history of colonialism, the German
Imperial government and white settlers sought colonial
super-profits through the acquisition of mineral resources,
new investment outlets, and an exploitable supply of cheap
labour. This led to direct interference in the economic,
social and political affairs of the indigenous population.
An inevitable consequence was resistance which led to
prolonged colonial war with the white settlers. Given the
fact that the population was sparse and had inferior weapons,
colonial resistance resulted in the killing of more than 60
per cent of the population of central and southern Namibia.14
Once the dispute was settled in the battle field, there was
no longer a conflict between the law of the conquerors and
the law of the aborigines.	 Indigenous institutions were
simply destroyed and their law perished with them. 	 The
14 op.cit., UNIN Namibia: Perspectives for National
Reconstruction and Development, p.25
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victors transplanted their Western law. The net result of
the colonial expansion and conquest meant that the economic
and social life of the Namibian indigenous population was
totally disrupted and reorganised to suit the needs of
colonialism and capitalism. We have already stated that
colonisation was initiated by the need of the colonial power
(Germany) to expand economically and to bring within its web
of domination the land, resources, and market potentials of
Namibia. It spelt the total disorganisation of traditional
life and the transformation of the indigenous population into
colonised work forces.
Since those colonised were non-European and non-christian
people of colour, it was easy to rationalise and maintain
what was to become a racially defined class system of
exploitation. This policy was clearly laid down by the
German Imperial government. During the Berlin Conference of
1884-5, Bismarck, the German leader at the time stated that:
"All the governments share the wish to bring the nations of
Africa within the pale of civilisation by opening up the
interior of the continent to commerce, by furnishing the
natives with the means of instruction". 15 It was perceived
by Germany that the exploitation of Namibia's natural
resources was only possible under a system of tenure that
would give the white settlers maximum freedom of control to
the exclusion of the indigenous population. 	 Bismarck's
policy was effectively put into practice. 	 As Dr Paul
15 see Ruth First, (1975), South West Africa, Peter
Smith Publisher Inc., p.69, emphasis added
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Rohrbach, a highly placed official in the German Colonial
Office put it, colonisation meant that "the native tribes
would have to give up their lands ... in order that the white
man might have the land ,, . 16 As will be discussed below, this
was to mean an outright seizure without compensation.
In order to consolidate economic control, political and
social institutions were erected to maintain the relations of
power and privilege that lay at the heart of the colonial
situation. With the establishment of these early colonial
relations by Germany, the beginning of a class system of
domination and exploitation that was to manifest itself
largely in racial terms developed.
Thus, racial differences were not only used in making social
distinctions, but they were used in the organisation of the
economic structure of colonial society. The racial realities
of the colonial situation in Namibia has a material basis in
the organisation of the social relations of production, and
it still today plays an important role in the mining
industry. The rise and expansion of capitalism marked a new
period in the history of Namibian natural resource
exploitation. In the earlier periods of German colonialism,
economic exploitation of the territory's natural resources
was largely based on commerce.
16	 ibid.
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After the discovery of mineral resources, the labour of the
African population became an integral factor in the
development of the German economy. In addition, the economic
development of capitalist Germany was to be based directly on
the continued exploitation and underdevelopment of Namibia.
Without the massive plunder of Namibia's natural resources
and the eventual appropriation of this wealth to Germany, the
growth of large-scale capitalist manufacture and industry in
Germany would have been delayed. This massive accumulation
of capital was therefore a crucial prerequisite for the
development of German capitalism.	 The development of heavy
industry and financial institutions were directly or
indirectly financed by colonial exploitation. Indeed, the
motto throughout the process of colonisation was "Give
Germany Colonies and the Germans will be as prosperous as the
English". 17
5	 THE PARCELLING OF LAND AND MINERAL RIGHTS
Once the European powers agreed that Namibia was to become a
German colony, German concessionaires (at first individual
traders and later companies) began to negotiate and conclude
dubious agreements with local chiefs for land and mining
rights.
The most extensive agreements were concluded with a famous
German trader called Luderitz. On 1st May 1883, he "bought"
17
op.cit.,	 J.H.Esterhuyse,	 South	 West	 Africa
1880-1894, p.66
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the harbour of Angra Paquena together with the surrounding
land with a radius of 5 miles (8km). 18 The alleged price was
£100 in gold to be paid to Chief Josef Fredericks, but it was
never paid. 19 The second transaction took place on the 25th
August 1883 and involved "the whole of the coastline from
Angra Pequena to the Orange River, including all the harbours
and bays together with the interior, to a width of 20
geographical miles measured from every point along the
coast". 20 On 19th August 1884, he "purchased" the whole
coastline from 26 degrees south latitude to 20 degrees south
latitude, together with all land stretching into the interior
within "20 geographical miles" of the coastline. This deal
meant that the whole territory of the Topnaars community
under Kaptein Piet Haibib passed to Luderitz. By 1885, he
claimed ownership of more than half of Namibia.
It is interesting to note that Luderitz's land and mineral
rights deals were interpreted by him as outright sale. Being
unable to provide enough funds for the exploitation of his
various rights (including, as he claimed, sovereign rights),
he sold all his rights to the German Colonial Company for
South West Africa (Deutsche Kolonial Gesellschaft f u ur Suudwest
21.5Afrika) on the 3rd of April, 188	 The company consisted
18
see I.Goldblatt, (1971) History of South West
Africa from the beginning of the nineteenth century,
Juta and Company Ltd - Cape Town Wynberg Johannesburg,
p.80
19	 . .ibid.
20	 .ibid., p.82
21	 ibid., p.102
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of leading figures in German financial circles and was
incorporated in Germany on 13th April 1885. Further land
purchases were carried out by the company, and by late 1888,
it held approximately 240,000 square kilometres of land. 22
On the 25th March 1888, it was granted a certificate
recognising its possession as private rights. In addition,
it was vested with quasi-sovereign rights, this was an
approximation to a chartered company. 23 Since the formal
acquisition of Namibia as a colony in 1884, the German
Colonial Company for South West Africa was the colonial
administering authority on behalf of the German Imperial
government.
•J
Not surprisingly, a serious	 dispute arose as to 	 the
interpretation of the land and mineral deals.
	 The white
settlers interpreted them as ceding land and mineral rights
in perpetuity to their exclusive enjoyment.
	 On the other
hand, the local chiefs interpreted the agreements in
accordance with customary law. As we have already discussed
above, customary law recognised the rights of individuals to
use the land and everything under it subject to the rights of
other members of the community. Under customary law, a
purported alienation was void or invalid because it was
contrary to law, in that where this happened, there was a
strong implication of an intention on the part of the chiefs
22
see Horst Drechsler, (1966), Let Us Die Fighting,
Akademie Verlag, Berlin, p.30
23
op.cit., I.Goldblatt, History of South West Africa
from the beginning of the nineteenth century, p.108
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to treat the land as their own absolutely. They gave an
impression that the land and the minerals under it belonged
to them and as such, there was an attempt by the chiefs to
give away what they did not have. It is also submitted that
although the chiefs' rights varied from community to
community, none of the communities in Namibia had a chief
with power that could entitled him to dispose of the land.
Customary land use had almost universal application in Africa
before the colonial period. In the former British colonies
of West Africa, the nature of customary land was well stated
in the 1898 report on Land Tenure in West Africa. 24 It was
stated by the Chief Justice Rayner in these terms: "'The next
fact which it is important to bear in mind in order to
understand the native land law is that the notion of
individual ownership is quite foreign to native ideas.
	 Land
belongs to the community, the village or the family, • • •
village or family have an equal right to the land, but in
every case the chief or headman of the community or village
or head of the family, has charge of the land, and in loose
mode of speech is sometimes called owner. He is to some
extent in the position of a trustee, and as such holds the
land for the use of the community or family. He has control
of it, and any member who wants a piece of it to cultivate or
build a house upon, goes to him for it. But the land so
given still remains the property of the community".25
24	
see Sunmonu v. Disu Raphael (1927) A.C.881
25	 ibid., p.884, emphasis added
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Therefore, the chiefs could not give away what belonged to
the community.
In addition, the concessions could not grant exclusive
mineral rights in perpetuity. Customary law would not
recognise such a grant as such interests were unknown to it.
According to customary law, it was a use by the community at
large, not an appropriation of any portion of the land into
the subject's exclusive possession and occupation.
Therefore, it is submitted that the exercise of land rights
did not confer upon the individual who used the land any
right, title or interest in the portion of the land over
which the right is exercised. it was an incident of the
community's absolute ownership of the land.
Finally, the facts of the land and mineral rights deals
suggest that traders and companies' officials fraudulently
misrepresented the	 nature	 of	 the	 documents. 26 The
probability of the widespread use of fraud in obtaining the
concessions is significantly increased when it is realised
that the concessions were not only written by the traders and
companies but were also written in German, as well as using
technical jargon which local people could not have
understood. Notwithstanding this fact, the concessions were
presented as being from the chiefs, people who could not even
read and write.
26
op.cit., I.Goldblatt, History of South West Africa
from the beginning of the nineteenth century, p.102
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It is interesting to note that even the German colonial
officials had knowledge of Luderitz's widespread fraud. It
is reported that Theodor Leutwein, one of the colonial
Governors in Namibia, was also aware of Luderitz's fraud. he
is even reported to have stated that: "'of all the dubious
land acquisition treaties negotiated by Luderitz, the one
concerning the coastal area between Swakop and Omaruru is the
most dubious' ,,• 27
On 30th October 1888, one of the largest communities in
central Namibia publicly declared that all the mineral rights
which had been granted to the Germans were null and void, and
the German "protection" treaty was also repudiated. 28 This
development led the German Colonial Company for South West
Africa to request direct intervention from the Imperial
government. On 25th June 1889, the Government responded by
assuming direct administration of the territory. 29 As a
result, the white settler's interpretation of the mineral and
land rights prevailed. From this day on, Namibia became the
most savagely exploited country in Southern Africa, and
became oppressed by the most aggressive and most delinquent
fascist state in the world.
We have already discussed that the imposition of capitalist
values in Namibia	 required the development of an
27	
op.cit., Horst Drechsler, Let Us Die Fighting, p.25
28
op.cit., I.Goldblatt, History of South West Africa
from the beginning of the nineteenth century, p.105
29	 ibid.
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institutional framework within which they could be expressed.
Colonialism had a specific objective, to exploit the
resources found in the colony. The concept of traditional
property rights which existed before colonisation could not
form a basis for the exploitation of the territory's natural
resources. In 1905, the Colonial Department in Germany
called on the Colonial administration
	 in Namibia
	 to
expropriate African property movable and immovable. The
Colonial Deputy Governor in Namibia, Hans Tecklenburg, stated
the policy as follows: "'with the confiscation of their land,
the natives will be deprived of the possibility of raising
cattle ... any form of tribal organisation would
	 be
eliminated. 000 No major community of natives must be left
to their own devices ••••	 Freedom of movement will be
abolished and passes will be introduced as a compulsory
measure ... Here in this settler colony the natives must
never be allowed to forget for a single moment that they are
in a country ruled by the white men and that they are subject
to German legislation".30
This policy was followed by the 'Imperial Decree of 26
December 1905 Pertaining to the Sequestration of Property of
Natives in the Protectorate of South West Africa'. 31 The
decree enabled the colonial Governor to sequester the land of
Africans, and it provided him with the legal means to do so.
It empowered the Governor to declare the whole of central
30
op.cit., Horst Drechsler, Let Ds Die Fighting,
p.215
31 ibid., p.106
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Namibia (the then Hereroland) Crown land. Lindequist, the
Colonial Governor at the time wrote to the Colonial Office in
Germany on 8 August, 1906, stating that: "'All legal
impediments have thus been removed that stood in the way of
granting the numerous applications made for the acquisition
of farms and homestead in Hereroland". 32 Southern Namibia
was confiscated from the indigenous population on 8 May 1907.
The confiscation of land and property of the Africans raised
some concern among liberal circles in Germany. Commenting on
the severity of the Imperial Decree of 26 December 1905, a
member of the Reichstag stated that it amounted to "'nothing
else but robbery on a large scale ... it is not only that the
tribal system is to be abolished ... but all tribal property
is to be taken away from the natives. 	 In this day and age
such plunder is unworthy of a state which has inscribed law
and justice on its banner. If put into operation, the Decree
will leave the natives ... impoverished and enslaved ... So
the ideal of 'economically oriented colonial politicians' is
nearing realisation: the blacks will serve as lowly toilers
for the white man.	 The Decree marks the entry of modern
slavery into South West Africa'". 33
At this stage, the German Government's main objective was to
encourage the development of mining and land settlement. A
considerable part of the territory was parcelled out to a
32	 ibid.
33	 ibid.
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number of syndicates and companies. Two groups of land
owners and mineral rights holders emerged, (1) those
companies who had acquired land or mining 'rights' from the
local chiefs, and (2) those who acquired concessions from the
crown. Minerals were by far the most important to Germany's
industries, and the colonial administrators were expected to
encourage it as much as possible.
In addition, the development of the mining industry was
regarded by the colonial administrators to be the principal
source of revenue. As a result, the aiding of the miners
became a special duty of the colonial administration, for
when the mines were prosperous, it could hope to meet its
financial obligations more easily. Mining operations
involved financial risks. Interest rates on borrowed capital
for use in the overseas trade (colonies) were generally high,
especially as in case of disaster the loss fell entirely on
the capitalist lender. Bankruptcies were therefore not
uncommon in the history of trade with the overseas colonies.
Indeed, it was near bankruptcy which forced Luderitz to sell
his land and mineral 'rights' to the German Colonial Company
for South West Africa. Therefore, overseas colonial trade
was a speculative enterprise fit only for German merchants
with large funds and not too impatient of early returns on
their capital.
As a result, only companies were suitable to undertake mining
activities. Apart from the German Colonial Company for South
West Africa, four other companies played an important role in
the development of Namibia's mining industry. These were:
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..
Siedelungsgesellschaft	 fur	 Deutsch	 Sudwestafrica,
Otavi-Minen-und Eisenbahngesellschaft, Gibeon-Schurf-und
Handelsgesellschaft, and a British Company called South West
Africa Company Ltd.
When the functions of the colonial administration were
assumed by the German Imperial government, the ownership of
minerals became vested in the state. It should be pointed
out that the origin of this legal practice had nothing to do
with any objective to subject mineral resources to the
requirements of Namibia's economic development. 	 On the
contrary, it was devised to further the end of colonial
exploitation and racial discrimination. Crown use took the
form of granting rights of prospecting and exploitation to
mining companies in return for royalties payable on the
quantities extracted. The granting of such rights was also,
naturally, an important means of dispensing patronage.
The whole territory was opened to prospectors. 	 Within
specified restrictions, a prospector had the right to
prospect, work or dispose minerals. This move encouraged a
speedy discovery of minerals. By 1908, commercial copper and
lead production had already started. The territory produced
3,000 tons of copper, and 5,000 tons of lead during the same
.period. 34 In 1910, one of the companies mentioned above, the
Otavi-Minen-und Eisenbahngesellschaft,	 initiated copper
34
op.cit., Nicolas De Kun The Mineral Resources of
Africa, p.166
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production. 35 Diamonds were discovered in 1908, and their
discovery made Namibia the most important colony for Germany.
Unfortunately for Germany, her fortunes in Namibia did not
last long. She had been the last European power to acquire
colonies and the first to lose them.
6	 THE INTRODUCTION OF APARTHEID AND THE EXPANSION OF THE
MINING INDUSTRY
The Mandates System and the League of Nations originated from
the peace settlements after the First World War. At first,
there was a question as to what to do with the territories
conquered from Germany.
	 On the one hand, some States
strongly pressed for	 the annexation of the occupied
territories, while other States favoured the idea of
administering the territories as international mandates under
which the territories would be administered on behalf of the
League of Nations.
	
The relationship between the League of
Nations and the Mandatories was to be regulated by special
agreement. 36
Thus, the Mandates System was a device which existed in more
enlightened form of colonial administration and was a
compromise to solve a dilemma, namely, "how could the Allied
35	 ibid.
36For a detailed discussion on Namibia, see UNIN (1987),
Namibia: A Direct United Nations Responsibility, particularly
chapter 4.
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Powers be allowed to keep their gains without affronting
people, especially in the US who wanted to break free from
old-fashioned imperialism? The mandates system was the
answer: it gave the Allies ... as rulers in the territories
concerned assured possession within a scheme of international
accountability through the League." 37 This explains why one
of the protagonists of the mandate system was President
Wilson of the United States of America. 38
The compromise arrangement was embodied in Article 22 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations which was incorporated in
the Treaty of Versailles signed in 1919. 39	The Article
stated: "To those colonies and territories which as a
consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the
sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them, and
which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by
themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern
world, there should be applied the principle that the
well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred
trust of civilization, and that securities for the
performance of this trust should be embodied in this
Covenant."
375ee Northedge, (1986), The League of Nations: its life
and times 1920-1946, Leicester University Press, p. 193.
38See generally Digest of International law, (1963),
vol. 1, Department of State Publication, p. 604.
39As for the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, see
Treaty Series (1917-1921) No. 4, 28 June, 1919, HMSO.
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The territory of Namibia (as well as other former German
colonies) was considered at the time to be "inhabited by
peoples not yet able to assume a full measure of
self-government". Two principles were considered to be of
paramount importance: "the principle of non-annexation and
the principle that the well-being and development of such
peoples form "a sacred trust of civilisation". The
principles were given practical effect by establishing an
international regime known as the Mandates System.
The territories were divided into three categories according
to what was referred to as their stages of development,
namely, A, B and C mandates. Namibia was in the last group.
The distinguishing feature of this group was that owing to
the "sparseness of their population, or their small size, or
their geographical contiguity to the territory of the
Mandatory", would be "best administered under the laws of the
Mandatory as integral portions of its territory" subject to
overriding safeguards	 in favour of the	 "indigenous
population". 40 Furthermore, in the case of 'C' mandates, it
is reported that "In fact, the Allies submitted to the
Council draft agreements for the 'C' mandates, and these were
accepted with minor changes." 41
40
see Article 22 of the Covenant of League of
Nations, see particularly paragraphs 3 and 6
41Op. cit, UNIN, (1987), Namibia: A Direct United
Nations Responsibility, p. 82.
- 31 -
The mandate for Namibia was conferred upon His Britannic
Majesty in 1919, and Britain was given full powers of
administration and legislation, to be exercised on his behalf
by the Government of South Africa. With the entry of the
racist South African regime into Namibia, apartheid was
immediately introduced in violation of the international
status of the territory. While cases of racial
discrimination occur in other parts of the world, it is the
systematic and official character of apartheid which makes
Namibia (apart from South Africa itself) unique in the world.
The South African regime deliberately pursue a policy which
denies racial equality and seeks to bring about the
separation of the racial groups for the sole purpose of
ruthless exploitation. This policy has been applied by all
methods of action at the disposal of the racist regime, and
in particular, by the adoption of an extensive network of
laws concerning every aspect of human activity. It is a
person's racial classification and not his individual merits
or qualifications which determines what rights he may
exercise. Thus, racial oppression and exploitation became an
intrinsic part of the social order of the Namibian society.
In order to consolidate further from where the Germans left,
racial differences became the basis for economic exploitation
and social organisation.
To justify this racially based class exploitation, the regime
developed an elaborate system of African differentiation into
"ethnic" groups and confined to reserves or "homelands".
Relegated to the lower levels of humanity, the sole purpose
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in the life of the African population was to serve the
interests of South Africa, white settlers, and more
importantly, international capital.
6.1 The emergence of the white settler population and its
collusion with international capital: An Overview
By the end of the First World War, the emergence of mining
multinational companies accelerated international trade
across international boundaries. The entry of multinational
mining companies into Namibia crippled the old practice of
monopoly trade enjoyed by Germany. Although their entry did
not fundamentally change the pattern of natural resource
exploitation, they broke out-of-date moulds such as physical
control of the territory as a pre-condition for resource
exploitation. This development facilitated a transformation
from direct imperial rule as a pre-condition to exploitation
to neo-colonialism. From the early 1960s, physical
occupation of the colonies in Africa became no longer
necessary (save in few instances such as Namibia), and the
physical retreat from Africa of the European colonising
countries became almost complete.
In countries such as Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola, and
Mozambique, the task for decolonisation became much harder
(and it is still the case in Namibia) due to the fact that
there is a large number of settler population. In addition,
Namibia is distinguishable from all other former German
colonial countries such as Tanzania, Togo and Cameroon by the
presence of a relatively large class of white settlers ( a
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white national bourgeoisie). The dominance of this class is
based upon privileged access to and exploitation of resources
of land and African labour. Over the long run, the interests
of mining multinational companies became roughly compatible
with the interests of the white settlers.
The white settler class is deeply entrenched, and holds a
substantial share of private investments in mining and other
sectors of the Namibian economy alongside international
capital. Moreover, since the mandate period, from 1925, the
Namibian white settlers have enjoyed access to the apparatus
of the South African state, as well as autonomous
administration in Namibia. Control of the colonial
administration has been utilised, in association with
international capital, to encourage the growth of a white
economy based on an infrastructure from surplus extracted
from African labour. The institutionalisation of white
economic privilege has produced capitalist relations of
production.
Since imperialism maintained its interests in Namibia through
the white settler community, the privileges granted to the
white settlers ensured their support for imperialism.
	
In
this way,	 imperialism was guaranteed access	 to the
territory's
	 natural	 resources	 while	 the	 long-term
exploitation of the African population was secured. In
addition, European settlement was encouraged by international
capital and South Africa since it provided them with firmer
control over the territory and greater security for their
assets. The discovery of considerable mineral wealth made
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necessary the availability of a large labour force to develop
these resources. There thus developed a form of master and
servant relationship in which the white settlers and
international capital control all the levers of political and
economic command, while Africans supply the basic labour
force needed in the mines. Indeed, as will be discussed in
Chapter II, it is precisely for this reason that Africans
cannot be granted prospecting or mining licences. The
lasting inequality to which this gave rise is at the root of
the present situation in Namibia.
The arrival of white settlers in large numbers from South
Africa had a drastic impact on the African population. The
settlers took the most fertile land and pushed the Africans
on to	 the worst	 land.	 Therefore, the change of
administration from German to the South African regime made
the plight of the African population even worse. The
situation arose whereby the settlers blocked access to those
positions of nominal power which normally went to a class of
indigenous populatLon in other non-white settler ex-colonies
of Africa. The territory was demarcated into two main parts,
one part reserved for Africans, and the other part reserved
for white settlers.
The "Police Zone" which may be referred to as the "European
area", embraces all major infrastructural and industrial
installations. The discrepancy is also attributable to the
differential access available to whites and blacks to
resources, not only of land, but of technology, management
skills, credit, and marketing facilities. In this way, it
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ensured Namibia's continued economic dependence on the
international capitalist economic system.
In this context, mineral exploitation in Namibia may be
described as a joint-venture between international capital
and the racist South African illegal regime. The reason for
the association is that neither party has at its disposal all
the elements necessary in order to succeed on its own in the
exploitation of the territory's mineral resources. While the
South African regime purports to own Namibian mineral
resources, it lacks the means to explore for and successfully
develop them (e.g., capital, experienced management, trained
operational personnel, and access to the international world
market). The capital and the expertise required for this lie
largely in the hands of mining multinational companies based
in the Western nations.
The legal creation of mineral rights has been a prerequisite
for the exploitation of the territory's mineral resources by
the mining companies. Without South Africa's consent, these
companies lack access to the exploitation of the mineral
resources. South Africa provides mining legislation - rules
governing mining rights. The legislation determines how
mining rights are held, and the extent to which companies may
obtain mining rights. A relationship of mutual dependence is
thus a vital economic fact. This fact is clearly reflected
in the mining concessions provided for under the 1968
Minerals Ordinance discussed in subsequent chapters.
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The relationship between mining companies and South Africa
benefits both parties, which in turn encourages South Africa
to maintain its belligerent hold on Namibia. Despite United
Nations resolutions and Decree no.I calling upon foreign
governments and their companies to avoid investment in
illegally occupied Namibia, foreign investment especially in
the mining sector, has considerably increased since the
termination of the mandate. The incentive of high rates of
return on capital investment and the freedom to repatriate
profits have proved stronger than the right of the Namibian
people to independence.
It is interesting to note that mining companies seem to be
content with the current colonial situation. As long as they
benefit from apartheid, colonial oppression and exploitation,
they have not only chosen to turn a blind eye to the plight
of the indigenous population, 	 but they have actively
supported the current situation. This is clearly reflected
in the 1982 Chamber of Miners Report which stated that: "The
prospects of an internationally supervised independence
election appear to many to be no stronger now than they were
two or three years ago ... there is a school of thought
especially in the business community, that would prefer the
present uncertainty to continue, rather than face the
certainty that would follow a universal suffrage election.
... In most cases, independence has been followed by a
running down of the economy, the erosion and sometimes the
disappearance of personal assets and private enterprise
values, and generally by a process in which business
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interests have come off second best". 42 However, there may
be another school of thought which is either indifferent or
which would like to see an end to the present uncertainty
mainly for personal interest.
Therefore, it is clear that the economic interests of foreign
mining companies create a major obstacle to Namibia's
independence. Their interests seem to dictate that the
present situation has to be maintained in order to prolong
the period of exploitation.
To South Africa,	 maintaining economic ties with the
multinational companies	 is regarded to be
	
highly
satisfactory. By establishing a high degree of
interdependence with international capital, the regime
strengthens the material base of its economy, and minimises
the possibility of commercial sanctions. 	 It also
consolidates and strengthens political ties with the Western
capitalist countries, and lessens the effect of 	 its
international isolation.
6.2 The granting of mining rights (concessions) 
We have already discussed above that the administration of
Namibia was transferred to South Africa in 1919 under the
Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaty of Peace.
The transfer of the administration also meant that the mining
42
see Chamber of Mines of SWA/Namibia Report, (1982)
p.5, emphasis added
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rights held under the German period had to be fundamentally
transformed. A Concessions Commission appointed in 1919 was
entrusted to inquire into the concessionary rights acquired
from the German Government by seven mining companies namely:
(1) the German Colonial Company for South West Africa,
(2) the South West Africa Company Ltd, (3) the
Otavi-Minen-und Eisenbahngesellschaft (4) the Kaoko-Land-und
Minengellschaft (5) the South African Territories Ltd (6) the
Hanseatische-Minen-Gesellschaft, and (7) the Anglo Colonial
Territories. Most of the companies' mining concessions were
confiscated, the South African Government then proceeded to
make its own grants of mining rights.
This section examines the manner in which mining legislation
has promoted the linkage between the South African illegal
regime and multinational mining companies. The regulations
which govern the operations of mining transnational
corporations are those which are discussed in Chapter II.
Through the system of awarding mineral rights in the form of
concessions, foreign mining companies have acquired, over the
years, major interests in the exploitation of Namibia's
mineral resources. In this way, the South African illegal
regime has transferred key mining rights giving economic
control in the mining sector to foreign companies. Mining
rights are now granted in terms of the general regulatory
provisions of the 1968 Minerals Ordinance.
The legislation contains provisions which give foreign mining
companies exclusive long-term mining rights in return for
income taxes. Apart from the grant of mining rights, the
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companies exercise rights of control over production and
distribution of Namibian minerals. Therefore, the main
features of mining concessions comprise the exclusive
management of operations by the companies; control over the
volume of mineral production, expansion and development;
control over marketing; and control over distribution and
processing.
By 1971, about 120 mining companies were involved in
prospecting for Namibian minerals. 43 Until 1969, only 36
temporary prospecting rights and mining concessions had been
granted. By 1974, the number reached a peak of 569, and by
1975, the concessions covered almost a third of the Namibian
territory. What follows is a detailed discussion of some
mining companies which have acquired mineral rights in the
territory.
6.2.1	 CDM Ltd and the Halbschied Agreement
Before we discuss diamond concessions in detail, it is
important to note that sources used in the following two
sections are mainly derived from text books and newspapers.
The main reason is that there is little detailed official
information. The only available detailed official
information relates to the manner in which diamond companies
are required to mine and market their minerals.
	 This is
43
see The Department of State Airgram, E2 SAFR-A-174
from: American Embassy Pretoria, Subject: Namibia: The
State of the Economy in mid-1971. Ref.Pretoria A.54, A46
and A47, p.6
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discussed in detail in Chapter III. Furthermore, it must
also be noted that actual copies of the concession agreements
are not available to the public although some of their terms
have been revealed through official sources such as
commission reports.
De Beers had tried on several occasions, without success, to
gain control of the Namibian diamonds during the German
period. The company sought the exclusive right to sell the
Namibian diamonds in the early days of their discovery. 44
When this scheme proved unsuccessful, it sought to buy as
many shares in the German Colonial Company for South West
Africa as possible but again without success. The Germans
were determined to keep De Beers out of Namibian diamonds.
In 1909, the German Secretary for the Colonies, Dernburg,
reported that "Quite recently, large numbers of shares in the
Deutsche Kolonial Gesellschaft f fl ur S uudwest Afrika have been
bought up by English interests. Steps are being taken, after
discussion with the Chairman of the company to see that its
control does not pass into foreign hands". 45 This reference
was directed at De Beers which had acquired 15 per cent of
the German company's shares and was seeking to acquire more.
De Beers' dream came true when South Africa assumed the
administration of the territory. On 31 October 1919, an
agreement was concluded at the Hague by H.C.Hull, South
44	
see The Times - London, 1909, 6 April, p.5, col.f
45
op.cit., I.Goldblatt, History of South West Africa
from the beginning of the nineteenth century, p.179
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Africa's ex-minister for Finance, with all the nine principal
German companies which owned the diamond fields in Namibia.
Under the agreement, the mining properties and undertakings
of the companies were transferred to a new company "The
Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa Ltd" (CDM)
with a share capital of £4,500,000. The major part of the
capital was held by British and allied subjects, who
controlled and managed the company.
The effect of this agreement was that all the chief German
diamond interests were acquired and transferred to the South
African company which owned more than 90 per cent of the
diamond output in Namibia. This meant that for the first
time in the history of diamond mining, practically all the
known diamond producing areas of the world became held and
controlled by British and Allied subjects. De Beers' dreams
had come true. The price paid for the German interest was £3
million, and the supporters of the new company were the
Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa and the financial
groups connected with the Corporation such as Messrs
J.P.Morgan and Company, the American Financiers. 46
The South African Government approved the deal on the 3rd of
November, 1919, with the exclusion of the German Colonial
Company for South West Africa whose mining rights were
46
see The Times - London, 1919, 4 November, p.4.,
co1.1, and I.Goldblatt, History of South West Africa,
op.cit., p.238
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confiscated by the Government. 47
 CDM was finally registered
as a limited company on the 9th of February 1920. It is
interesting to note that Mr H.C.Hull, the ex-finance minister
in the South African Government, who negotiated the deal
became the company's first chairman. 48 After the takeover of
the German diamond companies, CDM proceeded to negotiate with
the South African Government for diamond mining concessions.
Given the fact that Mr H.C.Hull was the chairman of the
company, it was relatively easy to obtain a diamond mining
concession from the South African Government. The company
obtained mining rights in Diamond Area No.I (the then German
Sperrgebeit area discussed in Chapter II) initially for a
period of fifty years49 to 1990. 50 The mining right was
later extended in 1967 to the year 2010. 51
In 1923, CDM consolidated the mining rights with the then
Administrator of South West Africa. The company was granted
the sole right to explore, mine or work for claims over the
area referred to above. It was also recognised as the
successor in title to the Deutsche Diamenten Gesellschaft
47
see I.Goldblatt, History of South West Africa,
p.238
48
see The Times - London, 1920, 26th February, p.19,
col.d
49The mining right was later extended in 1967 to the
year 2010.
50	
op.cit., Goldblatt, History of South West Africa,
p.240
51	
see Windhoek Observer, - Namibia, 28 June, 1985
- 43 -
(DDG), a German subsidiary company of the (DKG). Under the
1910 agreement between the (DKG) and the German Government,
the company was granted mining rights over the Sperrgebeit
until 31 March 1911. Thereafter, the mining right became
vested in the German Government. Agreement was reached
between the German administration and the DDG on the
formation of a company, the Halbscheid Company, which would
work the diamond area. It was also agreed that the proceeds
from this area were to be shared equally between the DDG and
the German Government. In the Hallscheid Agreement referred
to above, the rights of the DDG in the Halbscheid Company
(the company was never formed) were transferred and became
vested in CDM.
Notwithstanding the fact that mineral rights over 	 the
Sperrgebeit became vested in the administration, due to CDM's
undue influence, these rights were "leased" to the company.
It subsequently acquired the mining rights over the remainder
of the Sperrgebeit (Diamond Area No.2). The rights are held
under a permit granted in 1954, 52
 and the area comprises more
than 3,500,000 hectares or 36,000 square kilometres. 53 It is
interesting to note that most of the mining rights which the
company acquired under the 1954 Minerals Ordinance have not
been altered notwithstanding the fact that the ordinance has
been repealed.
52	
see Windhoek Advertiser - Namibia, 28 June. 1985
53	
see Windhoek Observer - Namibia, 6 June, col.a
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6.2.2	 Offshore Diamond Concessions
In April 1963, the then South West Africa Administration
granted a concession to a seven company consortium of
financial interests to mine for diamonds from the sea. The
members of the consortium were: Federale Mynbou, Sanlam, Spes
Bona	 Mynboumaatskappy,
	
Bonuskor,	 Santam,	 Federale
Volksbeleggins, and Duinveld Beleggings. 54 This move
resulted into a situation whereby the whole of the Namibian
coastline was given out to mine for sea diamonds.
Other concessions are held by the Marine Diamond Corporation,
now 100 per cent owned by De Beers; Southern Diamond
Corporation; Diamond Mining and Utility Company,
	 and
Atlantiese Dimant Korporasie. The Marine Diamond
Corporation, before it was acquired by De Beers, used to be
an operating company owned jointly by Collins Organisation
(50 per cent of the share capital), 55 General Mining
Corporation (25 per cent), and Anglo-Transvaal Investment (25
per cent). 56 The Collins Organisation's 50 per cent share
was held by a company called Sea Diamonds. The three
companies also jointly own a diamond operating company called
54	
see The Times - London 1962, 28 April, p.13, col.d
55 The Collins Organisation is an American concern
specialising in the construction and laying of
under-water pipelines
56	 in 1963, the capital of the Marine Diamond
Corporation was £3 million.
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Southern Diamond Corporation. 57 Before the takeover, De
Beers was closely associated with the Marine Diamond
Corporation, in 1963, it lent El million to the company in
order to increase its share capital. In addition, it was
also intended to increase diamond production from the sea bed
off the Namibian coast. 58 Other De Beers companies in
Namibia are: CDM Prospecting Ltd; CDM Properties Ltd; De
Beers Services Ltd; and the South West Finance Corporation
Ltd. 59
On 28 October 1963, the then Secretary for Namibia announced
that the Marine Diamond Corporation was granted an extension
to its diamond concession, to operate to the limits of the
territorial waters, six miles from shore or to the end of the
continental shelf, whichever is greater. 60
6.2.3
	
Rossing Uranium Ltd
Unlike CDM, there is no officially available information
concerning mining concession agreements between South Africa
and foreign mining companies. The difficulty is also
compounded by the fact that there is no standard form of
concession agreement in Namibia.
	 Each mining lease is
57
see The Times - London, 1963, 21 January, p.14,
col.b
58	
see The Times - London, 1963, 4 March, p.16, col.f
59	
see De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd Annual Report,
(1982) p.44
60	
see The Times - London, 1963, 29 October, p.17,
col.d
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individually determined between the South African regime and
the mining companies. Due to the political situation and the
legal uncertainty of the concessions, especially after
independence, details of such agreements are normally kept
secret. Therefore, this section does not provide a complete
picture of the mining concessions held by RTZ through its
subsidiary and operating company, Rossing Uranium Ltd.
The present uranium deposit was discovered more than 50 years
ago, but the low grade ore made exploitation uneconomic until
1966 when RTZ was drawn into the scheme. The first
significant study began in 1956 when Dr D.A.M.Smith located a
radioactive anomaly. The Anglo American Prospecting company
then investigated the area by trenching, diamond drilling and
underground excavation. 61 Between September 1966 and March
1973, RTZ joined the Namibian Uranium Prospecting race and
finally decided to undertake commercial exploitation by using
the extraction methods developed at its Palabora copper mine
in South Africa. It easily obtained, through its Rossing
subsidiary company, an exclusive mining right from the South
African Government to mine Namibian uranium at Rossing. It
is likely that RTZ initially obtained a 20 year mining
concession over Rossing.
The 20 year mining right assumption is based on Rossing
Uranium Ltd's own publication - a monthly magazine entitled
"Rossing".	 According to one article entitled 	 "Rossing
61	
see Rossing, (1979) June, P.13
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Uranium: geology and mining operations", 62
 it is stated that:
"The ore reserves of the Rossing deposit were developed from
data provided by the surface diamond drilling programme
undertaken by Rio Tinto in the period 1967 to 1971. Using
computer techniques a series of long-term mining plans was
developed from the ore reserve data until an optimum 20 year 
plan was obtained.
	 This calls for an open-pit mining
operation ..." 63 This seems to suggest that initially, the
mine was believed to have a life span of 20 years after which
the ore reserves would become exhausted. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that RTZ's subsidiary company, Rossing
Uranium Ltd, was granted a 20 year mining concession. It is
possible that the mining rights might have been extended
because Rossing's general manager, Mr Gordon Freeman,
revealed in 1983 that based on 5,000 tons of uranium oxide
production a year, Rossing uranium ore reserves could last
for 23 years. It was also revealed that deeper uranium
deposits had been found in the vicinity of Rossing
(presumably within the area which covers the current mining
rights) which could considerably prolong the mine's estimated
life. 64
RTZ finally decided to form a subsidiary company (Rossing
Uranium Ltd) in 1968 to serve as an operating company to
exploit Namibian uranium. The company has its registered
62	 the article appeared in June 1979 publication
63	
op.cit. Rossing, p.14, emphasis added
64	
see Rand Daily Mail - South Africa, 27 October 1983
- 48 -
office in Namibia where it was incorporated. In addition, it
was reported in 1983 that Rossing was considering extending
its activities to gold, copper and tungsten on the Namibian
coast. 65
6.2.4	 Tsumeb Corporation Ltd
Concession rights which are currently held by Tsumeb
Corporation stem from the old German company, the
Otavi-Minen-und Eisenbahngesellschaft (OME). 66
 The rights
were in turn acquired from an English company, South West
Africa Company, in 1899. OME was granted the right to
prospect for and mine precious stones and base minerals, but
most of its operations became copper production. When the
administration of Namibia
Africa, OME was granted the sole mining rights for
within 1000 square miles of the present Tsumeb mine.
period has been extended by successive proclamations
the Second World War when the company's rights became
in the Custodian of Enemy Property. These rights were
one year
This
until
vested
later
changed from Germany to South
bought by a consortium of American and British companies led
by American Metal Climax and Newmont Mining on 6th January,
1947, for £1,010,000 pounds.
Tsumeb Corporation Ltd was incorporated in Namibia as an
operating company on the 4th of January 1947. It acquired,
65	 ibid.
66
op.cit., I.Goldblatt, History of South West Africa,
p.239
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from the South African Custodian of Enemy Property, mining
rights which were previously held by OME. Today, the company
produces copper, zinc, lead, cadmium and silver. It also
holds a mining concession of 1,788 hectares and 59,850 acres
of non-mining interests in Namibia. Up until 1982, major
shareholders in Tsumeb were still Newmont Mining Corporation
and Amax. In 1982, Amax sold all its stake to Anglo-American
Corporation and its complex of companies.
	
It took control
through Gold Fields of South Africa (GFSA) which acquired 42
per cent of the share capital in Tsumeb. 67 The transfer of
Amax's equity interest to Gold Fields means that a South
African based company now effectively controls Tsumeb, and
consequently, ties the Namibian mining industry even more
closely to South Africa's economic interest. Apart from the
information provided above, very little is known about the
terms of the mining concession and its duration.
6.2.5
	
The South West Africa Company Ltd
On the 3rd of August 1892, the German authorities granted a
mining concession (popularly known as the Damaraland
Concession) to Dr Scharlach and C.Wickmann. The rights were
transferred, with the consent of the German authorities, on
the 12th of September 1892 to the South West Africa Company.
It is one of the oldest companies still operating in Namibia
today. Initially, its major shareholders were British.	 It
was incorporated and controlled from London since 1892.
67
op.cit., Leake S.Hangala, Structure of Namibian
Mineral Industry, p.57
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Among the early shareholders was Cecil Rhodes who played a
major part in the success of the company. The initial
concession area covered about 22,000 square miles. In 1896,
it bought from the German Kolonial Company 	 (Deutsche
Koloniale Gesellschaft) a large area of mining concession
covering an area of 37,000 square miles. 	 By the same
agreement, it was exempt from paying mineral tax until 12th
September 1912. 68
After the change of administration in 1919, it was granted,
for a three year period, the sole right to prospect for and
extract precious stones and base minerals in the Damaraland
Concession area, granted to it by the German administration.
The concession period has been extended by the successive
proclamations, by virtue of which the company is still
operating in Namibia today.
	 Significant changes took place
in 1976 when the company became a wholly owned subsidiary of
Kiln Products Ltd, which is in turn owned by Goldfields of
South Africa (GFSA). The change enabled its headquarters to
move from London to Johannesburg in South Africa. 69
68
op.cit., I.Goldblatt, History of South West Africa,
p.116
69	
see C.M.Ushewokunze, (1981), Draft Report on Legal
Aspects of Namibia's Mining Industry, UNIN - Revised
June, p.93
- 51 -
CHAPTER II — COLONIALISM, MINERAL EXPLOITATION
AND MINING LEGISLATION IN NAMIBIA
1 COLONIALISM AND NATURAL RESOURCES
The colonisation of Namibia by Germany may be regarded as the
most important landmark in the exploitation of Namibia's
mineral resources. During the initial stage of colonisation,
the policy of the German Crown was to leave responsibility
for the construction of institutional life in the hands of
its colonists. 1 The German Crown learnt from the British
experience whereby great trading companies, chartered by the
Crown, served as the institutional model for colonisation. 2
It was soon realised that chartered companies played an
important role in extending German commercial strength. As a
result of the use of commercial forms of organisation, the
German Crown played a minor role in the activities of the
chartered companies. At the same time, colonisation by the
commercial organisations was expected to yield tangible
profits to investors.
The role of the companies during the German colonial period
legitimised the exploitation of the indigenous inhabitants,
and the harnessing of private self-interest in the pursuit of
German national welfare. Personal profit and German public
'See J.H. Esterhuyse, (1968), South West Africa
1880-1894: The Establishment of German Authority in South
West Africa, C. Struik (pty) Ltd, Cape Town, p.88.
2	 ibid.
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good were capable of being combined.
	 Companies which
operated in Namibia attracted heavy investment not only from
merchants but from the nobility and gentry as well. 3 The
welfare of the trading companies operating in Namibia became
a concern that touched many levels of German society.
Commerce became an affair of state. Indeed, it was the
strength of the German state and its willingness to back
mercantile operations that made long-term investment in joint
stock companies secure. As time progressed, the German state
became better organised to support the structure of commerce
in Namibia.
The companies conformed to the pattern of a private group
licenced to promote the common welfare of Germany. They were
given power to purchase land and to make on that land any
reasonable laws not contrary to the laws of Germany. They
were licensed as self-governing agents of the German Crown.
As more and more merchants, adventurers, and men of wealth
became interested in exploiting Namibia's natural resources,
they naturally turned to the familiar institutions (chartered
3 It is interesting to note that even Emperor William
had large investments in Namibia. He even bought two
farms for £4,800. See the Times, London, 1912, 3rd May,
p.5, col.b. The Emperor's interests in Namibia were so
extensive that he even attended a Lecture given by Herr
Dernburg, the Colonial Secretary, on Namibia (German
South West Africa as it was then known). The Lecture was
delivered in the Chamber of Parliament (Reichstag) in
Germany. Among those present were: the Empress, Prince
Henry of Prussia, Princess Victoria, Duke Adolf Frederick
of Mecklenburg - as Chairman, a large number of Deputies,
naval and military officers, high state officials, and
members of the German Colonial Association. See The
Times - London, 1909, 22 January, p.5, col.d.
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companies) that proved to be effective instruments
	 in
colonial commercial activities.
During the period of company rule, the mineral estate was
part of the surface estate and passed with it until severed
and treated separately. This principle was acceptable when
mining was still a small-scale initiative, starting from
outcrops and restricted to small depths. It soon became
clear that the system has drawbacks. The parcelling of
estates hindered prospecting and mining. Furthermore, the
opposition of even one landlord was likely to jeopardise an
entire mining concern. Landowner's privileges, especially
those of the colonial company, prevented and impeded mineral
development by interested parties. Moreover, the system
resulted in speculation and tying-up of large areas of land.
When the German Crown assumed direct colonial administrative
responsibility, mineral rights were separated from the
surface rights and became vested in the Crown. The result
was that surface right owners lost their right to the
minerals existing on or beneath their land. However, the
fact that mineral rights became vested in the Crown did not
necessarily mean that their exploitation became exclusively
state undertaking.	 The colonial administration allowed
private interests to take part in their exploitation. In
order to encourage mineral development, three methods of
granting exploitation rights were adopted, namely, grant to
the discoverer, grant to the applicant at the Crown's
discretion, and grant by special contract.
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The system promoted the search for mineralised outcrops by
the reward it offered to fortunate prospectors. It also
encouraged the excavation of many small mines. The method of
grant at the Crown's discretion became the most widely used
system. The Crown, acting in its capacity as owner of
mineral rights, had legal power to choose the holders of
mining titles. The system enabled the colonial State to
pursue a dynamic mineral policy by choosing from among the
applicants whom it considered to be the most competent by
reason of technical skill and financial resources. In order
to achieve its mineral development objectives, it became
necessary for the State to promulgate mining legislation and
regulations to establish required conditions for making
applications and for the procedure to be followed. This is
discussed in detail below.
2 TERMINOLOGY
The phrase 'mineral rights' means the same thing as 'mining
rights'. In its most general sense, the phrase means rights
pertaining to mines and minerals. It is important to note
that the expression has come to be a term of art. It may
mean the sole ownership of the minerals in the whole
territory by the State whether or not such minerals are
located in public land; or the expression may refer to the
lesser and abstract right to go on someone else's land to
prospect for minerals and, if minerals are discovered, to
mine them and take them away without ever having any
ownership in the land itself.
55
Under English common law, the owner of the land owns it
downwards to the centre of the earth, including everything
contained in the soil below the surface. The landowner
accordingly owns the minerals in the ground and he may
consequently mine and dispose of them (although this may
depend on the terms of the title deeds since mineral rights
are capable of being owned separate from the land), save to
the extent to which his legal rights have been curtailed by
statute, as is the case in South Africa. 4 It is clear from
the above discussion that both the dictionary and scientific
meaning of the term 'mineral rights' are inadequate for the
purposes of this study.	 It is important to note that the
word is used in the mining legislation with a legal
the State and the miner.
of the word is one which
prevail over the purely
significance in relation both to
The legal conception or definition
in the cases of conflict has to
scientific or dictionary meaning.
2.1 Mineral
The word is susceptible to expansion or limitation in meaning
according to the intention with which it is used. The
meaning ranges from the general one of inorganic substances
found in the country rock or as deposits in or substances
forming part of the Earth's crust, usually extracted by
mining or quarrying, to the more particular meaning of the
4 In South Africa, all precious stones, precious
metals and source materials are vested in the State. See
generally the Mining Rights Act 20 of 1967, the Precious
Stones Act 73 of 1964 and the Atomic Energy Act, 1967.
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processed and refined products of that extraction in the
shape of elements or compounds or classified species of
inorganic substances belonging to the mineral Kingdom.
Although the statute may provide a definition of the word
'mineral', it is important to note that this does not mean
that only those substances which fall within the definition
are minerals; it means that, for the purposes of the
administration or the law, minerals are deemed to be the
substances so defined.
Section 1 (XXIII) of the Mines, Works and Minerals Ordinance
20 of 1968 states that: "'mineral' means any substance,
whether in solid, liquid or gaseous form occurring naturally
in or on the earth or bed of the sea and having been formed
by or subjected to a geological process, but does not include
water, not being water taken from the earth or sea for the
extraction therefrom of a mineral: provided that subject to
the provisions of section 16(2), the term 'mineral' shall not
apply to soil, sand, clay, gravel or stone (other than
limestone or marble) if these substances are bona fide
required for - (a) agriculture; (b) building; (c) fencing;
(d) road making; (e) the manufacture of brick and tiles; (f)
the construction of sports or air fields; (g) the
construction of bridges, dams, reservoirs, weirs, canals, or
other irrigation works; (h) railway construction; (i) any
other purpose so declared by the Minister by notice in the
Gazette".
It is clear from the statutory definition that the meaning of
the phrase 'mineral' has been narrowed down by the exceptions
57
listed in the statute. This enables individuals to use the
substances not classified as minerals without having to
obtain permission under the Ordinance. However, the meaning
is still wide enough since even the substances excluded from
the definition may, under certain circumstances, still be
regarded as minerals. Section 16(2) of the Ordinance
empowers the Minister to declare the substances excluded as
minerals if he is satisfied that they are being mined "for a
purpose of disposal to another party for profit".
Furthermore, the question of whether a particular substance
is or is not a mineral is a matter for the State to decide in
that it is legally entitled to declare that a particular
substance is a mineral for the purposes of the mining laws.
By making specific exception to the definition of 'mineral',
the general intent of the mining legislation seems to include
minerals which are still unknown or which are presently
considered to have no intrinsic value but which, given the
development in science and technology, would become valuable
in future.
2.2 Mine
It is important that mining legislation should clearly define
the word 'mine' since the extraction of minerals depend on
the development of a mine. Furthermore, clear statutory
definition of the word has legal significance for the general
public because such areas are normally protected places,
especially in the case of diamond mines which it is an
offence to visit without official permission.
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Section 1(XXII) of the Ordinance defines the word 'mine' when
used as a noun to mean "any excavation in the earth, whether
abandoned or being worked, made for the purpose of searching
for or winning any mineral, and any place where any mineral
deposit is being worked in any quarry ... and when used as a
verb, means any operations with the object of winning
minerals from the earth or from water in or under the earth
or from the sea or the seabed, and shall include all
excavation work whether by underground or open working or
otherwise, and any boring and other operations necessary for,
or incidental to such winning, and shall include the
collecting of sea bird guano".
3 MINERAL DEVELOPMENT AND LEGISLATION UNDER GERMAN RULE
The development of mineral resources brings about the
establishment of norms of conduct especially in the search,
production, and disposal of minerals. During the German
Colonial period, the colonial state developed a legal system
intended to regulate the exploitation of Namibia's mineral
industry. The legal framework permitted the undisturbed
pursuit of various mining activities and imposed restrictions
in the manner in which these activities were to be carried
out.
German policy was based on encouraging white immigration of
German origin which called for intensive economic development
by the colonial state. The active role of the colonial state
was reflected in the establishment of an elaborate legal
framework. By enacting legislation and imposing regulations,
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the colonial administration was vested with powers to control
and regulate every aspect of economic activity especially in
the mining sector. But the role of the colonial state in
economic development was essentially regulatory in character
as legislation was oriented mainly towards creating the legal
framework for a private enterprise economy.
3.1 1888 Imperial Mining Decree
The first mining legislation in Namibia took the form of a
'Claim' system. Under this formula, any legally qualified
person had the right to hold, work or dispose of minerals
within a specific area in which he discovers minerals. The
colonial State had discretion to impose certain general
restrictions. The first mining legislation and regulation
were introduced as a result of gold discovery in 1887. 5	In
order to regulate gold mining activities, a two point plan
was formulated by the German colonial State. First, steps
were to be taken with a view to protecting the gold-fields,
and secondly; steps were to be taken to establish necessary
administrative machinery on the gold-fields. 6 The policy
resulted in the enactment of the "Imperial Ordinance
Concerning Mining Matters and the Extraction of Gold and
5 op.cit.,	 J.H.Esterhuyse,	 South	 West	 Africa,
1880-1884. p.25
6	 ibid., p.127
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Precious Stones in the South West Africa Protectorate" dated
25th March 1888. 7
The Ordinance consisted of forty-four paragraphs. 8 By virtue
of the first paragraph, the Deutsche Colonial Gesellschaft
fur Sudwest Africa, a company formed to exploit Namibian
minerals, was placed under the control of the German
Government. Section 1 provided as follows: "For any minerals
valuable on account of their contents of metals, sulphur,
alum, vitriol and saltpetre; also for precious stones,
graphite and bitumen in solid and liquid form, the Mining
Rights Prerogative within the South West Africa Protectorate
appertains to the Deutsche Colonial Gesellschaft fur
Sudwest-Africa under the supervision of the Empire". The
German Commissioner in the territory was charged with the
administration and control of the mining industry.
	 The
company was required to establish a mining office and placed
under the supervision of the German Imperial Commissioner. 9
The main function of the mining office was to keep a claims
register and the collection of claim monies from the
prospectors. It was also charged with the function of
investigating conflicting claims and ownership rights, and to
supervise the working of the mines. The Imperial Ordinance
imposed a fee of 10 marks for the registration of every claim
7 ibid., p.129. The precise citation in German read:
"Verordnung Bergwesen und die Gewinnung von Gold und
Edelsteinen im S u udwestafrikanschen Schutzgebiet".
8	 ibid.
9	 ibid.
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and 20 marks for the transfer of a mining claim to another
name.
10
The first mining office of the Deutsche Colonial Gesellschaft
f"ur S"udwest Afrika was opened on 31st July 188P 	 In
accordance with the Imperial ordinance, the first mining area
was proclaimed. A total of fifty three mining claim licences
were issued to claim holders within a period of three months.
A number of mining companies and individuals began to arrive
in the territory with a view to making a fortune from the
newly discovered gold. The expectations of the companies
soon proved to be illusory. The exploitation of gold became
an unsuccessful business venture due to its low quantity. 12
As a result, stockholders did not receive a favourable return
on their investment. It became extremely difficult after
initial enthusiasm had waned for the companies to raise
enough capital to keep them afloat. Notwithstanding this
state of affairs, the 1888 Imperial Ordinance provided a
framework for subsequent development of mining legislation in
Namibia.
3.2 The 1905 Imperial Mining Decree
After the experience with gold, the search for mineral
resources was extended to other minerals such as diamonds,
ibid., p.130
ibid., p.133
ibid.
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copper and iron.
	 Because of the financial difficulties of
the	 colonial	 administration,	 especially after	 the
unsuccessful gold rush, it became necessary to attract mining
companies and individuals to search for minerals. As an
incentive to attract prospective investors, a new legal
framework regulating mining was enacted. In the formulation
of a suitable legal framework, the colonial authorities
worked hand in hand with interested parties, especially
mining companies which already controlled large areas of
mining concessions in the territory.
On 8 August 1905,	 the German colonial administration
proclaimed the Imperial Mining Decree to regulate mining
activities. This decree repealed the 1888 ordinance. Under
its terms, general freedom of prospecting within the
territory was established. This freedom was specifically
extended in respect of the areas held by the Concession
companies. Anyone was entitled to explore and to extract
"precious" and "common" minerals subject to the provisions of
the ordinance. However, blacks and "other coloured people"
were not permitted to extract any mineral without obtaining
the special consent of the colonial Governor. With few
specified exceptions such as land required for public roads,
the pegging of mining claims could take place on any land.
Designated minerals were excluded from the landowner's
property and became the property of the State. In contrast
to section 1 of the 1888 Imperial Ordinance, section 1 of the
1905 Ordinance attempted a lengthy definition of minerals.
It stated that "The minerals hereinafter named are excluded
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from the right of disposal of the owner of the land, and
shall not be searched for or won save in accordance with the
provisions of this Ordinance: A. Precious Minerals (1)
precious metals (gold, silver and platinum). (2) Precious
stones (diamonds, rubies, emeralds and sapphires). B. Base
Minerals (1) All metals not mentioned before, in their native
state and as ores. (2) Mica and semi-precious stones, as well
as asbestos and fluor spare. (3) Coals, salts, and valuable
earths, namely:- (a) Coal, brown and graphite. (b) Bitumen in
solid, liquid or gaseous form, especially rock oil and
asphalt. (c) Rocksalt with the salts occurring upon the same
deposit and salt springs. (d) Earths, which are valuable
owning to their sulphur contents or for the production of
alum, vitriol and saltpetre. (e) Phosphates (organic and
inorganic) and guano, the recovery of cooking salt out of
the so-called salt-pans does not fall under this ordinance".
However, private landowners retained full rights over the
land. Compensation was provided to landowners for land usage
by mine owners upon the conversion from prospecting to
mining. Once compensation was paid, mine owners enjoyed the
exclusive right to search for and extract minerals from such
land. There was provision for the payment of prospecting and
mining fees to the colonial mining authority together with
mineral extraction tax.
In contrast with the first ordinance of 1888, the 1905 decree
took the form of a lease system (sometimes referred to as the
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Concession system). 13 The ordinance vested title to all
Namibian minerals in the Imperial government. 	 The miners
derived their rights to work the minerals by some form of
tenure granted by the colonial authority. In this context,
the tenure which the miners exercised was equivalent to a
property right. -it consisted of a bundle of rights and
obligations, the composition of which varied greatly
depending on where such rights were being exercised. In the
case of privately owned land, compensation was required to be
paid to the private landowners before mining rights could be
exercised.
3.3 Regulations and policy relating to Diamonds
The discovery of diamonds in Namibia, in September 1908,
transformed Namibia into Germany's most important colony.
Diamonds were in fact discovered by an African employed on
the railway, running from the harbour of Luderitz to the
interior. 14 Subsequent discoveries followed rapidly until a
long stretch of shore line was proved to be rich in diamonds.
Following its discovery,	 administrative as well as
legislative steps were taken to protect the industry.	 The
administrative regulations which were subsequently introduced
contained four main objectives.
	
First, half the net profit
of the diamonds were to be retained by the administration;
13 for a detailed discussion on mining systems, see
Charles J.Alford, (1906),	 Mining Law of the British
Empire Charles Griffin and Company Ltd - London, pp.1-3
14	 The Times - London, 1912, 24 May, p.22, col.a
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secondly, measures were to be taken to secure an adequate
market for the diamonds; thirdly, suitable conditions were to
be established for the working of the mines; and fourthly,
the exploitation of the diamonds was to be mainly reserved
for German capital, and to provide increased work for the
German diamond-cutting industry.15
As we have explained above, Germany had full control of trade
in Namibia. The colonial administration kept a watchful eye
on the development of the territory's commerce, limiting
participation to merchants of German origin. Based on the
philosophy that Namibia was a natural source of specific raw
materials that could not be produced in sufficient quantity
in Germany, the official policy was to ship all the raw
materials to Germany. Although the 1905 ordinance provided
that any legally qualified person was entitled to prospect
for any mineral, severe restrictions were imposed on the
marketing of diamonds by individual producers.
In 1909, a number of administrative regulations were
published in the North-German Gazette regarding the
regulation of the diamond industry. 16 All diamond winners
were required to hand in their diamonds to a specified
Government authority. Upon the settlement of their value,
they were entitled to receive cash payment in accordance with
15	 ibid., 1909, 23 January, p.8, col.a
16 these measures were published by the Colonial
Office, see The Times - London, 1909, 29 January, p.6,
col.b
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the valuation. Power was reserved to the Colonial authority
to restrict the diamond output. This measure was not meant
to protect over-exploitation of the territory's diamonds, but
was designed to prevent market depreciation.
Further administrative measures were taken in Germany
designed to protect the diamond industry. A limited
liability company with capital of £100,000 was formed under
the auspices of prominent German banking houses. 17 They were
instructed to act as representatives of all interested groups
in the colony. The purpose of the association was to combine
all the mining interests on the one side over against "fiscal
and colonial" interests on the other. 	 The company became
known as	 the Diamond State Co.	 (Diamanten Regie
Gesellschaft). The colonial authority acquired majority
shares in the company with an option to acquire all minority
shares if it became necessary to do so. 18 All the diamonds
produced in the territory had to be delivered to the company
for sale up to maximum quantities. The colonial authority
reserved the right to fix the price of these diamonds if it
became necessary. The main objective was to maintain the
price of the diamond industry on the world market at the
desired level.
17 I Goldblatt, History of South West Africa from the
beginning of the nineteenth century, (Juta and Company
Ltd - Cape Town 1971) p.178
18
see The Times - London, 1913, 8 December, p.22,
col.d
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In 1914, the company was reorganised. It came to be
administered by a board of eight persons, of whom four
represented the producers, with a Government Commissioner
having a casting vote.	 Its shares were divided equally
between the colonial Treasury and the producers. 19 It is
stated by Ruth that "South West Africa now entered an era of
profit more gratifying to German than that in any other of
her colonies ... The report of the British Consul for 1913
revealed South West Africa in a thriving economic condition.
Colonies, it seemed to Germany at last, could be made to
justify themselves. "20
Before the Germans could develop a comprehensive mining law
and exploit other minerals in large quantities, the First
World War broke out. Mining activities came to a halt during
the 1914 to 1918 war. After the war, Germany lost the
territory of Namibia. It was stated that the loss of Namibia
was "a bitter blow" to Germany because the territory was
regarded to be "by far the most important German possession
overseas. ... In 1912 the imports were valued at £1,625,000
and the exports were valued at £1,953,000 ... The discovery
of diamonds in the Luderitz Bay district in July, 1908,
caused a rush of diamond seekers. Within a year the output
was valued at £1,000,000". 21 According to Ruth, apart from
the economic importance of the territory, it was "Germany's
19	 ibid., 1919, 3rd March, p.15, col.e
20See Ruth First, (1975), South West Africa, Peter Smith
Publishers, p.88.
21	 see The Times - London, 1915, July 10, p.5, col.c
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second largest colony, and the only one suited to White
settlement." 22 However, it is important to note 	 that
notwithstanding Germany's loss, the regulatory mining
framework which developed survived post German colonial
period, subject only to minor modifications.
4 MINERAL POLICY AND LEGISLATION UNDER SOUTH AFRICAN RULE
Before we discuss in detail the current mining legislation
and policy prevailing in the territory, a number of factors
have to be mentioned. It should be remembered that South
Africa acquired the territory of Namibia at the time when
minerals were being exploited in large quantities. In terms
of raw materials, the Namibian minerals acquired much
importance in developing and expanding industries of the
Western countries. They became part of their programme for
economic reconstruction and development after the war which
had brought mining in the territory to a halt. It was the
period in which the expansion of international capital began
to gather momentum,	 it was also a period in which
international mining companies began to emerge.	 Unlike
Germany, South Africa was financially weak and
technologically backward, which meant that she relied heavily
on international finance and multinational mining companies
to exploit the Namibian minerals.
22Op. cit. Ruth Fist, (1975), South West Africa, p. 72.
Professor R.H. Green is of the view that in terms of economic
importance, Namibia was in the second category.
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The history of capitalism and imperialism has taken many
forms over the years. There have been changes in the ways in
which private property and property rights have been
acquired. The change, especially in mineral rights, has
increasingly taken into account a number of social,
political, and economic pressures which have acted as
constraints upon traditional forms of ownership. The
emergence of multinational mining companies in Namibia,
radically changed the pattern of international trade in the
mining industry. To provide a legal framework for the
activities of the mining companies, the South African racist
regime has enacted mining legislation whose main purpose is
to encourage excessive exploitation of the 	 territory's
minerals. The creation of mineral rights has been a
prerequisite for the exploitation of the territory's mineral
resources.
By and large, mining multinational companies own and control
the technology and the capital required to find and exploit
the minerals. Hence, it was inevitable that an alliance had
to be formed between the South African regime and the mining
companies for the purpose of exploiting the mineral resources
of the territory. This in turn has helped to integrate
Namibia's economy with that of the racist South African
regime and of some Western states. The recognition that
Namibia's independence is not far in the future, has prompted
the mining companies to conclude that maximum profits should
be extracted as quickly as possible while the colonial
situation still prevails.
	 At the same time, they have
70
exploited the weaknesses of the mining legislation to their
advantage.
4.1 The Mandate Period
As already mentioned above, the South African regime's main
objective was to provide a basically regulatory framework
within which private mining operations could be conducted.
During the early days of the mandate, the South African
administration relied on the same general principles embodied
in the German laws. The process by which South Africa
assumed "rights" over the Namibian minerals in succession to
the German administration has been discussed in details in
the preceding chapter. However, it is important to note that
the succession is only relevant in so far as it provided the
context for the mining laws successively enacted since South
Africa assumed the task of administering the territory in
1919.
Under the provisions of the Treaty of Peace and South West
Africa Mandate Act of 1919, the Governor-General was
empowered to legislate by proclamation and the Union
Parliament by Act. The Governor-General had discretion to
delegate the power to issue proclamations to the
Administrator (the then head of the administration in Namibia
appointed by the South African Government), as long as the
proclamation or ordinance was not in conflict with any
proclamation of the Governor-General or Union Act. In
practice, the device provided no significant diminution of
South African control by law, which meant that the South
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African Government had full power to make effective her
obligations under the mandate.
Before the South West Africa Mandate Act of 1919, Namibia was
under martial law, until the formal transfer of
administrative powers via the League of Nations. The only
significant administrative action during the martial law
period was that the South African Governor-General made
diamond taxation and royalties which were previously paid to
the German Colonial authority payable to the South African
administration in Namibia.
After 1919, a number of changes took place starting with the
introduction of Roman Dutch law on 1st January 1920, by the
Administration of Justice Proclamation, 1919. A certain
number of South African Acts were given direct application to
the territory. Others were applied by specific proclamations
of the Governor-General or the Administrator. The rest of
the law was provided by proclamations; ordinances of the
Legislative Assembly; fragments of German law especially that
of mining, preserved by proclamations of the Administrator;
and such provisions of German law which covered matters not
touched on in the rest of the law.
In 1919, the South African Government appointed a commission
known as the Concessions Commission, to inquire into the
concessionary rights acquired by the mining companies during
the German administration. On the basis of the Commissions'
report, the South African Government issued a proclamation
known as Concession Modification and Mining Law Amendment
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Act, no.59 of 1920. The legal consequence of the
proclamation was that mining concessions held by a number of
companies during the German period were abrogated without
compensation, and without the dispossessed holders being
entitled to make any appeal. 23 The main argument of the
South African Government was that it acted under its ordinary
right, and it was in the "public interest" to pass
legislation expropriating private property without paying any
compensation.
The policy of the South African Government was to open the
whole country and maintain a system of unrestricted
prospecting in order to promote economic development. The
Administrator's report of 1920 emphasised the "opening of the
country to prospecting ... followed by the application of the
amended mining law, and completed by the completion of this
law without modification or restriction to the whole country
may be regarded very justly as inaugurating a new epoch ..."
This meant that no significant changes were effected in so
far as mining law was concerned. The Imperial Mining Decree
of 1905 continued to operate.	 In December of 1919,
Proclamation no.24, of 1919 amended certain provisions of the
Imperial Mining Decree. In accordance with the
Administrator's report, freedom of prospecting provided for
under the 1905 Decree was extended throughout Namibia.
Mineral rights in respect of both state and private land were
23
op.cit., I.Goldblatt, History of South West Africa,
p.140. See also The Times - London, 1930, 10 September,
p.12, col.c.
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vested in the Administration.
	 The Administrator was placed
in charge of administering the application of
	 the
proclamation. Magistrates in each district within the
"Police Zone" (the area excludes Bantustans situated in the
Northern part of the country) were empowered, initially, to
grant prospecting rights.
In 1925, South Africa decided to confer some form of autonomy
to the territory of Namibia. 	 The South West Africa
Constitution Act of 1925 was passed for this purpose. The
administration of the territory was entrusted to an Executive
Committee, consisting of the Administrator, appointed by the
Governor-General, and four members elected by each Assembly
for its duration. The entire members of the Executive
Committee and the Legislative Assembly consisted of whites
only. The Legislative Assembly composed of six members
appointed by the Administrator with the Governor-General's
assent and twelve elected members. The election of these
members was restricted to whites only. It was necessary to
have the consent of the Governor-General before legislation
was passed on certain vital issues, including native affairs
and taxation; mines and precious stones; tariffs, customs and
excise duties; and control of the public services as well as
the constitution and jurisdiction of courts of justice. All
matters relating to "minerals, mining, mineral oils or
precious stones" including fees, royalties and taxes payable
to the Administration remained in the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Administrator directly responsible for the running of
the Mining Authority.
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The Imperial Mining Ordinance of 1905 was repealed and
replaced by the Mining Consolidation and Amendment
Proclamation 4 of 1940. Section 1 of the Proclamation
provided as follows: "The right of mining for and disposing
of precious and base minerals in the Territory including the
territorial waters thereof and the sea bottom within such
territorial waters, is vested in the Administration and no
precious or base mineral shall be searched for or won save in
accordance with the provisions of this Proclamation". In
addition, the South West Africa Constitution Act of 1925 was
amended by the South West Africa Constitution (Amendment) Act
no.23 of 1949 in order td, provide for the establishment of a
Mines Division for Namibia. In theory, the Mines Division
was placed under the control of the Legislative Assembly but
in practice, real control remained in the hands of the
Administrator operating through the Executive Committee. The
mining industry continued to operate through this existing-.
administrative and legislative framework until they were
superseded by the first systematic mining Ordinance of 1954.
The provisions of section 1 of the earlier Proclamation were
re-enacted in the same terms but with an extended definition
of 'mineral' to include all mineral substances that can be
obtained from the earth by mining, digging,
	 drilling,
dredging, quarrying or other operations. Under the terms of
the Mines, Works and Minerals Ordinance 26 of 1954, the
powers and functions of the Mines Division were established
and came to be clearly defined. It provided that: "There
shall be a department known as the Mines Division which shall
be subject to the direction of the Administrator for the
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Territory... The function of the Mines Division shall be the
control of the mfming industry, and the exercise of all
rights, powers and jurisdiction vested in the Administrator
in regard to minerals, mines and works in the Territory".
The Ordinance made a distinction between the rights of the
mine owner and those of the land owner. It remained in force
until after the termination of the mandate by the United
Nations when it was repealed by another ordinance which
contains the most comprehensive and systematic mining law in
the territory.
4.2 Post Mandate Period and the Mines, Works and Minerals
Ordinance 20 of 1968
Since the termination of the mandate, there has been a
revolution in the conduct of mining operations. Methods of
mining techniques have been transformed; the volume of
mineral production and export have increased vastly; and a
new range of minerals have been added to the list. A whole
range of new contract structures (e.g., interlocking
ownership in uranium) and financing techniques has evolved,
and the receipt, storage and transmission of information have
been completely changed by new technology. If it be right
that mining law is rooted in the customs and practices of
those who are directly involved in the mining industry, we
could reasonably expect to find a parallel transformation in
the mining law and policy introduced by the South African
racist regime.
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We could expect a reappraisal of fundamental concepts, a
wholesale jettisoning of twentieth century statutes enacted
by the German colonial administration. It is a matter for
some astonishment that this has not occurred in any
fundamental way. Although there has been new legislation,
most of it has been institutional in character. The
principal mining law statues have remained substantially in
the form in which they were enacted by the German colonial
administration (especially the 1905 Imperial Mining Decree)
up to the 1968 ordinance. What follows is a discussion on
the main provisions of the Mines, Works and Minerals
Ordinance 20 of 1968.
In 1968 (i.e. two years after the termination of the mandate
by the United Nations), the South African colonial
administration passed the most comprehensive and detailed
legislation designed to regulate the mining industry in open
defiance of the United Nations resolutions. The Mines, Works
and Minerals Ordinance no.20 of 1968 was enacted. It
repealed the Mines, Works and Minerals Ordinance no.26 of
1954. it redefines the powers of the Mines Division, and
provided for the administration of the mines via the then
Secretary of the territory. The Secretary was empowered to
supervise and control the mining industry and exercise all
rights, powers and jurisdiction vested in the then South West
Africa Administration.
Before going into detail, it should be pointed out that there
have been a number of administrative changes. However, it
should be stressed that these changes have not affected the
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substantive provisions of the ordinance. It is for this
reason that the changes will only be discussed briefly after
we have discussed the main provisions of the ordinance.
Before cosmetic changes were introduced in 1980, the right to
apply for prospecting licences and mining grants was limited
to whites of 18 years or more; companies registered under the
Companies Ordinance no.19 of 1928; and foreign companies
complying with the provisions of the ordinance. As a result
of the apartheid laws, whites, coloureds and blacks were
given a legal definition.
A 'Coloured person' was defined as a person who is not white
or black, and who is generally accepted as a coloured person,
but not including a person who although a coloured person by
descent, is "generally accepted as a native". 24 A 'native'
was defined as a person who is a member of an aboriginal race
or tribe of Africa or who is "generally accepted" as such. 25
Finally, a 'White person' was defined as a person who in
appearance obviously is, or who is "generally accepted" as a
white person, but not including anyone who although in
appearance obviously white is "generally accepted" as a
coloured person. 26
24	 Section 1(VII) of 1968 Ordinance
25	 Section 1(XXVI)
26	 Section 1(XIVI)
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4.2.1	 Ownership and Control of Minerals 
Like the 1905 Imperial Mining Decree, repealed by the
1954 ordinance, ownership of all mineral resources is vested
in the state without qualification. It is provided by S.2(1)
that: "... the right to prospecting and mining for and
disposing of precious and base minerals in the Territory,
including its territorial waters and continental shelf is
vested in the Administration". Before the 1980 cosmetic
reforms, 27 mineral rights in the "homelands" or reserves were
vested in the South African Bantu Trust (constituted under
S.4 of the South African Bantu Trust and Land Act, no.18 of
1936). 28 The formula of state ownership enables the South
African Government to grant mining rights over private land
and saves mining-right holders from spending large sums
either on land purchases or on compensation which would
otherwise be necessary.
The South African Government, by adopting the formula of
mineral ownership, has enabled itself to have complete power
over the Namibian resources whether mined by the South
African companies or by foreign multinational mining
companies. It is apparent, therefore, that parcelling
(leasing) out of land by the South African regime creates no
rights whatsoever to minerals therein. Where the lease of
land is coupled with the grant of a mining right or rights
conferring on the grantee the rights to win minerals, it is
27	 These are discussed in detail below.
28	 Section 2(2)
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in virtue of such grant, and not the lease of land that the
right to win minerals arises. In practice, the two interests
are usually conferred by two different administrative organs
pursuant to entirely different statutes (i.e., one conferred
under the land ordinance, and the other conferred under the
mining ordinance). This means that it is possible to lease
land for other purposes (e.g., agriculture) to one person at
the same time as it is the subject of a mining right to
another.
In practice, most mining right holders obtain both
surface and mining rights, especially when they have to take
out a mining licence. South Africa as "owner" of the
minerals under S.2 of the ordinance, has the exclusive right
to decide who can and should work the minerals.
4.2.2	 Categories of Mining Rights Created
We have already intimated above that the working of
minerals requires large amounts of capital which South Africa
alone does not possess. In promoting the exploitation of
Namibia's minerals to the maximum desirable extent, the
regime has brought about a system in which the exploitation
of mineral resources by foreign mining companies
characteristically takes place under a system of licences.
Two categories of mining rights have been granted under the
Ordinance. The lowest form of the right is the prospecting
licence, and the highest form is the mining licence. The
holder of a mining licence, for example, may prospect within
the area to which the licence relates as though he were the
holder of a prospecting licence. The gradation of rights
represents progressive stages from searching through mining a
80

register - 31
	
On compliance with certain requirements
under section 46, the prospector may have his claim or
claims converted into a mining area under a deed of
conversion which is registered in the mining area
register kept by the Registrar of Mining Titles. By this
procedure, the holder of a claim and the owner of a
mining area obtains the exclusive right to prospect and
mine for minerals specified in the deed of conversion.
Alternatively, the holder of a prospecting licence
may obtain from the Minister of Mines the grant of the
exclusive right to prospect in any defined area. Such
grant is embodied in a deed of grant called a prospecting
grant. There is a requirement to register the rights in
a prospecting grant register kept by the Registrar of
Mining Titles situated within the Mining Titles Office.32
The Minister is also empowered to grant to the
prospecting licence holder any particular mineral or
minerals for a given period. 33 In addition, he is
empowered to add any list of minerals to the prospecting
licence holder, 34 and once the rights are granted to the
holder, he cannot cede, lease, or transfer them without
the consent of the Minister of Mines. 35
31	 Section 29
32	 Section 60
33	 Section 60(1) (b)
34	 Section 60(1) (c)
35	 Section 57, this function is now exercised by the
Administrator-General
82
A person wishing to obtain prospecting rights over
any area not closed to prospecting can apply for any
number of prospecting licences. Every applicant for a
mining right has to show that he is financially sound and
technically capable. He has to specify the names of the
minerals he intends to prospect and give a detailed
description of the area over which a licence is . ught.
There is no limitation as to the size of the area which
one can be granted. This is mainly due to the fact that
the industry is dominated by the multinational mining
companies. It is characterised by a monopoly of large
areas being held by big mining companies, and a number of
minerals are divided among the major companies (e.g., the
diamond industry is dominated by De Beers, and the
uranium industry by Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ)).
It must also be borne in mind that every applicant
for a prospecting licence has to prove that he has
financial resources and technical staff available to
carry out the proposed programme of operating
effectively. This practical requirement effectively
limits the chances of an individual who wants to apply
for a prospecting licence. Furthermore, the technology
for prospecting is mainly available to large mining
companies, and it is becoming more sophisticated all the
time especially when prospecting activities are carried
out offshore. All these developments favour large mining
companies which possess proven technology. 36
36 Two companies were formed in the 1960s specifically
(Footnote Continued)
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theinvolve of	 geological	 formations,
of the
generalised Or may
geological mapping
topographic aerial
A prospecting licence entitles the holder to enter
freely upon the land specified in his licence to search
for minerals. Usually, the activities of the prospector
mapping
mineralisat ions, and
The mapping may be
be detailed. In most cases, surface
is usually accompanied by the use of
prospecting area.
structural conditions
maps.	 Finally, laboratory samples are made of the
various samples collected in the field. Should the
holder of a prospecting licence discover mineral
occurrences, he would then be ready to obtain the second
stage of the mining rights.
Exclusive Mining Rights
The ordinance states that no mining is to be carried
out on any land until the land is pegged off, and
registered as a claim in accordance with s.60. In the
case of private land, there is to be no mining until the
mining right holder concludes a written agreement with
the landowner on compensation terms, and has obtained a
permit from the mining Commissioner authorising mining. 37
The last category of the mining rights created under
the new legal regime is the mining licence. Under s.61
of the ordinance, the holder of a prospecting licence may
(Footnote Continued)
to recover diamonds from the sea along the Namibian coast
using modern technology. These are: Marine Diamond
Corporation and Southern Diamond Corporation. See The
Times - London, 1963, 21 January, p.14, col.b
37 Section 28
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obtain a mining licence, in respect of a workable mineral
deposit covered by the grant. Like the prospecting
licence, the mining licence is exclusive. It grants to
the holder the right to mine, i.e., a right to carry out
the whole coordinated operation to obtain industrial
utilisation of a deposit from the extraction of the
minerals to the processing and disposal of the mineral or
minerals.
The right to mine is embodied in a deed of grant,
known as a mining grant. There is a requirement that the
grant should be registered in the grants register of the
Mining Titles Office. The holder of the mining grant
enjoys his rights until the mineral or minerals involved
have become exhausted, or for the period prescribed in
the grant. Before actual mining can take place, there is
a requirement to convert a claim into a mining area.
This is usually done by a deed of conversion. The deed
gives to the owner of the mining area an exclusive right
to mine and dispose of all minerals specified in the
deed. Once a claim has been converted into a mining
area, the owner is obliged to begin regular mining
operations within two years from the date of the deed of
conversion.
The claim holder is required to survey, demarcate
and prepare a diagram of the mining area.
	 He is also
required to give notice of the conversion. Any
objections to it are dealt with by the Mining
Commissioner, who must register the conversion in
accordance with the law relating to the registration of
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mining titles in the Mining Titles Office. 38 Those claim
holders whose mining rights are situated on private land
are required to compensate private land owners for the
mining operations carried out on such land. Any dispute
between a land owner and a mining owner over their
respective rights is referred to a Board of Adjudication
by the mining Commissioner. 39
It usually happens that mining rights are obtained
on farming land which makes it difficult to carry out
both operations simultaneously. S.70 of the Ordinance
provides for the compulsory purchase of such land on the
direction of the Minister of Mines. Mining rights lapse
if the exclusive right to mine is terminated by the
administration. It is important to note that cases of
termination vary. However, it must be noted that there
are two main ways under which mining concessions may be
terminated. First, the concessionaire may be empowered
to terminate the concession under the power of
abandonment or surrender reserved under the terms of the
concession or under s.55 of the Mines, Works, and
Minerals Ordinance of 1968. Second, the State has a
right to terminate a mining concession in case of
fundamental breach. In this section, however, we shall
restrict our discussion to the right of the State to
terminate mining concessions. 	 Under s.47(6) of the
38 The Mining Titles Office was established by the
Mining Titles Registration Proclamation R90 of 1969
39 Section 68
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Ordinance, the State is empowered to terminate a mining
concession if the concessionaire fails to pay a rental
within three months from the date of receipt of a written
notice from the Mining Commissioner specifying such
failure. The Mining Commissioner is empowered to declare
the concession forfeited, "and may in addition institute
civil proceedings against the defaulter for the recovery
of the amounts so accrued and the cost of such
H40publication.
Furthermore, s.56(1) confers wide powers to the State to
terminate mining concessions. It is important to note
that the section does not provide grounds for
termination. It provides that forfeiture "of any mining
area shall be by notice in the Gazette under the hand of
the mining commissioner and such notice shall give the
reason for such forfeiture." It is submitted that apart
from the provisions of the statute, the State has a right
to terminate a mining concession under the general
principle of law in case of fundamental breach of
obligations. In case of fundamental breach, the State
may regard the concession as repudiated.
	 This is the
legal position under the general principle of law
notwithstanding the absence of any express provision in
the mining concessions or agreement.
405.47(7). S.30(2)(c) applies in respect of prospecting
rights.
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4.2.3	 The legal nature of the mining rights created
It is important to have a clear understanding of the
character of a mining right conferred by the mining licence
in order to appreciate the degree of control exercised by the
South African racist regime over mining rights in Namibia.
We have already observed above that a mining licence gives to
its holder an exclusive right to exploit, process, and
utilise the minerals within the boundaries of his licence.
This is only limited by the condition that the holder observe
and fulfil all obligations demanded by the South African
regime through the mining legislation. It is apparent from
practice and legislation that the grant of exclusive mining
rights includes possession of two separate interests, (a) the
surface covered by the licence, and (b) the minerals within
the bounds of the licence.
The possessory interests in a mining licence are of a
special character, and differ from the interests created
under the general domain of land law. As between the
mining-right holder and all persons other than the South
African regime, the mining-right holder is treated as
possessing all the attributes of a fee title, so long as the
requirements of the ordinance are satisfied. The land
enclosed within a mining grant area is usually treated
differently from other public land. Third parties cannot
trespass. This does not, however, limit the regulatory
functions exercised by Government officers 41 or by the owner
41	 Section 85
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of the surface land, when mining operations are taking place
on his land. The mining licence holder is given the right of
access to mining lands and to sever minerals specified in the
licence, and the power by severance to acquire title to the
minerals and dispose of them.
Mining rights are granted by the South African Government
upon compliance with certain conditions. The Ordinance
regulates the terms of the licence. It is also important to
note that the terms under which the mining licence is held
and their interpretation are fixed by the Ordinance. With
respect to the land covered by the mining grant, the holder
only enjoys the use of the surface of his ground for the
purposes subsidiary to the main object of his tenure which is
the extraction of minerals. Title to the land is split in
that the legal title to both minerals and the land (if it is
publicly owned) is retained by the South African regime as
owner while the use of land and title after the severance of
minerals passes to the holder of the mining licence. Since
these rights depend on the mining legislation, their exercise
can be restrained or new obligations imposed on them
notwithstanding the provisions or the rules in existence when
the mining right was granted. The implication of this state
of affairs is that the South African regime can enact mining
laws which create new rights and obligations.
It is important to note that there is an important
difference between the grant of exclusive prospecting and
mining rights under the 1968 Ordinance and common law mineral
rights. Under Common law, the holder of mineral rights may
exercise his right to prospect or mine at any time in the
future whereas the rights of the holder of a prospecting and
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mining grant are limited by the duration of the grant. While
the holder of mineral rights under common law may have a
legitimate complaint against an extension of the use of the
surface which may detrimentally affect prospecting or mining
at an indefinite time in future, the holder of a prospecting
or mining grant has no ground for complaint unless the
extension may prejudice such prospecting or mining operations
as may still be carried out during the continuance of his
rights.
Some of the principles which are applicable under common
law have been endorsed by the courts. These include (1) In
case of irreconcilable conflict the use of the surface rights
must be subordinated to mineral exploitation and mining; 42
(2) A holder of mineral rights is entitled to mine wherever
and whenever he chooses. 43 The owner of the surface may not
dictate where and how the right to prospect or mine is to be
exercised by facing the mineral rights holder with a
fait accompli of changed conditions on the surface. (3) No
user of the surface is defensible which has the effect of
taking away the right to prospect and mine; for otherwise the
right to prospect or mine ceases to have any content and
amounts to breach of undisturbed possession. 44 The
consequence of these principles is that the surface owner's
rights may be rendered less valuable.
42
see Hudson v. Mann and Another, 1950 (4) SA 485 at
488 E-F
43
see Douglas Colliery Ltd v. Bothma and Another, 1947
(3) SA 602 at 616
44 ibid., p.610
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However, the common law principles referred to above
which are applicable in South Africa (subject to statutory
limitation) have no application in Namibia because all mining
rights are governed by statute and mineral rights in the
ground are vested in the State. 	 This fact was clearly
stressed in Aussenkjer Diamante (pty) Ltd v. Namex (pty) 
Ltd. 45
Finally, in contrast with the mining legislation in a
number of mineral producing countries (especially in the
developing countries) the mining legislation in Namibia does
not provide for joint-venture agreements between the South
African Government and private mining companies. This was
clearly stated in a brochure issued in 1978 by the First
National Development Corporation of South West Africa Ltd.
It was stated that: "Unlike the situation in most
mineral-rich countries, South West Africa/Namibia has mining
laws designed to encourage companies to find and exploit
resources and they do not discriminate against foreign-owned
firms... There is no compulsory participation by the state
or by local interests in mining ventures, no obligation to
plough back profits or recruit local managerial personnel, no
pressure to process minerals in the country and no
restriction on output volumes".
The practice of the colonial administration is that if a
foreign mining company, i.e. a mining company which is not
composed of South Africans or Namibians, seeks to obtain
mining rights in the territory, it is only required to offer
45	 1983 (1) SA AD p.263
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a minimum share of 25 per cent to local companies. According
to the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations,
"measures aimed at encouraging investors in the mining sector
were introduced in 1974. Previously the government could
require up to 50 per cent 'local participation' in any mining
or prospecting venture, on payment of half share in the value
of assets, and a 10 per cent premium, if justified, on
valuation. In theory this might have meant a company was
compelled to sell off half the equity in the venture in the
event of an exploration programme proving successful. This
requirement was reduced to 25 per cent, leaving the promoter
control over the venture; 'local participation' is only
required when the mining stage is reached and an operating
company needs to be registered." 46
Even if this arrangement could benefit "local" interests,
it does not do so in practice because most of these companies
are owned by South Africans notwithstanding the fact that
they are incorporated in Namibia. Even those which are
incorporated in South Africa are regarded as local companies
under the Companies Ordinance no.19 of 1928 as amended from
time to time. Another disadvantage to the Namibian
population is that there is a lack of a separate Namibian
identity in terms of the genuinely autonomous administrative
and financial institutions.
The only instance in which a private mining company or an
individual can lose mining rights is through expropriation of
46See United Nations Centre on Transnational
Corporations, (1981), "Role of Transnational Corporations in
Namibia", First Draft Report, United Nations, New York, p.
2-17.
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the rights in	 the "public interest"
	
and for
	 public
purposes. 47 It is not clear from this provision whether
after expropriation the state undertakes mining activities,
or mining rights are transferred to other private mining
companies.
4.3 Mining Legislation and policy applicable to specific
minerals
In addition to the general statutory provisions of the 1968
ordinance, as amended from time to time, there are special
legal norms regulating diamond and uranium mining.
In the case of diamonds, the need for special additional
legislation stems from the fact that the minerals are
obtained from the deposits as finished products (given the
fact that 98 per cent are gem diamonds). Special legislation
is also required to maintain and strengthen the marketing
monopoly enjoyed by De Beers' Central Selling Organisation.
In the case of uranium, the industry is of great strategic
importance to the South African racist regime partly because
of the international embargo on oil sales to South Africa,
and because of the military uses of uranium. In most uranium
producing countries of the world, there is usually special
legislation regulating the mining, disposal and its uses.
47 Section 86 of the Executive Powers (Mines) Transfer
Proclamation, 1978
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4.3.1	 Diamonds
The most important legislation relating specifically to
the diamond industry is the Diamond Industry Protection
Proclamation no.17	 of 1939. 48 It provides	 for	 the
"regulation, control, development and protection of the
diamond industry of South West Africa". These functions are
carried out by the Diamond Board, set up by the Diamond Board
Establishment Proclamation no.4 of 1921. It vested in the
then South West Africa Administration powers formerly
exercised by the "Diamanten Regie" discussed above.	 The
Board was established as a corporate body with perpetual
succession, consisting of the Administrator-General 49 and
diamond producers in the ratio of either 1:2 out of 3, Or
2:3.
It is entrusted with the supervision of all agreements
relating to the production, quotas and sales, valuation and
delivery of diamonds from producers to purchaser. 50 Every
diamond producer in the territory is required to deliver all
diamond production to the Board if required, and no other
person other than the Diamond Board is permitted to export
diamonds from Namibia. The Board has discretion whether or
not to export diamonds. The legal implication is that only
the authorities have the right to dispose of all the diamonds
48	 It has been amended by Proclamation R88 of 1969
49 Before the Administrator-General 	 it was the
Administrator
50 Section 3
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found and won in Namibia. Any other form of sale by an
individual or company is void and of no legal effect.
In addition, magistrates and post commanders are
empowered to intercept and open postal parcels if they
reasonably believe that they contain diamonds which are being
dispatched from the territory without the authority of the
Diamond Board. 51 Any person who picks up diamonds in any
place outside the prohibited areas (sperrgebiet) has a legal
duty to hand them over to the magistrate. Diamond detectives
and police officers are empowered to search any claimholders'
property under a warrant issued by a magistrate or authority
given by the head of the Diamond Detective Department.
Employers are empowered to search their Black and Coloured
employees. 52
The proclamation further delineates the areas of the
prohibited diamond areas into two zones, namely, Diamond Area
no.1 and Diamond Area no.2. No person is permitted to enter
these areas without a permit issued by the Diamond Board or
under the authority of the Administrator-General.
53 Africans
and Coloureds are prohibited to enter the areas unless they
are employed by a claimholder, and are not allowed to leave
the area unless they are accompanied by a European. Any
African or Coloured person who is found in these areas
without a permit is liable to arrest. 54
51	 Section 15
52	 Section 17
53	 Section 22
54	 Section 25
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Severe penalties are prescribed for any person who
contravenes the restrictions discussed above. Any person who
is found in possession, attempting to buy, receive, sell
export, or dispose of diamonds is liable to maximum prison
sentence of 15 years and a fine of 4000 South African
rands. 55 These penalties also apply to claimholders who
contravene the provisions of their licence, and to servants
who attempt to steal the diamonds. 56
4.3.2	 Uranium
Uranium occupies a central position in all countries of
the world which produce the mineral. This is due to the fact
that it has capacity to generate fuel for nuclear energy
stations (mostly located in developed countries), and its
ability to produce nuclear weapons of mass destruction. In
short, it influences the balance of power in East-West
relations. In all countries of the world, it is regarded as
a strategic mineral. It is for these reasons that the South
African regime has enacted legislation designed to regulate
the production, possession, and disposal of the Namibian
uranium.
Control is exercised under the Atomic Energy Act, 1967.
This is a South African Act enacted by the South African
55	 Section 28
56
e.g., in S v. Kapweja, 1975 (2) SA AD p.541, it was
held that theft, concealment or retention of employer's
diamonds in contravention of section 30(1) of
Proclamation 17 of 1939 could lead to imprisonment, as
opposed to a fine provided for under the section if the
accused is the first offender, when "the amount of the
fine would be entirely beyond the means of the accused".
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Parliament and it	 directly applies
	
to Namibia.	 Its
administration in Namibia lies with the South African
officials and institutions.	 It provides the South African
Government with complete control of uranium production,
possession, and disposal.	 The right to produce nuclear or
atomic energy is vested in the state. It also provides for
the control of processing, enrichment, reprocessing,
possession and disposal of source materia1. 57 Prospecting
and mining licences for the Namibian uranium are issued under
the provisions of the Mines, Works and Minerals Ordinance
no.20 of 1968. 58 The right to mine other minerals also
includes the right to mine for and dispose of source
materials. 59 The legal implication of the provision is that
if a claimholder of other minerals discovers that they also
contain source materials, he does not have to apply for a
fresh source material licence.
The supervisory powers are exercised by the Atomic Energy
Board established under the earlier Act, Atomic Energy Act,
1948. Various interest groups are represented in the Board,
e.g., Uranium producers, commerce, industry, scientific
research, secretaries for Mines and Foreign Affairs, and
three other persons appointed by the South African
Government. 60 The Act does not contain a specific provision
for Namibian representation. The Board has extensive powers.
57	 Section 2
58	 Section 5(c)
59	 Sections 5 (3)
60	 Sections 8, 11 and 12
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It is empowered to prospect; mine; enrich;
	 reprocess;
produce; export; acquire; dispose; produce nuclear or atomic
energy; finance nuclear research and training; and 	 to
conclude production quotas with producers for the fulfilment
of existing uranium contracts. 61 It has power to control the
grant or acquisition of patents relating to nuclear or atomic
energy. 62
As for the mining activities in Namibia, there is a
requirement to inform the Board in writing of any permission
granted to claimholders to prospect and mine source material
or the recovery of such material from tailings. 63 The South
African Government can withdraw prospecting and mining
licences from claimholders if the security of the State is
likely to be endangered. All the functions of the Minister
of Mines in Namibia are vested and exercisable by the
Administrator-General 64
All information relating to the existence of source
material is to be reported to the South African authority.
The Act contains provisions which require strict secrecy
relating to the release of information concerning uranium.
Apart from the political implications, this is the main
reason why detailed information relating to the Rossing mine
and other uranium prospecting activities in Namibia cannot be
61 Section 13
62 Section 21-24
63 Section 5 (9) (b)
64 This has been made possible by the Executive Powers
Transfer (General provision) Proclamation, 1977, and the
Transfer of Administration of the Mines to the
Administrator-General Proclamation, 1978
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made available by the companies concerned. The secrecy
provision was only extended to Namibia after the South
African Government decided to exploit uranium in the
territory. It is of particular interest to note that the
1967 Act provided for an immediate application of its
provisions to Namibia, while the 1948 Act did not.
The Act provides that without the consent of the
competent authorities: "no information may be published or
disclosed on the locality, extent, and source material
content of ore reserves, on the importance of the production
or the price and conditions of acquisition of such material,
in or outside South Africa; no person may disclose
information on activities or transactions carried out in the
past connected with source material; no information may be
communicated which is connected with any investigation or
negotiations with a view to acquiring a site licence or with
any licensed site under the Nuclear Installations (Licensing
and Security) Act, 1963". 65 The competent authorities (the
Atomic Energy Board and the Minister of Mines) may
furthermore direct that in any proceedings, evidence in
connection with transactions in any company producing source
material be given in camera. It is clear that the word
'person' as used in the statute refers to a natural person as
well as a legal person, i.e., companies.
65 Section 30 as amended by the Atomic Energy
(Amendment) Act no.46 of 1978
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4.4 Administrative changes relating to the regulation of the
mining industry
It is important to note that a number of administrative
changes have taken place, some of which relate to the
regulation of the mining industry. Although these changes do
not alter the substantive nature of the mining legislation in
the territory, it is felt necessary to discuss them briefly.
The main reason is that some of the institutions which have
been established may be retained by the future independent
government in Namibia.
In August 1977, the South African Government appointed the
so-called Administrator-General to head the South African
illegal administration in Namibia. He took over the
functions which were formerly exercised by the South West
Africa Administrator, another South African official who
headed the colonial administration in Namibia since the
mandate period in 1919. The changes also resulted in the
Administrator-General assuming a number of functions
previously exercised by the South African ministries. In
1969, the South West Africa Affairs Act no.25 of 1969
transferred, among others, mining and all matters relating to
minerals to the South African Department of Mines in
Pretoria. 66 As a result, territorial autonomy was sharply
restricted. This change virtually reduced Namibia into the
66 This was implemented by Proclamation no.R89 of 1969
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status of a fifth province of South Africa.
	 After the
appointment of	 the Administrator-General,	 he assumed
responsibility
	
for	 the day-to-day conduct	 of	 the
administration in the territory.	 Being a representative of
the South African Government,	 he has power to	 issue
proclamations which have the effect of law.
In the case of the mining industry, the Executive Power
(Mines) Transfer Proclamation, 1978, transferred the
administration of mines from the South African Minister of
Mines to the Administrator-General. In addition, the Mineral
Rights Proclamation of 1978 provides that the "rights of
prospecting and mining for and disposing of precious and base
minerals in the territory, including its territorial waters
and continental shelf is vested in the
Administrator-General". The vesting of mineral rights in the
"homelands" in the South African Bantu Trust contained under
s.2(2) of the 1968 ordinance is repealed. Now the legal
position is that all mineral rights (except those falling
under the Atomic Energy Act, 1967 discussed above) over the
whole country are vested in the Administrator-General.
Amongst the departments so transferred was the Namibian
section of Department of Mines, which means in theory,
control over all mining matters has been assumed by the
Administrator-General.
In practice, no significant changes in the context of mining
legislation in existence had been made. The only notable
change is that, rules and regulations issued by the South
African Government officials no longer apply automatically in
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Namibia. The Administrator-General has discretion to
delegate responsibility to the South African officials and
their representatives in Namibia. He has power to consent to
the application of South African regulations which he deems
to be in the "interests" of Namibia. The powers of the
Administrator-General were briefly interrupted in 1983 when
the South African Government assumed direct responsibility
over all mining rights. This was after the collapse of the
so-called internal government in Namibia. The functions of
the Administrator-General were restored towards the end of
1985.
Apart from the Administrator-General, there are a number of
other officers who fall within the Mines Division discussed
above. We have already stated that the main function of the
Mines Division is to supervise and control the mining
industry in the territory. It exercises all rights, powers,
and jurisdiction vested in the Namibian colonial
administration and its officers regarding minerals and mines
works. It is divided into three sections, namely, Mining
Titles Office; Mines Inspectorate; and the Geological Survey
Branch. Apart from the Administrator-General who has overall
control, the Mines Division is headed by the Mining
Commissioner. He is responsible for receiving, considering
and granting mining rights. 67 He is required to maintain a
registry of claims and mining titles in which pegging of
claims, forfeiture, cancellation, abandonment and transfer of
67	 i.e., prospecting and mining licences
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mining rights are recorded. Finally, he is required to issue
permits for the disposal of minerals.
Below the Mining Commissioner, each of the three sections of
the Mines Division is headed by a senior officer. The Mines
Inspectorate is headed by the Chief Inspector of Mines
appointed by the Administrator-General. The sections' main
function is to supervise safety standards in the mines
including mining machinery and explosives. He has power to
hold an inquiry into causes of a mine accident and
contraventions of the mining ordinance relating to general
safety standards. The Geological Survey Branch is headed by
the Surveyor-General. The main function of the branch is to
survey and register mining areas. 68
 The survey must comply
with the requirements of the Land survey Ordinance, 1963.
Finally, the Mining Titles Office is headed by the Registrar
of Mining Titles. Its function is to preserve all mining
titles lodged with the office by the Mining Commissioner.
68
Section 74 of the Mines, Works and Minerals
Ordinance 20 of 1968
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CHAPTER III - MARKETING ARRANGEMENTS
1	 INTRODUCTION
As will be shown below, the colonial administration in
Namibia exercises very little control over the marketing of
Namibia's minerals. The mineral trade and pricing policy are
firmly controlled by foreign owned multinational companies
which manipulate Namibian mineral prices to their advantage.
Therefore, the main objective of this chapter is to show that
the present relationship between the mining companies and the
Namibian colonial administration has led to the enrichment of
the mining companies. This relationship, which is partly
facilitated by the colonial mining legislation, has greatly
contributed to Namibia's process of underdevelopment.
It is a characteristic feature of the mining companies that
they need an adequate and reliable flow of mineral resources
in order to make a profit. We have already discussed in the
preceding chapter that mining laws and regulations have
enabled mining companies to be in firm control of the
Namibian minerals. They have acquired a high degree of
freedom of action in the production and disposal of the
Namibian minerals.	 By owning and operating the deposits,
they are in a position to control the terms of supply of the
minerals at the world market to their own advantage.
	 The
activities of De Beers in the marketing of diamonds provides
a vivid example. It will be shown below that the control
relationships between the subsidiaries and the parent mining
companies based outside Namibia are far stronger and have
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proved more significant than the regulation and revenue
relationships between the subsidiaries and the Namibian
colonial administration.
Operating subsidiary companies in Namibia are regarded as
organic parts of the parent companies situated abroad which
are in fact control centres. This enables parent companies
to control the information on prices, costs, reserves,
production conditions, and all other factors which are needed
to devise proper controls. All these factors make it
difficult for the colonial administration to prevent transfer
pricing from taking place.
In addition, the colonial administration has adopted actual
realised prices as a basis for calculating gross income as
opposed to open market (arm's-length) price. Since Namibian
subsidiaries sell the minerals to affiliates, the prices are
usually lower than open market prices. This means that the
colonial administration does not monitor the marketing of the
minerals.
2	 MARKETING AND LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS
Apart from the regulation of diamonds and uranium, control
over other minerals is exercised almost exclusively in terms
of the provisions of the Mines, Works and Minerals Ordinance
20 of 1968 and the regulations made thereunder. The
Ordinance contains four main provisions which regulate the
marketing of the Namibian minerals. These are ss.38(1), (3)
(4) and (5); s.44(2); s.87; and s.88.
	 The legislation
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divides mineral rights into two phases - prospecting and
mining phase,. A prospecting phase restricts the rights of
the mining rights holder to prospecting only.
The provisions of s.38 principally deals with the marketing
of minerals during the prospecting phase.
	
Section 38(1)
empowers the Mining Commissioner 	 to issue a permit
authorising the removal of mineral samples from the site of
the prospecting operations. This aims to achieve two main
objectives: (1) it prohibits the removal from the site of
prospecting operations of any minerals which have been
recovered in the course of prospecting, and (2) it prohibits
the disposal of such minerals without obtaining a permit
issued by the Mining Commissioner. In addition, s.38(3) of
the Ordinance states that "no base mineral sample weighing
more than ten pounds shall be sold: provided that the mining
commissioner may issue a permit for the sale of samples
weighing more than ten pounds on good cause shown")
S.38(b) makes it an offence to contravene the provisions of
the Ordinance. In addition, it empowers the Mining
Commissioner to "demand from the persons concerned payment of
the value of the minerals which have been unlawfully removed
or disposed of or may confiscate such minerals for the
benefit of the Minister and may further declare forfeited the
claim from which such minerals have been recovered, and if
such amount is not paid the Mining Commissioner may institute
1	
my emphasis
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civil proceedings for its recovery". S.38(4) prohibits any
person from receiving or purchasing minerals from any person
unless the seller is in possession of a permit issued by the
Mining Commissioner. The buyer is also required to obtain a
permit from the Mining Commissioner if such minerals are
exported abroad.
In this chapter and in Chapter IV, we have extensively relied
on the information of the Thirion Commission. Therefore, for
the interest of the reader, it is necessary to explain the
background to the Commission. It was appointed in 1982 by
the colonial administration to investigate allegations of
administrative corruption in Namibia. A Supreme Court judge
from the Republic of South Africa was appointed as its
chairman. The Commission extended its terms of reference to
include the mining industry because of the relationship
between the industry and various government control boards
such as the Diamond Board.
The Commission was required to report to the so-called
Administrator-General on its findings and to make
recommendations to him regarding "'(a) any steps which ought
to be taken against any person or body as a result of or
arising from the findings of the Commission; (b) the steps
which in the opinion of the Commission ought to be taken to
rectify any irregularity, overstepping of powers,
misappropriation or misapplication found by it or the
consequences thereof, and to prevent the repetition thereof;
(c) the steps which in the opinion of the Commission ought to
be taken to eliminate any shortcomings ... 	 (d) any other
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matter concerning its terms of reference which the Commission
may deem necessary or expedient.'" 2
Among the personnel which assisted the Commission included
Mr. Martin Grote, an economist, who was a research officer in
the Department of Finance and the Director of the Department
of Justice. Part I of the report deals with the Commission's
investigation "of the exercise by State functionaries of the
duties entrusted to them under statutes dealing with control
over prospecting and mining and the disposal and export of
minerals." 3 The report also deals with the adequacy or
otherwise of the current measures and institutions for
regulating marketing of minerals and taxation of income from
the sale of minerals.
In the course of the investigation, the Commission examined a
number of documents and files. These included files of the
Mining Commissioner, reports of the Inspector of Mines, deeds
of grant relating to prospecting and mining rights and
minutes of the Diamond Board. According to the Commission,
"Non-contentious matters were dealt with by way of informal
discussions with officials and the Receiver of Revenue.
Matters of a contentious nature were dealt with at public
sessions of the Commission at which witnesses were required
to give evidence."
2See Thirion Commission p.2.
3ibid.
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Among the chief witnesses included Gordon Brown, a former
employee of CDM. He worked for the company from June 1968 to
June 1983. "For the first five years he was employed as a
mining supervisor. Thereafter, for another period of five
years he was employed as a works study officer in management
services and for the last five years he was a technical
assistant to the general manager." 4 His evidence included
the allegation of overmining by CDM. He alleged that CDM
overmined both in stone size (carats per stone) and grade
(carats per M 3 ). He also alleged that overmining was the
consequence of the unrealistically high production targets
set for CDM by the De Beers Board of Directors. During the
proceedings, the Commission was guided by the principle
established in Dukes v.	 Marthinusen, 5 namely that if
witnesses or experts are called "by both sides to express
their views and their bona fides is not attached ... it is
the function of the judge to appraise the value of their
testimony." The most important aspect of Brown's evidence is
that CDM's own documents "prima facie corroborate every
aspect of [his] evidence." 6
The Commission found irregularities in a number of public
bodies and also in a number of mining companies. CDM was
heavily criticised. As the Economist put it, "What is De
Beers' case for the defence?	 Part of its problem in this
4See Thirion Commission, (1985), p. 253.
5 (1937) AD 12, see also Thirion Commission, (1985), P
317.
6 See op. cit, Thirion Commission, p. 280.
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issue is its obsessive secrecy. In 1984, when it was already
evident that Mr. Thirion was coming to harsh conclusions
about CDM, De Beers agreed that its senior management could
give evidence but only in camera. The judge said no it must
be in open court." 7
 According to the Financial Times, "De
Beers, which has frequently complained bitterly about its
inability to make representations to the Thirion Commission,
refused to allow the Commission's investigators to examine
accounts which would have confirmed or refuted strong
allegations of transfer pricing by the diamond company." 8
In practice, the provisions discussed above are not enforced
because the colonial administration is not interested in
exercising any control over mining activities. This
conclusion was confirmed by the Thirion Commission's Report9.
The Commission reported that the "mining commissioner
confirmed in evidence that it is not the practice of his
office to confine permits under section 38(3) to quantities
of mineral samples weighing not more than 101bs or to require
good cause to be shown before granting a permit for the sale
of a mineral sample in excess of 101bs. The provisions of
the proviso to section 38(3) have therefore to a large extent
7 See The Economist, London, (1986), 15 March, pp. 76-81
at p.81 col. a.
8See The Financial Times, London, (1986), 18 March,
p.36, col. a.
9
see Thirion Commission, (1985), Eighth Interim
Report.
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become a dead letter". 10 This incompetence and complicity
has enabled the mining companies to take advantage of the
situation.
According to the findings of the Commission, during the five
year period, 1979-1983, the mining companies removed 51,605
tonnes of mineral "samples", i.e., 10.321 tonnes per annum. 11
On top of the list were two companies, Tsumeb Corporation Ltd
and Omitara Mines (Pty) Ltd. Tsumeb Corporation Ltd is
reported to have exported large quantities of mineral
"samples" to overseas markets where they fetched high
prices. 12 During the three year period, 1978-1980, Omitara
Mines (Pty) Ltd exported 420.252 tonnes of "samples" to
France13
 close to 100 tonnes at a time.
As we have noted above, the rights of the prospectors are
limited and restricted to prospecting only. At the
prospecting phase, the colonial administration is still the
legal 'owner' and holder of the title to all minerals. The
legal consequences of the prospecting phase are that,
technically, the administration at this stage owns any
minerals which are discovered by prospecting licence holders
and discovery does not give the holders of such licences any
rights. This also applies to the mineral samples which are
10
see Thirion Commission, Eighth Interim Report, 
1985, p.37
11 ibid., p.40
12	 ibid.
13	 ibid., P-37
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removed by the prospecting licence holders. It is also
arguable that the State being the 'owner' of all minerals
during this phase, is entitled to maintain all legal and
equitable actions for actual or threatened injury that are
accorded to owners of property at common law. This is in
addition to the provisions of the Ordinance which make it an
offence for any person to exercise any mining right without
the consent of the Mining Commissioner. The Mining
Commissioner is also entitled to institute civil proceedings
for the recovery of the minerals.
In terms of s.38(1), the Mining Commissioner is empowered to
issue mineral sample permits subject to such conditions as he
may deem fit. The main aim of s.38(1) which also authorises
ore samples to be removed from the site of prospecting
(subject to the Mining Commissioner's permission) is only to
enable such samples to be identified, assayed or analysed.
Therefore, it is open to the Mining Commissioner to insist
that the companies should furnish him with the information
relating to the nature of the mineral samples, their value,
and their destination. It is submitted that although the
Mining Commissioner is empowered under s.38(3) to authorise
the sale of base minerals samples weighing more than ten
pounds under certain conditions, the main purpose of the
section is to deal with mineral samples required for test
purposes (i.e., chemical or metallurgical testing). The key
word of the section is the word 'sample'. The Shorter Oxford
English Dictionary defines the word sample as "a relatively
small quantity of material from which the quality of the
mass, group, species etc., which it represents, may be
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inferred". The removal of 100 tonnes of mineral 'samples' at
a time compared with the statutory limit of 10 pounds can
hardly qualify within the true construction of the section.
In addition, since the permit issued under s.38(3) is valid
for 12 months, it has been abused by the mining companies
since there is nothing to prevent them from using the same
permit over and over during the period of its validity, apart
from the requirement that each sample should not weigh more
than 10 pounds. Indeed, as we have already pointed out
above, even this limitation has not been observed by both
mining companies and the mining commissioner. The loophole
could easily be rectified by requiring a permit for every
consignment of mineral samples sent abroad instead of the
current situation where the permit is valid for a year
without any significant restrictions being imposed on
prospectors. The only reason why the State has taken no
action could be the considerable influence of the mining
companies. It is reported that from 1979 to 1983 "mining
companies exported on average 10,321 tonnes" 14 of mineral
samples per annum. Therefore, minerals extracted during the
prospecting phase have been turned into "a flourishing trade
in mineral i samples". 15 These findings led the Thirion
Commission to the conclusion that "one has here yet another
instance of minerals of which the State is the owner, being
14	
op.cit., Thirion Commission, p.40
15	 ibid.
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sold without the State having obtained a proper recompense or
compensation" 16
Apart from the legal controls discussed above, the Ordinance
contains provisions whose main objective is to control the
disposal of minerals during the mining phase. Under s.44(2),
the owner of the mining area cannot dispose of any minerals
mined in the area except under the authority of the Mining
Commissioner. Section 87 obliges the producer of any
precious metal to sell the metal through a commercial bank
and to render to the Mining Commissioner an assay certificate
showing the price and quantity of such precious metal and a
duplicate note from the bank. Finally, s.88(1) prohibits the
export of any precious or base minerals without an export
permit issued by the Mining Commissioner.
The statutory provisions discussed above aim to achieve three
main objectives: first, that the Mining Commissioner keeps
control over all minerals mined in the Territory, from the
prospecting phase through to the mining phase; second, that
the colonial administration has adequate powers to control
and combat illegal mining by unauthorised persons; and third,
that all Namibian minerals are sold at market-related prices
so that the State can get its fair share of company profits
through taxation. As the Thirion Commission concluded, in
16	 ibid.
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practice, the "efficacy of these provisions to achieve either
of those aims is questionable". 17
It should be noted that these statutory provisions are only
designed to protect the interests of the mining companies
from the illegal diggers, especially with regard to precious
stones. A number of companies are also involved in the
export of by-products such as silver and/or gold." 18 As an
example, Tsumeb Corporation exported 69,734kg of silver, and
22,184kg of gold in 1983 alone. 19 In addition, although s.88
obliges the exporter of Namibian minerals to produce an
export permit issued by the Mining Commissioner to the
stationmaster (in the case of export by rail) at the place of
consignment; collector of customs at the port where the
minerals are shipped (in the case of export by sea); and to
the postmaster (in the cases of export by post), the section
does not cover instances where minerals are exported by road
or air. This loophole significantly reduces the
effectiveness of the permit system especially in the case of
precious stones and metals which can easily be exported by
air to overseas markets. In addition, Namibian minerals can
easily be exported by air or road to South Africa where they
could be shipped to overseas markets in order to avoid the
application of s.88. It is therefore not surprising that the
17	 this is the conclusion reached by the Thirion
Commission, see particularly p.102 of the report
18	 ibid., p.103
19	 ibid.
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Thirion Commission concluded that the "implementation of the
system has become largely a purposeless formality". 20
Apart from the limited control of the colonial administration
discussed above, one additional factor for its weakness is
the nature of the mining agreements which multinational
mining companies have been able to secure. The trend has
been to secure comprehensive agreements covering all aspects
of the company's operations over a long period of time. Most
mining agreements in Namibia have the effect of treating
mining companies under the terms and conditions which require
little regulation and decisions by the colonial
administration. The most notorious mining agreement is the
Halbscheid Agreement discussed in Chapter I regarding the
exploitation of Namibian diamonds. De Beers sought as far as
possible to escape subjection to general legislation and
general administration applying to other minerals. This is
one of the factors which puts CDM (De Beer's operating
subsidiary company in Namibia) in a privileged position. The
full significance of such privilege will become clearer as we
examine the content of the Halbscheid Agreement in Chapter
IV.
3	 MARKETING OF DIAMONDS
De Beers was established in 1888 (by Cecil Rhodes a South
African immigrant from Britain) after the amalgamation of two
20	 ibid., p.105
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diamond companies,	 Kimberley Central and the French
Company. 21 In order to gain an advantage over its rivals, De
Beers managed to centralise and control the marketing of
diamonds. According to Lanning, the company entered into a
contract, in 1890, with a group of London diamond merchants
and assigned them the sole marketing rights. They included
some of the most influential and dominant such as Wernher
Beit and Company; Barnato Brothers; Rosenthal and Sons
Company; and A. Dunkelsbuhler and Company. 22
However, De Beers' dream of monopolising the diamond industry
could only be achieved if it also controlled production not
only in South Africa but also in important diamond mines of
Africa.	 To this end, its object was "'to acquire by
purchase, amalgamation, grant, concession, lease 	 any
houses ... farms, mines ... waterworks or other works
diamonds and other precious stones, gold and other minerals
... machinery, plant ... patents for invention ... to carry
on the business of miners in all its branches ... To acquire
any tract or tracts of country in Africa or elsewhere ... To
treat with rulers or governments of any country for the
acquistion by the company of benefits or valuable rights.'" 23
21See Lanning Greg with Mueller Marti, (1979), Africa
Undermined - Mining Companies and the Underdevelopment of
Africa, Penguin Books, p. 41.
22 ibid.
23. . quoted from Paul Emden, (1935), The Randlorde,
Hodder and Stoughton, London, p. 260.
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Remarkably, most of De Beers' objectives were achieved.
Close associations with diamond producers such as Angola and
Zaire were established. After the First World War, a major
coup came when De Beers managed to obtain a diamond
concession (through
	 the conclusion of the Halbschied
Agreement discussed in Chapter I) in Namibia. It is stated
that in negotiations "with the Union government, Oppenheimer
[Ernest Oppenheimer, the father to Harry Oppenheimer the
current Chairman] emphasised his South African connections
and pointed out that most of the capital for Consolidated
Diamond Mines came from South African residents. He won the
contract on condition that 'your corporation and those who
are associated with you in this matter undertake to work the
assets of the companies you are acquiring at all times, with
due and proper regard to the interests of the Union
government and of the Territory of South West Africa.'" 24
After the diamond concession was obtained, the first major
task was to integrate both buyers and producers into one
organisation. De Beers established the Diamond Corporation
in 1930 whose main task was (and still is) to sign long-term
diamond marketing contracts with producers outside South
Africa. Finally, to "prevent future clashes with the South
African government and the Administration of South West
Africa [as Namibia was then called], Oppenheimer persuaded
the two governments to become members of the Diamond
Producers Association in 1934."
24 i bid., p. 58.
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One of the principal problems for Namibian diamonds is to
establish whether or not the country is receiving a fair
price. Diamonds come in a wide range of sizes and qualities,
and valuation is a highly skilled task which Namibians do not
possess. It has proved difficult for the Diamond Board to
check the assortment and valuation of diamonds. Since
Namibian diamonds are controlled by de Beers, and since the
diamond industry requires great skill and expertise, De Beers
has used its position to gain the maximum profit from
Namibia's diamond industry. Apart from controlling the
Namibian diamond industry through CDM, De Beers controls a
substantial part of world diamonds. As a result, it is in a
position to set the price of diamonds without worrying about
being undercut by other diamond producers. The only primary
consideration of the company is what the market can bear.
De Beer's main interest is to manipulate the price of
diamonds by controlling its production throughout the world.
In the late 1860s, alluvial diamonds were discovered in South
Africa. In 1871, the great Kimberley pipes were discovered.
As for Namibia, gem diamonds were discovered in large
quantities in 1908, thus, by the turn of the century, there
was a possibility that world markets would be flooded with
diamonds, thus, bringing down its price. During the German
colonial period, Namibian diamond production threatened De
Beer's dominant position. The company made several
unsuccessful attempts to gain control of the Namibian
diamonds, even to the extent of attempting to buy the diamond
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fields. 25 What worried De Beers during the German colonial
period was that instead of selling the diamonds through De
Beers, a contract was made between the German Government and
the Belgian syndicate, Coetermans-Kryn-Walk. The syndicate
composed of three large firms based at Antwerp to which the
exclusive right to cut all diamonds produced in Namibia was
reserved. 26 During this period, Antwerp was the principal
market for diamonds. In 1911, there were 16,000 workmen
employed in the various branches of the diamond industry, 300
diamond cutters, 200 brokers and 300 manufacturers. In
contrast, Rotterdam, which was the principal rival, employed
8,000 workmen. 27 De Beers eventually managed to convince
the German Government to form a cartel in order to protect
the diamond industry from falling prices.
In 1913, an agreement was reached in London between the
managers of De Beers and Dr. Solf, the German Imperial
Secretary of State for the Colonies to cooperate in the
production and sale of diamonds in the world market. 28
Notwithstanding the fact that the German colonial occupation
did not last long after the discovery of diamonds, 2,130,000
carats valued at £8.500,000 British pounds were produced from
25
see The Times - London, 26 December, 1908, p.4,
col.a. It was speculated that a British company wanted
to buy the diamond field for £125,000 within a year of
their discovery
26	
see The Times - London, 10 April, 1912, p.14,
col.c.
27	 ibid.
28	
see The times - London, 12 November, 1913, p.19,
col .f
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1909 to 1914. 29 Within two months of their discovery in July
1903, 2,720 carats were produced. The monthly production
from September to December was 6,644; 8,621; 10,228; and
11,549 carats respectively or 39,762 in total. This amounted
to about £55,000 in value. 30	The rate of	 production
increased considerably during the subsequent years, e.g.,
from February 1910 to 31st March 1911, diamond output
amounted to 813,323 carats. During the same period, a total
of 798,865.5 carats were sold for 21,389,456 marks (roughly
£1,065,000). 31
3.1 The Diamond Board and Marketing Contract
The terms under which mining companies exploit mineral
resources in Namibia are often embodied in written
agreements. Although some of these agreements are secret,
some have been made public such as the Halbscheid Agreement
regarding diamond concession rights acquired by CDM. In this
section, we examine the provisions of this agreement insofar
as it relates to the marketing of diamonds. In order to
understand the legal implications of the agreement, reference
must be made to the establishment and functions of the
Diamond Board in Namibia.
29
see Leake S. Hangala, Structure of Namibian Mineral
Industry, p.26
30
see The Times - London, 23 January, 1909, p.8,
col.a
31
see The Times - London, 24 May, 1912, p.22, col.a.
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The Diamond Board was established in 1921 by the Diamond
Board Establishment Proclamation of 1921. After the repeal
of this Proclamation in 1939, another proclamation called the
Diamond Industry Protection Proclamation 17 of 1939 was
promulgated. Section 4 of the proclamation sets out the
functions of the Board. 	 These include the following: "4.(1)
to supervise the carrying out of all interproducer's
agreements and all sales agreements, and all sales of
diamonds; ... (c) to attend to the receipt, valuation,
transport, insurance and assortment of diamonds sold; (d) to
collect and receive from the purchasers the records of sales
under all sales agreements and the moneys due thereunder ...;
(e) to advise the Administrator on the question of
terminating any interproducers agreement or sales agreements;
(7) Every producer, shall whenever called upon in writing to
do so by the Board, or the Inspector of Mines for the
Territory or any person authorised by him, forthwith deliver
all diamonds produced by him to the Board ... (8) no person
other than the Board shall export any diamonds from the
Territory".
Section 9(1) states that no person other than the
Administrator (now the Administrator-General) is authorised
to sell or dispose of any diamonds won in the territory. The
sale or disposal of any diamonds in contravention of the
section is void and of no effect. Finally, section 10 states
that the "Board shall not, save on the written authority of
the Administrator, deliver or allow any diamonds to pass out
of its possession, except in pursuance of a contract of sale
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entered into in S.W.A. by the Administrator exercising the
powers conferred upon him by section nine...".
3.1.1 Namibian diamonds and the Central Selling Organisation
To appreciate the manner in which the Diamond Board fulfils
its statutory functions, it is necessary to explain how
Namibian diamonds reach the world market. Namibian diamonds
contribute a significant share of De Beer's profits and are
vital to De Beer's monopoly position in the diamond industry.
Diamonds from Namibia and South Africa, which together form
the Diamond Producers Association, pass to the central
Selling Organisation - a collective name for a group of De
Beers controlled companies, In order to preserve its
dominant position, De Beers encouraged the formation of the
Diamond Producers Association (DPA). The members are the
South African Government (in its capacity as producer through
the State Alluvial Digging company), De Beers, CDM, the
Namibian administration, and the Diamond Corporation Ltd.
The DPA was established in 1934 to coordinate the sale of
diamonds produced in South Africa and Namibia. It is managed
by a board of seven, two from De Beers, two from the
Government of South Africa (one of which is to be the
chairman), one each from the Diamond Corporation, CDM and
Namibian administration. Its main objects are (1) to receive
and sell diamonds from its members; (2) to regulate the value
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of gem diamonds from its members; and (3) to advise its
members on the regulation of the production of diamonds. 32
All Namibian diamonds go through the DPA before they reach
the international market. From Namibia, all diamonds have to
go to South Africa where they are handled and sorted by
companies controlled by De Beers. As a result, Namibian
diamond sales are adversely affected in two ways. First, CDM
sells the diamonds to De Beers group of companies at prices
which are markedly lower than those prevailing in the world
market; and second, Namibian diamonds are sorted by the De
Beers group of companies.
	 This is significant because each
quality category has a different price tag. There are about
two thousand quality categories with the price range of $1.70
to more than $3,500 per carat. 33 As a consequence of diamond
sorting by De Beers, Namibian diamonds are undervalued. By
contrast, other diamond producers outside South Africa who
have close ties with the CSO employ independent expert
diamond valuers to grade their diamonds.
Countries such as Tanzania, Angola, Sierra Leone, Botswana
and Zaire have either trained their own citizens to undertake
the valuation of diamonds, or have contracted independent
valuers. 34 In Botswana, the government established a company
32 for a detailed discussion see the Thirion
Commission, op.cit., p.174
33
op.cit., Leake S.Hangala, Structure of Namibian
Mineral Industry, p.26
34op. cit. Lanning Greg with Mueller Marti, (1979),
Africa Undermined, p. 420.
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called Botswana Diamond Valuing Company (BDVC). It is 55 per
cent owned by the government through Batswana Development
Corporation, and the rest of the shares are held by De
Beers. 35 It is stated that the company "trains Batswana in
diamond-sorting and diamond marketing techniques at the
London headquarters of the De Beers Central Selling
Organisation „ . 36 After sorting and valuing the diamonds,
they are sold to the CSO "under joint supervision by De Beers
and Government valuers. Diamonds are sorted and valued
against a sample parcel and price book prepared by the CSO.
Both the sample parcel and the price book are reviewed from
time to time to ensure that they are in line with the market
and the government valuer has full access to them.” 37
	In
addition, the Government maintains regular consultation with
the CSO through "Marketing Meetings where senior Government
officials who deal with minerals (Minerals Policy Committee)
[are] briefed on the status and problems of the market as
well as CSO regulatory policies." 38
 Perhaps the most
important development is that De Beers Botswana Mining
Company Ltd, a joint venture held equally between the
Government and De Beers, acquired 5 per cent interest in De
35See Hartland Thunberg Penelope, (1978), Botswana: An
African Growth Economy, Westview Press, p. 50.
36. .
37See Marole B. (1987), "DEBSWANA JOINT VENTURE: A Case
Study", paper presented to a Workshop on Negotiating with
Transnational Corporations in the Mineral Sector and
Regulating Mining Operations, 13-17 October, Chobe, Botswana,
United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, New
York, pp. 1-8 at 7.
38. .ibid, p.6.
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Beers. This entitles the company to two seats on the board
of De Beers and other CSO companies. The arrangement enables
the Government to obtain information and consultation on
matters relating to the diamond industry. Moreover, it has
an opportunity, through participation at the board and other
meetings, to contribute towards decision making and to ensure
that its interests are protected.
In Sierra Leone, the Government Diamond Office
	 (GDO)
undertakes the sorting of diamonds. 39 It is also reported
that a company called Precious Minerals Marketing Company
(PMMC) has recently been established in Sierra Leone. 40
	Its
main functions are to deal and export alluvial gold, diamonds
and other minerals. Finally, in Zaire, the government is
advised by a Belgian diamond merchant.41
Therefore, it is clear from the above discussion that unlike
Namibia, other countries have managed to establish their own
sorting organisations by training their own nationals. It
is, however, submitted that they are not yet in a position to
match De Beers' considerable expertise. It has been stated
that when "the diamonds have been sorted in the country of
39See Ralph Gerald Saylor, (1967), The Economic System
of Sierra Leone, Duke University Press, Durham, N.C. p. 137.
For further details on West African diamonds, see Greenhalgh
P.A. L. (1985), West African diamonds 1919-1983: An Economic
History, Manchester University Press.
405ee British Overseas Trade Board, (1985/86), Hints to
Exporters - Sierra Leone, p.20.
41
op. cit. Lanning Greg and Mueller Marti, (1979),
Africa Undermined, p. 420.
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origin they still have to be checked by the CSO, which
naturally	 will	 concentrate	 on	 correcting	 mistaken
over-valuation, while beilg less anxious	 to	 remedy
undervaluation. ,, 42
The situation is made worse by the fact that the Namibian
Diamond Board exercises little control over the marketing of
diamonds notwithstanding wide powers conferred to it by the
Diamond Industry Protection Proclamation 17 of 1939. Indeed,
this Proclamation has become an instrument which consolidates
De Beers' monopoly control over the diamond industry. The
Diamond Board is in fact staffed by De Beers' employees. The
Board does not employ ordinary administrative personnel,
instead, it employs a number of accredited agents to carry
out its administrative functions. As a result, De Beers has
considerable influence over the activities of the Board. As
the Thirion Commission discovered, the Secretary of the Board
is the "manager of De Beers ... and also company secretary of
CDM and alternate director of CDM". 43 At the diamond field
in Orangemund, the Board has a "local secretary, an assistant
local secretary and	 two additional assistant	 local
secretaries - all four being full-time employees of CDM. In
London the Board has ... two deputy agents who are managers
of CSO Valuations (Pty) Ltd, a De Beers company. At Cape
42. .ibid.
43	
op.cit., Thirion Commission, p.181
127
Town [in South Africa] the Board has three agents; all of
whom are employees of De Beers Marine (Pty) Ltd". 44
Therefore, close relationship between the Diamond Board and
De Beers is exceptional given the fact that one of the
Board's main functions is "to advise the
Administrator-General on the question of terminating any
sales agreements". 45 Indeed, we may pose a question, can
the Board which is dominated by De Beers' employees advise
the Administrator-General to terminate a sales contract with
De Beers if it turns out that Namibia does not get an
equitable benefit from such a contract? It should be
obvious that there is a clear conflict of interest in the
present arrangement and yet, according to the Board's
Chairman, the members of the Board "are all appointed by the
State. ,, 46
The question to be raised is that why should the State
appoint the Board's personnel who are almost all De Beers'
employees when their duty is supposed to monitor the
activities of De Beers' group of companies? According to
the Chairman of the Board, he does not see any such conflict
of interest. He goes on to state that "Some of your
questions were critical of the fact that the Secretary of the
44	 . .ibid.
45S.4(1)(e) of the Diamond Industry Proclamation No. 17
of 1939.
46See the Diamond Board Chairman's letter of 5th August
1982 in the appendix, p. 2, first paragraph line 4.
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Diamond Board is an employee of De Beers and that the Board's
Offices are those of CDM. We are satisfied that this is the
most efficient way of handling the secretarial affairs of the
Board." 47
Notwithstanding the above criticisms, it is realised that it
is generally difficult to effectively monitor the diamond
industry given De Beers' dominant position. Diamonds are
classified in two thousand quality categories, each with a
different price tag. It would be unrealistic to expect the
Board which does not have qualified personnel to monitor the
diamond industry 100 per cent. Furthermore, the problem of
effective monitoring is not unique to Namibia. However, what
distinguishes Namibia from other diamond producers is the
fact that other countries have taken steps aimed at
minimising their weak bargaining position. 	 Indeed, even
Botswana which has quite recent diamond industry has strived
to control the industry by training its own nationals. This
enables the government to influence the industry from
production right through marketing. The Government has also
taken steps to monitor De Beers thorugh board representation
in the operating joint venture company. These steps are
significant and have gone a long way to reduce these
countries' weak bargaining position.
The Cape Town agents are responsible for taking possession of
all the diamonds which are won in the territorial waters by
47	 .ibid.
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De Beers Marine Ltd, a wholly owned De Beers subsidiary.
Once the diamonds reach Cape Town, they are sorted according
to their size, value and colour. Diamonds from CDM are sent
to Kimberley by the Board's agents. It is clear therefore
that in practice, the Diamond Board is making use of the
services of De Beers and its subsidiary companies "for the
purpose of performing its control functions in respect of
these companies". 48 Once diamonds reach South Africa, they
are handed over to CSO Valuation Ltd. for assortment in terms
of its contract with CDM. It should be noted that CSO
Valuation Ltd. is also De Beers controlled company. In South
Africa, Namibian diamonds become part of the Diamond
Producers Association.
All the diamonds acquired by the DPA from its members are
sold to The Diamond Purchasing and Trading Company Ltd.
(PURTRA), 49 which is 53 per cent owned by De Beers. PURTRA
in turn sells the diamonds to The Diamond Trading Ltd
(DITRA), and finally, DITRA sells the diamonds at its ten
'sights' annually in London to buyers who are selected and
approved by De Beers. As a result of this arrangement,
PURTRA receives a 10 per cent commission on the diamonds
which it buys from DPA. 50 The contract establishing the DPA
is the basis of De Beer's Central Selling Organisation (CSO),
the body which controls the sale of diamonds in the world
48 ibid., p.183
49 the arrangement is contained in clause 14 of the
contract
50
op.cit., Thirion Commission, p.180
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market of the capitalist countries. It is estimated that CDM
currently produces about 26 per cent of the CSO each year. 51
As Table III:1 below illustrates, the diamond industry is by
far the most strictly controlled of the world's commodity
markets.	 De Beer's main objective was to establish a
powerful monopoly.	 It is stated by the company that the
"policy of De Beers as leader of the diamond industry is to
maintain the long-term stability and prosperity of the
industry as a whole.	 To that end De Beers established and
built up the Central Selling Organisation (CSO)". 52
It is estimated that between 80-85 per cent of gem and
natural industrial diamonds are marketed by De Beer's CSO. 53
Apart from Namibia and South Africa, other major diamond
producing countries outside the socialist countries are
Botswana (50 per cent State-owned); Zaire (MIBA - 100 per
cent State-owned); Angola (DIAMANG - 61 per cent State-
owned); Sierra Leone (DIMINCO - 51 per cent State-owned);
Ghana (Consolidated African Selection Mine - 55 per cent
State-owned); and Australia. 54
 Other less important African
producers are Tanzania, Lesotho, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Liberia
51
see Greg Lanning with Marti Mueller,
	
Africa
Undermined, (Penguin Books, 1979) p.406
52
see De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd Annual Report,
1982, p.48
53
see US Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines
Bulletin, 671, Mineral Facts and Problems (1980 Edition)
p.349
54
op.cit., Greg Lanning with Marti Mueller, Africa
Undermined, p.401
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and Central African Republic. 55
	There are three channels
through which natural diamonds reach the CSO.
	 First,
diamonds which are produced in Namibia and South Africa are
channelled through till?. DPA. 3econd, long-term contractual
sales by foreign producers - such as Zaire, Angloa, Tanzania,
Botswana, and Sierra Leone - are handled by The Diamond
Corporation Ltd (wholly owned by De Beers) or its
subsidiaries or related companies. In 1982, De Beers also
entered into an agreement with the Argyle diamond mine, in
Western Australia, to market 95 per cent of the diamonds
through CSO. 56
 Third, some of the diamonds are bought on the
open market (some of these are from central and west Africa)
through De Beer's associated companies. For further details
on the CSO see Table 111.1.
55	 ibid.
56	
see Chamber of Mines Report, Namibia 1982, p.7
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NAMIBIA 26%
- CDM (LTD) 100%
DE BEERS OWNED. MINES
DIAMONDS FOUND ON
SHORE
- DE BEERS MARINE
(PTY) LTD 100% DE
BEERS OWNED. MINES
DIAMONDS IN THE
TERRITORIAL WATERS.
- DIAMOND BOARD -
CARRIES OUT ALL SALES
OF DIAMONDS WON IN
NAMIBIA
REP OF S.A. 39%
- GOVT OF S.A. 10%
PRODUCES DIAMONDS
THROUGH ALLUVIAL
DIGGING
- DE BEERS - 25%
- PREMIER - 4%
MANAGED BY SEVEN
MEMBERS:
- REP. OF S.A.- 2
INCLUDING THE CHAIRMAN
- DE BEERS - 1
- NAMIBIAN COL.ADM. - 1
- CDM - 1 AND
- DIAMOND CORP -
DIAMONDS ARE
DIAMOND PURCHASING
AND TRADING CORP.
THE DIAMONDS ARE
THEN SOLD ONCE A
MONTH TO 200 BUYERS
APPROVED BY DE BEERS.
THEY IN TURN SELL TO
CUTTERS IN ANTWERP,
AMSTERDAM, TEL AVIV,
LONDON, AND NEW YORK,
AND THEN FINALLY
THROUGH RETAILERS TO
THROUGH DE BEER'S ASSOC
COMPANIES, CSO
PURCHASES DIAMONDS
OFFERED ON THE OPEN
MARKETS IN AFRICA
AND ELSEWHERE
Table 111.1
THE WORLD DIAMOND TRADE
F
DPA 65% OF CSO
PARTIES:
- GOVT OF S.A.
- NAMIBIAN COL.ADM.
- DE BEERS
- CDM AND
- DIAMOND CORPORATION
CENTRAL SELLING ORGANISATION
DE BEERS GROUP OF COMPANIES
SORT THE DIAMONDS INTO
INDUSTRIALS AND GEMSTONES, AND
CLASSIFY THEM ACCORDING TO THE
STANDARD SELLING ASSORTMENT
DIAMOND TRADING CORP	 INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTORS
(INDIRECTLY CONTROL-	 (1946) LTD HANDLES
LED BY DE BEERS	 INDUSTRIALS 
THROUGH THE ANGLO
AMERICAN CORP. ANGLO
HOLDS ABOUT 30% OF DE
BEERS WHILE DE BEERS IN
TURN HOLDS ABOUT 33% OF
ANGLO * HANDLES GEMSTONES
	 LONG-PERM CONTRACTS
ENABLES THE DIAMOND
CORP (100% OWNED BY DE
BEERS) TO BUY DIAMONDS
FROM
- ZAIRE
- ANGOLA (MIBA)
- TANZANIA (MWADUI)
- BOTSWANA (ORAPA)
- SIERRA LEONE
(DIMINCO)
- AUSTRALIA 95%
OF ARGYLE DIAMONDS AND
- USSR THROUGH ANTWERP
IN TURN SOLD BYJ
•1/
INDUSTRIAL DIST-
RIBUTORS (SALES) LTD
THE DIAMONDS ARE SOLD
ON A DAILY BASIS BY
\APPROVED BUYERS TO
INDUSTRIES FOR DRILLS,
ABRASIVES, AND CUTTING
TOOLS
THE PUBLIC	 1
* See The Times (London) 24 March, 1980, p.22, col .h
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Source: Based on information from G Lanning and M.Mueller,
(1979), Africa Undermined, pp.400-421; Thirion Commission,
(1985), pp.180-181; U.S.Dept. of the Interior, (1980), Bureau
of Mines Bulletin - Mineral Facts and Problems, p.349;
Chamber of Mines Report, (1982), Namibia, p.7; and De Beers
Consolidated Mines Ltd., (1982), Annual Report„ p.48.
3.1.2 Evaluation
The arrangement discussed above shows that the distinguishing
feature of De Beers in relation to other mining companies
operating in Namibia is that it owns and controls productive
and distributing channels of Namibian diamonds. Its
subsidiary companies (CDM and De Beers Marine Ltd) operate in
an integrated manner and are subject to centralised
decision-making by De Beers. As a result, it is submitted
that De Beers is in essence dealing with itself. It is able
to fix diamond prices from its Namibian affiliates without
making use of the machinery of the ordinary market. These
transactions are based on an arbitrary system of
intra-company transfer pricing designed to maximise
advantages to De Beers by shifting tax from Namibia.
However, it is submitted that other companies are also
involved. For instance, Tsumeb failed to report silver and
gold content of blister copper it exports for refining. It
is stated that as a result, "the Namibian authorities have
been unable to verify independently how • much Tsumeb earns
from precious metals. The amounts were not small. In 1983
alone, 103.18 tons of silver were recovered from Tsumeb's
blister copper and lead ingots. Apart from tax avoidance,
the same companies appear to have made wide use of transfer
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pricing devices to limit that part of their income which
would be counted as generated and taxed in Namibia."57
The Thirion Commission found several cases in the minutes of
the Diamond Board in wIlich tran3fers and exchange of diamonds
between De Beers and DICORP had taken place. It also found
that in some cases, diamonds were sent to South Africa for
sawing before sale. In all these cases, no export duty was
paid. 58 The Commission also concluded that unless "the
Board's control extends all the way from the production site
to the sorting table and from there to the final sale and is
exercised by persons who are independent of the producer, the
purported control	 remains a sham". 59 The Halbscheid
Agreement between CDM and the colonial administration gave De
Beers an added advantage.	 CDM was granted a diamond
concession in an area covering 3.5 million hectares or 36,000
square kilometres. 60 The area covers one of the richest gem
diamonds in the world. Thus, in securing access to the
Namibian diamonds, De Beers succeeded in securing exclusive
access by legally monopolising control over the diamonds.
57 See Financial Times, London, 1986, March 18, p. 36,
col. a.
58	 op.cit., Thirion Commission, p.197
59	 ibid., p.185
60
see Windhock Observer, - Namibia, 6 July, 1985,
p.27, col.c.
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3.2 Diamond Profits
De Beer's investment in Namibia is by far the most important
to its profits. Table 111:2 below shows CDM's contribution
to De Beer's profits after ta g . It should be noted that
these figures do not give the real extent and nature of CDM's
profit contribution to De Beers. A number of factors such as
transfer pricing, tight secrecy in the diamond industry,
elusive and misleading information published by CDM must be
taken into account.
According to Hangala, total diamond production during the
period 1953-1970 amounted to 44,766,325 metric carats. CDM
expatriated a net profit after taxes of about US$1299
million. 61 As Table III illustrates, CDM is one of De Beer's
most profitable companies. It is estimated that in "the
five-year period to 1967, the annual profits of CDM
averaged £7.5 million ... after tax. This is equivalent to
an average rate of return of 500 per cent" on its original
investment. 62 It is also stated that "in 1970, which was not
a good year for De Beers, it made more profit than the twenty
most profitable South African companies combined ,, . 63 It is
important to note that CDM contributed 40 per cent of De
Beer's profits after tax during the same period (Table 111:2
61
op.cit., Leake S. Hangala, Structure of Namibian
Mineral Industry, p.24
62
op.cit., Greg Lanning with Marti Mueller, Africa
Undermined, p.472
63	 . .ibid., p.447
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TABLE 111:2 - CDM'S PROFIT CONTRIBUTION TO DE BEERS
A	 1956-1962
YEAR DIAMONDS: VALUE IN US$ MILLION NET PROFITS IN DE BEERS
1956 49 31
1957 47 28
1958 38 25
1959 43 31
1960 44 33
1962 32 43
1970-1979
PROFITS AS % OF DE BEERS
GROUP AFTER TAX
YEAR % OF GEMSTONE PRODUCTION
BY DE BEERS GROUP MINES
1970 48 40
1971 44 33
1972 43 39
1973 42 41
1974 39 40
1975 41 42
1976 40 41
1977 41 45
1978 39 45
1979 31 40
Source: A Nicolas De Kun, The Mineral Resources of Africa
(Elsevier Publishing Company - London 1965) p.165
B S.Hangala, Structure of Namibian Mineral Industry,
University Printing Press, Helsinki, 1985) p.28
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above. It is also important to note that Namibia produces 98
per cent gem diamonds which are more valuable than the
industrial diamonds found in South Africa.
In addition, a number of other factors determine the
profitability of CDM in Namibia, these include: (1) cheap
method of extraction - there has been a trend towards an open
cast system of mining. This trend can be attributed to
several factors, e.g., surface mining yields a higher
recovery rate than deep mining and does so more economically.
(2) Cheap labour - African employees in Namibia are paid low
wages. 64 (3) Favourable tax system - mining companies in
Namibia pay low taxes than in any other country in Southern
Africa. These issues are discussed in detail in chapter IV.
4	 URANIUM
The maturity of the industrial revolution and the associated
emergence of multinational companies in the capitalist
countries created an entirely new environment for mineral
exploitation, marketing, and use. The scale of operations,
complexity of extraction, process, and technology grew. This
resulted into mineral exploitation to become an elaborate
chain of activities which included prospecting, extraction
and marketing.	 In the case of uranium, 	 processing,
enrichment, and reprocessing was added into the list of
64 see report in the Sunday Times - London, 7 April,
1974, p.10, col.b.
138
activities. Mining legislation and regulation reflects this
new development.
We have already noted in the proceeding chapter that the
Atomic Energy Act of 1967 provides the South African
Government with control of all uranium mined in Namibia.
Section 2 vests the sole right to produce nuclear or atomic
energy in the State. It also provides for the control of
processing, enrichment, reprocessing, possession and disposal
of source material. Therefore, by contrast with the case for
other minerals, the 1967 Act gives the South African
administration direct control of Namibia's uranium.
Therefore, in discussing the Namibian uranium industry, a
number of factors must be taken into account. It must be
noted that unlike diamonds, details of uranium contracts are
normally kept secret by all parties concerned. It is also
difficult to provide a reliable overall assessment of the
Rossing mine mainly due to political reasons.
RTZ has adamantly refused to reveal to whom and on what terms
Namibian uranium is sold.	 In addition, although it is a
British company, it has decided to shelter under s.30 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1967 which bans the disclosure of any
information about South Africa's nuclear programme. The
secrecy provision has resulted in even the Articles and
memorandum of Association of Rossing being withdrawn from
public scrutiny. 65	In addition, whereas export and sales
65	
see Windhoek Advertiser - Namibia, 29 April, 1985
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policies of countries such as Australia, Canada and the US
are largely based on non-proliferation and peaceful use of
nuclear energy, South Africa (not being a member or signatory
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons)
pursues its nuclear policy with practically no legal
restrictions. The South African Government policies are
therefore mainly concerned with maximising returns rather
than with other issues such as nuclear proliferation and
international security. This explains why South Africa is
the most secretive among uranium exporters.
4.1 A brief history of uranium
Radioactive ores were mined long before uranium came to prove
its potential. It is stated by Gray that "At first,
radioactive ores were mined for radium, used for medical
purposes; uranium was a by-product with limited use and less
value". 66 Up to about 1912, the only uranium and radium
bearing ores in the world were located in Czechoslovakia at
Joachymsthal mines. 67
 Other sources were later discovered in
Colorado and Utah. In 1915, a third source was discovered in
Africa in Zaire where Belgian prospectors discovered uranium
and radium. 68 The Shinkolobwe mine in Katanga region of
Zaire started production in 1921 by Union Miniere du Haut
66
see Earle Gray,
	 The Great Uranium Cartel,
(McClelleland and Stewart, Toronto, 1982) p.16
67	 . .ibid., p.17
68	 . .ibid.
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Katanga.	 Zairean uranium played an important role
	 in
manufacturing the world's first nuclear bomb.
During the early 1940s, the Shinkolobwe uranium mine was the
largest source ,i-aniun in the world. Towards the end of
1940, Union Ailliere started shipping Zairean uranium to New
York - USA mainly because the company feared that Germany
might invade the then Belgian Congo. During the period when
the Manhattan Project was under way (i.e., the project
assigned to manufacture a nuclear bomb), 1,200 tons of
Zairean uranium was used. 69 Later, uranium was discovered in
Canada, Australia, South Africa, Spain, France, Gabon (in
1963 at Oklo and Mouna), 70
 and Niger (in 1974). 71 Brazil and
Argentina are among minor uranium producers. 72 Finally,
extensive uranium exploration in developing countries has
indicated potential commercial reserves in a number of
countries such as Algeria, Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea,
Togo,Nigeria, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Angola, Somalia, Zaire
(the Shinkolobwe mine was exhausted in the early 1960s and
closed down), Mexico, Peru, Chile, Bolivia and Colombia.73
69	 ibid., p.23
70 see UN Centre on Transnational Corporations,
Transnational Corporations and Contractual Relations in
the World Uranium Industry: A technical Paper, (United
Nations, New York, 1983) p.26
71	 ibid.
72	 ibid.
73	 ibid., p.58
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After the Second World War, the major world powers embarked
on an arms race to develop new weapons of mass destruction.
In August 1949, the Soviet Union became the second nation to
explode an atomic bomb, followed by Britain in October
1952. 74 The atomic bomb w3i; followed by a more deadly and
powerful bomb, the hydrogen bomb, and in November 1952, the
US exploded the word's first thermonuclear device. This was
followed by the Soviet Union in August 1953. 75 In addition
to producing weapons,
	 new technology revealed that
electricity could be produced commercially from power plants
utilising a controlled fission process. 76 It was later
discovered that the amount of energy that could be obtained
by this process was considerable, and as a consequence,
nuclear power began to be seen by leaders in the East and
West as the source of energy for the future. Multinational
corporations also realised that nuclear power would provide
an opportunity for massive investments and profits. This led
to the emergence of the concept of the 'peaceful atom', as
put forward by President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace"
proposals in 1953. 77
To the general public, the promise of a "peaceful atom" was
very attractive initially because it added a ray of hope in a
op.cit., Earle Gray, The Great Uranium Cartel, p.40
ibid.
see R.Rometsch, international Safeguards on the
peaceful uses of nuclear material, (Nuclear Law Bulletin
- OECD) vol.13, April, 1974, p.66
74
75
76
77	 . .ibid ., p.67
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world entangled in a massive arms race. This led to a wide
variety of corporations (both private and public) devoting
their expertise to developing nuclear power. In June 1954,
the Soviet Union became tho first nation to produce
electricity .ror itclear Yli:; was followed by Britain
in May 1956, and by the US in December 1957. 78
4.2 Uranium Contracts
Once nuclear power proved to be a viable commercial
enterprise, markets for nuclear power reactors spread to the
Third World countries including South Africa. The racist
South African regime began to undertake an ambitious nuclear
power programme in order to lessen its dependence on imported
oil, and thus, to be in a better position to cope with an
oil embargo. Nuclear power today is big business. It
requires a vast input of capital and expertise. It is for
these reasons that companies which originally showed the most
interest were those with large organisation and reserves of
capital. Companies such as RTZ decided in 1966 to invest in
Namibian uranium mining despite the fact that the territory
is illegally occupied. Any misgivings about this illegality
of South Africa's presence were set aside in view of the
possibility of huge profits and protection from both the home
country (Britain) and South Africa.
	
A number of factors
influenced RTZ to invest in illegally occupied Namibia.
78	
op.cit., Earle Gray, The Great Uranium Cartel, p.41
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Before we discuss Namibian uranium contracts in detail, it is
necessary to discuss uranium sales contracts generally.
4.2.1	 Analysis of Sales Contracts
Most uranium industry trade is focused on uranium oxide. 	 It
is the nuclear fuel most commonly sold under contract.	 The
next phase in the nuclear cycle is called Uranium
Hexafluoride (UF6). Due to a number of factors, conversion
of uranium oxide (U308) to UF6 is limited by technological
constraints, as a result, few companies from developed
countries operate the facilities which are located 	 in
developed countries. In 1983, there were less than 10
conversion facilities in the world, excluding socialist
countries. Not a single one is located in the developing
countries. 79 Furthermore, enrichment of OF6 is strictly
controlled by national governments in which enrichment
facilities are located. This trend is a continuation of
government policy dating back to the period when the industry
was exclusively used to manufacture nuclear weapons.
Therefore, government control over enrichment processes
restricts sales of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) and the
enriched uranium. It is for this reason that the discussion
in this section mainly refers to the marketing of uranium
oxide (0308).
79 op.cit., UN Centre on Transnational Corporations,
Transnational Corporations and Contractual Relations in
the World Uranium Industry: A technical Paper, p.30
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The uranium world market is highly concentrated in terms of
both buyers and sellers. In 1983, Canada was the leading
supplier followed closely by Namibia and South Africa. 80
Among the importers, Japan 4as the largest, followed by West
Germany. It is submitted :hat developing countries do not
enjoy a strong bargaining position mainly due to the fact
that uranium production is concentrated in developed
countries. In 1980, developed countries accounted for 80 per
cent of non-socialist uranium production. 81 Most uranium
sales contracts are regulated and distinguished by the time
dimension and frequency of delivery. For the purposes of our
discussion, three types of sales contracts have been
identified namely, (a) spot sales; (b) short-term contracts;
and (c) long term cont:acts.
A	 Spot Sales contracts
Spot sales contracts refer to those transactions which
are made for a fi.ced price on a single occasion. It is
important to not that, aaIike in many other mineral
commodities, there is no official spot market for the
trade and pricing of uranium. In most cases, delivery
of uranium oxide - which is usually traded in this way
at the international market - usually occurs immediately
or soon after purchase. The price which the purchaser
pays is normally the prevailing spot price at the time
80	 ibid.
81	 ibid., p.60
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of signing the agreement.
	
The other distinguishing
feature of a spot sales contract is that each sale is
under a new and different.ag reement, unrelated to any
earlier sale. 82 Spot	 sales	 are,	 however,	 not
significant because electricity authorities are likely
to favour making firm forward arrangements for a large
proportion of their anticipated uranium requirements so
as to avoid the situation where attempts to obtain
substantial quantities at short notice cause significant
pressure on prices. Notwithstanding this potential
disadvantage, spot sales still serve a useful purpose in
that they help to smooth the relationship between supply
and demand.
Short-term Sales contracts
In contrast to spot sales, short-term uranium contracts
are a bridge between spot sales and long-term
commitments between the buyer and the seller. In
addition, a short-term sales contract involves more than
one uranium delivery by the seller to the buyer under
the same contract terms over a short period of time,
usually 18 months or less. 83 As we have seen above,
although spot sales contracts allow both buyers and
sellers maximum flexibility, they can work to the
disadvantage of either party. They do not afford buyers
82	 ibid., p.105
83	 ibid., p.106
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with surety of supply and prices may work to the
disadvantage of either party. The buyer is vulnerable
when prices increase, while the seller is vulnerable
when prices decrease. Finally, spot sales contracts may
work to the considerable disadvantage of the seller in
that he is not guaranteed an outlet.
It is also submitted that short-term contracts play a
significant role due to the shortcomings of 	 the
long-term contracts. There are a number of factors
which may work against long-term contracts. In trying
to reach agreements on prices to be paid for uranium,
considerable difficulties could be encountered. Cost
changes arising from general inflationary conditions and
from changes in exchange rates cannot be forecast
accurately, and the possible advent of new uranium
producers and the effects of change in mining and
milling techniques are further complicating factors.
Also consumers would not generally be in a position to
make firm forward commitments for all their long-term
uranium requirements,	 principally because of the
possibility of changes in demand for electricity. In
the long term, neither the uranium requirements in a
given time period nor the rate of growth of requirements
can be predicted with precision. Therefore, short-term
contracts are used to redress the problems of
extremities associated with both spot sales and
long-term contracts.
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C	 Long-term contracts
Both producers and consumers prefer long-term contracts
(compared with	 short-term contracts)	 to cover	 a
substantial proportion of their uranium transactions.
As for producers, long-term contracts reduce many of the
risks associated with the establishment and operation of
mining and milling operations. Producers may also be
able to obtain substantial advance payments on contracts
or borrow against the income expected from contracted
sales. Given the fact that there are more producers
than consumers, most producers took steps to protect
their industries. It is stated that to "protect their
market share and provide for future outlets, uranium
producers cultivated long-term relationships with the
operating nuclear utilities.	 The logical outgrowth of
this was the long-term sales contract". 84 Long-term
contracts range from 2 to 20 years, with deliveries
divided into a predetermined schedule of
	 "equal
allotment, based upon the known requirements of the
buyer's facilities". 85 Deliveries may commence several
years later after the contract is entered into, e.g.,
Rio Algom contracts entered into in 1974 had clauses
which stipulated deliveries to commence in 1981, 8 years
after the contracts were concluded. 86
84	 ibid., p.107
85	 ibid.
86	
see Rio Algom Ltd Annual Report, 1979, p.4
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In order to provide for flexibility, most long-term
contracts incorporate a 'base' price, together with
provision for renegotiation for adjustments to the base
price to provide for general cost increases. This helps
to protect producers from erosion of their 'real'
profits. The parties normally base contract prices on a
'cost-plus' formula, so that prices paid would be
adjusted to take account of actual increases in uranium
mining and milling costs in the supplying countries.
The practice in the early 1960s was to quote a fixed
price in the contract. 87 Although this method resulted
in stable prices and provided producers with protection
of their market shares while at the same time enabling
consumers assured supplies at known prices, increasing
world uranium prices during the 1970s meant that sellers
were losing considerable potential profits. In
addition, producers were beginning to experience rising
production costs. As a result, most long-term contracts
began to incorporate clauses such as base price, market
price, negotiated price and cost of production price.
Therefore, negotiated prices afford highly flexible
pricing in response to both market circumstances and the
particulars of each long-term contract transaction. A
combination of price formulas discussed above are widely
being used by Rio Algom, RTZ's subsidiary company
87
op.cit. UN Centre on Transnational Corporations,
Transnational Corporations and Contractual Relations in
the World Uranium Industry: A technical paper, p.108
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operating in Canada.
	 Most of the long-term contracts
entered into in 1966 were mainly of the "base-price-plus
escalation	 type".88	 Most	 of	 them were
	 later
renegotiated "to recognise changes in economic
conditions". Finally, contracts entered into in 1974
provided for prices to be determined on an annual basis
at the "higher of a minimum price and a settlement price
to be determined in advance of each delivery year,
taking into account free world market conditions for
uranium oxide for the delivery year". 89
4.2.2	 Rossing Uranium Contracts
In May 1971, Rossing Uranium Ltd announced its intention to
develop an open-cast uranium mine. 90 By 1975, all the
details relating to the financing of
	 the mine were
completed91
 and the construction of the main processing plant
was completed in June 1976. 92 The completion of the
processing plant enabled its commissioning and commercial
production of 771 tons of uranium oxide during the same year.
Once Rossing became a commercially viable mine, RTZ started
offering shares in the mine to potential customers with the
added lure of long-term delivery contracts at fixed prices.
88	
see Rio Algom Ltd Annual Report, 1979, p.4
89	 ibid.
90	
see RTZ Annual Report and Accounts, 1971, p.33
91	 ibid., 1975, p.34
92	 ibid., 1976, p.32
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Given the fact that uranium is a strategic mineral, most
cutomers tend to be government agencies (i.e., State owned or
controlled companies). This means that although privately
owned comapnies such as RTZ mine uranium, contracts between
sellers and buyers are usually settled at governmental level.
The first most important customer in RTZ's dealings was the
British Government.	 As Grenada Television Ltd., World in
Action programme stated in 1980, 93 .How Britain came to be
involved in the Rossing contract is a mystery". Mr. Anthony
Wedgwood Benn, the then minister responsible for the signing
of the contract, alleged that the original 1968 contract was
with RTZ's subsidiary company in Canada and Namibia became
the source after a "secret" switch. 94 This position is
supported by the Labour Party. It is stated that "The
involvement with Namibian uranium began in 1968 when the
AEA95
 was authorised to conclude a contract with Rio Algom (a
Canadian subsidiary of RTZ) ... In early 1970 the contract
was switched to Riofinez, a South African subsidiary of RTZ,
to exploit deposits at the Rossing mine in Namibia." 96
On the other hand, RTZ maintains that Namibia was always
intended to be the source. RTZ's Alistair Frame put it in
these terms: "the contract originally was with Rossing always
93 "Follow the Yellowcake Road" 10.3.80.
94. .ibid.
95Atomic Energy Authority.
96See the Labour Party (April 1981), Statement by the
National Executive Committee, Namibia, p. 7.
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was with Rossing and there was no attempt to switch." 97 Alun
Roberts states that the British Government signed a "contract
with RTZ for Namibian uranium" in March 1968. 98 In 1968, a
contract was signed between the British Government and the
company to deliver 7,500 tons of uranium oxide. This was to
be delivered, initially, between 1976 and 1982, but technical
problems and a fire which destroyed one plant at Rossing
meant that the duration of the contract had to be extended to
a date which is currently unknown. At the present moment,
the exact duration of the contract is shrouded in secrecy
although it is officially stated that it ended in December
1985. In a letter dated 18th July 1984, RTZ chairman,
Anthony Tuke, stated that the "'date on which the CEGB
contract with Rossing Uranium will terminate depends upon all
the formalities of that contract being satisfied, and the
CEGB will decide that.
	 I cannot give you a specific date
for this, ... we anticipate that these will be finalised in
September or October this year'".
	 In November 1984, a
Foreign Office official announced that the contract would end
"'early in 1985'". Again on the 21st January 1985, an
official from the Department of Energy, Alastair Goodlad,
gave a written reply to a parliamentary question stating that
the "'contract with the Rossing mine has already
terminated'". The same answer was repeated on 26th March
97
op. cit. "Follow the Yellowcake Road."
98See Alun Roberts, The Rossing File: The Inside Story
of Britain's Secret Contract for Namibian Uranium, CANUC, p.
63, for a detailed discussion see particularly pp. 22-33.
See also SWAPO of Namibia, (1982), Trade Union Action on
Namibian Uranium, London, p. 24.
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1985 stating that deliveries "'under the contract were
completed in December 1984'".99
It has also recently been revealed by Mr Tony Benn, the
former British Energy Secretary, that on 29th January 1976,
the Cabinet amended the contract to increase the quantity by
a further 1,100 tonnes. This means that the total amount of
Namibian uranium was increased to 8,600 tonnes. 100 As Table
111:3 illustrates, with Britain openly committed, other
customers followed but until recently, their identities have
remained secret. It later transpired that other customers
include Japan, West Germany and France. Iran was also
initially involved in the Namibian uranium. Its involvement
was part of the late Shah's grant design to transform his
country into a modern industrial power. Plans were made to
build up a massive nuclear power programme. An estimated 20
nuclear power plants were to be built at a cost of US$30
billion. 101 This required a large amount of uranium, some of
which was to come from Namibia.
Between 1975 and 1976, Iran contracted to buy 1,784 tons of
Namibian uranium oxide at $27 a pound, considerably below the
market price, at that time $40. 102 Other reports suggest
99
see CANUC - Update on the CEGB - Rossing Contract,
1983-1985
100 see South, February, 1983, p.67
101 ibid., p.66
102
see The Times - London, 30 December, 1979, p.19,
col.b.
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Table 111:3
	 Namibian Contracted Uranium Deliveries MTU
YEAR
1976
BNFL (now)
to CEGB
-
JAPAN
-
IRAN
-
FRG
400
FRANCE
-
TOTAL
400
1977 630 690 - 800 - 2100
1978 630 1070 100 900 - 2690
1979 630 2010 100 1000
-
3740
1980 830 2310 (470) 1000 - 3940
1981 1250 2710 (1000) 340 110 4410
1982 1250 2810 (1000) 340 460 4760
1983 1250 2710 (1000) 340 850 5160
1984 1250 2710 (1000) 340 1380 5680
1985 1250 2710 (1000) 340 1380 4430
1986 3360 (1000) 340 1380 5080
1987 2380 (1000) 1380 3760
1988 2380 (1000) 1380 3760
1989 1150 (1000) 1380 2530
1990 1150 (1000) 1380 2530
Source: Michael C.Lynch and Thomas L.Neff, The Political
Economy of African Uranium and its Role in International
Market (Bendix Field Engineering Corporation, Grand Junction
Co. (USA) March 1982, Unclas UN Ltd. 1982) p.36
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that the total delivery of uranium contracted by the Shah was
between 30,000 to 50,000 STU 308. 103 In addition, the Shah
agreed to take a secret 15 per cent stake in the mine itself.
The contract was subsequently cancelled when there was a
change in Government. It later came to light that towards
the end of 1979, the Iranian Government tried to dispose of
Namibian uranium delivered to West Germany for processing
into hexafluoride. In December 1982, after the cancellation
of the contract by Iran, RTZ singed a 15 year contract to
supply 4,000 tonnes of uranium oxide to the Taiwan Power
Corporation. Unconfirmed reports suggest that this uranium
is likely to come from Rossing, possibly comprising supplies
which had originally been contracted to Iran. 104
It is interesting to note that in the interests of secrecy,
RTZ decided to set up a 'letter box company' in Switzerland
at a place called Zug. It was reported in 1979 that the
Namibian uranium trade was being organised at a "private
house in the small Swiss town of Zug. The house, at number
10 Baarenstrasse, is staffed by a single secretary. She
refers all enquirers to a firm of Zurich lawyers, Pestallozi
and Gmur. Their specialty is the setting up of 'letter-box
companies' on behalf of big multinationals. That Zug house
is the nominal headquarters of RTZ Mineral Services ... in
103
see Michael C.Lynch and Thomas L.Neff,
	 The
Political Economy of African Uranium and its Role in
International Markets (Bendix Field Engineering
Corporation, Grand Junction Co. (USA) March 1982, Unclas
UN Ltd) p.83
104
see New Statesman, 28 January, 1983
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reality, RTZ Mineral Services is operated from its parent
company's London headquarters in St James' Square". 105 The
main function of RTZ Mineral Services is to handle RTZ's
world sales of uranium oxide and hexafluoride. This explains
how the Japanese Government managed to cancel the uranium
contract with Rossing only to contract the same amount with
RTZ. 106
Therefore, RTZ Mineral Services is intended to conceal the
source of Namibian uranium. It could also be the case that
RTZ sought to establish this "letter box company" in order to
avoid embarrassing some of its uranium customers who may be
reluctant to contract directly with Rossing. This explains
how the Japanese Government, through Mitsubishi International
Corporation, managed to cancel the uranium contract with
Rossing only to contract the same amount with RTZ through its
wholly owned "company", RTZ Mineral Services.
According to Yoko Kitazawa, some of the functions of RTZ
Mineral Services is to provide "services related to the
extraction and sales of natural and refined minerals and
executing in-transit shipping." 107 In reality, the company
105
see The Sunday Times - London, 30 December, 1979,
p.19, col.b.
106 see New Statesman, 28 January, 1983; Swapo Press
Release of 5th February, 1983; C Lynch and Thomas
L.Neff, The Political Economy of African Uranium and its
Role in International Markets, op.cit., p.60
1075ee Yoko Kitazawa, "On the illegal Japanese Uranium
Deals", in United Nations, (1985) Seminar on the Activities
of Foreign Economic Interests
	
in the Exploitation of 
(Footnote Continued)
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is "not simply a paper company but a ghost company. This
means that transactions with Mitsubishi's head office in
London are directly with Rossing in Namibia ... The Rossing -
RTZ - Mitsubishi connection is a typical example of the true
nature of the transnational corporations which 	 readily
ignore, for their own profit-seeking, the sufferings of the
victims of colonialism and racial discrimination." 108 The
policy of the Japanese Government seems to be that unless the
imported uranium shows a Namibian certificate of origin, no
action can be taken against the importer. 109
A	 Uranium Prices
There is considerable difficulty in predicting the
uranium market mainly because of its chronic
instability. From 1946 until 1960, uranium markets
boomed, largely because of the US military demands. It
is reported that u ranium deliveries to the US Atomic
Energy Commission reached "a peak of 34,400 tons of
uranium oxide (U308)" 110
 most of it imported. Once the
military requirement was met, the industry began to
experience a slump.	 Further problems were faced when
the US decided to impose an official embargo on uranium
(Footnote Continued)
Namibia's Natural and Human Resources, Ljubljana, Yugoslavia,
16-20 April 1984, New York p. 55.
108. .ibid.
109 i bid. p.56.
110 see New Scientist, January-March, vol.85, 1980,
p.549
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imports in 1964. This measure was intended to protect
the viability of the domestic industry. Prices fell
from over US $44/kg of uranium oxide (U308) to less than
$15.
A number of factors helped to transform the uranium
slump into a boom. Deprived of the US market (the
world's largest uranium market), producers in Namibia,
Canada, Australia, South Africa, France and
multinational companies such as RTZ decided to form a
club which entered into what was called 'informal
marketing arrangements'. 111 The move was first backed
by the Canadian Government with its mining industry to
form an international price-fixing and market sharing
cartel for uranium. The first meeting of major
international uranium producers is reported to have
taken place in Paris in 1972. At this meeting and other
subsequent meetings, policies were developed to regulate
market quotas, terms and conditions of sales, and the
awarding of sales agreements. This was later confirmed
by a senior Canadian federal official who was reported
to have said that "'anything the producers did was with
the blessing of the Canadian Government'''. 112 In 1972,
the Canadian Government was forced to establish a
minimum export price for uranium. In August 1972, the
111
see Financial Times - London 22 January, 1980,
p.15, col.a.
112
see The Sunday Times - London, 5 September, 1976,
p.41, col.a
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Canadian Minister of Mines and Energy stated that: "'To
stabilise the current uranium marketing situation and to
promote the development of the Canadian uranium
industry, I have today issued a direction to the Atomic
Energy Control Board covering such aspects as minimum
selling prices and volumes of sales to export
markets . 113 During the early days of the cartel, the
spot price for uranium soared from US $5 a pound to
$40. 114
It is interesting to note that it was during the period
of the cartel that Rossing announced its intention to
develop an open-cast uranium mine in Namibia. During
the first half of the 1970s, RTZ's fortunes in the
uranium industry multiplied, the cartel succeeded in
pushing the price of uranium to profitable levels.
There were other factors simultaneously existing which
contributed to the uranium price rise. These factors
include the Australian government policy regarding
uranium development, Canadian uranium export policies,
Opec price increases and the Westinghouse announcement
of its decision not to honour its contract commitments
to supply uranium to its customers. Westinghouse, (a
nuclear power plant manufacturer and influential
middleman in the international uranium market) sold 80
113
see The Times - London, 24 August, 1972, p.16,
col.h.
114
spot price refers to small quantities of uranium
bought from the open market at short notice.
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million pounds of uranium, 65 million of which it did
not have, to its customers for $1,000m, in the hope of
picking it up later at low prices. The strategy of the
company was to offer supplies of uranium as an
inducement to utilities to buy its nuclear plants. This
proved to be a very serious miscalculation because
uranium prices rose even faster.
In September 1975, the company was forced to plead
"commercial impractability" (force majeure) as a reason
for not supplying its customers with uranium. 115 One of
the most decisive factors was Opec's decision to raise
the price of oil in 1973. This move led to uranium
prices soaring even further. Following the reduction in
oil supply from the Middle East, the EEC formulated a
policy whereby it was to become independent of Middle
East oil supplies by a massive expansion of its nuclear
programme. Uranium prices rose even further due to
surging demand as nuclear programmes grew all over the
world in response to oil price rises. This situation
led utilities to scramble, scrambling into the market to
obtain the necessary fuel for reactors ordered or being
built.
Political developments in Australia added to Rossing's
market opportunities. Australia's uranium development
was delayed because of the Government's desire to keep
115
see Financial Times - London, 22 January, 1980,
p.15, col.a.
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the industry under national control.
	 The Australian
Labour Government imposed an embargo on uranium exports,
and halted new uranium mine developments. This move
forced one Australian company, Queensland Mines, to
declare force majeure on the supply of uranium to
Japan. 116 In 1977, the United States announced the
gradual lifting of the embargo on uranium imports.
Utilities were permitted to import 10 per cent of their
uranium requirements in 1977. It is stated that the
"percentage was gradually increased to 15 per cent in
1978, 20 per cent in 1979, 30 per cent in 1980, 40 per
cent in 1981, and 60 per cent in 1982", and it was
totally lifted in 1984.117
In the case of Australia, stringent conditions on
uranium reprocessing were imposed when the Conservative
Government lifted the uranium export ban. The lifting
of the ban did not completely remove the political
sensitivity of the industry. The Labour Party even
threatened to abrogate international contracts if it
were returned to power. 118 The move by the Conservative
Government to impose stringent conditions on uranium
contracts led Japan to threaten Australia that it would
116
see The Times - London, 24 August, 1972, p.16,
col.h.
117
op.cit., UN Centre on Transnational Corporations,
Transnational Corporations and Contractual Relations in
the World Uranium Industry: A technical paper, p.56
118
see The Times - London, 5 September, 1977, p.5,
col.b.
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Table 111:4
	 The Estimated price of uranium and UK
expenditure on Namibian supplies, 1978-1984 (March
1982 prices)
YEAR
	 PRICES
	
EXPENDITURE3
WORLD MARKET NAMIBIAN CONTRACT AT WORLD AT NAMIBIAN
PRICES1
	
(PRI9
	 MARKET PRICE CONTRACT
($/LB)
	
MB)	 PRICE
1978 48 16 235.5 78.6
1979 42 14 196.4 65.5
1980 36 12 160.3 53.4
1981 35 12 148.3 50.8
1982 34 11 137.3 44.5
1983 32 11 123.1 42.4
1984 31 10 113.6 36.6
TOTALS 1,114.5 371.8
Notes:
1	 1980 to 1985 estimates are derived from CEGB/P7, Table
5, p.31; the 1978 figure is estimated from M.Radetski
'Uranium' (London; Croom Helm, 1981); and the 1979
figure is linearly interpolated between those for 1978
and 1980.
2	 These are derived on the basis that, as of January 1977,
the contract price was about one-third of that
prevailing on the world market - see The Rossing File
(London: CANDC, 1980) p.47. This is assumed to hold
between 1978 and 1984.
3	 Discounted to 1993 and expressed in $ million.
Source:
	 The Sizewell B PWR and Namibian Uranium - Proof of
Evidence by Robert Rosenthal, Sizewell B Power Station Public
Inquiry RR/P/1.
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turn to South Africa if new terms were too tight. 119 This
partly explains why Namibian uranium is so important to
Japan. Finally, Namibian uranium is attractive to custom ers
because there are no restrictions on reprocessing or the
product being used to manufacture nuclear weapons. Canada 120
and Australia121 prohibit customers to use their uranium for
the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The provisions of the
agreement between these two countries and their customers are
verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAA)
(and the European Atomic Energy Commission - Euratom - with
the EEC customers). This enables the two governments to
decide as to whom should uranium be sold, and under what
conditions should such sale be allowed. In respect of the
UK, the attraction of Namibian uranium has been stated in
these terms: "'RTZ supplies the uranium upon which the
military programme ... depend .,. RTZ and the Government have
a direct interest in trying to acquire uranium without
safeguards ... the defence interest in unsafeguarded uranium
is the only possible explanation ... for the decision to
shift to Rossing from Canada 122
119 see The Sunday Times - London, 26 January, 1977,
p.63, col.h.
120
see The Times - London, 1978, 17 January, p.4.,
col.f; UN Centre on Transnational Corporations,
Transnational Corporations and Contractual Relations in
the World Uranium Industry: A technical paper, op.cit.,
p.55; and Rio Algom Ltd Annual Report, 1977, p.3
121
see The Times - London, 1981, 22 September, p.15,
col.b
122 Statement by Tony Benn (Labour Minister 	 for
Technology and responsible for the UK Atomic Energy
Authority from 1966-1970). He made the statement at the
(Footnote Continued)
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B	 Uranium Profits
RTZ has made enormous profits on its uranium operations in
Namibia. Up to 1978, the Palabora Copper mine in South
Africa used to be the company's principal investment in
Southern Africa with its holding of 29 per cent in Palabora
Mining Company Ltd. 123
 This picture was radically changed in
1979 when Rossing became fully operational. Since 1979,
Rossing became by far the most profitable investment in
Southern Africa with profits several times higher than the
Palabora Copper mine in South Africa. In 1979, Rossing
represented 47.8% of total uranium sales in RTZ group of
companies, and 49% in 1980. 124
 Rossing's contribution to RTZ
profits is illustrated by Table 111:5 below.
It is clear from Table 111:5 that RTZ's most profitable
investment in Africa is Rossing. It is interesting to note
that between 1980 and 1981, Rossing became the third largest
profit contributor to RTZ's net profit attributable to its
shareholders. 125	Rossing's 1982 results were even more
encouraging since it was the second largest contributor to
RTZ's net profit. 126 Given these huge profits, it is
(Footnote Continued)
Bristol Commission of Inquiry into RTZ, on 27 November,
1982, see The RTZ - The Alternative Report, 23 May, 1984
123 see RTZ Annual Report and Accounts, 1972, p.33
124 see Trade Union Seminar on Namibian Uranium,
London, 19-31 June 1981
125 see RTZ Annual Report and Accounts, 1980, p.49 and
1981, p.49
126 ibid., 1982, p.51
164
Ii1JLAGE 
•5
H.A Huiswan Esq
Kajuit 295
Groningen
Holland
RTZ
R.T.Z. Services Limited
PO Box 133
6 St James's5quare London SW1Y 4LD
Telephone 01-930 2399
Telegrams Riozinc London Telex SW1
Telex 24639
BPH/AC
7 September 1978
Dear Sir
In reply to your letter of the 27th August, we regret that under
the South African Atomic Energy Act we are unable to give you
information about the contracts of Rossing, except for the. one
with British Nuclear Fuels which was made public in answer to a
question in the House of Commons. This contract is for 7600 tons
but no other details were made public.
The same restriction, of course, applies to the Palabora Mining
Company.
Yours faithfully
B P Hee (Miss)
Social Responsibility Adviser
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unlikely that the company (RTZ) will ever abandon its illegal
involvement in Namibia's uranium industry as a consequence of
international pressure. This reluctance is coupled with the
double protection which it enjoys both from the British
Government and from the racist South African regime. Its
involvement in the Namibian uranium industry has resulted in
large amounts of uranium oxide (U308 ) being shipped out of
the country every year. 127 From 1976 to 1982, Rossing
produced and exported 27,613 tons of uranium oxide.
Mr Colin Macaullay, Rossing's Managing Director confirmed in
1985 that the company (Rossing) depends on 'exclusively'
long-term contracts. He went on to state that very "few new
sales of uranium are occurring, nor have they occurred for
some years.... Rossing has to rely on existing contracts".
According to him, Rossing's long-term contracts ran "through
the rest of the decade and the rest of the century", but to
keep the mine running at full production, "it will need more
contracts in the nineties". 128 This explains why	 the
strategy of the company has been to lure customers by
offering lower prices than those prevailing at the world
market. Compared with the 1970s, conditions in the uranium
world market have changed. The 1970s was exceptional in that
the surge in demand coincided with uncertainties over
supplies, pushing prices up. Today, the situation has
drastically changed because of a number of factors. First,
127
see the appendix
128
see Windhoek Advertiser - Namibia, 30 April, 1985,
col.a.
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Table III:V
	 RTZ's Geographical profit analysis - Africa
region
1977-1983
COUNTRY YEAR TURNOVER OF GROUP	 GROUP PROFIT
	 NET PROFIT ATTRIBUTABLE
OF COMPANIES (%)
	 BEFORE TAX (%) TO RTZ SBAREBOLDERS (%)
S.A. 1977 90.8 18.8 3.2
S.A. 1978 95.8 (4.5) 24.3 (8.6) 6.2 (6.3)
NAMIBIA 81.3 (3.9) 4.5 (1.6) 2.0 (2.0)
S.A. 1979 123.7 (4.5) 45.3 (10.0) 9.3 (6.2)
NAMIBIA 128.1 (4.7) 27.2 (6.0) 12.6 (8.4)
S.A. 1980 149.8 (4.9) 44.4 (8.3) 10.0 (6.4)
NAMIBIA 161.3 (5.3) 54.4 (10.7) 21.1 (13.6)
S.A. 1981 125.6 (3.8) 23.0 (6.6) 5.3 (5.2)
NAMIBIA 157.9 (4.8) 63.0 (18.1) 21.4 (20.9)
S.A. 1982 155.0 (3.9) 29.8 (8.7) 3.6 (2.9)
NAMIBIA 217.9 (5.5) 91.2 (26.8) 32.3 (25.8)
S.A. 1983 169.5 (3.5) 36.5 (6.3) 7.1 (3.6)
NAMIBIA 169.9 (3.5) 62.5 (10.9) 14.6 (7.4)
Source: RTZ Annual Report and Accounts, 1977-1983 pages 40,
45, 49, 51 and 53 respectively. Note no separate Namibian
statistics have been made since 1984.
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projections for future nuclear capacity have been lowered
drastically due largely to lessened demand, rising costs and
environmental and licensing restrictions.
Secondly, uranium reserves have steadily risen following the
discovery of reasonably assured resources in Australia and a
uranium expansion programme in Canada. Finally, civil
nuclear industry has become a highly politicised industry
following nuclear accidents. Environmental opposition in
many western countries has brought nuclear growth to a
virtual standstill. All these factors force Rossing to offer
its uranium below the world market price. This is
illustrated by Table 111:6. It is important to note that
Rossing uranium prices were renegotiated upwards probably in
1985. It is stated that "profits have fallen from a peak in
1982 so that by early 1985 they reached their lowest point
for a decade. Rossing has had to renegotiate its secret
long-term contracts with nuclear utilities in the major
Western countries as a result." 129
However, Rossing is still able to make substantial profits.
It is estimated that South Africa receives about US $500
million per annum "from the Rossing output". 130 There are
two major reasons why this is so, first, Namibian uranium is
129See Brian Hackland et al, (1986), "Behind the
diplomacy: Namibia, 1983-5" Third World Quarterly, vol. 8,
pp. 51-77 at 54.
130
see UN Plunder of Namibian Uranium, (New York,
1982) p.15
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1983, p.9; The Guardian, Londopn, 1983, 12 May, p.26, col.d.,
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pp.24-48; and UN, (1982), Plunder of Namibian Uranium,
pp.11-14.
cheaper because of the racial discrimination in wages, low
taxation rate, and lack of stringent legal controls in
health, ecology,and the environment. Secondly, open cast
mining is much cheaper than underground mining. In addition,
uranium will remain an important source of energy. According
to one estimate, "one drum of uranium oxide contains the
energy equivalent of 23,000 barrels of crude oil,,. 131
Transportation and Processing
Namibian uranium undergoes four processing stages. 	 At
Rossing, it is first mined as uranium ore, then milled
(crushed and treated with chemicals at the plant) in order to
yield a concentrate called uranium oxide (0 0 ). At this
stage uranium oxide is transported from Namibia for further
processing due to the fact that processing beyond uranium
oxide is a technically complex business. Uranium which is
destined for Europe is supposed to be transported by a
company called Transnuclear (owned by BNFL - 33%, French and
West German procurement agencies have a similar stake).
131
see SWA/Namibia Information Service, Mining brief,
July 1980, 0.10
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Because of political reasons, the company sub-contracts the
transport of uranium from Namibia to Europe. Although these
contracts are kept secret, it has been revealed that services
of South African Airways (SAA), UTA, and Deutsche-Africa Line
have been used. Once in Europe, services of various
non-union small transport companies are used (including the
now famous UK company called Edmundsons of Morecambe Ltd).
When Namibian uranium reaches Europe, it undergoes three
processing stages before
	 it is used in the nuclear
reactors. 132 First, uranium oxide (U308) is converted into
hexafluoride (UF6); secondly, hexafluoride is processed into
fuel rods which are fed into nuclear reactors to generate
electricity. The processing stages can be extended into
reprocessing spent fuel to produce plutonium which can be
used in fast breeder reactors. Most of the plutonium which
is produced by the United Kingdom is exported to the US133
and Japan. Transportation and processing of Namibian uranium
is illustrated by Table 111:6.
5	 BASE METALS
Tsumeb Corporation Ltd (TCL) is the principal producer of
base metals in Namibia.	 The company owns five mines
Tsumeb, Kombat, Matchless, Asis West and Otjihase - which are
served by a copper and lead smelter. In the early 1970s.
132
see CANUC News, no.3, Spring 1983, p.9
133
see unconfirmed report in The Guardian - London, 12
May 1983, p.26, col.d.
171
Tsumeb accounted for 80 per cent of the base metals produced
in the territory. 134 The company's dominant position is
partly due to the ore body which is mined in its concession
areas. It has been remarked that the "ore body at Tsumeb is
unique in that a tremendous variety of metals occur within a
single body - copper, lead, zinc, cadmium, and silver". 135
in addition, the company produces a variety of minerals such
as arsenic trioxcide, cadmium, germanium, pyrit, 136 and
gold. 137 It also has metallurgical plants, one is a smelter
of blister copper and the other is a lead smelter.
Other small producers of base metals include Oamites Mine Co.
Ltd (Falconbridge of Canada Ltd has a major shareholding);
Rosh Pina mine (owned by Iron and Steel Corporation of South
Africa); Uis mine (also owned by Iron and Steel Corporation
of South Africa); and Helicon and Rubicon mines (managed by
SWA Lithium Mines). 138
Most base mineral processing - concentration, smelting and
refining - is carried out in Namibia. Facilities for
fabrication are located close to the areas of large consumer
134
see op.cit., SWA/Namibia Information Service -
Mining Brief, p.11
135	 . .ibid.
136
op.cit., Leake S.Hangala, Structure of Namibian
Mineral Industry, p.44
137 op.cit., Thirion Commission, p.103
138
op.cit., Leake S.Hangala, Structure of Namibian
Mineral	 Industry,
	
pp.46-47;	 and Proswa Namibia
Foundation, Mining in SWA/Namibia, pp.7-10
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countries in Europe, Japan, and America. In the case of
copper, there are two generally internationally quoted
prices. Copper exports to North America are quoted at the US
foreign price. This is the price "at which the US buys
imported copper and is the price quoted on the New York
Commodity Exchange". The official price for exports to other
countries is quoted as the 'London Metal Exchange' (LME)
price. The main customers of Namibia's base metals are
France, the Netherlands, the UK, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Italy, USA, Japan, and South Africa.139
Although there are no recent official statistics on mineral
exports, the 1966 official figures (the last date of official
figures) provide a detailed analysis on country by country
basis. The figures show that there were four largest buyers
of base minerals: the US (R16.7 million), Belgium (R9.4
million), West Germany (R3.9 million - for copper and
vanadium), and South Africa (R3.3 million - for zinc and
lead). In addition, it is interesting to note that South
Africa accounted for 50 per cent of Namibia's mineral
exports. 140 It is also reported that the principal base
mineral is blister copper. In 1966, it accounted for 76 per
cent of US mineral purchases. South Africa accounted for 63
per cent of purchases in refined lead. 141
r
139
op.cit., Leake S.Hangala, Structure of Namibian
Mineral Industry, p.47; and the Thirion Commission,
op.cit. p.118
140
op.cit., G
	 Lanning	 with M Mueller,
	 Africa
Undermined, p.476
141	 . .ibid
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Most mining companies in Namibia sell their minerals through
their parent companies and affiliates outside the territory.
This provides an opportunity to the companies to use transfer
pricing techniques to make profits appear wherever it is more
covenient to them. This means that the producer list price
system is the most commonly used in order to govern sales not
only within affiliates in Namibia but abroad as well. The
Thirion Commission found that there is considerable
difference in producer list prices when compared with the
London Metal Exchange, sometimes the LME prices are "more
than 100% higher". 142
Producer list price in the case of minerals refers to mineral
prices which are set by the mining companies themselves. In
most cases, such prices are substantially lower than "free
market" prices. In the case of Namibia, producer list prices
are normally controlled by the companies to serve the
interests of a vertically integrated industry. One example
will suffice to illustrate this point. From 1979 to 1983,
Imcor Zinc (pty) Ltd's Rosh Pinah mine mineral sales of
silver, lead and zinc concentrates amounted to R84,447,190.
This was R64,395,525 less than the official London Metal
Exchange (LME) of R148,842,715. 143 All Imcor Zinc's mineral
production is sold to Zincor, both Zincor and Imcor Zinc are
wholly owned subsidiaries of Iron and Steel Corporation which
is in turn owned by the South African Government. Unlike
142 op.cit., Thirion Commission, p.117
143See The Thirion Commission, p.116.
	 See also Table
111:7 for zinc and lead concentrates.
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Nambia, other major mineral producers such as Zambia base
their prices on official LME quotations. 144
The utilization of producer list price may, however, not
necessarily mean that the prime motive is transfer pricing.
For a number of legitimate reasons, mining companies may find
it advantageous to sell their minerals below the prevailing
market price. They may prefer an assured stable market over
a long-term sales contract. However, if such sales are
between affiliates, as is often the case in Namibia, there is
a need to regulate such sales in order to minimise loss of
revenue to the State. As the Appendix on Imcor Zinc shows,
there is considerable difference between producer list prices
and free market prices. What is even more strange is the
fact that there could be a difference of up to 100 per cent
in some cases.
Finally, as the Appendix on TCL's unit prices of refined lead
shows, in most cases, mineral sales prices to South Africa
are always lower than sales to countries such as Italy and
Japan (even if one takes into account exchange rate
fluctuations, transportation costs to South Africa should be
far much less than to Japan and Italy. This should have been
reflected in the prices). The considerable difference
between producer list prices and free market prices led the
Thirion Commission to conclude that "there is reason to
144See Richard L. Sklar, (1975), Corporate Power in an
African State, University of California Press, p.777. For a
detailed discussion on Zambia see Chapter VII below.
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believe that transfer pricing in the form of the sale of
minerals at prices which are not market-related, is practised
by certain mineral producers ...
	
with resultant loss of
revenue to the State". 145
 Given the examples above, it is
submitted that South Africa (through its wholly owned and
subsidiary companies) and multinational mining companies are
the major beneficiaries at Namibia's expenses.
The problem is compounded by the fact that most of these
minerals are exported to South Africa. According to Hangala,
Namibia is the most important source of South Africa's tin
requirements. Most of the tin concentrates from Uis mine (in
Namibia) are "shipped directly to the Vanderbijlpark
Steelworks in South Africa. They provide nearly 50 per cent
of South African tin requirements for use in the production
of electrolytic-plated sheet". 146
These operations have provided enormous profits to the mining
companies. In the case of Tsumeb Corporation, from 1963 to
1967, the annual profits of the company averaged £6 million
after tax. This is equivalent to an average rate of return
of 350 per cent on its original capital investment. Profits
more than doubled from R5 million in 1972 to R13.2 million in
1973. The company continues to make huge profits
notwithstanding the fact that the market for most base
metals, especially copper, is experiencing severe recession.
145Op. cit., Thirion Commission p.119.
146
op.cit., Leake S.Hangala, Structure of Namibian
Mineral Industry, p.47
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In the eight year period to 1980, the annual profits of the
company improved considerably. Hangala estimates that net
profits between 1973 and 1980 were R77.4 million. 147 This
represents, on average, the annual net profits of R9.67
million. Namibia's production figures of copper, refined
lead, zinc, tin, silver and refined cadmium are provided in
the appendix.
Our discussion in this chapter shows that the colonial
administration does not in fact control the marketing of
minerals. Multinational mining companies have a free hand in
the disposal of the Namibian minerals. This was also noted
by the Thirion Commission which concluded that "at present
the state has	 no marketing policy at all". 148 The
Commission's Report went on to state that there is also "the
possibility that rare and valuable minerals such as germanium
dioxide and gallium may be leaving the country. At present
the state has no means whereby to physically verify the
correctness of monthly returns or the validity of the permits
in relation to the constituent parts of the minerals actually
exported". 149 Therefore,	 provisions	 in the	 mining
legislation which purport to control the marketing of the
minerals produced in the territory have become a dead letter.
147	 - .ibid., p.46
148 op.cit., Thirion Commission, p.104
149 ibid., pp.102-103
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6	 CONCLUSION
We have seen that the State has legal power to impose
restrictions in respect of mineral exports and marketing.
Accordingly it is also important to note that the legislation
does not impose any significant limits upon the capacity of
the State to control mineral exports. The scope of the power
is aptly provided for in the 1968 Ordinance, the Diamond
Industry Protection Proclamation 17 of 1939 and the Atomic
Energy Act of 1967. Therefore, it is a matter for the State
to determine the means of control, and the matters to be
taken into account in exercising the control. The power
conferred by the above statutes enables the state to
prohibit, regulate and control the exportation and marketing
of Namibian minerals. It follows therefore that the power to
regulate the exportation and marketing of Namibian minerals
necessarily comprehends the power to decide who may export or
market minerals, and on what terms should such minerals be
sold.
The means and the criteria by which this choice is to be made
are for the state to decide. The Diamond Board has wide
powers to decide how Namibian diamonds are disposed of.
These powers have not been used for the benefit of the
country as a whole. Instead, as shown above, they have been
used almost exclusively for the benefit of De Beers.
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CHAPTER IV - TAXATION OF INCOME FROM MINING
1	 INTRODUCTION
In most mineral producing developing countries, mineral
ownership by the State means that mineral resources are the
heritage of the people and the individual holder of mineral
rights is entitled only to a reasonable return on his
investment. This view is today generally accepted by most
Third World mineral producing countries which have the
welfare of their people at heart. The exploitation of a
mineral deposit leads eventually to the exhaustion of the
minerals. It follows from this that it is in the interests
of the national economy that any mineral deposit that can be
profitably exploited should be worked in the interests of the
country.
Therefore, the State should ensure that the revenues obtained
from mining operations should bear some relation to the value
of minerals extracted by the mining company exploiting it.
As will be discussed below, in the case of Namibia, the
taxation of income derived from mining operations totally
ignores these issues. The colonial administration puts more
emphasis on the interests of foreign investors, and this is
clearly reflected in the legislation. Mineral exploration is
regarded as a costly activity which carries a high element of
risk. In addition, foreign investors argue that during the
initial stage of mining development huge amounts of capital
is borrowed at a high interest which can only be compensated
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by a high rate of return on investment after the production
stage is reached.
It must, however, be noted that in most cases, the claims are
usually exaggerated because mining does indeed yield a high
return on capital and it is precisely this which makes
investment in mining attractive to foreign multinational
companies. The question whether the investor should be
allowed to recover his capital investment is usually not in
dispute, it is the conditions (i.e., the rate and speed)
under which he should be allowed to do so which are matters
for debate. As shown in Chapter II, South Africa is keen to
attract foreign investment both to its own territory as well
as to Namibia. South Africa's rate of capital accumulation
is insufficient to pay for the costs of advanced technology
and management skills necessary in the mining sector to
sustain her economic development. In order to attract such
investment into the Namibian mining industry, the regime has
tended, over the years, to offer special inducements to
foreign investors.
Therefore, it is submitted that the legislation applicable to
the taxation of income from mining operations is constructed
on automatic incentives provided by a good investment climate
to foreign investors. Any mining company which invests in
Namibia can be guaranteed all the concessions on its shopping
list - a lower tax rate; and generous provisions for
immediate write-off of capital expenditure against gross
profits.	 In addition, capital and profits are freely
allowed to be repatriated out of the territory.
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In 1981, tax legislation in Namibia was placed under the
direct control of the Administrator-General. The current tax
structure is regulated by the 1981 Income Tax Act which is
exclusively applicable to Namibia. The Act contains special
provisions applicable exclusively to mining. Differential
tax rates are applicable to income from mining of different
minerals such as precious stones, gold and uranium, and base
metals. Differential rates of tax do not, however, apply to
individuals who derive income from mining operations; such
income is taxed in the hands of the individual at the same
rate as income derived from other sources. A distinction
must therefore be drawn, in the case of companies, between
mining income and non-mining income.
With the exception of dividends received by residents in
Namibia, which are taxable regardless of source, taxation is
based entirely on income derived in the territory. There are
two types of taxes provided for under the statute namely: the
normal income tax for companies and individuals; and the
non-resident shareholders' tax levied on certain companies
(i.e., mining companies as well as other non-mining
companies). In addition to direct taxation, the Mines, Works
and Minerals Ordinance 20 of 1968 provides for payment to the
State of licence fees and rentals in consideration of the
grant of mining rights which by statute are vested in the
State.
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2	 FISCAL PROVISIONS
Before we discusss relevant statutory provisions and their
impact on the tax system, it is important to note a few
points. First, many of the financial issues relating to
mining taxation in Namibia are so complex that we cannot, in
the space of this chapter, do full justice to them.
Secondly, the main objective of this chapter is to summarise
the main features of the tax legislation which apply to
mining operations. Finally, relevant provisions relating to
income tax system, as well as royalty regimes are explained
in non-technical language.
Our purpose in this section is to discuss and analyse the
fiscal provisions of the tax legislation so as to elucidate
the nature and incidents of the legal relationship between
the colonial administration and multinational mining
companies. For this purpose, we shall look at the procedure
adopted in raising revenue from the mining industry.
2.1 Pre-production phase - licence fees and rentals
It must be noted that rights and obligations of the parties,
in the mining industry, are determined by the phase at which
private investors conduct their mining operations. These
rights and obligations are also reflected in the physical
provisions. During the prospecting and exploration phases,
private investors are required to pay certain charges to the
State. These are payments, referred to in this section as
licence fees and rentals, which are due to the State before
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income tax becomes payable when the mining phase is reached.
It is important to note that there are important distinctions
between licence fees and rentals. Licence fees vary greatly
from country to country. However, in most cases, they
include licence application fees, recording fees, filing
fees, registration fees, inspection fees, search fees, and
fees payable to the State for the transfer of rights. On the
other hand, rentals usually
	 refer to surface	 charges and
other rights that are	 payable to the State in respect of
prospecting and	 mining	 licence areas held	 by the
concessionaire. In Namibia's case, there is no standard
yardstick on which rental charges are imposed. As a result,
there are considerable variations on the rate of rentals that
private investors pay to the State. This is discussed in
detail below.
The pre-production phase is wholly regulated by the 1968
Mines, Works and Minerals Ordinance. A series of payments
for the various grants obtainable from the colonial
administration are specified in the Ordinance. Under section
20(4) of the Ordinance, a prospecting licence holder is
required to pay R25 per annum on every licence issued by the
mining commissioner. Section 30(1) requires a claimholder to
pay R2 per claim per month until his claim either lapses or
is converted into a mining area. Once such claim is
converted into a mining area, the claimholder is required to
pay R2 per hectare per year(s.47(1)).
In addition, the legislation imposes what is referred to as
"Special Grants of Prospecting". Section 60(1) empowers the
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Minister to grant to the prospecting licence holder the
exclusive right to prospect in any defined area for any
particular mineral or minerals, subject to such terms and
conditions as he may deem fit. Section 60(2)(c) requires the
holder of such grant to pay a rental determined by the
Minister. The holder of exclusive prospecting rights granted
in terms of section 60 has a right to obtain an exclusive
mining right which entitles him to mine the minerals.
However, this right is subject to a number of conditions
including the payment, in addition to taxation or any share
of profits as may be provided for in the mining grant, of a
rental determined by the Minister (s.61(4)(c)).
The statute does not set a percentage or fixed amount for
rental dues in the case of exclusive prospecting right and
exclusive mining right. As a result, fiscal provisions are
determined on an individual basis between the mining
companies and the so-called Administrator-General. The
Thirion Commission discovered that the annual rentals
determined under s.60(2)(c) in respect of prospecting grants
show considerable variation from one grant to the other. In
addition, they bear no relation to the size of the areas or
the value of the prospecting rights. The situation is even
worse in the diamond industry, e.g., CDM holds prospecting
and mining rights in the diamond area No.2 which covers an
area of 3,066,250 hectares. A rental of only R400 p.a. is
payable; Grant 14/2/4/148 covers an area of 14,000 hectares
but a rental of R200 p.a. is payable; and Grant m46/3/16
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which covers an area of 7,000 hectares, a rental of R200 p.a.
is also payable in respect of it)
In the case of diamond area no.2 which covers more than
3,000,000 hectares, only one grant applies to it. It is
interesting to note that even the Thirion Commission was
forced to comment that this kind of grant "is a relic of a
bygone age". The rental which is payable for the area is
only R400 p.a., which is currently applicable to it. Another
example of the dominant position of multinational mining
companies is the rental payable in respect of the Sperrgebiet
(Diamond Area No.1). The area covers 2,829,000 hectares, and
it is still regulated under the Halbscheid Agreement (i.e.,
the agreement which enabled CDM to acquire a diamond
concession). A rental of only £406.4.0 p.a., has been
payable in respect of the area since 1922. The duration of
the agreement was extended by s.10 of the Finance Act no.91
of 1971 of the Republic of South Africa to 31 December 2010
without altering the amount of the fee payable by CDM. The
result is that the fee payable by CDM for its mineral rights
in respect of the Sperrgebiet has remained unaltered for more
than 60 years, and it is likely that it will remain unaltered
until 2010 as long as Namibia remains a colony. In addition,
it must be noted that the Diamond Area No.1 covers what were
some of the richest gem diamond fields in the world and yet
1
see Thirion Commission, Eighth Interim Report,
(1985), p.54
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CDM has been paying a nominal fee while the diamonds have
almost been exhausted.
The significance of prospecting and mining rights fees to the
revenue of the colonial administration are minimal in that
they do not constitute compensation for the value of the
minerals mined. Their only significance is to speed up the
rate of prospecting and mining development. It must also be
noted that all expenditures incurred by the mining companies
during the pre-production stage are regarded as capital and
thus deductible for tax purposes once a mine starts to make a
profit at the production (extraction) phase.
	 Some of the
deductions allowed include expenditure on
	 "surveys,
boreholes, trenches, pits and other exploratory work
preliminary to the establishment of a mine ... together with
any other expenditure which in the opinion of the Secretary
is incidental to such operations (s.18(b) of the Income Tax
Act No.24 of 1981).
2.2 Production Phase
Upon development of a mine, the next stage is that of
production or mining. The interests of the colonial
administration and the companies do not seem to conflict with
regard to rates and levels of production. The main reason is
that the legislation does not impose restrictions on
production. The aim of this section is to analyse the
provisions made under various statutes which determine the
extent to which the colonial administration influences or
affects decisions relating to such critical matters as
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taxation. Therefore, we will attempt to address ourselves to
the following questions: What is the nature of the financial
provisions? In what forms does the colonial administration
receive its financial returns under the arrangement in
question? Are there provisions for payment of a royalty and
taxes?
2.2.1
	 Royalties 
A royalty as used here, describes the rent or tax
payable to the colonial administration purely on the basis of
'ownership' of the minerals. The basic advantage of a
royalty is that it is a guaranteed payment to the colonial
administration for the depletion of the mineral resources,
irrespective of whether the companies make a profit or not.
In addition, royalties also avoid complex problems such as
the rationale and admissibility of deductions from profits
for purposes of assessing tax.
The royalty system was heavily depended upon by the
German colonial administration. In 1908, an agreement was
reached between the German colonial administration and the
Deutsche Colonail Gesellschaft f"ur S u udwest Afrika
	 (the
company entitled to the exclusive mining rights in Namibia
during the German period) to introduce a royalty system. The
German legislation provided for the payment of mineral
extraction tax, fixed at 2 per cent and later increased to 10
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per cent on the value of the diamond output. 2 In addition,
the legislation provided for the imposition of export duty.
It is interesting to note that apart from the diamond
industry, there is no royalty levied on minerals today. It
was stated in a booklet prepared by the then Administrator in
1928 that: "the mine owner must pay ... an output royalty of
2 per cent of the value of the minerals before treatment".
This fixed percentage was provided for under Proclamation
No.59 of 1920. In 1941, Royalty Proclamation No.19 of 1941
repealed the 1920 proclamation and provided for the fixed per
centage payment of royalties on gross proceeds of certain
minerals. The formula was provided as follows: gold 2 per
cent; guano and phosphates 5 per cent; tin 4 per cent;
vanadium, lithium, beryllium, salt and semi-precious stones 2
per cent; and finally, tungsten, tantalum, titanium, cadmium,
copper, lead, zinc, silver, and fluorspar 1 per cent.
Minerals not covered by the proclamation were exempted from
royalty.
Proclamation 19 of 1941 was repealed by Proclamation 9
of 1944. It also amended s.62 of the Mining Consolidation
and Amendment Proclamation No.4 of 1940 by empowering the
then Administrator to fix the amount payable as a royalty in
respect of all precious minerals except diamonds. This
enabled the Administrator to promulgate Proclamation No.10 of
1944 which enabled him to fix a royalty on the gross proceeds
2
see I.Goldblatt, (1971), History of South West
Africa from the beginning of the nineteenth century,
Juta and Company Ltd - Cape Town, p.238, see also The
Times, London, 1909, 29 January, p.6, col.b
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of the sale of gold and silver ores. This proclamation was
repealed by another proclamation (Proclamation No.17 of 1946)
in 1946 but nothing was substituted in its place. The result
is that since 1946, no royalty has been payable on mineral
production apart from the export duty on diamonds. 3 In
contrast, the Mineral Rights Tax Act of 1972 of the Republic
of Botswana provides a 3 per cent royalty on the gross market
value of any minerals, other than coal, oil shale, natural
gas, precious metals and precious stones. in the case of
precious stones, the State is entitled to 25 per cent royalty
payment from the annual realised profits. In addition, every
holder of mineral rights is required to pay a "mineral rights
tax", which is assessed at (1) R40 per square kilometre of
land on which such rights are held or (2) 10 per cent of the
value of the minerals produced, whichever is higher. 4
In the case of diamonds, the notorious arrangement
between the colonial administration and the South West
Finance Corporation, a wholly owned De Beers subsidiary,
presents the most
	 striking illustration of economic
exploitation by multinational companies in Namibia.
According to the Consolidated Royalty Agreement of 1922-3, a
royalty of 22.5 per cent of the aggregate of the Diamond
Profits Tax and the Diamond Export Duty is payable to the
South West	 Finance Corporation	 by the
	 colonial
3	
op.cit., Thirion Commission, P.81
4	 ibid.
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YEAR ENDING 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
31 MARCH
TAX FROM 63.1 108.2 198.9 174.8 134.5 53.0 46.0
DIAMOND MINES
LESS TRANS- 7.1 14.5 18.6 18.6 16.3 6.9 5.8
FERS TO SWF
CORP
1984 1985
73.1 68.0
8.3 6.5
administration. 5
 This is supposedly justified on the ground
that the company succeeded to some of the rights of the
Deutsche Kolonial Gesellechaft f"ur S fl udwest Afrika. As Table
I below shows, diamond taxes for the nine year period from
1977 to 1985 totalled R919.6 million of which R103.1 million
(about 10 per cent) was paid to the South West Finance
Corporation in respect of the said agreement.
	
This
represents, on average, an annual payment of about R11.45
million. All royalty payments due to the company come from
diamonds won in the Diamond Area No.I, formerly the
Sperrgebiet.
TABLE IV:1 Revenue Collected by the Central Revenue Fund from
Diamonds and the Amount Paid to the South West Finance
Corporation: R Millions 
TOTAL DIAMOND TAXES 1977-85
	
919.6
TOTAL PAYMENTS TO SWF CORP 1977-85	 103.1
SOURCE: compiled from Statistical/Economic Review,
SWA/Namibia 1985, p.17
5
op.cit., I.Goldblatt, History of South West Africa
from the beginning of the nineteenth century, p.240
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Apart from the huge sums involved, the agreement between
South West Finance Corporation and the colonial
administration is peculiar because it contradicts the notion
that the colonial administration is supposed to be the owner
of the minerals.	 Therefore, under the terms of the law
applied by the illegal administration, the payment of
royalties under normal circumstances should be due to the
colonial administration instead of paying the company which
does not have legal ownership of mineral rights.
It is submitted, however, that a royalty - being a
payment made irrespective of profits - is not generally
accepted by the mining companies. Since royalties are paid
out at an earlier point in time than profits, they are
regarded by the companies as a marginal cost. If the rate of
the royalty is high, it can be argued that this can increase
the cost to the companies and render mining operations
unprofitable. This can also lead to premature abandonment of
partly developed mines or to negative decisions with regard
to the development of marginal ores, i.e., the mining right
holder is likely to ignore minerals of low quality and grade
in order to avoid costs. This can prevent the development of
an otherwise a profitable mineral reserve. In addition, a
royalty payment is usually fixed at a standard charge
regardless of fluctuations in the cost of production not only
between different mineral rights holders, but in different
mines of the same mineral rights holder. Finally, the system
can result in discrimination among mining companies because
it takes a higher proportion of the profits in less
profitable mines.
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Although there may be inherent defects with a royalty
system, it can still serve a useful purpose since it can be
viewed as compensation to the owner of minerals for the
exhaustion of a national asset.
2.2.2
	 Income tax
As we have already discussed above, fees and rentals
that are charged for certain procedural formalities amount to
insignificant sums and are intended to cover administrative
costs rather than generate revenue to the State.
	
In
addition, we have also seen that royalties play an
insignificant part since they are currently applicable only
to the diamond industry. Their insignificance in the case of
Namibia may stem from the fact that they are not favoured by
the mining companies. Their application expose them to a
great deal of uncertainty as to whether they will be able to
extract the minerals profitably. We have already noted that
they represent an additional cost of extraction to the
companies, one that can be incurred whether or not the mining
project is profitable.
On the other hand, a commitment to pay an income tax on
profits appears less risky. As is the case with a tax system
based on profit, if there are no profits, the companies have
no obligation to pay tax to the colonial administration.
They incur significant obligations only if profits are
significant. Therefore, the most important fiscal regime in
Namibia today is income tax levied on profits of mining
companies and individuals who derive their income from mining
operations. It is not surprising therefore to note that the
colonial administration has increasingly resorted to income
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taxation to appropriate a share of the profits arising out of
mining operations.
A	 History of Mining Taxation
The object of this section is to briefly discuss
the historical background of mining taxation in Namibia.
Our aim is to analyse taxation laws which were
applicable to the territory and their relationship with
the taxation laws of South Africa. However, it must be
noted that only those laws relating to income taxation
are considered. Those relating to royalties have
already been discussed above. Furthermore, only those
laws dating back to the 1960s are discussed mainly
because we have not been able to gain access to those
dating back before this date.6
Until recently, the tax system in Namibia was more
complicated than that operating in South Africa. 	 The
reasons for this are many. They include the fact that
in addition to tax ordinances and proclamations
promulgated in the Territory, a member of the South
African Acts of Parliament relating to income taxation
had dual application both in South Africa as well as in
Namibia. In some cases, especially issues relating to
tax rates,
	 these Acts were subject
	 to minor
modifications insofar as they were applicable to
6In discussing taxation generally, most available
materials start with the 1960s. However, the author is
reliably informed that the UNCTC has published some work on
taxation in Namibia for which Professor H. Green was
consultant. Unfortunately, I have not been able to gain
access to these materials.
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Namibia. In addition, there used to be two institutions
or revenue funds to which income derived from mining
operations in Namibia was payable. The proportion of
funds due to these two accounts used to be regulated by
a number of income tax statutes, both of the South
African Parliament and ordinances and proclamations
promulgated in Namibia. A good example of these are
Income Tax Act No. 113 of 1977 (which provided a ratio
under which income was paid into the two accounts
discussed below) and Proclamation No. 85 of 1979. The
two accounts were South West Africa Account of the South
African Consolidated Revenue Fund (i.e. a joint account
held by South Africa and Namibia), and the Territory
Revenue Fund established for the exclusive use by the
whites in Namibia.
Before major changes were introduced in 1981, the
principal statute governing taxation of income from
mining operations in Namibia used to be Income Tax Act
No. 58 of 1962. This is •a South African Act which had
dual application both in South Africa as well as in
Namibia. The only minor difference was that insofar as
it applied to Namibia, some modification was thought
necessary, especially provisions relating to the rate of
taxation. The Act empowered the South African
Parliament to fix income tax rates applicable to
Namibia. These used to be fixed annually by the South
African Parliament until 1977 when the responsibility
for this was transferred to the Administrator-General in
Namibia. Insofar as the power to fix income tax rates
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for companies was concerned, he exercised it under the
Rates of Normal Tax (Companies) Act, promulgated
annually in the Official Gazette. Taxes paid by the
companies, including mining companies, used to be paid
into two accounts mentioned above. 	 The Territory
Revenue Fund for whites in Namibia used to receive
one-seventh of the total income. This account was
managed and controlled by the then South West Africa
Legislative Assembly (a whites-only assembly).
In 1979, important changes took place. Both the
South West Africa Account of the South African
Consolidated Revenue Fund and the Territory Revenue Fund
were abolished by Proclamation No. 85 of 1979. Two
accounts were established in their place, one called the
Central Revenue Fund for Namibia and another account
which is still exclusively managed and controlled by the
whites for their exclusive benefit. In contrast to the
earlier arrangement, the 1979 changes require all taxes
from the mining industry to be paid into the Central
Revenue Fund for Namibia. The account for whites
receives one-eighth of taxes raised from non-mining
business activities. The proportion of the tax which is
paid into this fund is now regulated under the Rates of
Normal Tax (Companies) Act No. 16 of 1980.
Although we have been unable to discuss the history
of tax laws from the early days of the South African
rule, it is submitted that the main objective of the
South African regime during this period (and indeed up
to the present period) was to offer generous tax
concessions to private foreign investors. The extent of
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the concessions suggest that South Africa is very keen
to attract and retain private foreign investment in
Namibia's mining	 industry.
	
The policy seems
	 to
encourage	 greater	 prospecting,	 exploration	 and
development of mineral resources, and to offer tax
concessions as a device to compensate private investors
for the high risks which are involved in prospecting and
exploration. At the same time, South Africa seems to be
directly and indirectly benefiting from these
concessions through its State mining companies as well
as through dividends from joint venture mining
enterprises with other private mining companies. It
also benefits indirectly through income which is
generated by a number of private South African mining
companies operating in Namibia. Indeed, the income
which these companies generate from Namibia forms an
important part of the South African capital and helps
that country to industrialise. It is in this context
that some of the tax concessions offered to the mining
companies in Namibia should be viewed. The full extent
of these concessions and their effect in Namibia is
discussed in detail elsewhere in this Chapter.
B	 The 1981 Income Tax Act and Types of Taxes Payable
In 1981, major changes in respect of tax laws
applicable to Namibia took place. The major South
African Statute, the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962
ceased to apply to Namibia. It was replaced by the
Income Tax Act No. 24 of 1981. This Act is exclusively
applicable to Namibia. Apart from the diamond industry,
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it regulates all income taxation matters arising from
mining operations (and other income taxation from other
business activities which are not relevant to our
discussion). It is the most detailed and most
comprehensive Act ever to have been introduced
specifically for Namibia. Before we discuss some of its
provisions in detail, it is important to point out that
the issues covered in the Act are complex, technical,
and comprehensive. Therefore, it will not be possible
to discuss all the provisions of the Act. Our main aim
is to discuss and analyse those provisions of the Act
that have direct relevance to our general discussion.
The issues discussed in this section 	 include
persons liable to pay income tax on their income derived
from mining operations; the accounting principles
employed in determining what constitutes taxable income;
the deductions allowed; and types of income tax payable
by taxpayers.	 The Act identifies two categories of
persons who are liable to income tax, namely, companies
and natural persons. A distinction is made between
resident persons and non-resident persons. Furthermore,
a distinction is also made between domestic companies
and non-domestic companies. However, it is submitted
that for tax purposes, the distinction between a
domestic company and a non-domestic company is not very
important because all companies that carry on mining
operations or derive income from such operations are
treated equally. The Act defines a "domestic company"
as "a South West African" company or a company which is
managed	 and	 controlled	 in	 Namibia	 (s.1(viii)).
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Therefore, a domestic company is regarded as a company
which is (a) incorporated in Namibia under the Companies
Act (regardless of shareholders' nationality), or (b) if
the management and control of the affairs of the company
are exercised in Namibia notwithstanding the fact that
it is not incorporated in Namibia.
Three types of taxes are imposed by the Act, namely
personal income tax paid by individuals; corporation tax
paid by companies; and dividend shareholders' tax paid
by both individuals and companies in their capacity as
shareholders. However, for the purposes of our
discussion, we shall limit ourselves to the last two
taxes. All mining companies operating in Namibia are
liable to pay corporation tax (s.6(2)). The rate of
this tax is dependent upon the type of mineral that is
mined. For tax purposes, minerals are divided into
three categories, namely: diamonds, uranium (including
gold, silver, oxmiridium, and pyrites), and base metals.
The importance of the distinction will become clear when
we discuss income tax rates in the next section.
However, it is important to point out that base metals
are accorded preferential income tax rates in contrast
to uranium and diamonds.
For income tax purposes, a distinction is also made
between companies that carry on a mining business in
Namibia (i.e. those which operate mines) and those which
simply derive a rent from mining activities (i.e. those
which merely receive dividends). All companies which
carry on mining operations pay corporation income tax,
while those which simply derive a rent in the form of
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dividends are only liable to pay dividend shareholders'
tax.	 In order to determine the method of calculating
taxable income, it 	 is important
	 to discuss	 the
accounting principle that is provided in the Act.
The most important provisions of the Act may be
divided into three parts. These are: provisions
determining the types of receipts and profits which are
assessable or chargeable to income tax; the deductions
that are allowed from the gross income in calculating
taxable income; and the rates of income tax payable on
the taxable balance of chargeable
	 income after
deductions have been made. The procedure for
determining chargeable income is provided for under s.36
and s.17 of the Act. Section 36 distinguishes profit
from capital in order to arrive at chargeable income for
income tax purposes. Broadly speaking therefore,
chargeable income may be referred to as income from a
mining business operation less capital and other
incentives offered by the Act. The most important
deductions that are allowed are those of a capital
nature. Two types of capital expenditure are identified
by the Act, namely pre-production and production or
development expenditures.
	
All these expenditures are
deductible before arriving at taxable or chargeable
income.
Section 36 of the Act allows all mining companies
to offset against
	 income all capital expenditure
incurred before the mine comes into production. The
section also allows all capital expenditure during the
life of the mine to be deducted from chargeable or
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taxable income. The effect of the section is therefore
that all capital expended before or after production is
allowed to be offset against income earned in the year
of assessment of tax. If it turns out that such
expenditure exceeds the income, the balance is allowed
to be carried forward to be offset against any income in
the succeeding year or years until it is redeemed.
Section 17 details some of the deductions that are
allowed. These include expenses incurred on: legal
expenses (s.17(c)); repairs on machinery, implements,
utensils and other articles (s.17(d)); acquisition of
machinery, implements, utensils, and articles (s.17(e));
premium or consideration paid for the right to use or
occupy land or buildings, the right to use any plant or
machinery, patent, design or trade mark, scientific
research, and any sum contributed to a pension fund
(s.17(g)); and expenses on managerial advice and other
expenses incurred both in Namibia and abroad (s.17(1)
and s.17(1)(b)).
The Act also allows provision for depreciation. It
allows a scheduled deduction over a period of years, for
instance, s.17(f) provides that there shall be
deductible from chargeable income an allowance equal to
twenty per cent of the cost of erecting buildings in the
year of assessment, and four per cent of such cost for
each successive year for a period of twenty years.
As noted above, another tax that is levied under
the Act is dividend shareholders tax. Any person who
derives a rent in the form of dividends is required to
pay shareholders' tax.
	 For tax purposes, the word
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"dividend" is broadly defined as any amount distributed
by a company to its shareholders. The phrase "amount
distributed" is given a wider meaning. It includes any
"profits distributed, whether in cash or otherwise, and
whether of a capital nature or not, including an amount
equal to the nominal value, at the time of issue
thereof, of any capitalisation shares awarded to
shareholders and the nominal value of any bonus
debentures or securities awarded to shareholders"
(s.1(vii)(b)). Therefore, if a shareholder receives
dividends including the award of shares, the amount so
received is treated as part of the shareholder's income
and is taxable accordingly. The rate of the
shareholders' tax is currently levied at 15 per cent of
the amount distributed (s.45).
Special regimes and the rate of taxation
We have already intimated above the the Income Tax
Act no.24 of 1981 contains special provisions applicable
exclusively to mining. In addition, differential tax
rates are applicable to income from mining of different
minerals. Taxation of mining companies is determined
in accordance with the general principles of taxation
under the Act, subject, however, to a number of special
provisions, some of which are applicable to mining
generally, and others are applicable to mining
operations for different types of minerals.
Base metals - before 1981, the Income Tax Act no.58
of 1962 used to fix the rate of taxation payable by
mining companies engaged in base metal production at 35
per cent of taxable income (compared with a basic rate,
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at that time, of 40 per cent plus 5 per cent surcharge
for all such companies operating in South Africa). In
1979, the rate was increased to 40 per cent by the
so-called Adminis .:rator-General. 7 The rate of taxation
on companies whicll produce base metals is now determined
under s.6(2)(e) oE the 1981 Income Tax Act. The current
rate of taxation is fixed at 42 per cent. 8 This rate is
the same applied to other companies operating in
Namibia.
Uranium and gold taxes are also governed by the
1981 Income Tax Act. The Act provides that uranium
taxation should be computed on the same basis and on a
similar rate as those of gold. Section 1(xix) states
that mining for gold or to mine for gold "includes
mining for uranium or to mine for uranium". It is also
important to note that for tax purposes, other minerals
recovered in association with gold mining operations,
such as silver, oxmiridium and pyrites, are deemed as
income from gold mining (s.6(3)). Income from other
sources accruing to a gold mining company is taxed at
non-mining company rates. 	 It is submitted that the
wording of the statute, especially where it refers to
minerals which "results directly from mining for gold"
is misleading because there are no gold mines in
7
see U.N. Centre on Transnational Corporations,
(1981), The Role of Transnational Corporations	 in
Namibia August, first draft report, p.2-9
8
see op.cit., SWA/Namibia Budget 1984-1985, p.13,
paragraph 70
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Namibia. At the present moment, gold is mined as a
by-product, this means that there are no minerals which
are won "in the course of mining for gold". This means
that apart from uranium and other precious metals
mentioned in the !statute, mining companies pay only 42
per cent on their taxable income from gold since it is
mined as a by-product of other minerals such as copper.
The rate of taxation applicable in respect of gold
and uranium provided for under 2.6(3) is more
complicated than the formulas used in other minerals.
The tax on income from gold and uranium mining is on a
sliding scale.	 It is based on the ratio of taxable
income to gross revenues. The current formula for the
gold and uranium mining tax rate, expressed as a
percent, is Y=60-480/X. In interpreting the formula, it
is stated that "Y is the tax rate and X is the per cent
of revenue that is profits. For example if profits are
8 per cent of revenues, the tax rate is zero; if profits
are 20 per cent of revenues, the tax rate is 36 per
cent; and if profits are 40 per cent, the tax rate is 48
per cent". 9
Diamond taxation was initially regulated by the old
German Ordinance, the Imperial Mining Decree of 1905 and
later under the Mining Consolidation and Amendment
Proclamation of 1940.
	
Currently, diamonds are subject
9
see Leake S.Hangala, (1985), Structure of Namibian
Mineral Industry, University Printing Press, Helsinki
p.54 see also Bureau of Mines, US Department of the
Interior Mineral Persepctives - Namibia, August, p.18
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to three types of tax: the Diamond Company Income tax,
Diamond Profits tax (payable only in respect of diamonds
found or won in specified areas), and the Diamond Export
Duty (this is more or less a royalty tax).
The Diamond Company Income Tax, as established by
the Administrator-General in 1980, is 50 per cent of
taxable income. 10 The second most important category of
diamond taxation is the Diamond Export Duty regulated by
the Diamond Taxation Proclamation no.16 of 1941.	 Under
s.3(2) of this Proclamation, all rough and uncut
diamonds exported from Namibia by the Diamond Board are
subject to a 10 per cent levy on the proceeds of the
sale. The levy is deducted from the operating profit in
order to arrive at the amount classified as taxable
income. Finally, the third category of diamond taxation
is the Diamond Profits Tax. Under s.4 of the Diamond
Taxation Proclamation no.16 of 1941, 15 per cent of what
the Proclamation terms "Profits Tax" is levied on all
diamonds won or found in Diamond Area No.1, formerly the
Sperrgebiet. 11 However,	 this	 provision is	 of	 little
significance since the 	 15 per cent	 levy is	 deductible
from the income tax payable under the 1981 Income Tax
Act	 (s.11).
It must
	 be noted
	 that	 the 1973	 Commission of
Enquiry into the Diamond Industry of	 South Africa and
10
see op.cit., SWA/Namibia Budget, 1984-1985, p.13,
paragraph 68
11
The area is defined under s.10 of the said
proclamation
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Namibia found that the overall diamond tax rate in
Namibia was lower than that applicable in other gem
diamond producing countries in Africa. The Commission
found that the average rate in South Africa was 69.7 per
cent; in Botswana, the government was receiving between
65 and 70 per cent of profits by way of royalty, taxes
and dividends (from 50 per cent government equity) and
in Tanzania, the government profits included income tax
at 50.65 per cent, plus a 5 per cent levy on the gross
value of diamonds and a royalty rate of 15 per cent on
the gross value of diamonds.
Thus, despite its record of high profitability, the
diamond industry in Namibia is, on average, subject to a
lower rate of tax than the generally less profitable
diamond mines in South Africa, Botswana and Tanzania.
It is also important to note that the assessment of
Diamond Profits Tax is done by the tax assessor
appointed under the Diamond Taxation Proclamation of
1941. As we noted in Chapter III above, although the
Diamond Board is supposed to supervise the diamond
industry, in practice, most of the senior employees of
the Board are also CDM employees. We have also seen
that that CDM company secretary is also the Secretary of
the Diamond Board. 12
12
see The Economist, London
pp.76-81
15-21 March, 1985,
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there are other factors which need to be taken
in assessing the benefits which a host country
In order to appreciate fully how Namibia is put at a
disadvantage, it is necessary to compare tax rates which have
been imposed in Namibia with those of other countries such as
Canada. Before we discuss tax rates in detail, it is
important to note that the rate of tax if viewed in
isolation, may be misleading insofar as it is intended to be
used as an indicator of the government take. Other equally
important factors such as capital allowances and other
deductions which mining companies are allowed to make from
their gross income should also be taken into account as they
are as important as the tax rate in determining the magnitude
of the government take. The share due to the State can be
substantially higher (notwithstanding the seemingly lower
rate of taxation) iE certain types of allowances and
deductions are not allowed in contrast to a higher rate of
taxation where these deductions are allowed.
Furthermore,
into account
receives from the exploitation of its
Modern mining legislation and mining
impose upon private foreign investors
constitute ancillary advantages in favour
in addition to the physical arrangements.
mineral resources.
project agreements
obligations that
of host countries
These obligations
cover a wide range of issues such as education, training of
employees, medical services, and scientific advancement. In
the case of Namibia, it is needless to state that all these
benefits are visibly absent from the terms of the mining
concessions.
206
In comparing tax rates between Namibia and Canada, another
important factor must be taken into account, namely, minerals
in Namibia are taxed differently depending on the type of
mineral that is being mined. Again in Canada, there are two
main taxing authorities, the Federal Government and States
governments. It is for these reasons that any comparison
should take these factors into account. Therefore, for the
purposes of our discussion, the comparative rate of taxation
used in this section is that between the Federal Government
of Canada and the rate of taxation in base metals in Namibia.
The Federal basic rate of taxation has varied over the years.
In the years 1973 to 1983 on which data is available, the
rate of corporation tax on mining companies has been as
follows: 49 per cent in 1973; 48 per cent in 1974; 47 per
cent in 1975; 46 per cent in 1976 "and subsequent taxation
years. ,,13
The accounting principle is complex but in its basic form,
important items are exploration and development expenditure.
Exploration expenditure is deductible in full in the year in
which it is incurred and in subsequent years if it is not
deducted in a prior year. 14 On the other hand, development
13See Tolmie Ross J., (1976), "Canadian Mineral
Landholding System, Royalties, Rentals and Taxation", in
Negotiating and Drafting Mining Development Agreements: An
inter-regional workshop arranged by the United Nations, 
Buenos Aires, 1973, Mining Journal Books Ltd., London, p. 66;
also Robert B. Parsons, (1982), Canadian Mining Taxation,
Butterworths, Toronto, p.1; and s.123 of the Income Tax Act.
14. .lipid, s.66(1)(2), see also op. cit, Robert B. Parsons,
(1982), Canadian Mining Taxation, p.31.
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expenses are deductible at the rate of "30 per cent per annum
on a declining balance bases." 15 Capital cost allowance is
allowed on four major classes of items namely Class 10 -
mining buildings and equipment acquired after production - 30
per cent; Class 12 - cost of mine shafts and other
underground working - 100 per cent; Class 28 - cost of
pre-production on certain buildings and equipment 30 - 100
per cent; and Class 29 - assets used "primarily	 for
manufacturing or processing beyond the prime metal stage"
50 per cent. 16 In addition to the 46 per cent income tax
rate, there is a 5 per cent levy referred to as "temporary"
surtax. 17 It is clear from the foregoing discussion that
unlike Namibia, there are no open-ended tax concessions that
are allowed as deductions. Indeed, it is stated that a
"general provisions of the Income Tax Act denies a taxpayer
the right to deduct amounts in respect of capital outlays,
and thus effectively disallows the deduction of depreciation
and amortization expenses that are recorded in a taxpayer's
books of account. 18
Furthermore, it is stated that a "withholding tax of 15 per
cent (to be increased to 25 per cent unless governed by
reciprocal tax	 treaties)	 is imposed	 [on]	 dividends,
15 i bid,  see also s.66(2)(2).
16op. cit, Robert B. Parsons, (1982), Canadian Mining
Taxation, p.45.
17. •ibid. p.21.
18i bid. p. 44. Emphasis added.
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royalties, and interest paid by Canadian companies 	 to
non-residents." 19 A royalty rate on leases in 1976 was 5 per
cent of gross "production for the first three years and 10
per cent thereafter." 20
In contrast, there are no royalty payments imposed on similar
minerals in Namibia except diamonds which, for reasons
discussed below, exist only on paper. Apart from a
withholding tax of 15 per cent, there is no withholding tax
paid on royalties and interest, indeed these items are
deductible in the case of Namibia before arriving at taxable
income. Comparable rates of taxation for base minerals in
Namibia over the years have been 35 per cent, increased to 40
per cent, and then increased to the current rate of 42 per
cent. Indeed, even these rates may be misleading in that
base "metal mines operating on State Land are allowed a ten
per cent deduction on normal tax." 21 Furthermore, unlike
Canada and South Africa, there are no royalty payments in
Namibia. Therefore, the mineral rent due to Namibia is
considerably reduced.
In contrast to Namibia, comparable rates in South Africa over
the years have been 40 per cent, 46.2 per cent, and the
current rate is 50 per cent. 	 In addition, a surcharge of 5
19Op. cit. Tolmie Ross J., (1976), Canadian Mineral
Landholding System, Royalties, Rentals and Taxation, p. 67.
20. .ibid.
21For details see Mining in SWA/Namibia, Proswa Namibia
Foundation, p.2.
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per cent is imposed. Furthermore, in addition to income
taxation, the legislation (e.g. the Mining Rights Act 1967
and the Precious Stones Act 1964) provides for payment to the
State of a lease consideration for the grant of mining rights
which by statute are vested in the slate. The consideration
may take the form of a share of profits, in which event the
share of profits payable is fixed by the Mining Leases Board.
Indeed, even the colonial administration in Namibia recognise
the fact that tax rates in Namibia are lower than those in
South Africa. For instance, it is stated in 1987/88 budget
that "tax rates ... in SWA/Namibia are in general lower than
in South Africa." 22 However, it is alleged that this is
because South Africa grants more concessions but this is not
supported by legislation (see Section 5). It is further
stated that from "the viewpoint of the entrepreneur the
present environment in our country is far from ideal, ... We
therefore see a lower tax rate as a partial compensation for 
these unfavourable local circumstances." 23 This view is in
sharp contrast with at least one school of thought within the
business community "that would prefer the present uncertainty
to continue." 24
The final point that needs to be noted is that in comparing
tax rates between Canada and Namibia, important factors that
22See SWA/Namibia Budget 1987/88, p.5. Emphasis added.
23 i bid., emphasis added.
24See Chamber of Mines of SWA/Namibia Report, (1982),
p•5, see also Chapter I.
210
are in Canada's favour must be taken into account.
	 First,
unlike Namibia, Canada benefits from down stream mining
activities such as processing and consumption. Second,
Canada enjoys considerable benefits from the exploitation of
her mineral resources, her citizens participate on equal
terms (at all levels of the mining industry) with private
foreign investors.	 Third, the State itself is an active
partner in the exploitation of the mineral resources,
therefore, some of the benefits that accrue to the State are
in the form of dividends. Finally, Canada is one of the
capital exporting countries, indeed, the export of its
capital to developing countries includes Namibia where
Canadian mining companies are active. Therefore, it is
respectfully submitted that all these factors should be taken
into account in comparing tax rates between Canada and
Namibia.
3	 THE IMPACT OF INCENTIVES ON INCOME TAX
Special tax allowances and deductions have been made
available to the mining companies under the 1981 Income tax
Act and previous acts. Section 36 of the Act provides for
substantial capital and redemption allowances with respect to
mining expenditures. Thus, mining companies are allowed to
deduct from income derived during a year of assessment from
mining operations the amount of all capital expenditure
incurred during that year of assessment. Section 36(1)
provides that: "the amounts to be deducted ... from income
derived during a year of assessment from the working of any
mine shall be, where such mine commences production during
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any such year of assessment, the amount of capital
expenditure incurred up to the close of that year of
assessment, and thereafter in respect of each succeeding year
of assessment, the capital expenditure incurred during such
succeeding year of assessment".
The meaning of 'capital expenditure' is expressly defined to
include: (a) expenditure on shaft sinking and mine equipment;
and (b) expenditure on development, general administration
and management (including any interest and other charges
payable on loans) prior to the commencement of production or
during any period of non-production (s.36(3)(a) and (b)). It
must be noted that the true construction of s.36(3)(a) limits
the definition of capital expenditure to equipment the use of
which is directly connected with the conduct of the mining
operations and not activities incidental thereto or in
connection therewith. It is interesting to note that
notwithstanding the restrictive definition of the said
section, it was discovered by the Thirion Commission that the
Receiver of Revenue attached a wider meaning to the section
to include the provision of housing which can hardly fall
within the meaning of "shaft sinking and mine equipment 25
Statutory provisions that pertain to pre-production
expenditures reflect an underlying philosophy of the colonial
administration that such expenditure should be written off
before any obligation to pay tax arises. Therefore, capital
25	
op.cit., Thirion Commission, p.156
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expenditure incurred by the taxpayer in respect of mineral
operations fall into one of the following categories of
pre-production expenditures namely: (a) searching for,
discovery of, testing or securing access to minerals; (b)
acquisition of certain rights on or over such deposits: (c)
machinery and other works which would have little or no value
to mining rights holder if the mine ceases to be worked; and
(d) development, general administration and management prior
to the commencement of production or during any period of
non-production.
In addition to s.36 of the 1981 Income Tax Act, exploration
and development expenditures such as "preliminary surveys,
boreholes, shafts, development and equipment" are treated as
capital expenditures and entitles the successor mineral
rights holder to treat them as such (s.37(1)). Thus, where a
mining company (the successor company) has acquired all or
substantially all of the property used by the predecessor
company, the successor company becomes entitled to deduct in
subsequent years the cost of such expenditure since it is
treated as capital expenditure. One example will suffice to
demonstrate the effect of the section. In 1980, Tsumeb
Corporation Ltd purchased a 70 per cent share of Otjihase
mining property at a consideration of R32 million.	 The
management of the mine was taken over by TCL and operated on
the basis of a joint venture with Otjihase. 26
26	 ibid., p.147
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As a result of the deal, TCL has not paid tax since 1979
despite the fact that in 1980, mineral sales amounted to
R128,312,599, the highest sales for 13 years up to 1982.
During the four year period (1981 to 1984), mineral sales
amounted to R88,662,380; R110,943,604; R122,781,000; and
R131,877,000 respectively. 27	The effect of this agreement
was that in terms of sections 36 and 37 of the 1981 Income
Tax Act, the colonial administration allowed TCL to deduct
the full R32 million as a deduction from the company's 1980
income. Thus, what would have been a profit of R21,700,414
on which the company could have paid income tax of R8,680,165
was converted into a loss, to be carried forward, of
R10,288,586.
In addition, the company spent capital expenditure on the
Ojihase mine (from 1981 to 1984 expenditure amounted to
R13,631,674) and by 1984, TCL's assessed loss was still
R43,254,869, The result is that the company has not paid tax
since 1980 and it is not likely to pay tax for some years to
come until the accumulated loss has been offset against
income. The consequences of these generous write-off
provisions has enabled mining companies to reduce their
taxable income by considerable amounts. In addition, there
is considerable fluctuation in the payment of income tax as a
result of the current practice whereby all allowable
expenditures are written off against income in the year in
which production commences and thereafter, any further
27	 ibid., p.131
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expenditure is written off in the year in which it is
incurred. The weakness of the provisions is clearly
demonstrated in the performance of eight mining companies
discussed below and their contribution to the Central Revenue
Fund.
(1) The SWA Company (Pty) Ltd - from 1970 to 1982, the
company sold minerals to the value of R56,534,231 but paid
only R1,695,272 in tax. The tax was paid in four tax years,
1972, 1974, 1975 and 1976. In 1977, the company sold
minerals valued at R21,023,444 but it did not pay any tax.
Finally in 1974, it paid R887,031 in tax when the sales
totalled R6,129,987 but in the following year, the tax
liability dropped to R188,376 despite the fact that mineral
sales totalled R7,144,175, an increase of R1,014,188. 28
(2) Deblin Mining Company (Pty) Ltd - during the 13 year
period, 1970 to 1982, the company sold minerals valued at
R9,345,785 but only paid R286,280 in tax.29
(3) Oamites Mining Company Ltd and Otjozonjati Mine Ltd sold
minerals worth R93,051,319 and R3,365,331 respectively but
only paid tax in the sum of R2,781,053 and R797,178
respectively. 30
(4) Imcor Zinc (Pty) Ltd (Rosh Pinah) started mineral
production in 1969 but only paid tax for the first time after
28	 ibid., p.130
29	 ibid.
30	 ibid. p.131
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11 years (i.e., in 1980).
	 From 1969 to 1979, the company
sold minerals valued at R63.6 million. 31
(5) SWA Lithium Mines (Pty) Ltd did not pay tax for 13 years
(from 1970 to 1982) notwithstanding the fact that it sold
minerals worth R4,043,518. From 1977 to 1982, the colonial
administration spent R58,000 on building roads leading to the
mine. The total expenditure on roads for specific mines for
the 5 years period (from 1978 to 1982) was R5,138,289.32
(6) TCL - for the 13 years up to 1982, the company sold
minerals worth R847,859,709. During the same period, it paid
tax in the sum of R49,654,471, this represents 5.86 per cent
of the mineral sales. 33
(7) Imcor (Pty) (Uis Tin Mine) - the company paid tax only
once during the 13 year period to 1982. This was in 1979
when it paid R136,273 when mineral sales amounted to
R9,548,930. During the 13 year period, the total mineral
sales amounted to R75,217,034. By January 1980, it was
making a profit of "R500,000 per month".34
(8) Rossing Uranium Ltd - from 1976 to 1982, mineral sales
amounted to R1,440,93 million but due to the provisions
discussed above (i.e., exemption from taxation provisions),
no tax has been paid up to 1982.
	 At the same time, the
31	 ibid.
32	 ibid.
33	 ibid.
34	 ibid., p.132
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colonial administration has spent R2,038,387 "in building and
maintaining roads leading to the mine". 35
Finally, incentive provisions have been abused by the mining
companies. In order to avoid taxation, they have resorted to
channelling what would have been taxable income into
expansion projects some of which may not be justified on
purely economic considerations. The incentive provisions
have also encouraged mining companies to indulge in capital
intensive projects at the expense of labour intensive mining
projects which Namibia needs in order to alleviate the high
rate of unemployment. This has resulted in Namibia being
turned into a net importer of expensive, but often
unnecessary capital equipment. The problem is compounded by
the fact that no limitation is placed on the type of capital
goods or mining projects which would qualify for a deduction
in terms of s.36 of the 1981 Income Tax Act. All these
factors adversely affect the income which the colonial
administration derives from the mining industry.
4	 COLONIAL NEGLECT AND ITS IMPACT ON INCOME TAX
We have seen in the preceding section that where a taxpayer
has incurred substantial exploration and development
expenses, this can substantially reduce his taxable income
(at times even to nil even though he reports a higher amount
of pre-tax profits for accounting purposes). 	 Under such
35	 ibid.
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at monthly intervals, a return for the
the Chief Inspector of Mines all the
including the value and quantity of
or sold. In spite of this requirement,
Commission found that there is persistent failure
circumstances, proper accounts are essential if business
profits are to be correctly calculated for tax purposes.
The absence of proper accounts may result in an undercharge
which may later have 3erious consequences. In the case of
Namibia, there is lack of supervision by the colonial
administration in the activities of the mining companies.
This colonial neglect has resulted into serious consequences
in so far as income tax is concerned.	 A few examples from
the findings of the Thirion Commission will suffice.
Under Regulation 132 of the Regulations published 	 in
Government Notice 143 of 1st October 1968 the mine owner is
required to render,
preceding month, to
information required
mineral ore exported
the Thirion
to render returns in respect of the production and sale of
particular minerals. 36 In addition, there are discrepancies
and inconsistencies in comparison between monthly returns,
annual reports, inspection reports, permits and other
relevant information. 37 Some examples include the following
(1) Imcor (Pty) Ltd (Uis tin mine) omits to mention the
presence of a number of by-products in its tin concentrates
and yet in 1980, the company "exported tantalite to the value
36	 ibid., p.88
37	 ibid., p.90
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of R386,755,18". 38 It is assumed that tantalite has been
produced as a by-product since the company started
production.
(2) Otjihase Mine did not mention the gold content of the
copper concentrates which it produced in 1981 and 1982. 	 In
1966 and 1983, the gold content was 34,385 kg and 21,986 kg
respectively. 39
(3) The returns of Brandberg West Mine (SWA Company Ltd)
during the four year period, 1977 to 1980 showed its wolfram
production which was "332,089 tonnes (54 per cent) lower than
the figures ... reflected in the DS Minerals Yearbook 40
The discrepancies and inconsistencies were discovered in the
total of about 25 mines. 41 Therefore, in order to determine
whether the taxpayer can be said to have evaded payment of
taxes, he must be shown to have excluded from his total
income an amount which he is legally obligated to include, in
computing his total income for purposes of assessment of tax.
The examples given above clearly show that mining companies
have employed unlawful means which seek to withhold tax which
is otherwise payable.
In addition, fictitious and improper characterisation is
being made of income or expense items. CDM features
prominently in this practice, e.g., the Thirion Commission
38	 ibid., p.89
39	 ibid.
40	 ibid.
41	 ibid., p.87
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discovered that the company used to enter what was called
'head office expenditure' in its records. During the 5 year
period to 1978, the amount involved totalled R49.4 billion
divided into R5,982million in 1974; R6,000 million in 1975;
R9,288 million in 1973, 42
 It is also reported that after
1978, the item 'head office expenditure' disappeared from the
company's records and was replaced by what it termed
'indirect capital expenditure' and the amount of such
'expenditure' was significantly increased. It must be noted
that the expenditure referred to refers to De Beers, CDM's
parent company. Indeed, the Thirion Commission was forced to
conclude that head office expenditure "is a favourite item
whereby multinational companies effect a distribution of
income among its subsidiaries so as to reduce the liability
for the payment of tax". 43
Companies such as
to avoid taxes.
subsidiaries with
are advantageous
De Beers are involved in elaborate schemes
It has set up several wholly-owned
a view to facilitating transactions which
from the tax point of view.
	 Since
the
have not been restricted or
it has provided an
tax as much as
exemptions and deductions which are capable of providing
scope for tax avoidance
controlled by appropriate legislation,
opportunity to mining companies to avoid
possible. In 1978, the Marine Diamond Corporation Ltd (MDC)
leased its mineral rights for the mining of diamonds to CDM.
42	 ibid., p.326
43	 ibid., p.327
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MDC is a wholly owned subsidiary of CDM which is in turn a
wholly owned De Beers subsidiary.
Under the agreement, CDM undertook to pay MDC an annual
rental equivalent to the annual net profit derived by CDM
from the two foreshore areas in addition to a royalty of 4.5
per cent of the value of all diamonds recovered in the areas
of the lease. When the Administrator-General increased the
rate of taxation on diamonds to 50 per cent, the agreement
was altered. Prospecting grant was added and CDM undertook
to pay an annual rental which was greater of the sum of
R500,000 or an amount equivalent to the annual net profit
derived by CDM from the two foreshore areas whichever was the
greater. 44
MDC carries out prospecting operations in these areas on
behalf of CDM. According to the Thirion Commission's
findings, CDM is planning to spend R10 million annually on
prospecting. R7,247,879 was spent on prospecting and the
figure was to rise by R1 million per annum over the five year
period totalling R48 million. Calculated at the rate of 50
per cent as diamond income tax, this means that the colonial
administration would forego about R26 million in tax which it
would receive if the agreement had not been entered into.
Under s.36 of the 1981 Income Tax Act, CDM is entitled to
deduct from its current income, for tax purpose, 	 the
expenditure incurred on prospecting in the leased areas.	 On
44	 ibid., p.137
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R500,000 rental which CDM undertook to pay MDC, MDC pays
income tax at the ordinary rate for companies, which is 42
per cent of the taxable income since it is deemed to be not
involved in the diamond operations but merely deriving income
from diamond 0,)e-1:Lo1s (which is taxed at 42 per cent
compared with 50 per cent for companies involved in diamond
operations).
It is also alleged that CDM is involved in overmining. The
exploitation of the diamond resources by CDM is partly
governed (in addition to the Mines, Works and Minerals
Ordinance No. 20 of 1968) by the Halbscheid Agreed discussed
above. Clause 3 of the Agreed partly states that "CDM when
working any area pegged under this agreement, shall conduct
operations as thoroughly and economically as it does on its
other mining fields and shall carry on mining satisfactorily
to the Administration :and not with a view to exhausting the
superficial and more 7aluable deposits to the detriment of 
the low grade deposits. .45
 It is important to note that the
phrase "carry on mining satisfactorily to the Administration"
implied supervision by the colonial administration over CDM's
mining activities.
According to a TV documentary entitled "Disappearing
Diamonds" shown in Britain in September 1987, it is alleged
that overmining took place after the death of Sir Ernest
45For details see Thirion Commission Report, 1985,
p.229. Emphasis added.
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Oppenheimer, CDM's founder member.
	 He is quoted by a
Namibian newspaper	 to have said that	 "'Unless you
deliberately mislead your shareholders ... there is only one
method of working South West Africa. That is to see what
46
According to the Financial Times, the "change in emphasis
occurred only a few years after Mr. Harry Oppenheimer had
assumed the chairmanship of De Beers following the death of
his father, Sir Ernest Oppenheimer. CDM concentrated on
preferential extraction of richer areas, particularly those
which contained the larger and more valuable gems. The
reason is still unclear, but it appears to be due to a
combination of fears over De Beers' status in Namibia once
the territory wins its independence from South Africa and
demands from De Beers' marketing division for more diamonds
than could be extracted if average material was worked." 47
According to the documentary referred to above, "De Beers had
'stolen' assets of about one billion pounds from its
Consolidated Diamond Mines in Namibia by excessive overmining
in breach of a 64 year-old agreement [i.e. the Halbscheid
Agreement]. Contrary to accepted mining practice, this
involved working the reserves with the largest stones and the
highest grade ... effectively reducing the life of the
46For details on overmining and transfer pricing
allegations see The Namibian, (Namibia) 2nd October, 1987,
p.4; and The Guardian, (London), 29 September, 1987, p.4.
47See The Financial Times, London, 18 March, 1986, p.
36, col. a.
diamonds you have got and work the average grade.'"
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mine. .48 In addition to the various sources quoted above,
the strongest evidence concerning overmining charges comes
from De Beers' own documents. The three most important of
these are: a Life of Mine Forecast 1977, a Life of Mine
Review September 1981, and a General Manager's Report of
January 1978.
	 CDM admitted the authenticity of
	 these
documents. 49 It is also important to note that when the
copies of the documents were presented before the Thirion
Commission, "CDM was represented by an attorney who was
keeping a watching brief, no objection was raised to the
admissibility of the documents when the attorney
representing CDM addressed the Commission, ... he alluded to
these documents as stolen documents." 50
It is also stated by Roger Murray that when the documents
were presented to an independent diamond expert, they
indicate that "CDM may have extensively overmined in the
1970s, that the life of the mine may be shorter than
anticipated and that its profitability may be decreasing." 51
According to the documents, "the average size of the stone
mined fell from 0.88 carats in 1972 to 0.66 carats by 1981
... the ore grade is falling from 0.3 carats per cubic metre
in 1968 to an expected 0.04 carats per cubic metre in 1993.
48Quoted from The Namibian, 2nd October, 1987, p.4.
49See Roger Murray, (1984) "Leaked documents spark CDM
diamond controversy." African Business, November, p.57.
50See The Thirion Commission, p. 258.
51Op. cit. Roger Murray, (1984) "Leaked documents spark
CDM diamond controversy."
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Output, which [was] just under 1M carats [in 1984], 98 per
cent of which [comprised of] high-quality gemstones, is
expected to start declining rapidly from 1990." 52
 The
documents also revealed that in "1968 the General Manager
recorded ov?.rmining by 323 per cent, Much later in a 1981
report, a senio: ninager warned that the mine would 'power
dive' itself into earl . , closure unless the rate of overmining
diamonds was slowed down." 53 In 1982, CDM's	 resident
director Mr. Hoffe expressly stated that "CDM is an old mine
nearing the end of its life." 54 He went on to state that the
1982 ore reserve estimate indicated that CDM has a life of
"between 12 and 15 years but because prospecting is
continuing it is estimated that CDM will continue producing
at least until 2000 A.D." 55 If these allegations are true,
there is no doubt that CDM is prima facie in breach of Clause
3 of the Halbscheid Agreement.
It is also important to note that although CDM claims that
its mining programme will lead to 97 per cent recovery, the
central issue is whether or not CDM gave priority to mining
out more valuable stones in breach of clause 3 of the
Agreement. Moreover, even if the recovery programme proves
successful, it does not mean that the revenue of the company
will not be affected if it is true that more valuable stones
5 .2ibid.
53Quoted from The Namibian, 2nd October, 1987, p.4.
54See The Thirion Commission, p. 250.
55See letter addressed to Mr. Lang in the Appendix.
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have been mined out.
	 It must also be noted that the
Halbscheid Agreement represents a good example of colonial
neglect. Notwithstanding the fact that mineral rights are
vested in the State, the agreement provides that a royalty of
22.5 per cent of the aggregate of the Diamond Export Duty and
Diamond Profits Tax should be payable to the South West
Finance Corporation (another De Beers subsidiary company).
The royalty is paid from diamonds produced in the area known
as the Sperrgebiet" as is now or may at any time hereafter be
owned, leased, controlled or worked by CDM and its successors
in title." 56 The arrangement has a distorting effect on
company tax which CDM pays to the State. This can only be
appreciated if the provisions of the income tax statutes are
briefly discussed.
In terms of the Diamond Taxation Proclamation No. 16 of 1941,
CDM is required to pay a 15 per cent diamond profits tax and
10 per cent diamond export duty. Under s.11 of the Income
Tax Act 1981, the amount assessed as diamond profits tax and
diamond export duty is deductible from the company tax
payable by CDM. Since the 22.5 per cent royalty payable to
the South West Finance Corporation is calculated on the
aggregate of the Diamond Export Duty and Diamond Profits tax,
the colonial administration pays out a larger amount as a
royalty than what CDM pays to the State. Indeed, one is
forced to conclude that these "taxes" are being used as a
56Consolidated Royalty (1941 Amendment) Agreement. 	 For
details see The Thirion Commission, 1985, p. 78.
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device to pay a larger share to the South West Finance
Corporation. It is for this reason that any discussion of
diamond taxation in Namibia which does not take this factor
into account may be misleading. It was also held by the
Thirion Commission that "Not only does the State receive no
income from Diamond Profits Tax but it in actual fact
foregoes tax ... since the State derives no benefit from it,
but is at the end of the day actually out of pocket as a
result of the fact that the tax serves to increase the amount
of the royalty payable by the State to S.W.F., it must be
abolished." 57
It should also be remembered that diamond rights from the
Sperrgebiet were owned jointly between the German colonial
administration and the German diamond company. When South
Africa assumed the administration, the rights of the State
were "leased" to CDM. There is no evidence that CDM paid for
the "lease". At least this should have been reflected in
CDM's tax obligations. Instead, the State is paying a
royalty to a private company for the rights which by statute
belong to the State. It is submitted that the arrangement
represents colonial neglect par excellence. Indeed, even if
the arrangement could be viewed in the context of attracting
private investment, it could have been renegotiated. This is
a universal practice in the mining industry (See Chapter
VII).
57See The Thirion Commission, 1985, p.163.
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The investment policy of the colonial administration seems to
be based on the assumption that foreign investors would only
invest in Namibia if they can obtain higher returns than in
neighbouring countries. Mining companies operating in
Namibia have been guaranteed stability of tax obligations.
It is interesting to note that in South Africa, the rate of
taxation on mining and non-mining companies (excluding gold
and diamond companies which have different tax rates) has
just been increased from 46.2 per cent to 50 per cent. The
so-called Policy Advisory Committee for Finance and Economics
in Namibia recommended against any increase in the rate of
taxation on the ground that that this "would contribute
little or nothing to solving the Central Government's
financial problems" •58
While the colonial neglect continues, South Africa and mining
company shareholders continue to receive enormous sums in the
form of dividends. It must be noted that Namibian mineral
resources significantly contribute to the revenue of the
fascist South African regime through its parastatal sector as
well as through private South African mining companies which
operate in Namibia. The well known South African state owned
company, Iscor, obtains vital supplies of Namibian minerals
such as zinc and tin from Namibia. The minerals are obtained
through its two operating subsidiary companies namely, the
Industrial Minerals Mining Corporation established in 1958
(wholly owned and operates Ois tin mine) and Imcor
58	
op.cit., SWA/Namibia Budget 1984-1985, P-13
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established in 1969 (51 per cent owned and operates Rosh
Pinah lead and zinc mine). The company supplies over half of
Iscor's tin concentrates.
	
It must be recalled that the
Industrial Minerals Mining Corporation is one of the
companies mentioned by the Thirion Commission and said to
have paid tax only once during a 13 year period. It is clear
therefore that the less tax it pays in Namibia, the more
South Africa benefits.
South Africa's plunder of Namibia's mineral resources is
illustrated by Imcor Zinc (pty), the fourth largest mining
company in Namibia, wholly owned by the South African State
company, ISCOR. The rental which it pays for its mineral
rights was fixed at R2 per hectare per annum. It was
disclosed by the Thirion Commission that "the rental cannot
be changed unilaterally during the currency of the grant ...
certain of the grants are to run until such time as the
mineral deposit has become exhausted. In respect of these
grants the State is contractually bound to a rental of R2
p.a. per ha. for the life of the mine ... however long that
may be."59
Furthermore, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) has
a shareholding in Rossing Uranium mine and it is also one of
the major shareholders in Oamites mine 60 (the company which
595ee The Thirion Commission Report, 1985, p.78.
60 see Proswa, Namibia Foundation Publication on
Mining in SWA/Namibia, p.8
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is also mentioned by the Thirion Commission). In the case of
IDC's shareholding in Rossing, it is reported that the
illegal racist regime received £3.6 million and £7.2 million
when Rossing profits in 1979 and 1980 were £27.2 and £54.4
million respectively. 61 This partly explains why the rate of
taxation in Namibia is lower than that of South Africa.
Therefore, the colonial neglect in Namibia benefits the South
African regime and foreign multinational companies.
5	 ALTERNATIVES
Our discussion in the preceding sections shows that sharing a
mineral rent can be a constant source of conflict between the
interests of Namibia and those of private foreign investors.
An equitable alternative of income taxation should be found
to minimise these conflicts of interest. The object of this
section is to briefly discuss options or alternatives that
could be adopted in place of the current open-ended system of
permitting write-off of investments and other tax concessions
before any obligation to pay income tax arises. Issues
covered in this section include limitation on the loan to
equity ration; taxing interest payments remitted abroad; and
limitation on the repatriation of capital, interest and
profits.
It is submitted that any alternative system must take into
account two important factors. As owner of the mineral
61
op.cit., Role of Transnational Corporations in
Namibia, p.4-2
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resources, the State should be entitled to receive an
equitable proportion of the mineral rent that is generated as
a result of the exploitation of its mineral resources. At
the same time, an equitable tax system should recognise the
legitimate needs of private foreign investors to receive more
than the going rate of return on their capital.
In the case of Namibia, there is a need to control and limit
some of the open-ended tax concessions that are granted to
private foreign investors. Among these should be put a
limitation on loan to equity ratio. It is a well known fact
that revenues from the exploitation of mineral resources may
be considerably reduced as a result of loan to equity ratio.
Where the amount of loan capital is unreasonably high in
relation to equity capital, the likely result is that there
may be an unfairly large interest deduction in the
calculation of taxable income. If, as is often the case in
Namibia, the loan is from a parent or another company in a
vertically integrated industry, the loan to the equity ratio
can work at the expense of the host State. The main
attraction for the mining companies is that they are able to
get a large part of their capital investment in the form of
repayment of loans rather than out of dividends withholding
tax. A high level of interest payments, given the fact that
they are chargeable as a cost, have the effect of reducing
the income tax liability. The current position in Namibia is
that the tax legislation does not restrict interest payments
on such loans. The problem could be minimised by restricting
such interest at rates charges by unrelated parties or some
pre-agreed formula or yardstick.
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There is also a need to amend the provisions of s.36 of the
1981 Income Tax Act to limit the aggregate amount of capital
expenditure that can be allowed as a deduction from taxable
income. The amended section could limit capital expenditure
deductions on project by project basis (i.e. expenditure
incurred in relation to any one mine), as opposed to a
company tax assessment basis. Indeed, this is the
requirement in South Africa under s.36 of the Income Tax Act
No. 58 of 1962. (as amended). The amendment could minimise
the current practice of cross-subsidisation among	 the
projects of the mining companies. 	 The effect would be that
capital expenditure incurred on a mine could only be offset
against income from that particular mine. This method has
long been adopted by the oil industry. The main objective is
to prevent oil companies from offsetting losses arising from
other projects against profits arising from oil activities.
The principle has since been referred to as "ring fencing". 62
Another alternative could be to link the accelerated tax
concession to reinvestment guarantees. This could be done by
stipulating a minimum percentage of the write-offs granted
for capital expenditure to be reinvested in the Territory.
It has already been noted that s.36 of the 1981 Income Tax
Act provides for an accelerated capital write-off. The
effect of the section has already been illustrated by TCL
example. An alternative to the section exists in South
62See generally Daintith, Terence and Willoughby G.D.M.
(eds), (1977) United Kingdom Oil and Gas Law, Oyez Publishing
Ltd, London, p.101.
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Africa under s.36 of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962.
Capital redemption under the provisions of the Act is spread
over the whole life of the mine. The Act stipulates that for
each year of assessment the unredeemed balance of capital
expenditure at the beginning of the year should be added to
deductible capital expenditure incurred during that year.
The aggregate thereof is then divided by the estimated life
of the mine to obtain the amount deductible from income in
that specific year of assessment. This aims to strike a
balance between the interests of the State and those of the
investor. Furthermore, in order to limit the current rate of
repatriation of capital and profits, a tax should be imposed
on interest payments remitted outside Namibia. There should
also be a limitation on the repatriation of profits by
requiring mining companies to re-invest a portion of their
profits in the country for a specified period of time. The
restriction could also be applied to a portion of the
redeemed capital.
All these measures would go a long way to minimise the
current problem that has been identified in the preceding
section. Indeed, if some of these problems are to be
minimised, Namibia needs to adopt some of the measures that
are currently in force in South Africa itself. In sum, the
South African tax laws could provide an answer to Namibia's
problems.
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6	 VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON INCOME TAXATION
The object of this section is to evaluate and analyse
problems associated with effective control of a vertically
integrated industry and the impact these problems have on
income taxation. In order for any tax system to be
effective, State personnel must be capable of analysing the
intricacies of interfirm transactions, transnational
accounting, and international taxation as used in the mining
industry. The inexperience or lack of personnel in this area
is likely to be one of the main handicaps of effective
control of a vertically integrated industry. It is also
likely to affect the State in its effort to achieve a more
favourable outcome in 	 dealings with	 transnational
corporations.
The growth of multinational mining companies has raised a
number of problems of effective control of their activities
by host mineral producing countries in the Third World. In
most cases, investment decisions are made by parent companies
and not by the operating subsidiaries situated in a host
developing country. Furthermore, investment decisions are
made in the context of an overall investment strategy aimed
at maximising the affiliates' total income. This results in
direct involvement or control by the parent companies over
the conduct of their operating affiliates.
6.1 Problems associated with determination of Income
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A vertically integrated
	 industry presents	 considerable
problems to the host State in determining the income of the
operating subsidiary of a multinational company. Among the
problems that most developing countries face are determining
the sources of income that are to be taxed, the prices that
govern sales made by the operating subsidiary to other
affiliated companies within the group, the application of
provisions relating to capital allowances, and finally the
calculation of costs, expenses, and other deductions that are
chargeable against gross income. Therefore, the biggest
problem that developing countries face is that multinational
mining companies operate globally. The companies may be
motivated to conduct their mining operations in such a way
that they shift recorded profits from one tax jurisdiction to
another in order to achieve a number of objectives. These
may include reducing taxes on their taxable income if the
physical regime of the host country is regarded as being too
severe; to avoid accumulation of profits in a country
regarded to be politically unstable (in some cases
notwithstanding the fact that the physical regime in such a
country may be favourable to the companies); 63 and to avoid
exchange controls and other restrictions that may be imposed
by the host State. 64
63Namibia provides a good example.
64This seems to be the experience in Namibia where
companies tend to shift profits from "RSA currency control
[to] finance global expansion" per Professor Green's
comments.
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The problems stated above reflect the nature and structure of
multinational mining companies. They are not confined to the
experience of one country such as Namibia but are problems
faced by most if not all mineral producing countries.
Therefore, transactions in a vertically integrated industry
such as the mining industry present universal problems, and
more so in developing countries. Part of the problem is that
the laws and administrative machinery of most developing
countries are not sufficiently developed to cope with
affiliate transactions. It will be shown below that although
many developing countries have taken measures aimed at
minimising adverse effects caused by affiliate transactions
(transfer pricing), considerable problems still remain
unresolved. Affiliate transactions or transfer pricing has
forced many developing countries to undertake constant
monitoring of these transactions by taxing authorities.
Among the issues covered in the monitoring process have
included mineral sales and intra-trade purchase prices of
goods and services.
One of the major problems experienced by mineral producing
countries is the method to be applied in determining the
price to govern sales of the mineral resources produced in
their countries. Pricing is an important part of mineral
taxation for it establishes the method for valuing minerals,
which in turn determines gross revenue upon which income tax
is imposed. If the accounts of the operating subsidiary
mining company are not effectively monitored, profits may be
reduced by manipulating accounts so as to inflate costs and
deflate earnings. The resulting consequence is the reduction
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of the operating subsidiary's tax liability. This may be
achieved in several ways, for instance, mineral sales to
affiliates may be set at artificially low transfer p,ices.
In most cases, these prices are much lower than those which
could be obtained in arm's length transactions. Several
options are available to the mineral producing countries to
deal with this problem. In recent years, pricing has been
used as a method of increasing taxation or rent collection.
Some countries require that taxes should be calculated on the
basis of market prices (if these prices are higher than
transfer prices). As a result, many forms of pricing have
been adopted. They include spot market prices, reference
prices, and posted prices. These prices reflect mineral
producing countries' desire to arrive at an arm's length
price which is a neutral market price between unrelated
parties. However, the use of open-market prices may not
necessarily solve some of the problems discussed above
because such prices are likely to swing widely. This may
have an impact on taxation. The experience in copper
provides a good example.
In some cases, the absence of openly quoted prices may
present considerable problems to the taxing authorities as
there may be no criteria on which to determine the price
which could be realised. This is the case in minerals such
as uranium. In these cases, the only solution may be for the
host State to assume control over part of the sales so as to
have a reliable standard. Developing countries have taken
further steps to minimise problems associated with mineral
sales within affiliates. Some of them, notably Zambia, have
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established single channel State monopoly marketing
companies. This is discussed in detail in Chapter VII. In
other countries where mineral sales are made to unaffiliated
parties, actual realised prices are used as a basis for
calculating income tax. However, if mineral sales are to
affiliated parties, some adequate yardstick of value is
normally specified,
Apart from the problems associated with the determination of
arm's length prices in mineral sales, the pricing of goods
and services among affiliates can have an adverse effect on
the operating subsidiary's net income on which it is taxed.
It is often the case that mining companies buy most of their
equipment and inputs through affiliates. This can provide
the companies with an opportunity to price the goods so that
profits are generated where they serve the interests of the
group. Where imported goods are over-priced, this is likely
to result in a diminished net income of the operating
subsidiary on which it is taxed. This problem has been
tackled in a number of ways. The laws of most developing
countries require the application of arm's-length prices to
be used for income tax purposes. However, where arm's-length
prices do not exist, this can present a problem to the taxing
authorities. Two options may be adopted by a developing
country that wish to minimise this problem. The first
option is to base affiliate transactions on the cost-based
figures, or alternatively, the State can hire independent
assessors to evaluate the imported goods.
	 In such
circumstances, figures arrived at by independent assessors
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authority to arrive at the net income of the operating
subsidiary for income tax purposes.
Apart from purchases of goods, another method which may be
available to multinational mining companies for shifting
accounting profits from one country to another is the use of
charges for services within affiliates. These charges, which
are normally made by parent companies to their operating
subsidiaries, cover a wide range of services such as sales
commissions on mineral exports, technical, financial and
consultancy charges; and "head office" expenses (as is the
standard practice with De Beers (supra)).
	
It is submitted
that this is an area where developing countries 	 face
considerable problems of verification to ensure that these
services are provided at	 arm's-length prices.	 It	 is
particularly difficult to verify the true cost of say
technological information services for instance. In most
cases, due to specialisation, it is difficult independently
to verify certain charges offered by the parent company or an
affiliate. The diamond industry provides a good example. De
Beers' services (or at least some of them) are not matched by
other companies outside its group of companies. Under such
circumstances, it would be difficult to approximate what
would constitute reasonable charges for diamond sorting for
example. The arm's-length charges may either be too low or
too high since there is no way in which the taxing authority
may verify the true value of these charges.
As already noted above, if no action is taken by the State to
control these charges, they are likely to be used by the
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companies as a method of shifting income of the operating
subsidiaries. In a situation where there is comparable
charges, legislation (or mining project provision) may be
adopted to require affiliate charges not to be higher than
those that would be provided by third parties. On the other
hand, where there are no comparable charges, the host State
may protect its interest by placing a burden on the operating
subsidiary to submit calculations to determine what
constitutes fair charges for income tax purposes.
6.2 Monitoring Activities of Multinationals
Problems that are associated with a vertically integrated
industry cannot be minimised without an effective monitoring
mechanism. However, due to the structure of multinational
mining companies, most developing countries would find it
very difficult effectively to monitor their activities. In
most cases, these countries have adopted laws and regulations
which enable State officials to inspect the books of account
and records of the operating subsidiaries. Inspection rights
enable the State to inspect the books in order, for instance,
to verify the shipment and sale of the operating company's
mineral resources. This may be necessary for determining the
f.o.b. revenue from the sale of such minerals.
In theory, inspection rights may be a useful tool possessed
by the host State in its effort to monitor activities of
operating subsidiaries. In practice, however, this may not
necessarily prove to be effective. It has been stated by
Studholme that "where inspection of company books takes
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place, the Multinational Mining Company keeps
	 separate
records for government inspection and its own record." 65
However, this problem may be minimised by requiring the
operating subsidiary to adopt a standard method of
accounting.
Perhaps the biggest problem which most developing countries
face is not so much that of compliance with their laws and
regulations but lack of qualified personnel. It is an
obvious fact that lack of qualified personnel can hinder
effective regulation and monitoring. This can also have a
direct bearing on the mineral rent due to the State. The
administrative staff should be in a position to comprehend
most of the complex issues raised above so as to minimise the
adverse effect of affiliate transactions on the amount of tax
that is due to the State.
	 The personnel must be capable of
interpreting and processing the information that is supplied
to them by operating subsidiaries. If the information
obtained through the monitoring system is to be useful to the
State, its personnel must be in a position to make a more
accurate evaluation of such information. It goes without
saying that most host countries, Namibia included, lack such
personnel. it is for these reasons that even a voluntarily
supplied information by a vertically integrated company may
prove to be of no value to the host State. At the end of the
65See Studholme, Caroline, (1981), The Legal Regulation
of Mineral Exploitation in Developing Countries: A Study in
Dependent Development, LL.M. dissertation submitted to the
University of Warwick, Coventry, UK, p.200.
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day, the purported monitoring mechanism may turn out to be
more costly and worthless if those entrusted with the job are
not capable of even understanding the most elementary issues
involved with problems associated with controlling a
vertically integrated mining industry. Indeed, it is
submitted that due to considerable experience which
multinational mining companies gain from their global
operations, they are likely to be several steps ahead of any
attempt aimed at limiting their privileged position.
7	 CONCLUSION
Although theoretically tax concessions are a form of subsidy
which could be granted to foreign investors in order to
promote a certain industry, tax concessions can only be
effective if they bring about economic benefits to the host
country. Clearly, it is insufficient to grant a subsidy to
the companies who would have invested even without it. The
higher the number of beneficiaries of the subsidy although
they do not contribute to the economic development of the
territory, the lower its efficiency.
In the preceding sections, the current taxation legislation
affecting the mining industry has been examined. We have
seen that the legislation puts more emphasis on the essential
needs of the mining rights holders at the expense of the
needs of the Territory. In addition, the legislation has
not kept pace with developments in tax laws in other
countries. The small increase in the rate of taxation (see
the appendix) has nothing to do with improving the social and
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material conditions of the indigenous population but to
finance the costly state repressive machinery.
Therefore, the lesson which can be drawn from this study is
that open-ended concessions in themselves do not constitute a
satisfactory solution to mineral development which can
benefit the host country. Practical problems (such as
controlling the accounting principles in order to minimise
tax evasion and avoidance) remain to be solved especially
when the industry is dominated by foreign companies motivated
solely by an urge for profits.	 Although the inflow of
foreign capital may partly be facilitated through the
mechanism of tax concessions, it nevertheless 	 remains
uncertain as to how far that inflow is secured by direct
provision of incentives. While it is true that to some
extent tax incentives may have a bearing on the flow of
foreign capital in the mining industry, the investment
decision will, to a large extent, depend upon the
requirements of world markets and the estimate of the annual
growth of world consumption. The result is that even where
special concessions may not greatly affect the total flow of
foreign investment, these latter factors do often have
important bearing on the allocation of that investment.
There are four disadvantages in exempting investors from
taxation until capital investment has been recovered. First,
the demand for minerals (and the price) may drop before
liability for tax arises. Secondly, it encourages companies
to cream off the richer parts of the mineral deposit during
the early stage of mining operations, thus, running a risk of
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minerals being exhausted before tax liability arises.
Thirdly, the exemption can only be beneficial to the private
foreign investor if there is a double taxation treaty with a
tax sparing provision between the host country and the State
of the investor. Finally, during the exemption period, the
host State continues to incur enormous amounts on
infrastructure services for the benefit of the investor.
Having regard to the above discussion, we are compelled to
come to the same conclusion as that of the Thirion
Commission, namely Namibia "should not wait for independence
before realising that its mineral resources are a blessing
and have to be exploited with care and circumspection if the
highest possible return is to be obtained from them". 66
66	
op.cit., Thirion Commission, p.62
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CHAPTER V - MINERAL DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT
PROTECTION
1	 INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the effect of mining operations on the
environment in Namibia and the role played by mining laws and
regulations in protecting the environment. Before we discuss
these issues in detail, it is important to note a few points. It
is submitted that the analytical discussion on environmental
protection in Namibia has some limitations. It has not been
possible to gain access to the information relating to how
government authorities, notably the Chief Inspector of Mines,
exercise their official duties. The difficulty in obtaining
information was highlighted by the Windhoek Observer during the
Thirion Commission inquiry in 1985. According to the newspaper,
the Chief Inspector of Mines compiles annual reports "for
statistical purposes. These reports [are] submitted to the
Secretary of Economic Affairs, the Department of Geological
Survey and the Mineral Board in Johannesburg. The [reports are] 
not published for general information". 1 It is for these reasons
that environmental discussion on Namibia has limitations since it
is not possible to adequately evaluate the effectiveness of
environmental and safety controls in Namibia's mines.
'See Windhoek Observer, Namibia, 6 July, 1985, p. 27, col.
a. Emphasis added.
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Because of the importance of environmental protection to the
future of Namibia, it has become necessary to include a chapter
on environmental protection. In order to evaluate effectively
and objectively the adequacy of the laws and regulations relating
to environmental protection in Namibia, it is necessary to
briefly discuss the experience of other developing countries. It
is also necessary to discuss the experience of countries, notably
Australia, which produce similar source materials such as
uranium. However, our objective is to put more emphasis on
Namibia.
It has already been discussed in the preceding chapters that the
economic exploitation of Namibia's mineral resources has been
encouraged and supported by colonial governments from the first
years of German colonization. During the early days of the
mining industry, concern over the impact of mining operations on
the natural environment and on the health of the employees was
either neglected or took a secondary role. The reasons for this
are many, mineral resources were in high demand, especially
during the industrial revolution; minerals were regarded by the
colonial authorities as a source of wealth and prosperity to the
large white settler population; the mining industry was regarded
as a major source of employment; and many adverse effects on the
environment and on the health of the community which have come to
be recognised today were not yet known to science. All, or at
least some, of •
 these factors had important implications on the
manner and degree of environmental protection.
	 Given the fact
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that capital was still scarce those days, mining companies could
not be overburdened by stringent environmental controls.
However, this attitude is gradually changing due to the
realisation of the impact of mining operations on the environment
and on the safety and health of the employees and the community.
2	 ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH MINING OPERATIONS
The spread of multinational mining companies and the introduction
of new mining techniques have forced mineral producing countries
to reassess their priorities in mineral resource management. New
techniques have brought the introduction of toxic chemicals in
mineral processing. Furthermore, technological advancement has
made the exploitation of minerals such as uranium commercially
viable. As a result, uranium mining has brought a number of
environmental and health hazards such as exposure to radiation.
All these factors have forced responsible mineral producing
countries in developing countries to introduce extensive controls
over mineral development. As a result, mining legislation and
regulations have begun to acknowledge the environmental
significance of mining operations. These factors have also led
government authorities to assume environmental responsibilities
for mining projects by undertaking consultations and consider
environmental matters before making decisions.
A common form of pollution of land and water resulting from
mining operations is that caused by the escape of acid-bearing
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water flowing from slimes dams. This water may percolate or flow
from the beds and walls of slimes dams on to adjoining land and
into streams, thus, polluting the land and the water. It is
obvious therefore that damage caused by water pollution resulting
from mining operations include contamination of soil, surface
water, and underground water supplies. Other forms of pollution
such as air pollution (or atmosphere pollution) may occur as a
result of chemicals released in a form of fumes, or as a result
of wind blowing dust and vapour containing chemical products.
Therefore, the main objective of environmental regulation is to
prevent and deal with any disturbance resulting from mining
operations or at least restrict such activities to a tolerable
level. Mining operations - prospecting and mining - involve the
introduction of new types of activity and often disrupt the
existing patterns of land use and land values. This has led
mineral producing countries to take steps to ensure safe mining
operations, to protect employees and the community from the
adverse effects of mining operations, to provide effective
conservation measures and to minimise risks of pollution.
Furthermore, government authorities have taken measures to
protect and accommodate established residential,	 farming,
recreation and other land uses. Finally, the objective of
environmental control is to see that those who cause pollution or
likely to endanger the health of others through mining operations
pay to safeguard the interests of third parties and to protect
the environment. These objectives are reflected in the mining
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legislation, regulations, and administrative practices in most
established mineral producing countries.
Laws and regulations governing environmental and safety controls
derive from two principal sources - the common law and statutory
provisions. For the purpose of our discussion, common law should
be understood to mean a body of judge-made law. It is submitted
that common law principles are only appropriate to the protection
of individual interests and to the award of compensation. Common
law gives individuals defined rights enforceable by civil actions
such as nuisance and compensation claims resulting from physical
injury caused by mining operations. In addition to monetary
compensation, a plaintiff in a common law civil action can apply
for an injunction which will be granted at the discretion of the
court. As instruments of environmental control, however, common
law principles have little general application.
Although common law grants rights to individuals for the
protection of personal property and other interests in cases of
pollution, these rights are often quite limited. A person's
standing to sue (locus standi) depends on whether or not his
legal right has been transgressed. Where mining operations cause
a serious pollution or damage, a civil action can be brought only
if such mining operations constitute an infringement of someone's
rights. As a consequence, standing to sue, apart from cases of
personal injury or damage to health, depends on the ownership,
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occupation or other interest in the property that the law is
prepared to protect.
More effective environmental control is provided by statutory
provisions. In the case of Namibia, these provisions are mainly
found in the Mines, Works and Minerals Ordinance No. 20 of 1968
and in various forms of delegated legislation such as regulations
made by the Chief Inspector of Mines. The most important factor
is that these provisions are, in most cases, backed by criminal
sanctions. Therefore, the common law protects individual
rights, awards compensation and is backed, in some cases, by the
supplementary remedy of injunction. On the other hand, statutory
provisions provide controls backed by criminal penalties. It is
also important to note that these two principal forms of laws
operate almost entirely independent of each other, and according
to different standards.
It is important to note that the statute does not provide express
definition of terms relating to the control and protection of the
environment from pollution. However, it is necessary to define
some of the concepts used in this Chapter. The word pollution
should generally be understood to include any mining activity
which involves the discharge of solid, liquid or gaseous
substances, noise, vibrations, or radiation which can interfere
with the ecological processes or upset the living conditions of
the mine's employees and those who may be directly or indirectly
affected by mining operations.	 Environmental control includes
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measures taken by the State for the prevention of pollution of
the soil, air, water-courses, and rivers by mining operations.
It also includes measures relating to the protection of the
environment and to the health and general welfare of the
employees in the mines and the community.
Although it is generally difficult to obtain official information
relating to the conditions of the mines in Namibia, it is
generally believed by both African mine employees and a number of
consultants that prevailing conditions in at least some of the
mines are not satisfactory. A number of environmental problems
have been experienced.
	 For instance, it was revealed in 1985
during the Thirion Commission inquiry that there is
"unsatisfactory conditions at certain mines" in Namibia. 2
 The
most serious condition at the time was at Ills Tin Mine where "a
problem of dust appeared to be a pronounced one at [the] mine's
crushers." In 1984, it was reported that Oamites Mine
experienced "a surface subsidence and as a result, 110 employees
were laid of f.." 3 Finally, it was reported during the seminar
organised by the United Nations Council for Namibia in 1984 that
"Tsumeb mine has developed an unsavoury reputation for both a
very high rate of industrial injuries and a high incidence of
2.	 .ibid.
3See Windhoek Advertiser, Namibia, 2nd February 1984.
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arsenic poisoning. ,4 Environmental problems caused by Rossing
uranium operations are discussed in detail elsewhere in this
chapter. Given this state of affairs, how effective are the laws
and regulations relating to environmental safeguards in Namibia?
This is the subject of our discussion in the section which
follows.
3	 MINERAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS
IN NAMIBIA
The purpose of this section is to examine the legal regulation of
environmental control in the mining industry. Issues covered
include the role played by both common law and statute law in
environmental safeguards. Due to the environmental effect of
uranium operations in Namibia, we have specifically included a
section on the environmental problems caused by uranium mining.
We hope that this is appropriate due to the concern that has been
raised both in Namibia and at the United Nations regarding
environmental problems caused by Rossing operations.
Furthermore, a detailed discussion on the subject may also help,
it is hoped, a future lawful government of Namibia to promulgate
4See Brian Bolton, (1985), "The Condition of the Namibian
Workers", in United Nations, Seminar on the Activities of Foreign
Economic Interests in the Exploitation of Namibia's Natural and
Human Resources, Ljubljana, Yugoslavia, 16-20 April 1984, New
York, p. 34. For industrial injuries, see Windhoek Observer,
Namibia, 23 December 1983; and for arsenic poisoning, see
Windhoek Advertiser, 2nd February, 1984.
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laws designed to minimise pollution caused by Rossing and to
protect the health and safety of the employees of the mine and
communities in the surrounding area.
3.1 Environmental safeguards and the role played by common law
Before we discuss the role which common law can play in
environmental safeguards, we would like to point out that we have
been unable to find cases decided by the courts on the subject in
Namibia. Therefore, most of the cases cited below were decided
in South Africa. Our objective in this section is to show how
common law can play a role in pollution control and environmental
safeguards. Indeed, it is submitted that South African cases are
directly relevant to Namibia insofar as they establish common law
principles. Moreover, section 7 and section 52(3) of the Mines,
Works and Minerals Ordinance No. 20 of 1968 state that the
provisions of the Ordinance do not exempt any person from
prosecution for an offence under common law or deprive any person
of his common law rights.
Upon the severance of minerals from the surface, working powers
and liberties are expressly granted to the mineral licence
holder. The mining licence holder has a right to get and carry
away minerals. An express liberty to dig pits implies prima
facie a right to fix on the surface machinery necessary for
draining the mines and raising the minerals. An express right to
mine is incidental the right to deposit minerals and spoil on the
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surface and an express right to mine implies a power, so far as
it is necessary for winning and getting minerals, to remove
overlying strata. Most of these mining activities have an impact
on the environment, health and safety of the miners and the
community, and poses a danger to surrounding areas. How does
common law regulate environmental effects of mining operations?
As already noted, an express right to prospect and to mine may
include the right to deposit slimes, effluent or other
acidic-bearing water, and to deposit and store materials
necessary for mining purposes. 	 In law, the rights granted to
the mining companies raise a number of legal questions.	 For
instance, is the depositing of slimes, effluent or 	 other
acid-bearing water or material constitute mining operations
carried out under statutory authority? If so, would statutory
authority be a good defence to any civil claim arising from the
escape of injurious matter from slimes dams or from mineral,
tailings and waste-rock dumps or from mine workings generally?
Would it be a good defence for mining companies to prove that the
damage or pollution was caused in the course of or as a result of
the normal or natural user of land? Some of the cases cited
below will provide answers to these questions.
Under the common law, the mine owner owes a duty of care to every
person who is employed by him as well as to the members of the
general public. He is under a duty to take all reasonable care
to make sure that his activities (mining operations) do not pose
a danger to any person or property.
	 However, in certain
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instances, private common law rights may severely be restricted
by statute. Therefore, private common law rights are subject to
statutory limitations. In most cases, the rights will depend on
how the Courts construe the provisions of the statute. However,
notwithstanding statutory intervention, common law can still play
a significant role in environmental safeguards.
At common law, the pollution of water in a natural stream flowing
past the land of a riparian owner constitutes an infringement of
his right of property, whether or not he is the owner of any part
of the river bed. Such owner is entitled to the flow of the
water past his land in its natural state of purity. The same
principle is applicable to the mining industry. For instance, it
was held in the South African case of Rivas v. The Premier 
(Transvaal) Diamond Mining Co. Ltd. 5
 that a riparian owner is
entitled to have the water of the stream transmitted to him
"without ... alteration in its character or quality." 6
 The legal
consequence of this principle is that unless it is expressly
empowered by statute, a mining company has no greater power to
take away or prejudice the rights of third parties than has a
private individual or undertaking. Therefore, should a mining
company cause a nuisance by pollution through contamination of
water, for instance, it will be liable to an action just as any
5 (1929) WLD 1.
6 ibid per Barry J.
255
other person would be. In the absence of any express provision
conferring immunity from liability, mining companies, as a
general rule, cannot plead statutory power as a defence against
civil claims. It was held in R.V. Marshall and Another 7 that the
company having acquired a mining title under the Mines and Works
Act 43 of 1899, did not exercise statutory powers any more than
did a person who sold liquor under the Liquor Act. Each of them
exercised statutory rights but neither acquired any immunity from
the general law.
Therefore, it is important to note that the question whether
mining operations which interfere with private rights are
justified by statute is always a matter of construing the
particular statute in question. The general principle is that
where the powers conferred in the statute are directory, their
exercise in the manner authorised cannot create liability at the
suit of the injured party, for the implication is clear that the
legislature intended to legalise an infringement. This principle
was established in earlier cases such as Metropolitan Asylum
District Managers v. Hill and Others. 8 Where, however, statutory
powers are permissive, the legislature is presumed not to have
intended an interference with private rights 	 without
7 ((1950) 1 PHK 24(N)
8 (1881) 6 App. Cas 193 at 203.
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compensation. 9 However, this presumption may be negatived by
other considerations. For instance, it was held by the Court of
Appeal in the leading case of Johannesburg Municipality v.
African Realty Trust Ltd. that the "work authorised to be done
may be defined and localised, so as to leave no doubt that the
legislature intended to sanction a specific operation. In such a
case, ... an intention that it should be duly constructed in
spite of interference with common law rights might fairly be
inferred ... Or gain, if an act which a statute definitely
authorises to be done is one which must necessarily interfere
with common law rights, the court will infer a legislative
intention that they should be infringed." 10
Even in cases where there is nothing in the statute to 'localise'
the operations and where permissive powers are expressed in
general terms, a liability may not necessarily result if such
operations interfere with common law rights. For example, it is
a defence to show that under the circumstances of the case, it is
impossible to carry out the work without interfering with common
law rights. The courts in such circumstances will infer that an
infringement of common law rights was sanctioned, for otherwise
9
See Canadian Pacific Railway v. Parke (1899) App. Cas 535
at 544-545.
10
Per Innes CJ, (1927) AD 163 at 172-173.
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the grant of statutory authority would be negatory. 11 As for the
natural user of land defence, the approach of the Courts have
been generally in favour of the plaintiff. 	 The leading South
African case is Levin v. Vogelstruis Estates and Gold Mining Co. 
Ltd. 12 In this case, damages were awarded against the mining
company for permitting sand from a dump to encroach upon the
property of a neighbouring landowner. The company raised two
main defences, both rejected by the Court, namely that (1) the
encroachment was the result of the natural use of its land, and
(2) it had statutory right to put the dump where it was. The
Court in rejecting both defences, expressly stated that "the
legislature must be held to have intended that the use sanctioned
[was] not to be in prejudice of the common law right of
others.• 13
The common law principle of natural user of land was first stated
in the earlier case of Reed v. De Beers Consolidated Mines 14 in
these terms: "Every man may use his own property in a natural
way, and taking out minerals is a natural use of mining property.
If in the course, or in consequence, of such use, water which
'following the stratification of the country' ... would or might
11See Tobiansky v. Johannesburg Town Council (1907) TS 134
at 144.
12 (1921) WLD 66
13 i bidlip  at 192
14 (1897) 9 SC 333
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otherwise have remained or gone elsewhere, finds its way by
gravitation or percolation into the property ... of another,
there is no cause of action because there is no injuria. If,
however, water is collected by artificial constructions, or
excavations, or diverted by an artificial channel, or by
artificial means, such as pumping, or sinking a shaft and boring
a hole, ... and damage ensues which would not otherwise have
occurred, then, at all events in the absence of vismajor, an
action lies." 15 The legal consequence of this principle is,
therefore, that any erection of artificial structures such as
tailings dam or the application of artificial chemical processes
to the water which flows or percolates into the property of
another, the mining company can be liable to a civil action.
In addition, certain conducts which are liable to cause damage to
property or pollution may fall under the common law principle of
strict liability. This principle was developed in the well known
case of Rylands v. Fletcher. 16 The Court stated the principle as
follows: "The person who for his own purposes brings on his land
collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it
escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do, is
prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural
15 ibid 350.
16 (1866) L.R. 1EX 265
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consequence of its escape." 17 It must be noted that the rule is
one of absolute liability. In the case of mining operations, the
principle is applicable to cases of explosions, vibrations,
damage or injury done by mining operations, and escape of noxious
gas.
It is submitted that statutory regulation is the most appropriate
in environmental controls since resort to common law involves
protracted litigation which may be costly for the claimant.
Moreover, only those whose rights have been directly affected by
mining operations are able to sue. This is a serious limitation
which makes common law inadequate. Notwithstanding these
limitations, however, the cases which we have discussed above
show that common law has a role to play in environmental controls
and regulations.
3.2 State Regulation
Before we discuss the provisions of the statute in detail, it is
necessary to discuss briefly the administrative structure.
Questions relating to the regulation and protection of the
environment, safety and health of the miners and the community
from mining operations are dealt with by the Mines Inspectorate
Division. The Division deals with a broad spectrum of duties.
17. .lipid at 279
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Through legislation, wide powers have been assigned to the
Minister for Mines. He is empowered to issue general rules of
different kinds which include far-reaching powers to control
mining operations generally, and operations which are likely to
cause pollution or endanger the health and safety of the
community. The legislation, therefore, makes it possible for the
Minister to delegate some of his powers to other authorities or
to obtain assistance from them. In this connection, s.4(2) of
the Mines, Works and Minerals Ordinance No. 20 of 1968 empowers
the Minister to "(a) appoint a Chief Inspectorate of Mines who
shall exercise the powers and perform functions and duties
conferred ... by [the] ordinance," and to "exercise general
supervision of mines, works and machinery; (b) appoint properly
qualified persons as inspectors of mines or of machinery who
shall assist the Chief Inspector."
The main functions of the Chief Inspector and his staff are to
protect the environment from pollution, ensure that mining
operations do not endanger health and safety of mine workers and
those who are likely to be affected by such operations,
inspection of mining premises and compilation of reports on
accidents. These powers enable the Chief Inspector and his team
to take all necessary action to ensure that mining companies
comply with environmental protection conditions contained in
their licences. Mining companies are required to ensure that
mining operations are conducted safely. This is meant to ensure
that mining operations are conducted in such a way that the
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maximum economic recovery of mineral resources is combined with
sound conservation practices.
3.2.1 Substantive Provisions
The depositing of material in the course of mining operations is
generally authorised in terms of prospecting and mining licences
granted to the mining companies under the terms of the Mines,
Works and Minerals Ordinance No. 20 of 1968. The terms and
conditions of these licences have already been discussed in
Chapter II. Under the provisions of the Ordinance, the mining
commissioner as well as the minister have general powers to grant
permission to the mining companies to use surface land for
purposes of mining or for any purpose incidental to mining
operations. At the same time, the Ordinance contains substantive
provisions designed to prevent or minimise pollution resulting
from mining operations. It must be noted that most of these
provisions do not set precise standards describing permissible
levels of pollutants nor do they set targets of environmental
quality to be attained. However, it is submitted that these
general provisions serve a useful purpose in that they set basic
behavioural criteria which may easily be translated into
environmental protection measures in the course of project
planning.
The most useful provision contained in the Ordinance is section
34(1) which provides that every "prospector shall ... maintain
262
his workings in a safe condition and shall repair or make safe
... the surface of any land which has been rendered unsafe by
prospecting." During the mining phase, every mine owner is
required to "maintain in a safe condition any working place or
the surface of any land during ... mining operations." General
clauses or provisions offer certain advantages to the State.
They are easy to formulate, and they can also be applied
uniformly. Furthermore, uniform application of general clauses
is desirable because they do not overburden the State's
administrative resources. Finally, they confer a wide discretion
to the mining companies in the sense that they do not specify in
exact terms how pollution prevention measures may be achieved.
However, their advantages may sometimes be outweighed by the
economic inefficiencies that can result. Uniformly applied
provisions do not take advantage of individual mining project
variations in the costs of pollution at different sites.
Moreover, they do not provide differentiation between strict
•minimum standards such as those in the area of accident
prevention, and less rigorous standards in which economic
consideration are allowed a primary role. Therefore, there is an
imperative need to supplement general provisions with specific
clauses in order to take individual mining projects, such as
Rossing for instance, into account.
3.3.2 Monitoring Instruments
263
In order to assess the effectiveness or failures of environmental
laws and regulations, the State must be in a position to monitor
the activities of the mining companies. Monitoring mechanisms
consist of two main areas, namely reporting requirements and
inspection rights. These are discussed in detail below.
The requirement that mining companies should submit periodic
reports on their mining operations forms part of the State's
environmental regulations. It also occupies a central part of
the State's administrative functions. However, it must be noted
that the requirements of the mining companies to submit reports
is limited to the submission of a general report on the mining
operations which may include some aspects of environmental
measures taken. These requirements are primarily regulated under
section 82(1)(a) of the Mines, Works and Minerals Ordinance No.
20 of 1968.
Reporting requirement; offer considerable advantages to the
State. They can considerably reduce the country's supervisory
burden, especially if its administrative machinery is not
sufficiently developed. Mining companies, through reporting,
can provide useful information to the State on the mining
project's compliance with environmental standards. In addition,
reporting requirements are likely to induce mining companies to
adhere to established environmental standards especially if such
standards are coached in precise numerical terms. However, the
effectiveness of reporting requirements is determined by a number
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of factors. The State should be in a position independently to
verify the information it receives from the mining companies.
This will necessitate intermittent spot checks and the capacity
of the administrative authorities to process the data to
establish whether it is compatible with minimum environmental
standards.
Monitoring instruments cannot be effective if mining laws and
regulations do not provide for inspection rights. Inspection
rights represent an important supplement to reporting
requirements. The Mines, Works and Minerals Ordinance contain
provisions which provide for inspection rights. The colonial
administration is accorded sufficient statutory powers to enforce
the provisions of the Ordinance relating to environmental
control. Section 5(1) provides that the Chief Inspector or any
inspector of mines, machinery or explosives has power to enter
any mine at any time of the "day or night" to inspect the
conditions of the mine. It is clear from the foregoing
discussion that inspection rights can serve two main purposes.
First, they enable the State to inspect mining projects to
independently monitor the attainment of minimum environmental
standards. Second, the State has an option to limit its
inspection right to mere verification of the information obtained
from mining companies. It is for these reasons that inspection
rights provide a useful tool to the State to monitor mining
operations of the companies.
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3.2.3 Coercive Measures
State supervision and control over mineral resource development
proceeds from the principle of State ownership of such resources.
As owner, the State possesses the power necessary for the grant
and proper enjoyment of rights to mines and mineral products, for
prescribing the prerequisite qualifications, and for setting the
operating conditions and obligations to be observed by mining
companies. The legal consequences of the theory of State
ownership is that in the event of violations by the mining
companies of the laws and regulations, or non-fulfilment of their
obligations, penalties are normally provided in the legislation.
These may range from fines to suspension of operations or even
cancellation of mining rights depending upon the nature and
gravity of the offence or omission made.
It is generally recognised that even the most effective
environmental monitoring system is likely to remain ineffective
if, in the event of non-compliance by mining companies, the State
does not have legal means of compelling the companies to adhere
to environmental standards. It is for these reasons that mining
laws and regulations contain criminal penalties and coercive
measures.
In the case of Namibia, coercive measures are contained under the
Mines, Works and Minerals Ordinance No. 20 of 1968. The
Ordinance adopts two modes of sanctions for ensuring that mining
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companies comply with the provisions of the ordinance. Sanctions
may take the form of administrative action, for instance, the
Chief Inspector of Mines can, by the exercise of his
administrative powers compel mining companies to observe the
provisions of the ordinance. 18 Any failure to comply with the
Chief Inspector's orders may result into committing a criminal
offence. 19 In addition, the ordinance contains provisions for
the payment of compensation to those whose interests may be
injured by the non-observance of the provisions. 20 Any person
who attempts to obstruct the inspector commits an offence and is
liable on conviction to a maximum fine of four hundred rand or in
default of payment, to one year's imprisonment. 21 Finally, the
ordinance provides that if death is caused as a result of
contravening the provisions of the ordinance, the person
responsible is liable to a maximum penalty of two thousand rand
or five years imprisonment in default of payment "or such
imprisonment without the option of a fine." 22
3.3 Rossing Uranium Operations and Environmental Issues
18S.5(2)
19S.6
20S.53(3)
21S.6
22S.8(c)
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Due to the concern that has been expressed in Namibia and by the
international community regarding environmental, health and
safety issues resulting from uranium mining in Namibia, we have
found it necessary to devote a section on the subject. However,
for reasons stated below, it has not been possible to gain access
to official information regarding uranium operations. Therefore,
the discussion in this section must be considered in the light of
the absence of official information.
It is an established fact that uranium mining presents
considerable environmental and health problems. It is also a
well known fact that uranium mining can also have an adverse
effect on ground and surface water, air, and on animal and plant
life. Moreover, uranium mining has the effect of degrading the
quality of ground and surface water, and thus have negative
repercussions on the health of the inhabitants of the mining
area. The most common adverse effects on water quality result
from the contamination of streams and rivers. This can pose a
serious risk to the inhabitants who live near the mining
operations since their water is likely to be affected by the
discharge of wastes. Since the wastes contain radiation and
harmful chemicals, these are likely to leach out and contaminate
the underlying water table.
Furthermore, mine employees at the mine are exposed to a number
of radiation risks, in addition to mine related accidents. The
employees are exposed to in-plant radiation contaminants, gases,
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dust, fumes, vapours and toxic liquids which are released during
uranium mining and milling operations. It should be noted that
if adequate safety measures are not taken, these dangers are
likely to have a major economic effect on the mining project's
productivity and profitability. The long term effects of
radiation exposure may result into many employees being affected.
This is likely to result in the mining project's costs to
increase because there will be an urgent need to provide medical
care, disability payments and disruption of work schedules. The
unsatisfactory environmental and health conditions at the mine is
likely to result into unstable relationship between the employees
and the management.
Some of these factors may be minimised by comprehensive
provisions in the mining legislation and regulations requiring
uranium mining companies to promote safety measures. These may
include close supervision of safety procedures, provision of
radiation protection facilities, requirement to provide
adequately staffed safety unit, and training and supervision of
employees in safety on the job.
It has already been discussed in the first three Chapters that
the uranium industry is the most secretive in Namibia. Laws as
well as political factors have made it difficult to obtain
official information relating to Rossing's, operations. Most of
the information has come to light through consultants, mine
employees and newspaper reports at considerable risk.
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Like the diamond industry, there has been a trend towards an open
cast system of uranium mining. This can be attributed to several
factors. Firstly, open cast mining yields a higher recovery rate
than underground mining and does so more economically. Secondly,
the unsuitability of underground mining to certain areas of the
country such as uranium mining at Rossing leaves open cast mining
as the only alternative. Although it could be said that open
cast system of mining eliminates many safety and health hazards
such as cave-ins, the extraction of uranium through open cast
mining generates many environmental problems. However, in spite
of the gravity of environmental problems, effective regulation
can reduce the adverse impact of uranium mining by providing a
mechanism for balancing mineral extraction with the needs of the
environment.
In the case of Namibia, the colonial administration seem to have
put more emphasis on the mining companies' profitability at the
expense of environmental control. Although the provisions aimed
at environmental pollution prevention and regulation are not
comprehensive enough, they can still play an important role if
they are enforced. It was reported by the Mining Engineer during
the Thirion Commission inquiry that mining companies "always
attempted to comply with safety regulations, but this was not
always possible." 23
	This statement seem to suggest that
23
The Mining Engineer's testimony before the Thirion
(Footnote Continued)
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coercive measures provided for in the legislation are either not
enforced or are so inadequate that they are being ignored by the
mining companies.
3.3.1 Water Pollution
Since Rossing started commercial operation, there has been a
serious problem of water pollution. Acid discharge is a major
source of the economic damage resulting from mine-related water
pollution. In 1982, it was reported that serious surface
pollution was taking place at the triangle area where the Kahn
and Swakopmund rivers meet. 24 During the rainfall season, the
radioactive top-soil blown from the mine by the wind is washed
into these rivers where it sinks down possibly as far as the
ground water level. The Swakopmund water reservoir which serves
the town of Swakopmund is dependent on water from the two rivers.
Another source of surface pollution is that which is caused by
the tailings at the mine. The company built a dam by blocking
off a few valleys leading to the Khan River. The dam receives
about 80,000 cubic metres of waste per day. Some of this
uranium-enriched water seeps through the tailings dam wall, and
it is possible that it contaminates the underground water.
	 This
(Footnote Continued)
Commission, see Windhoek Observer, Namibia, 6 July, 1985, p. 27,
col. a.
245ee Windhoek Observer, Namibia, 16 October, 1982, p. 25
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means that the water in the surrounding areas is measurably
influenced by the operation of the mine.
3.3.2 Air Pollution
The Rossing mine and mill area including the tailings dam and
waste rock dump, are a major source of air pollution, affecting
the surrounding area.	 Four types of pollutant in any uranium
mining are identified. These are sulphur dioxide, which is
emitted from the acid plant; radon, which escapes from the pit,
ore dumps, tailings dam and mill; radioactive ore dust, which
escapes from the pit, ore dumps and the ore crushing area in the
mill; and radioactive yellowcake dust, which is emitted from the
part of the mill where dried yellowcake is handled. Dust is also
raised from bare ground and sulphur dust comes from the sulphur
stockpile (see Appendix V:1).
It is also important to note that the concentration of a
pollutant at any point depends on its rate of emission and the
way it is dispersed in the atmosphere. Since Rossing is situated
in a desert, any pollutant released into the air is carried along
by the wind. In a steady wind, the pollutant is moved in a plume
from the mine and gradually falls out onto the ground under the
plume. When the wind is gusty or turbulent - changing quickly in
speed and direction - the pollutant is spread over a wide area.
Information about wind conditions at Rossing shows that wind from
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the east predominates. 25
 Therefore, taking the year as a whole,
the western part, towards the town of Swakopmund, is the most
common wind direction. This means that towns situated in the
western part of the mine are directly downwind from the source of
air pollution.	 It is submitted that Arandis, and to a less
extent Swakopmund are in the worst possible position.
The extent of Rossing's uranium operation is revealed in the
company's monthly publication. It is reported that for
"production purposes maximum fragmentation of the rock is
desirable but this often results in excessive movement of the
rock." 26	It is not surprising why there is excessive rock
movement because blast holes "are either 310 mm in diameter with
a spacing of 7 m x 7 m or 380 mm in diameter with a spacing of
8.5 m x 8.5 m, and are drilled to a depth of 18 m, to establish
benches of 15 in high ... each hole is charged with bout 850 kg
of explosive." 27 A total of about 360 tonnes of explosive is
used each week.
The employees at the mine work around the clock seven days a week
and more than 1 milling tonnes of ore and waste is blasted every
25ibid
26See Rossing, June 1979, p. 14. Emphasis added.
27ibid.
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week. 28 The effect of the operation on the environment is
enormous. The Windhoek Observer reported in 1982 that at times
there could be a huge dust cloud about 100 km from the mine to
the town of Swakopmund. It was further reported that a cloud "of
a few hundred metres and quite a few kilometres in length
stretches along the inversion line where hot and cold air meets,
when the wind blows." The cloud "looks like an atomic mushroom
and apparently it is derived from excessive dynamite action to
loosen the formation at the mine ... The dust rising from this, 
obviously comes from material which contains uranium, causing a
continuous dust emission laden with radioactive particles." 29
3.3.3 Health Hazards
Uranium mining at Rossing poses a serious risk not only to the
miners but to the local population near the mine. Specific
diseases which may affect employees at the mine are usually lung
diseases. They include silicosis, T.B., bronchitis, emphysema
and fibrosis of the lungs (see Table V:1). One of the major
sources of danger is ore dust. This poses a serious hazard
because it contains silica.
	 It also contains the long-lived
alpha-emitting elements of uranium, thorium and radium. If
28See An Introduction to Rossing the largest Uranium Mine in
the World, p. 4.
29See Windhoek Observer, Namibia, 16 October 1982, p. 25.
Emphasis added.
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Silver Tsumeb
Tsumeb, Kombat,
Klein Aub,
Oamites
Tsumeb, Berg
Aukas, Rosh
Pinah
Copper
Zinc
Vanadium	 Berg Aukas
KaribibLithium
Tungsten	 Kranzberg,
Brandberg West
Tin	 Uis, Brandberg
West
Table V:l. Health Hazards Associated with Minerals and mining
Mineral	 Place	 Health Hazard
Uranium	 Rossing	 Kidney and liver diseases,
cancer and lukaemia, chemical
pneumonia
Lead
	
Tsumeb, Kombat,
Berg Aukas, Rosh
Pinah
Acute poisoning symptoms,
including headaches, weakness,
loss of appetite, nausea,
anaemia,	 joint
	 pains,
fertility problems
Chronic bronchitis, loss of
night vision, and kidney and
lung diseases
Skin problems, cataracts, and
possible kidney and liver
diseases and anaemia
Skin inflammation, lung
disease
Chronic bronchitis, lung
cancer, anaemia, damage to
nervous system and kidneys,
asthma,	 hives,	 intestinal
problems
Dust highly irritant to nose,
eyes, lungs and skin and is
toxic to kidneys
Severe lung fibrosis
Skin sensitization,
dermatitis, hives, kidney and
lung diseases.
Sources: UNIN, (1986), Namibia: Perspectives for National
Reconstruction and Development, Lusaka, p. 948; Mary Elliott
(ed.), (1977), Ground for Concern: Australia's Uranium and Human
Survival, Penguin Books, pp. 7-18; and James A. Lee, (1985), The
Environment, Public Health, and Human Ecology: Considerations for
Economic Development, the World Bank, published by The Johns
Hopkins University Press, London, pp. 54-85.
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inhaled in large quantities, it may cause silicosis and could
also increase the risk of lung cancer. There is also a high risk
that people who are exposed to radiation may develop some genetic
effects of radiation. 30
It is also important to note that African employees are not
provided with adequate health checks. According to the Major
Findings of the Hearings on Namibian Uranium held by the United
Nations Council for Namibia in 1980, it was reported that•
Namibian workers "mine the uranium ... in a constant cloud of
radioactive dust." 31 It was further reported that "concern was
expressed over the unusually limited and racially discriminatory
health care given at Rossing. White workers receive regular
health checks; black workers do not. Membership in the Rossing
medical aid plan is automatic for whites; blacks are allowed to
join only after a year of employment. In addition there is no
monitoring of exposure to radiation." 32 Another source of
hazard is radioactive from the tailings. It is also reported
30For further details, see Mary Elliott (ed.) (1977), Ground
for Concern: Australia's Uranium and Human Survival, Penguin
Books, see particularly Chapter I.
31See United Nations, (1982), Plunder of Namibian Uranium: 
Major Findings of the Hearings on Namibian Uranium Held by the
United Nations Council for Namibia in July 1980, New York, p. 6.
See also SWAPO of Namibia, (1982), Trade Union Action on Namibian
Uranium, London.
32Op. cit, United Nations, (1982), Plunder of Namibian
Uranium: Major Findings Held by the United Nations Council for 
Namibia in July 1980, p. 8.
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that these "heaps of dangerously radioactive materials are eroded
by wind and rain, spreading radiation over a wide area. The
mining company has made no plans for coping with these tailings,
which could remain a threat to the environment for 100,000
years. ,33
Concern about exposure to radiation was also expressed by one
Namibian newspaper in 1982. It reported that "when storing heaps
of uranium ore for the crusher plants, called stockpiles, • • •
RADON is produced.	 This is a short lived, highly radio-active
gas-like waste product and its extreme dangers	 are
internationally known. It can be breathed in easily and it
passes any filter without a problem. ... So fare scientific
studies of the RADON dust danger, led to the closing down of open
cast mines in Canada and Australia by responsible official
bodies. Here the question arises about the fate of the brown and
black workers of the mine, especially those living in the mining
area or the Arandis township nearby." 34 African employees are
mostly at risk since those from the "homelands" under contract
labour are accommodated at "A Camp" only one mile from the mine.
Those non-white employees who live with their families, live at a
township called Arandis, 10 miles from the mine, while all whites
33 i bid.
345ee Windhoek Observer, Namibia, 22 January, 1983.
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live at specially built seaside resort of Swakopmund 70
kilometres away.
The excessive use of explosives also poses a serious danger to
the employees. In 1983, an African employee died in a rock
avalanche. 35
 Finally, it is important to note that there is no
independent study of health risks and safety measures associated
with Rossing's operations. Moreover, the information which the
company provides is inadequate, misleading, and contradicted by
the testimony of the African workers, newspapers reports, and
consultants. The situation is made more complicated by the fact
that the company chooses to shelter under the Atomic Energy Act
of 1967 which prohibits any disclosure of information relating to
uranium mining.
In conclusion, it is noteworthy to state that the concern of the
Namibian population on Rossing's operations was eloquently
expressed by Cde. Theo-Ben Gurirab in these terms: "I cannot help
but express the concern of the Namibian people ... who are
suffering. It normally takes years, if not generations, for the
ill-effects of radioactivity and chemical poisoning to be
established, so that by the time we become independent not only
will we have been left with a country depleted of its natural
resources; we will have been left with a population that will
35See Windhoek Observer, Namibia, 22 January, 1983.
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suffer permanent ill health because of the exploitation that is
going on in Namibia."36
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that in some cases,
statutory regulations (though not comprehensive enough) could
play a major role if they could be enforced by the colonial
administration. In some cases such as uranium mining, the
standards fall far short of minimum international standards.
Therefore, in order to improve the laws and regulations designed
to protect the environment in independent Namibia, it is
necessary to discuss briefly the experience of other mineral
producing countries.
4	 ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS AND INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM STANDARDS
It has been realised by a number of mineral producing countries
that mining operations present a number of environmental and
health problems. The realisation of this fact has compelled
responsible authorities to take effective environmental and
safety measures designed to minimise these problems. In these
countries, mining legislation and regulations contain appropriate
provisions for the requisite preventative measures. Given the
36From the testimony of Cde. Theo-Ben Guriab at the hearings
on Namibian Uranium. See op. cit., United Nations, (1982),
Plunder of Namibian Uranium: Major Findings of the Hearings on
Namibian Uranium Held by the United Nations Council for Namibia
in July 1980, p. 8.
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fact that measures adopted by these countries are too
comprehensive, not all of them will be discussed in this section.
However, those which may be of immediate relevance to Namibia
will be discussed briefly.
4.1 Environmental Impact Study
In contrast to Namibia, before mineral development is allowed to
proceed, a number of mineral producing countries require mining
companies to submit studies and research results concerning the
effects of the mining project on the environment and on the
general safety and health of the community. It is a recognised
fact that in order to prevent or control effectively the adverse
effects of a mining development project on human health, there
must be sound and comprehensive advance planning. The
environmental impact study normally covers two main issues
namely, the effects of a mining project on the physical
environment, and the effects on the work force. The information
required includes preliminary assessment of area ecology;
effluent controls; prevention of the release of toxic effluent
into air or water; and monitoring of air, water, and vegetation.
On the other hand, information regarding the effects of mining
operations on the work force include the assessment of industrial
risks; engineering design of plants to prevent job hazards;
control of in-plant ventilation, periodic monitoring of employees
exposed to chemical hazards, and the provision of work safety
training.
280
The requirement for an environmental impact study is widely
practiced in many mineral producing countries. Two examples will
suffice to illustrate this point. In Australia, the
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (New South Wales)
requires the authorities to encourage "proper management,
development and conservation of natural ... resources, including
... minerals ... for the purpose of promoting the social and
economic welfare of the community and a better environment." 37
The Act requires an "increased opportunity for public involvement
and participation in environmental planning and assessment." 38
Before such plans are made,
	 the Act requires that an
environmental impact study must be carried out. 39 Under s.117
of the Mining Act 1973 (New South Wales), the minister or
governor, before deciding whether or not to issue a mining
licence or a mining lease, he is empowered to require
environmental impact studies to be made. Once such studies have
been undertaken, any mining licence or mining lease granted may
contain conditions relating to the protection of the environment
during mining operations. 40 The mining licence holder or the
37S•5•
38S.5(c).
39SS. 41 and 57.
40S.118.
281
mining lease holder is also required to rehabilitate areas
damaged by mining operations. 41
In contrast, Papua New Guinea incorporates the requirement for
environmental impact study in individual mining project
agreements. The Ok Tedi Agreement of 1976 provides in Schedule
II Part A that there should be an environmental impact study to
cover the following aspects: "(i) an analysis of the existing
environment ... (ii) an assessment of the environmental impact
of the project by considering the effects of each of the
component phases of mine and ancillary developments on the basic
environmental studies detailed in item (i) •..; (iii)
identification of the safeguards to be incorporated into the
project in order to avoid or minimise the adverse environmental
effects of each of the component phases of the mine and ancillary
developments ...; (v) the impact of the project on the resident
population ... the population's reactions to the project and the
long and short term community benefits; (vi) follow up action
required and planned for monitoring and assessment after final
project decisions are made." 42
41S.119. For further details on environmental regulation in
Australia see Bates S.M., (1983), Environmental Law in Australia,
Butterworths, Sydney.
42For further details see Schanze et al, (1981), Mining 
Ventures in Developing Countries Part 2 : Analysis of Project
Agreements, Kluwer-Deventer - The Netherlands, p. 224.
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Environmental impact studies offer a number of advantages. They
enable both the State and mining companies to systematically and
comprehensively consider all environmental needs before a final
decision is reached. For States, the gathering of information
from individual mining projects is potentially useful because it
could be used as a basis to formulate universal environmental
regulations. In addition, the procedure enables third parties
who may be adversely affected by the mining project to voice
their concerns and ultimately have a redress. Finally, the
emphasis which such studies put on community participation may be
useful because it has a potential of enlarging the information
base upon which both the State and mining companies are
dependent. It also establishes confidence in the mining project
and minimises suspicion and opposition from the community since
it can be reassured that environmental problems are being
minimised.
Notwithstanding the advantages of an environmental impact study,
it also has a number of drawbacks. The requirement for an
environmental impact study before the commencement of mining
operations is likely to increase costs to the mining project. It
is also likely to result in a delay since mining operations may
not commence before such a study has been commissioned.
Moreover, notwithstanding a commissioning of a comprehensive and
well studied environmental impact study, there may be no
guarantee that it can contribute to solutions of environmental
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problems which may subsequently be experienced once mining
operations begin.
4.2 Individual Standards
There has been a realisation in most mineral producing countries
that the scope, content and form of the environmental protection
measures should be tailored to the needs of individual mining
projects. The advantages of this approach are that the parties
(the State and mining companies) in devising environmental
control measures, will take into account factors which are unique
to each mining project. This enables the State to appraise each
mining project and issue regulations specific to the particular
mining project. The parties will be influenced by such factors
as the size of the mining project, its location, the type of
mineral mined, mining techniques employed, the cost involved, and
the role such a project plays to the national economy.
Individual standards are usually found in supplementary
agreements concluded between the State and mining companies.
These standard are usually formulated in two ways. Some of them
establish "numerical maximum emission levels for pollutants.
Other standards merely set verbally circumscribed guidelines of
behaviour. H43
	The Letseng-La-Terai 1974 mining project
4 3 ibid, p. 230.
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agreement in Lesotho sets out minimum standards for emissions.
It provides that the "effluent from slimes ponds upon the
specified area shall be sampled regularly and the following
determinations shall not be exceeded: (i) suspended solids -
1000 mg/1, (ii) total dissolved solids - 500 mg/1, (iii)
sulphates as SO4-250 mg/1, (iv) the pH shall lie between 5.5 and
9•5•" 44 On the other hand, the 1971 Bougainville Agreement in
Papua New Guinea relating to the disposal of over-burden and
tailings iprovides in part that the company "shall use all
practical measures to ensure that the tailings contain no more
than such a sufficiently low level of copper readily soluble in
natural waters as to ensure that no serious damage could result
therefrom to vegetation or animal life." 45
Individual mining project standards, such as those used in
Lesotho, which define in precise numerical terms the minimum
environmental standards allowed, offer a number of advantages to
the parties. They contribute to setting up guidelines of
behaviour, to be followed by the mining companies, which are
technically measurable.
	 They can also help to estimate the
actual cost of such measures by utilising actual costs obtaining
elsewhere in the mining industry.
	 Moreover, precise numerical
44 ibid. See also Annexure D. Clause 4(a) of the agreement.
45,Bougainville", Agreement relating to the Disposal of
Overburden and Tailings, 1971. See also op. cit. Schanze et. al,
(1981) Mining Ventures in Developing Countries Part 2: Analysis
of Project Agreements, p. 230.
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standards may help to reduce potential disputes between the State
and mining companies over the attainment of environmental policy
objectives of mineral resource development.
However, the formulation of precise numerical standards have a
limitation. At the time of negotiating these standards, it may
be possible that the parties may not have access to all relevant
information necessary for the formulation of precise standards.
Furthermore, even if such information may be available, it may
not be possible for the parties to formulate numerical standards
for every aspect of mining operations that may require
environmental regulation. As with specific clauses already
discussed above, the fixing of precise numerical standards is
likely to present a number of disadvantages. It may happen that
there may be a need for fixed term modification in the event
information concerning the environmental impact of the mining
operations becomes available. In addition, it may be possible
that additional sources of environmental pollution may be
experienced during the mining operations. In all these cases, it
may prove difficult to renegotiate original standards, especially
when such negotiations are likely to result in additional cost to
the mining companies. These potential problems may be minimised
by deploying a combination of technical and descriptive standards
which are flexible and revisable by the parties.
4.3 Specific Countries
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In order to evaluate the regulations and laws regulating
pollution in Namibia, it is also necessary to refer briefly to
environmental control in South Africa, and also evaluate the
experience of Australia in regulating uranium operations.
It is submitted that environmental control regulations
standards and procedures - in South Africa have no instructive
and practical application to the regulatory system in Namibia.
Notwithstanding the fact that South Africa has no uranium mines
(uranium is produced as a by-product of gold), it has developed
comprehensive anti-pollution regulations (though admittedly they
still fall short of international standards). Few examples will
suffice to illustrate this point. Under the 1976 regulations
made under the Water Act, mining companies are required to
prevent pollution caused not only by actual mining operations but
also as a result of run-off due to rain. These include the
following: (1) to prevent the pollution of any water by taking
measures to prevent effluent; (2) prevent run-off from eroding
slimes dams and minerals, tailings and waste-rock dumps caused by
rain; (3) to fence waterways to prevent the pollution of any
water; (4) to take effective measures to prevent liquid from
entering any evaporation dam or waterway; and (5) to design
slimes dams, tailings and waste-rock dumps so that they can
retain rainwater precipitated in them.
Furthermore, s.187 of the Mining Rights Act No. 20 of 1967
empowers the President of the Republic to make special
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regulations to prevent pollution and to prevent or abate
nuisances relating to prospecting and mining. Under s.27(1) of
the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act No. 45 of 1965, the
Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs is empowered to declare
any area a dust control area. The Minister is also empowered to
take steps to prevent mining operations likely to cause a
nuisance to persons in the vicinity from dust.
In 1980, numerous regulations were promulgated under s.12 of the
Mines and Works Act 27 of 1956. The regulations cover a wide
area, including the prohibition to dumping or impounding of solid
and other discards of any description in any place other than at
the site or sites demarcated for the purpose by the mine manager
with the approval of the Inspector of Mines. 46 They require
strict control of dumps and dams to ensure that the environment
is, so far as is practicable, not polluted. The disposal of
waste material from reduction works, beneficiation plants,
screening and washing installations at a mine must be disposed of
under written authority of the Inspector of Mines after
consultation with the Department of Water Affairs. 47 Sand dumps
or slimes dams may not be established on the bank of any stream,
river, dam, pan or lake without the written permission of the
46Reg. 5.13.1.
47Reg. 5.13.4.
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Inspector of Mines and upon such conditions as he may prescribe
after obtaining approval from the Government Mining Engineer. 48
It is clear from these laws and regulations that South Africa is
showing increasing concern for the protection of the environment
from the effects of pollution caused by mining operations.
Furthermore, the stringent precautionary measures prescribed in
these laws and regulations envisage a system of close cooperation
between the Inspector of Mines and the Government Mining Engineer
on the one hand, and the Department of Water Affairs on the
other.
In contrast to Namibia, uranium mining in Australia is mainly
regulated under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act 1953
(Commonwealth). The main purpose of the statute is primarily to
encourage and regulate the development of prescribed substances.
Most Government functions are exercised by the Australian Atomic
Energy Commission. The Commission is empowered to encourage
exploration for uranium and to supervise the activities of
persons who are mining, treating or selling uranium. 49
 Part III
of the Act empowers the authorities to make regulations relating
48Reg. 5.13.3.
49S.17. For further details see op. cit. Bates S.M., (1983)
Environmental Law in Australia.
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to the working of minerals,	 production,	 transportation,
treatment, storage, use and disposal of prescribed substances. 50
With regard to environmental issues, there are other numerous
laws and regulations which directly regulate uranium mining
operations. Issues covered include the following: (1)
contaminants in water from mine sites (these include uranium,
thorium, radium, arsenic, sulphate, ammonia and phosphate), (2)
procedures to limit suspended solids in run-off during
construction periods and to control erosion during operations,
(3) external ionising radiation, (4) radon, (5) ore dust, (6)
yellowcake dust, (7) ground vibration during construction and
operation, (8) air blast vibration during construction and
operation, and (9) noise during construction and operation.
During the mid 1970s, there was a proposal to mine uranium in the
Alligator Rivers Region of the Northern Territory. 51 The
proposal became a subject of a full-scale inquiry under S.11 of
the Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974.
	 The
inquiry resulted into two reports, Ranger Uranium Environmental
Inquiry First Report, 52
 1976 and Ranger Uranium Environmental
50S.38.
51See op. cit. Bates S.M., (1983) Environmental Law in
Australia, P- 138-
52Par1. Paper No. 309, 1976.
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Inquiry Second Report, 53
 1977. The Second Report recommended
against using the terms of the Atomic Energy Act 1953 to control
uranium operations because, there was a need, inter alia, to
introduce strong environmental conditions before uranium
operations could be allowed to proceed. It proposed that a
Standards and Monitoring Committee, independent of the companies
and the Australian Atomic Energy Commission should be
established. 54 Finally, The Report recommended the use of an
impervious blanket to prevent seepage from the tailings dam and
that eventually all tailings should be returned to the mine pits.
This recommendation was based "on the evidence pointing to
possible long-term adverse ecological effects due to continuing
seepage losses from the dam, to doubts about the integrity of the
dam over centuries and to the problem of radon emission from the
tailings if they were not submerged." 55
The Government authorised uranium operations under s.41 of the
Atomic Energy Act 1953. However, additional environmental
control legislation was introduced.	 The Statutes include
Environment Protection (Alligator Rivers Region) Act 	 1978,
Environment Protection (Northern Territory Supreme Court) Act
53Parl. Paper No. 117, 1977.
545ee Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry, Second Report,
1977, pp. 350.
55 i bid.  pp. 159-60.
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1978, Environment Protection (Nuclear Codes) Act 1978, and Atomic
Energy (Amendment) Act 1978.
Under s.5 of the Environment Protection (Alligator Rivers Region)
Act 1978, the government supervising scientist, appointed under
the Act, is empowered to investigate the effects of uranium
mining on the environment. He is also empowered to develop
standards, practices and procedures to be observed by uranium
mining companies. Furthermore, under s.3 of the Environment
Protection (Northern Territory Supreme Court) Act 1978, the
Supreme Court of the Northern Territory is empowered to enforce
all legislative and regulatory requirements relating to uranium
operations.	 It is also empowered to enforce environmental
protection conditions contained in the licence and lease rights.
Specific environmental provisions relating to the Ranger Project
are provided in the Appendix I of Schedule 2 of the Atomic Energy
Act 1953. It empowers the minister to establish the post of
Environment Protection Officer. Other requirements include the
rehabilitation and re-vegetation of the mining site, carry out a
monitoring programme and requirement to use the "best practicable
technology" in controlling emissions.
	 The use of the phrase
"best practicable technology" calls for standards which may be
higher than minimum international standards. In addition, the
minister has reserved powers to introduce further conditions
relating to the protection of the environment.
	 The Northern
Territory has also passed legislation designed to control the
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environmental effects of uranium mining in the State. In 1979,
1
it passed Uranium Mining (Environment Control) Act 1979. Under
s.5, the owner or manager of a mine is prohibited to commence
uranium mining operations unless an environment protection
officer has been appointed. Furthermore, there is a requirement
that employees should be conversant with the need to protect the
environment, and mining companies are required to undertake
environmental monitoring programmes. Finally, the minister is
empowered to order rehabilitation works. 56
5. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion shows that environmental and safety
issues have come to be recognised by most mineral producing
countries as important elements in mineral resource development.
Mining legislation and regulations have enabled government
authorities to examine the condition of mines to ensure that the
safety and health of persons employed in such mines is not
unnecessarily endangered. During the enforcement of laws and
regulations relating to environmental control, a number of
factors have come to influence the degree of control. These
include the need to achieve a balance between mineral resource
development and the needs of the environment, preservation of
health and safety of the community, protection of other land
56511.
293
uses, and the economic and social costs involved. It has also
been made clear that some of the prerogative powers of the
government authorities cannot be bargained away, such as the need
to maintain minimum international environmental standards.
It is important that Namibia should learn from the experience of
other mineral producing countries. There is an urgent need for
mining operations to meet minimum international environmental
standards, especially Rossing and Tsumeb. This will necessarily
mean that existing environmental provisions should be enforced
and additional regulations which would take individual mining
projects into account should be introduced. Individual standards
discussed above would provide a useful guide.
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Chapter VI Namibia's Mineral Resources and International Law. 
1. Introduction
For centuries, capitalism has remained a system of private
property par excellence. This is reflected in a number of
bills of rights and constitutions of the eighteenth century.
For instance, it was stated in 1780 Massachusetts Bill of
Rights that all "men.., have certain natural, essential and
inalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right.., of
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property." (1) The
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in France in 1789
stated that the "aim of every political association is the
preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man.
These rights are liberty, property..." (2) The concept of
private property was consolidated by legal protection. In the
US, Justice Patterson set as precedent, in 1795, for the
Supreme Court decisions by declaring that "it is evident that
the rights of acquiring and possessing property, and having it
protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and inalienable
rights of man." (3)
1. Quoted from Richard Schlatter, (1951), Private Property; The
History of An Idea, George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London, p. 187
2. ibid, p. 205
3. ibid, p. 194
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Given the fact that capitalism was the dominant force in
the world, the theory of private property was extended by
classical international law to cover private foreign
investment. (4)
The emergence of new states and alternative political
systems to capitalism had implications for the relationship
between the state and private property, and for the role of
foreign private investment. Since the Second World War, the
right of all peoples to self-determination has received
recognition as jus cogens in contemporary international law.
(5) The right to self-determination has also been interpreted
to mean the right of a State to economic self-determination.
As a result, the collapse of the colonial system and the
struggle of the developing countries to achieve economic self-
determination introduced substantial changes in the conditions
under which foreign private capital is regulated in developing
countries. Furthermore, UN General Assembly resolutions now
recognise the right of States to permanent sovereignty over
their natural resources. The basic principle is that their
exploitation must serve the national interest and well-being of
their nationals.
4. See the International Law Association, Report of the 34th
Conference of Vienna, London, 1927, pp.248-249; see also
Konstantin Kalzarov, (1964), The Theory of Nationalisation,
Martinns Nijhoff, The Hague p. 290
5. See Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 22 May, 1969. See also Tang An, (1987). "The Law
Applicable to a Transnational Economic Development Contract",
Journal of World Trade Law vol. 21, Aug.No.4, pp. 95-146 at 127
296
The principle also means that host States have the right to
decide the manner and form of natural resource exploitation in
the public interest. The host State can exercise this right
through laws and regulations governing natural resource
exploitation. Naturally, the host State's laws and regulations
will form the basis upon which private foreign investors engage
in the exploitation of natural resources. Developing countries
have also demanded that protection of private property should
take their legitimate needs to undertake fundamental social and
economic reforms into account. Finally, the development of
contemporary international law has enabled developing countries
to revise or even terminate natural resource concessions
awarded during the colonial period. (6) It has also enabled
them to undertake large-scale economic organisation and
restructuring. (7)
These developments will have a direct impact in post-colonial
Namibia. The right of a State to effect fundamental social,
political and economic reforms has been acknowledged as one of
the basic principles of contemporary international law. It is
for these reasons that after independence and in line with
experiences in other developing countries, mining concessions
6. For instance, Asante states that "It is now generally
recognised that "Colonial 'concessions or agreements' may be
rearranged." See Samuel K.B. Asante, (1980), "The Concept of
Stability of Contractural Relations in the Transnational
Investment Process," in Kamal Hossain (ed.) (1980) Legal 
Aspects of the New International Economic Order, Frances Pinter
(publishers) Ltd, London, p. 244
7. ibid
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will become subject to many influences and will th(n.eforo,
not escape an unavoidable evolutionary process. In addition,
the revocation of the mandate by the United Nations will have
important legal consequences to a number of mining concessions
granted to private foreign investors by the South African
regime. The legal validity of these concessions will raise a
number of legal questions, namely: (1) whether the illegal
South African colonial administration was entitled to grant
concessions which extend beyond the period of the mandate; (2)
whether a future lawful Namibian government will be bound by
such concessions; (3) what practical guarantees, if any, could
be given to foreign investors whose mining concessions extend
beyond the termination of the mandate; and (4) what claims will
an independent Namibia have against the racist South African
regime for continuing to allow the exploitation of the
territory's mineral resources in violation of international
law.
2. Colonialism, decolonisation and the protection of private
foreign investment. 
Under international law, a rule remains valid until it is
superseded by a countervailing practice of States. As already
noted in the introduction, the rules of classical international
law regarding the protection of private foreign investment were
formulated when most Third World Countries were still colonial
domains of Western powers. These principles failed to take
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into account the historical development which led to the
colonization of Third World Countries. Not surprisingly these
principles came under attack as soon as these countries
achieved their political independence. Before we look at the
impact of decolonisation, it is necessary briefly to discuss
these principles.
2.1 Classical international law and the protection of private
foreign investment.
The rules governing the protection of private foreign
investment were formulated in Europe during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Four main principles governed the
international protection of foreign private investment. These
were subsequently reaffirmed by the International Law
Association Congress held in Vienna in 1926. (8) The four
fundamental principles were: "(1) private property may not be
expropriated without compensation; (2) this principle is
applicable on the international plane; (3) international law
gives to every State the power to intervene against another to
protect its nationals, whenever this principle is violated; (4)
the expropriation of the property of foreigners... by indirect
means which in fact allow their property to be disposed of
without compensation, is not allowed." (9)
8. Op. Cit, Konstantin Katzarov, (1964), The Theory of 
Nationalisation, p. 290. See also International Law
Association, Report of the 34th Conference, 1927, London p. 227
9. Op. Cit, Konstantin Katzarov, (1964), The Theory of 
Nationalisation, p. 290
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In addition, a number of other restrictions were imposed
upon the host State before expropriation or nationalisation
could be effected. These included: (1) the property must be
required for public purposes; (2) the expropriation measure
must not discriminate against the alien owner; and (3) the
owner must be given "prompt, adequate and effective
compensation."
2.2 Erosion of the traditional rules. 
The principles listed above have been radically undermined
due to the emergence of new political systems some of which
posed a direct challenge to capitalism. The first attack came
from the Soviet Union during the 1917 Revolution. For the
first time in the political history of the world, a new
political philosophy developed which challenged the western
capitalist system.
It has been eloquently stated by Konstantin Katzarov that
the communist philosophy "derives its raison d'etre from the
radical and rigorous application of socialist principles of the
economic life of the country. The system is based on a
complete transformation of property, the most important result
of which is to ... give overriding priority to the socialist
property of the State. The land, natural resources •.. all
wealth of economic importance are the property of the State.
The whole economic system is based on the socialist ownership
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of the means of production, determined and directed by the
State economic plan." (10) It is clear that the Communist
system has a revolutionary and radical character. It is also
the least equivocal and the most rigorous system in opposing
the western concept of private property. (11) It introduced a
new stage in the evolution of law and the protection of private
foreign investment.
Classical international law became subjected to further
strain when Mexico decided to carry out economic reforms during
the 1930s. (12) After realising that the country was seriously
exposed to foreign economic domination, particularly American
capital, political and social pressures impelled the government
to undertake economic reforms. Naturally, these reforms had a
direct effect on private foreign investment and resulted in
significant weakening of classical international law.
Notwithstanding these developments, however, most of the
fundamental principles of classical international law survived,
albeit, with minor modifications.
10. ibid, p.77
11. For a general discussion see Konstantinov F.V. et al,
(1982), The Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninst Philosophy,
Progress Publishers, Moscow.
12. See The Times, London, 5 August, 1938, p.11 col e.
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2.3 Colonialism, classical international law and the role of
mining companies. 
During the colonial period, the indigenous population of
developing countries fell victim of classical international law
which made it "legal" for European powers to colonise them.
When colonization was being undertaken by competing European
powers, the acquisition of territory under classical
international law enabled capital exporting countries to regard
as "terra nullius" territories inhabited by populations whose
civilisation in the sense of the public law of Europe, was
backward and whose political organisation was not conceived
according to Western norms. (13) This thesis propounded the
view that organised nationalities or peoples of non-European
lands had no sovereign right over their territories and thus no
sovereign title which could be used to bar acquisition of title
by means of effective occupation. (14) The inhabitants,
therefore, were merely factually and not legally in occupation
of the territories, which could be treated "terra nullius" and
acquired by any State in accordance with the requirements of
classical international law.
13. See Okere B.O., (1979), "The Western Sahara Case," I.C.L.Q. 
vol. 28, pp 296-312 at 305
14. See the comments of Judge Ammoun in the Western Sahara
Case, (1975), I.C.J. Rep., 86
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Therefore, the concept of terra nullius was used as a legal
spearhead of European colonization and exploitation. In many
countries of Africa, including Namibia, the indigenous
inhabitants experienced "company rule", the most prominent in
southern Africa being the British South Africa Company
("Chartered"). This company administered a number of countries
including Zambia. (15) In the case of Zambia, before the
company ceased to administer the territory in 1924, it passed a
mining ordinance which was very favourable to its private
interests. It has been stated that "A private commercial
enterprise thus acquired an effective veto over the legal
regime governing the exploitation of what was shortly to be
revealed as Northern Rhodesia's [as the country was then
called] one valuable national asset - the mineral wealth of the
Copperbelt." (16) This privileged position enabled the company
to have "exclusive authority in the matter of the issue of
licences to mine and work minerals. The powers given to the
Company could hardly have been wider: the Company could, if it
so wished make a grant over an unlimited area in perpetuity."
(17)
15. See generally Peter Slinn, (1979), "The Mining Ordinance of
Northern Rhodesia: A Legislative History 1924-1958"  Journal of
African Law, vol. 23 pp. 84-106
16. ibid, p. 85. In 1924, the British Crown took over the
administration of the country from the Company.
17. ibid, p. 86
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In contrast to the extremely advantageous position of the
private foreign investors, the indigenous inhabitants of the
colonies were, in most cases, excluded from acquiring
exploitation rights. Their role was to offer their labour
power to the mines owned by the companies with unfavourable
conditions and terms of employment. Given these conditions,
for how long could classical international law regard property
rights of private foreign investors, acquired during the
colonial period as sacrosanct and irevocably intended for their
sole use? It was under these conditions that after gaining
their political independence, developing countries demanded a
just and equitable system which could balance the interests of
private foreign investors with the legitimate needs of these
countries to effect a comprehensive economic and social
reforms. This could not be done by individual States without
retaliation from capital exporting countries, hence, there was
a need to formulate common policy through the United Nations.
2.4 Theory of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. 
Decolonization and the establishment of the United Nations
dealt a severe blow to some of the old fashioned principles of
classical international law. After the Second World War, major
changes in the economic and legal sphere have taken place.
Most developing countries achieved their independence at a time
when effective control over their natural resources was in the
hands of private foreign investors. They soon realised that
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the right to self-determination would be largely negated if
they did not carry out comprehensive economic and social
reforms. They experienced considerable pressure to develop
their economy and to improve the social conditions of their
citizens. Economic conditions prevailing at independence
convinced the population that mere civil and political rights
remain sterile without social and economic rights.
Notwithstanding political differences among developing
countries, they have all supported the principle of permanent
sovereignty over their natural resources. Their objective is
to ensure a just and equitable distribution of wealth between
themselves and private foreign investors. There is general
agreement that classical international law presents the main
obstacle in achieving just and equitable terms with private
foreign investors. As a result, an attempt has been made to
subject mineral concessions to domestic laws of host countries.
This is manifested in numerous United Nations resolutions
discussed below.
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2.4.1. The role of the United Nations. 
In 1952, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on
the exploitation of natural resources. This resolution
recommended that all member States should "refrain from acts,
direct or indirect, designed to impede the exercise of the
sovereignty of any State over its natural resources" (18) It
was followed by another resolution adopted in 1962. (19) Unlike
the 1952 resolution, the 1962 resolution clearly defined the
meaning of permanent sovereignty over natural resources by
stating that the "right of peoples and nations to permanent
sovereignty over their natural resources must be exercised in
the interest of their national development and the well-being
of the people of the State concerned."
It is important to note four additions introduced by the
resolution namely: "peoples", "nations", "national development"
and "well-being of the people." The most important factor is
that the resolution was adopted with the support of the
overwhelming majority of capital exporting countries. Finally,
two more resolutions were adopted in 1974. One is entitled the
United Nations Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order (20), and the other is entitled
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (21)
18. Res. 626 (VII) of 21 December 1952, U.N. Yearbook (1952)
19. Res. 1803 (XVII) of December 1962 on Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources.
20. General Assembly Res. 3201 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974 reproduced
in 13 I.L.M. (1974) 715, and 68 A.J.I.L. (1974), 799
21. General Assembly Res.3281 (XXIX) of 12 Dec 1974, reproduced
in 14 I.L.M. (1974), 716 and 68 A.J.I.L. (1974), 799.
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(herein after referred to as C.E.R.O.S.). It is clear from the
terms of these resolutions that their essence is to enable
every State a right to exploit its natural resources. Finally,
their aim is to enable the host State to adopt economic
measures which include nationalisation of foreign enterprises
in accordance with its domestic law and to settle foreign
private investment disputes in the national courts according to
domestic law. These issues are discussed in detail below.
2.4.2 Nationalization. 
In this section, the terms nationalisation and
expropriation are used to describe the taking of private
foreign enterprises by host States in developing countries.
Although the terms have different connotations, these have
become blurred in domestic legislation, legal writings, etc.
However, the term expropriation is described by Leslie Rood to
mean "early takings of individual pieces of property" by the
State, but as "used in the legal literature it often has the
connotation of being a somehow wrongful act which can only be
justified if it meets certain requirements, such as a public
purpose and adequate compensation. (22) On the other hand,
nationalisation is a term which came into use in this century
to describe broad-scale takings which are a part of a social
22. See Leslie L. Rood, (1976), "Nationalisation and
indigenisation in Africa", Journal of Modern African Studies,
vol. 14, p. 429.
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and economic reform for the betterment of the people." (23) In
addition, another term which has come into common usage is
indigenisation. It has been described as a "process by which a
government limits participation in a particular industry to citizens of
the country, thus forcing alien ownerSto sell." (24) Although the
term does not fall within the terms of nationalisation, (25) it has a
close relationship to it in that in both cases, the object of the host
State is to recover control of the economy from foreign ownership.
Developments within the UN enabled world attitude towards
nationalisation to change. Indeed, it has been stated that today,
nationalisation measures "resemble modern business deals." (26) It
is clear that due to post-Second World War developements, any State
which wishes to nationalise its natural resources for the well-being of
its citizens can do so provided it complies with some basic rules. The
"public purpose" requirement developed by classical international law has
been given a wider meaning. In addition to nationalisation, host States have
a right to "indigenise" thier natural resources by requiring private foreign
investors to sell their assests to the indigenous inhabitants. It is
expressly provided for under Article 2(2)(C) of the C.E.R.O.S. The
article contains the phrase "transfer of ownership" which has been
interpreted to mean that "the property ... passes from one private
individual to another." (27) It has also been asked "whether a
transfer of ownership is for a public purpose." (28)
23. ibid.
24. ibid p. 430
25. Because the State does not take the property into public ownership.
26. Op. Cit. Leslie L. Rood, (1976), "Nationalisation and Indigenisation
in Africa", p. 435
27. For details see Fath El Rahaman Abdalla El Sheikh, (1984), The 
Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in the Sudan and Saudi 
Arabia, Cambridge University Press, London p. 330
28. ibid.
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Furthemore, the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources has important implications for the host State. It has been
stated by eminent jurists such as Eduardo Jimenez Arechaga that
"contemporary international law recognises the right of every State
to nationalise foreign owned property, even if a predecessor State or
a previous government engaged itself, by treaty or by a contract not
to do so." (29) According to him, the description of the State's
sovereignty as "permanent signifies that the territorial State can
never lose its legal capacity of exploitation of those resources,
whatever arrangements have been made for the exploitation and
administration." (30)
As illustrated in Table VI: I, developing countries have
actually demanded renegotiation and modification of economic
agreement contracts regardless of whether they contain what
came to be referred to as "stabilization clauses" i.e.
29. See Eduardo Jimenez Arechaga, (1980), "Application of the
Rules of State Responsibility to the Nationalisation of
Foreign-Owned Property", as Chapter 17 of Kamal Hossain (ed.),
(1980), Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order
Frances Pinter (publishers) Ltd. London, p. 220•Emphasis added.
30. ibid.
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contractural clauses prohibiting the host State to undertake
unilateral modification of economic development contract to the
detriment of the private foreign investor partner without his
consent. In addition, modification has taken place regardless
of whether the economic development contract was entered into
with the same government or not.
It is submitted that of all nationalizations which took
place from 1960-74, Africa took the lead. According to Leslie
Rood, out of 875 cases of nationalization "in 62 countries of
the world, 340 (or 39 per cent) were in black Africa". (31)
Large petroleum and mineral extraction industries were
nationalised in countries such as Ghana, (32) Mauritania, (33)
Nigeria, (34) Sierra Leone, (35) Guinea, (36) Senegal, (37)
Gabon, (38) Zaire, (39) and Zambia (40). The situation
described above is hardly suprising given the fact that in
contrast with other colonised peoples of the world, the people
of Africa bore the brunt of colonialism and racial
discrimination. Private capital was most visible and most
dominant in all aspects of the economic sphere than in any
31. Op. cit. Leslie L. Rood, (1976), "Nationalisation and
indigenisation in Africa", p. 431 See also UN Secretary-
General, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, A/9716
(Supplement to E/5425), 20 September 1974
32. 1974 33. 1974 34. 1973 35. 1970 36. 1961 37. 1974
38. 1974
39. 1967 See Lanning G. with Mueller M., (1979), Africa
Undermined, p. 248
40. 1969
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Partial
takeover
marketing
arrangements
55% equity
6% royalty &
50% tax
II
100% equity
100% Mrkt
arrangements
35% in 1973
55% in 1974
60% in 1976
APT, review
of
agreement
every 7 yrs.
50% Govt.
part.,
increase in
tax
51% Govt.
part
100%
100%
100%
51% control
over markt.
up to 1974.
II
/I
II
Table VI:I Changes in relationship between some selected host 
States and private foreign investors in developing countries. 
Country	 Mineral	 Multinational Co. Year
1.Botswana	 Diamonds	 DeBeers Botswana 1975
Mining Co. Ltd.
2.Gabon	 Iron Ore	 Miferma 1974
3.Ghana	 Gold	 Lonrho 1973
Diamonds	 CAST 1973
4. Guinea	 Bauxite	 Alcan 1961
5.Mauritania Iron Ore 	 Somifer 1974
6.Nigeria	 Petroleum	 Shell/BP 1973/6
7. Papua
New Guinea	 Copper	 Rio Tinto Zinc 1974
8. Senegal	 Phosphates Taiba 1974
9.	 Sierra
Leone	 Diamonds	 S.L.S.T. 1970
10.Togo
	
Phosphates Benin -
11.Zaire
	 Copper	 Union Miniere 1967
Diamonds	 M.I.B.A. -
12.Zambia
	 Copper	 Roan/Amax 1969
Result (1) 
50% plus tax
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Notes: 1 = % refers to Government Participation.
Source: Leslie L. Rood, (1976), "Nationalisation and
Indigenisation in Africa,"  Journal of Modern African Studies,
vol. 14, pp. 432-434; Asante K.B. (1980), "The Concept of
Stability of Contractual Relations in the Transnational
Investment Process" as chapter 18 of Kamal Hossain (ed.), 1980,
Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order (1980),
Frances Pinter (publishers) Ltd, London , pp. 256-257;
Colclough Christopher and McCarthy Stephen, (1980), The
Political Economy of Botswana, Oxford University Press, p. 153;
and Lanning Greg with Mueller Marti, (1979), Africa Undermined 
- Mining Companies and the Underdevelopment of Africa, Penguin
Books, p 248.
other part of the world which experienced colonialism. It has
been stated that the "petroleum, copper, iron, bauxite,
phosphate, gold and diamond operations are natural targets, not
only because the pattern for their seizure has been established
on other continents, but because they are highly visible, rich,
and ... profiting at the expense of the local inhabitants. The
people are deeply disturbed that a foreign corporation is
taking from... their soil - a natural resource which can never
be replaced." (41)
It has also been stated that this attitude has been taken
because in most cases, mining concessions were "concluded as
incidents of the colonial system in which metropolitan
companies were offered privileged investment interests in the
colonies and accordingly given such grotesquely favourable
terms as could hardly survive the collapse of colonialism ... in
41. Op cit. Leslie L. Rood, (1976), "Nationalisation and
indigenisation in Africa", p. 435
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these circumstances, host governments of newly independent
countries consider renegotiation or restructuring of these
arrangements as a legitimate part of the de-colonisation
process. It is now generally recognized that 'colonial
concessions or agreements' may be rearranged." (42) The period
1960-73 experienced extensive world-wide nationalisation of the
assets of the private foreign investors. It is stated that
about $4 billion worth of property belonging to the U.S.
nationals were nationalised. (43)
We now turn to discussing some specific cases of retrospect
changes of economic development contracts. Papua New Guinea is
one of the developing countries which achieved independence
with a negotiated "colonial concession". In 1967, an agreement
was entered into between the Australian Government, in its
capacity as the legal administering authority of Papua New
Guinea, and Rio tinto -Zinc to exploit the Bougainville Copper
Mine. (44) The Australian Government paid a 20 per cent equity
42. See Samuel K. B. Asante, (1980), "The Concept of Stability
Contractural Relations in the Transnational Investment
Process", as Chapter 18 of Kamal Hossain (ed.), (1980), Leal 
Aspects of the New International Economic Order, Frances Pinter
(publishers) Ltd. London, p. 224 43. Op.cit. Leslie L. Rood,
(1976), "Nationalisation and indigenisation in Africa", p. 431
44. See United Nations Department of Techinical Co-operation
for Developement, (1980) The Nickel Industry and The Developing
Countries, New York p. 76. For a detailed discussion see
Studholme Caroline, (1981), The Legal Regulation of Mineral 
Exploitation in Developing Countries; A Study In Dependent 
Development, unpublished LLM dissertation submitted at the
University of Warwick, Coventry, U.K.
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share at par value and imposed a graduated tax system on the mining
operations. According to Studholme, the 1967 Bougainville Agreement
had four main fiscal provisions. "Firstly, a fixed royalty of one and a
quarter per cent of the sale price of the ore was applied, secondly a
normal company tax of thirty three and a third applied to the mine,
thirdly a dividend witholding tax of fifteen per cent and finally the mine
was given a three year tax holiday." (45) After independence, the
Government of Papua New Guinea decided to modify the agreement.
After a long negotiation, the Bougainville Amendment Agreement was
finally reached between the Government and Rio Tinto - Zinc in 1974.
It abolished the automatic twenty per cent exemption of the company's
income from taxation, abolished the three year tax holiday, and most
important of all, the company became subject to additional profits tax
(APT). (46)
Finally, Botswana, which did not inherit a colonial mining concession
agreement or contract, has also undertaken substantial changes in its
original contract agreement with De Beers. (47) In 1970, the Government
entered into an agreement with De Beers to exploit the Orapa diamond
mine. (48) The Government acquired 15 per cent free equity share in the
45. Op . cit . Studholme Caroline, (1981) , The Legal Regulation of
Mineral Exploitation in Developing Countires: A Study in Dependent
Development, p. 224
46. ibid, taxation provisions are discussed in detail in Ch. 7
47. For details see Colclough Christopher and McCarthy Stephen,(1980), The Political Economy of Botswana, Oxford University Press.
48. ibid, p. 151
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project but soon realised that it was more profitable than
anticipated. In 1974, encouraged "by international trends in
the negotiation of mineral concessions, the Government expected
that a greater proportion of the financial benefits of mining
should flow to the public sector rather than to private
captial." (49) The Government initiated negotiations with De
Beers. Four main aspects were involved; "the shareholding of
the company and in particular what equity the Government should
have; the royalty payable; the tax structure; and what would
happen in the event of the project being more or less
profitable than anticipated." (50) An agreement was reached in
1975 whereby De Beers agreed to let the Government acquire 50
per cent of the equity in the operating company "free of
consideration." (51) In addition, the royalty system was
changed though not specified but could be varied by the
Government in order" to share in any excess profit, above the
target rate of return, which the company might make." (52)
Finally, the tax rate was also not specified and De Beers was
subject to normal tax legislations as "it applies from time to
time." (53)
49. ibid
50. ibid, p. 152
51. ibid, p. 153
52.
53.
ibib,
ibid
p. 154
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In addition to the renegotiation examples discussed above,
some host States have even gone further to unilaterally
terminate contracts granted to private foreign investors. One
example will suffice to illustrate this point. In 1958,
Argentina entered into oil contracts with a number of oil
companies, mainly from the US. (54) The contracts covered a
wide range of issues including the supply of machinery and
equipment; development, extraction and transportation of
petroleum; pipelines construction; and drilling of wells. Due
to political pressure, it soon became clear that the contracts
were more advantageous to the companies than to Argentina. As
a result, politicians were forced to act. In 1963, the
President of Argentina was able to state that "In the matter of
petroleum policy we shall do what we have repeatedly promised
to do: the contracts which were signed... against the country's
economic interests will be annulled." (55) the annulment Decree
No. 724/63 was promulgated in the same year and revoked the
contracts. (56)
It is clear from the above discussion that developing
countries are able to modify economic development contracts
with private foreign investors without raising an international
dispute. This has been made possible by contemporary
54. For details see Chayes Abram, et. al. (1969), International
Legal Process Little, Brown and Company, pp.811-814
55. Ibid, p 831
56. Ibid, p 838
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international law and the desire of private foreign investors
to continue their operations in developing countries. More and
more developing countries have shown a desire to be more direct
participants in the exploitation of their natural resources.
Mining concessions by their very nature cannot realistically be
seen to be immutable. Practice through the use of
renegotiation point to the fact that these agreements can be
varied. What then is the legal status of private foreign
investors? This is the subject of our next discussion.
2.5 Legal Status of Private Foreign Investment
Having discussed the impact of de-colonialization on the
mining concessions, questions may be posed: what is the role of
international law in the protection of private foreign
investment? Are the General Assembly resolutions cited above
binding on capital exporting countries? Have these resolutions
changed the basic outlook of international law in this area?
Some of these issues are considered in detail below.
After realising the precarious nature of their
investments ,most private foreign investors included
stabilization clauses in the economic development contracts
restricting host countries from unilateral modification of the
agreements. Since most of these countries lacked technical and
legal expertise, private foreign investors managed to include
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contractual provisions which were favourable to them. (57)
Private foreign investors had veto powers over the future of
the mining industry because host countries could not modify
certain contractual provisions (through administrative or
legislative action such as increased taxation rates and
government participation) without mutual agreement. We find
these contractual provisions in a number of countries such as
Botswana, (58) Zambia, (59) Libya (60) and Iran. (61)
An attempt was made to internationalise these agreements
i.e. it was said by capital exporting countries that concession
agreements have unique characteristics which distinguish them
from ordinary contracts governed by domestic law of the host
State. Some of these characteristics include the following:
"(i) They are concluded between the government on one side and
a foreign private contractor on the other; (ii) They...
establish
	
a long term relationship between the parties which
implies a certain degree of confidence and co-operation, and
(iii) They often contain provision for the settlement of
57. The other reason is that stabilization clauses were used as
an attempt to lure foreign investors.
58. See Macbul Rahim and Juliet Broad, The Legislative 
Framework, Agreements and Financial Impositions Affecting the 
Mining Industry in African Commonwealth Countries, Commonwealth
Secretariat, p.35. See particularly Arts. 41 (b) (i) and 42
(b).
59. ibid, p. 7.3
60. See 17 rul pp 1-37
61. For a detailed discussion see Rainer Geiger, (1974), "The
Unilateral Change of Economic Development Agreements", MILO.
vol. 23, pp. 73-104 at p. 76
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disputes by means of arbitration." (62) Arbitrators in famous
cases such as Aramco and the Government of Saudi Arabia (63)
even went as far as holding that by "reason of its very
sovereignty within its territorial domain, the State possesses
the legal power to grant rights which it forbids itself to
withdraw before the end of the Concession with the reservation
of the clauses of the Concession Agreement relating to its
revocation. Nothing can prevent a State, in the exercise of
its sovereignty, from binding itself irrevocably by the
provisions of a concession and from granting to the
Concessionaire irretractable rights. Such rights have the
character of acquired rights." (64)
Notwithstanding these arbitral decisions, developing
countries have undertaken unilateral modifications of
concession agreements. They have rejected anyattempt to
internationalise economic development agreements on the grounds
that any restrictions by international law on the disposition
of investment by the host State contradicts their right to
economic self-determination. In addition, they argue that
economic development agreements should not be distinguished
from public law contracts which operate in developed countries.
In public law contracts, the principle governing their
62. ibid, p. 75
63. See 17 ILM p.24
64. ibid, p7-74, para 67; see also ILR 117 (1963); tescaco, 17
ILM pp. 15-17, paras 40-45
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application were laid down in a famous British case of
Amphitrite v. The King where it was held that "the Crown cannot
by contract hamper its freedom of action in matters which
concern the welfare of the State." (65) In the US, a contract
between a private person and the government does not prevent
the government from overriding its contractual obligations in
the exercise of its police powers widely construed to include
"the health, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of
the community." (66)
Finally, the same principle applies in France where the
government retains the power, without any default," by means of
legislation administrative action or general character or
individual measures directly interfering with the contract to
, vary or rescind the contract transfer it to another
suspend
party or take it over itself." (67) It is argued that State
practice is not supported by the arbitral decisions cited above
nor are they supported by State practice of capital exporting
countries. Furthermore, it is argued that since public law
contracts have existed longer than economic development
contracts, there is no reason why they should not be regarded
65. (1921) 3 K.B. 599; see also Op. cit Rainer Geiger, (1974),
"The Unilateral Change of Economic Development Agreements, "
p.88
66. Op. cit. Rainer Geiger (1974), "The Unilateral Change of
Economic Development Agreements", p. 90; see also  Chicago Alton
R.R.V. Tanberger (1915) 238 US 67
67. Op cit, Rainer Geiger, (1974), "The Unilateral Change of
Economic Development Agreements," pp. 95-96
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as guiding principles in the performance of the economic
development contracts. It is said that private foreign
investors should not be entitled to a preferential treatment
they could obtain neither under their own "nor any other
developed legal system." To do so could "be nothing else than
a more subtle form of colonialism." (68)
As it happened in most of the arbitral cases, tribunals had
no authority to reverse governmental measures and their attempt
to order specific performance proved futile. At the end, the
best safeguard for private foreign investors became
compensation. Indeed, it is less controversial for private
foreign investors to claim compensation than to seek specific
performance or restitution. The issue of compensation caused
considerable debate between capital exporting countries and
developing countries. Some developed countries insisted on the
orthodox view on compensation. This view was articulated by
the US Secretary of State, Hull during the Mexican
nationalisations of 1938. He stated that "the right to
expropriate is coupled with and conditioned on the obligation
to make adequate, effective and prompt compensation. The
legality of an expropriation is in fact dependent upon the
observance of this requirement." (69) The principle requireS
68. ibid, p. 102
69. See The Times, London, 25 August, 1938, p. 7 col. a.
321
that in order to be prompt, compensation must be paid either
before or within a short time after nationalisation.
Furthermore, adequate compensation should correspond fully to
the value of the foreign investment affected by the
nationalisation.
It is submitted that the orthodox principle is no longer
applicable in practice. This has been confirmed by several
jurists and court decisions. Indeed, even the US Supreme Court
in Sabbatino case held that traditional rules of international
law imposing a duty upon an expropriating State to pay "prompt,
adequate and effective" compensation were no longer supported
by a consensus of States. The Court held that the validity of
such rules are in sufficient doubt as to make them inapplicable
to the dispute between the host State and the private foreign
investor. (70) It must also be noted that several developed
countries supported Resolution 1803 (XVII). It could be argued
that since the resolution omitted the words "prompt, adequate
and effective compensation" in favour of the term
"appropriate", they can be held to have waived their insistence
on traditional rules. However, the crucial question in
70. See 376 US 298: American Journal of International Law, vol.
60, (1966) p. 782 at 785; and Subrata Roy Chowdhury, (1980)
"Legal Status of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States," p. 89, as Chapter 3 of Kamal Hossain (ed.) (1980),
Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order, Frances
Pinter (publishers) Ltd, London
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international law has been how is the appropriateness of
compensation to be determined? Are there any guiding
principles and if so what are they?
There is no clear guidance from the terms of the resolution
except that appropriate compensation should be made "in
accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such
measures.., and in accordance with international law." This
does not resolve the problem because apart from the generality
of the provision, there could be a conflict between the
domestic law of the nationalising State and the international
law rules governing the appropriateness of compensation. (71)
This uncertainty is resolved by paragraph 2(C) of Article 2 of
C.E.R.O.S. and State practice. The Charter does not provide
for compensation for nationalised foreign investments under
international law. Under the Charter, the nationalising State
is required to pay compensation "taking into account its
relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the
State considers pertinent.., where the question of
compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled
under the domestic law of the nationalising State and by its
tribunals." (72) Article 2 (2) (C) of the Charter has been
71. The defeated US amendment to Res. 1803 attempted to define
appropriate compensation.., in accordance with international
law to mean prompt, adequate and effective compensation, see UN
Doc. A/C 2/SR 835, p. 5 and UN Doc AC/2/L, 668
72. Article 2 (2) (C)
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described as a classic restatement of the Calvo doctrine
designed to have a "global extension ... particularly for the
benefit of the entire developing countries." (73) It has also
been emphasized that though developed countries may regard the
Charter as devoid of any legal force and not binding, a
consensus of 120 States in favour of the new standard on
compensation with only 6 against establishes an overwhelming
support of the global extension of the Calvo doctrine. (74)
State practice consolidates the majority view. In post-Second
World War nationalisation measures, the payment of compensation
has been by instalments spread over a number of years. Several
factors such as the extent of the nationalised property, the
amount of compensation and the expectation of future commercial
relations have come to influence this trend. For example, the
duration of compensation payments in Zambia was eight years for
Roan Selection Trust and twelve for Anglo-American Corporation
although in both cases, Government bonds were later redeemed
much earlier when the Zambian Government terminated the
marketing and other agreements. (75)
73. Op.cit. Subrata Roy Chowdhury, (1980), "Legal Status of the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States," p.88
74. ibid p.80.The Calvo doctrine as developed in Latin America
requires private foreign investors not to seek diplomatic
protection from their home States so that they are only subject
to the domestic laws of the countries in which they operate.
75. See United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations,
(1981), Transnational Corporations in the Copper Industry, New
York p. 59
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It has also been stated by jurists of great eminence that
the Charter provision of "appropriate compensation" to be
determined by taking into account "all circumstances that the
State considers pertinent" provides a useful guidance as to
"which of the pertinent circumstances are to be taken into
account. One is the time during which the expropriated
undertaking has exploited.., the nationalised resources,
another is whether it has recovered or not the initial capital
investment, if there has been undue enrichment as a result of a
colonial situation; if the profits obtained have been
excessive; the contribution of the enterprise to the economic
and social development of the country; its respect for labour
laws; its reinvestment policies... For this reason or similar
ones, there may be cases where, in fact, the indemnity is 
minimal, none or even negative. But this does not signify, 
legally, the non-payment of compensation." (76)
This interpretation of contemporary international law has major
implications on the so called acquired rights principle
developed by classical international law. The same author
states the legal position of contemporary international law in
these terms: "The traditional doctrine considered that since
76. Op.cit. Eduardo Jimenez Arechaga, (1980), "Application of
the Rules of State Responsibility to the Nationalisation of
Foreign owned property," p. 222, as Chapter 17 of Kamal Hossain
(ed.), (1980), Legal Aspects of the New International economic 
Order. Emphasis added.
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the act of nationalization or expropriation was in violation of
acquired rights, the normal principles of State responsibility
for unlawful acts should apply. the very basis of this
traditional doctrine.., is removed once it is realized that
acquired right to private property... is no longer protected by
contemporary international law... Once the measures of
nationalization are not per se unlawful, but on the contrary,
constitute the exercise of the sovereign right, the general
rules of State responsibility in respect of unlawful acts can
no longer apply." (77)
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that compensation
is now regulated by the new criteria of "pertinent
circumstances". Privileges enjoyed by private foreign
investors during the colonial period constitute pertinent
circumstances to be taken into account. It is no longer a
defence to hold that these privileges were accorded to the
companies by a sovereign State, albeit, a colonial State and
therefore it wasn't their fault. What seems to be material is
the fact that past profits gained by private foreign investors
under privileged colonial period (which enabled them to achieve
a high rate of return) constitute a material consideration.
Whether these privileges were accorded by the companies
themselves when they were "sovereigns" or were simply accorded
the privileges by a colonial regime seems to be irrelevant 
under contemporary international law. Indeed, the contemporary
77. ibid, p. 221. Emphasis added.
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view taken by most developing countries regarding the
protection of private foreign investment is in line with
Mexico's arguments of 1938 namely, "the future of the nation
[can] not be halted by the impossibility of immediate payment
of the value of properties belonging to a small number of
foreigners who seek only lucrative ends." (78) It is for these
reasons that today, equity is a determining factor in
protection of private foreign investors.
does not ignore the privileges enjoyed by
private foreign investors and their conduct during the colonial
period. We now turn to discussing the relevance of
contemporary international law to Namibia and the status of
private foreign investment in the territory.
3. The Relevance of International Law to Namibia and the Status 
of Private Foreign Investment. 
Before we discuss the relevance of the issues raised above
to Namibia, a number of issues need to be clarified. First,
the future lawful government of Namibia will have an utmost
discretion to decide, in accordance with the wishes of the
people, the future of the mining industry. We are not in a
position, nor are we entitled to do so, to decide what the
future lawful government should do or should not do. Indeed,
we would like to stress in no uncertain terms that to do so
78. See The Times, London, 5 August 1938, p.11 col.e
determining the
Finally, equity
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would amount to writing a political manifesto for the future
lawful government and would be unacceptable. However, we
believe that the prevailing political, social, legal and
economic factors would guide the future lawful government in
deciding the future of the mining industry. Secondly, our only
objective here, without in any way prescribing what should or
should not happen, is to undertake a systematic exposition of
legal issues regarding the exploitation of Namibia's mineral
resources in the hope that it may assist the future lawful
Namibian government in deciding the future of the mining
industry. Therefore, the examination of the legal issues in
this section may form part of the wider option open to it.
We have seen that the practice of States and the evolution
of International law over the past forty years have clearly
established that States have a right to nationalise foreign-
owned property. Therefore, the future lawful government of
Namibia will have the right to nationalise foreign property in
accordance with State practice. In addition to the relevance
of contemporary international law to Namibia, the termination
of the Mandate and numerous United Nations resolutions on
Namibia will have important legal implications on the
concessions held by a number of mining companies in the
territory. The major question which may be asked is: what is
the legal position of the mining concessions given the fact
that South Africa's right to administer the territory has been
terminated? Before we discuss the legal implications of this
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question, it is necessary to briefly discuss the legal status
of Namibia from the colonial period to the present, and assess
South Africa's duties and obligations towards the territory.
In order to do this, we shall start from the Mandate period.
3.1 The Mandate System and Natural Resources. 
The concept of self-determination was developed long before
Namibia became a mandate territory. The principle was
clarified in 1917 by President Wilson of the US. He stated the
principle in these terms: "no nation should seek to extend its
policy over any other nation or people, but that every people
should be left to determine its own polity, its own way of
development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little
along with the great and the powerful." (79) It should be noted
that apart from the word "development" which could be construed
to mean political as well as economic development, no specific
reference to economic development as part of self-determination
was made. Furthermore, during this period, the concept of
self-determination was still regarded as only a political
principle since classical international law had not yet fully
accepted it as a right.
It has already been discussed in Chapter I that after the First
79. See Digest of International Law, (1965), Whiteman, vol. 5,
Department of State, Washington, June, p.41. See also S. Doc
685 64th Conference 2nd Sess. pp. 7-8
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World War, the Mandate System was established in order to
administer former German colonial territories. The objective
of the Mandate System was to ensure the well-being and
development of the indigenous population. It must be noted
that according to Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations, the "well-being and development" of the indigenous
inhabitants of the mandated territories formed a "sacred trust
of civilisation". The acceptance by the mandatory of this duty
carried with it certain obligations and responsibilities
established by international law. What are the legal
consequences of the words "well being and development" of the
indigenous population? "Well-being and development" can be
construed to mean a number of things. The words may mean
economic, social, moral and political well-being or
development. The objective was to promote the well-being of
the inhabitants, this meant not to exploit them or their
natural resources. Ironically, General Smuts of South Africa
stated the obligations of the Mandatory power as not "to look
upon its position as an office of profit or position of private
advantage for it or its nationals." (80)
It is also clear that the phrase "sacred trust" intended to
incorporate the idea of trust in the international mandate
system. The characteristics of a trust in domestic law are
80. See General Smuts, (1918), The League of Nations: A
Practical Suggestion, London; see also Digest of International 
Law (1963), Whiteman, vol. 2, Department of State publication
7353, December, p. 607
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that " (a) it recognizes only obligations on the part of the
trustee, and rights on the part of the beneficiary; (b) the
trustee may not derive from his trust any personal profit."
(81) Two other important points regarding the international
Mandate System should be noted. First, the "Mandatory power to
which the government of a territory is delegated by the League
of Nations holds the territory on a dual mandate... (a) on
behalf of the inhabitants of the territory; and (b) on behalf
of the International Society," (82) Secondly, the "rights
granted to the Mandatory are for the purpose only of the better
fulfilment of its obligations towards the country under
tutelage." (83) Furthermore, an international Mandate System
was to be regarded as a legal institution whereby international
law affords primary protection to the interests of the
indigenous inhabitants. Finallyj the foregoing shows that the
international Mandate System created a new species of rights
and obligations which was contrasted with that of colonies.
It is clear that the Mandate System was not intended to
benefit Mandatory Powers. In order effectively to discharge
their international obligations, all property and possessions
of the German Empire situated in the mandated territories were
transferred, with the territories, to the Mandatory Powers
81. For a detailed discussion see Isaak I. Dore, (1985), The
International Mandate System and Namibia, Westview Press,
London p.18
82. ibid
83. ibid
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without any consideration. (84) This goes to show that the
Mandatory could not hold any of the property of the mandated
territory in full dominion. Indeed, it was under a legal duty
to use all the revenue and profits from the natural resources
of the mandated territories for the benefit of the indigenous
population. In awarding mineral rights, it was under a legal
international obligation to ensure that their exploitation
benefited the indigenous inhabitants and not to use these
territories as instruments of profit and exploitation in
collaboration with international capital.
Furthermore, one of the most important factors is that
Mandatory Powers could not dispose of natural resources of the
mandated territories in any way they liked since they did not
possess sovereignty over the mandated territories. This view
was expressed by Judge McNair in his Separate Opinion in the
1950 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice.
He stated that "Sovereignty over a Mandated Territory is in
abeyance; if and when the inhabitants of the territory obtain
recognition as an independent State, as has already happened in
the case of some of the Mandates, sovereignty will revive and
rest in the new State." (85) How did South Africa perform its
international obligations? This is examined in detail in the
next section.
84. Article 257 of the Treaty of Versailles. See Redmond 
Treaties (1923) 3331
85. See separate Opinion of Sir Arnold McNair, International
Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion July 11 1950 ICJ
Reports (1950) 150
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3.2 South Africa's Behaviour
South Africa is the most privileged State in the sense that it
has managed to defy international public opinion with impunity
and contempt for more than sixty years. Its imposed system of
apartheid had been declared a crime against humanity by the
United Nations. The racist regime consistently ignored all
resolutions adopted by the United Nations over Namibia, and has
also ignored the ruling of the International Court of Justice
that its presence in Namibia is illegal. As stated by Julio
Faundez, "South Africa's right to administer Namibia was
derived exclusively from the Mandate... this right was
dependent upon South Africa fulfilling its obligation under
[the] Mandate." (86) What is the regime's record in the
exploitation of Namibia's natural resources? The findings of
many writers of great eminence and economic experts on Namibia
have been consistent. For example, Professor Reginald H. Green
states that "the colonial political economy of Namibia has
always been a political economy of theft. Land.., mineral
rights.., were taken away by force," (87) while Brian Hackland,
Anne Murray-Hudson and Brian Wood state that "Namibia's
extractive colonial economy [was] developed for the benefit of
foreign companies and white settlers." (88)
86. See Dr. Julio Faundez, (1987), "International Law and
Policy Making Process: The Case for Compliance" in Conference
Papers on Namibia, Oxfam, 11 May, p.4
87. See Professor Reginald Green, (1987), "Dependence,
Destablisation and Development", in Conference Papers on 
Namibia Oxfam 11 May p. 61
88. See Brian Hackland, Anne Murray-Hudson and Brian Wood, (1986),
"Behind the Diplomacy: Namibia 1983-5" Third World Quarterly, vol. 8
pp. 51-77, at 53.
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South Africa's contempt is illustrated by the following
statement: "the blacks (90-95 per cent of the population) hold
one third of the land while the whites (5-10 per cent of the
population) hold two thirds. Moreover: the white area covers
some 50.6 million hectares of the best farming and government
land... It contains virtually all Namibia's known base-mineral
deposits, diamond reserves: This inequitable distribution of
resources was backed by legislation and social policy which
discriminated against Namibians and which generously aided
foreign companies and white settlers." (89) It is against this
background that the international community has taken a
concerted effort to force South Africa to comply with
international law.
Since the Mandate period, South Africa's method of
administering Namibia has been challenged by the international
community on numerous occasions. The main issue of contention
has been the application of apartheid in the territory. (90)
89. See Jim Gale, (1985), "The 	 of-Co-operatiOn-taween
Foreign Economic Interests and the illegal South African
Regime", in United Nations (1985) Seminar on the Activities of 
Foreign Economic Interests in the Exploitation of Namibia's 
Natural and Human Resources, Ljubljana, Yugoslavia, 16-20 April 
1984, New York p. 50
90. See United Nations, (1974), A Trust Betrayed Namibia, New
York p.1
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The apartheid system has a direct effect on the welfare of
the indigenous inhabitants, especially in the spheres of
education, economic development, and the right to self-
determination. Even before the establishment of the Mandate
System, Prime Minister Smuts did not favour the idea of
including Germany's ex-colonies in Africa as mandated
territories. In his view, these territories were "inhabited by
barbarians who not only cannot possibly govern themselves but
to whom it would be impracticable to apply any idea of
political self-determination." (91) This clearly indicates how
Namibia was to be administered later on. Indeed, it did not
take long before the international community held that South
Africa's administration was "in contradiction to the principles
and purposes of the Mandate, the Charter of the United Nations
and the enlightened conscience of mankind." (92) This was
followed by a number of futile attempts to persuade South
Africa that it must recognise its legal obligations towards the
people of Namibia.
91. See UNIN, (1987), Namibia: A Direct United Nations 
Responsibility, Lusaka, p.80
92. Op.cit. United Nations (1974) A Trust Betrayed Namibia, p.2
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3.2.1 Background to the Termination of the Mandate. 
Upon the termination of the League of Nations, a resolution
was adopted on 18th April 1946. It noted that Chapters XI, XII
and XIII of the Charter of the United Nations embody principles
corresponding to those declared in Article 22 of the Covenant
of the League. (93) When the League of Nations was dissolved,
its supervisory authority for Namibia was inherited by the
United Nations. This view was at least implicitly recognised
by South Africa when, in 1946, it requested the United Nations
General Assembly's permission to annex the territory. (94)
Therefore, the approach made to the United Nations indicated
recognition of the body as the competent organ and was estopped
from denying it later. Instead of observing the terms of the
Mandate, South Africa continued to violate its international
obligations. Several requests by the UN to place Namibia under
the Trusteeship System were ignored. South Africa contended,
in 1947, that it was under no obligation to place the territory
under the Trusteeship System but agreed to submit reports to
the United Nations concerning Namibia. However, even this
undertaking was withdrawn in 1949. (95)
The developments discussed above forced the UN to seek an
93. Chapter XI Declaration Regarding Non-Self Governing
Territories; Chapter XII International Trusteeship System, and
Chapter XIII The Trusteeship Council
94. Op.cit. United Nations, (1974) A Trust Betrayed Namibia, 
p.6.
95. ibid p.9
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advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. The
Court was requested to clarity four main issues namely: the
international status of the territory; South Africa's
obligations under the Mandate; whether the Trusteeship System
was applicable to Namibia; and whether South Africa had
competence to change the territory's international status. The
Advisory Opinion was delivered in 1950. (96) The Court held
that South Africa continued to have the international
obligations contained in the League Covenant and the Mandate;
the supervisory functions formerly exercised by the League were
to be exercised by the United Nations; South africa was not
under a legal obligation to place Namibia under the Trusteeship
System; and South africa acting alone was not competent to
modify the international status of the territory. After
another period of futile negotiations, the Governments of
Ethiopia and Liberia instituted proceedings against South
Africa. (97) In their capacity as former members of the League
96. See International Status of South West Africa, ICJ Reports,
1950, p.128
97. See South West Africa case (Ethiopia v. Union of South
Africa Order of 13th January 1961 ICJ Reports 1961, p.6. Note
in addition to the cases cited, there were other cases decided
by the ICJ such as the 1955 Advisiory Opinion dealing with the
legal competence of the General Assembly to grant oral hearings
to petitioners which the Court decided it had. For a detailed
discussion, see UNIN, (1987) Namibia: A Direct United Nations 
Responsibility, Lusaka, particularly Chapter 6
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of Nations, they requested the International Court of Justice
to require South Africa to carry out its obligations and in
particular, to "cease violations of the Mandate; to end
apartheid in [Namibia]; and to report to the United Nations
concerning its administration."
In July 1966, the International Court of Justice gave
judgment by stating that it could not rule on the substance of
the case because the Applicant's claims had not established any
legal right or interest in the matter. (98) The Court declared
that the League Covenant made no provision for individual
League members to institute actions in regard to the
administration of a Mandate. This was in contrast to the 1962
judgment where the Court affirmed the applicability of Article
7 of the Mandate providing for legal action by League Members.
3.2.2. Termination of the Mandate
The 1966 I.C.J. judgment was a turning point in the
struggle between South Africa on the one hand, and the
international community on the other. By its Resolution 2145
of 1966, the UN General Assembly terminated South Africa's
mandate and placed Namibia under United Nations control. The
98. See South West Africa Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Reports 
1966, p.6 The First Phase decided in 1962 dealt with South
Africa's preliminary objections mainly that Ethiopia and
Liberia had no right to institute legal proceedings aganist
South Africa but was overuled by the court.
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the resolution was adopted by an overwhelming majority of the
UN members, 114 votes in favour to 2 against with 3 abstentions
(France, Malawi and the United Kingdom). However, South Africa
was not concerned, the then. Prime Minister Vorster stated that
the "Government does not want to create even an impression that
it considers itself bound by that unlawful resolution." (99)
After the termination of the Mandate, the UN established the
United Nations Council for Namibia to administer the territory
but was refused permission by South Africa to enter Namibia.
The termination of the Mandate was reaffirmed by the Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970).
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) declared that "the
continued presence of the South African authorities in Namibia
is illegal and that.., all acts taken by South Africa on behalf
of or concerning Namibia after the termination of the Mandate
are illegal and invalid." (100) In addition, by Resolution 283
(1970), the Security Council called upon all States "to ensure
that companies and other commercial and industrial enterprises
owned by, or under direct control of, the State cease all
dealings with respect to... concessions in Namibia; to withhold
from their nationals, or companies of their nationality not
99. Op.cit. United Nations (1974) A Trust Betrayed Namibia 
p.27
100. For a detailed discussion see Op.cit. UNIN (1987) Namibia: 
A Direct United Nations Resposibility p.200
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under direct governmental control, government loans, credit
guarantees and other forms of financial support that would be
used to facilitate trade or commerce with Namibia; and to
discourage their nationals or companies of their nationality.
from investing or obtaining concessions in Namibia; and to
withhold protection of such investment against claims of a
future lawful government of Namibia." (101)
Realising that their economic interests were at stake,
certain Members of the UN began to question (together with
South Africa) the General Assembly's legal competence to
terminate the Mandate. For example, when the Security Council
by Resolution 284 (1970) requested an advisory opinion on the
legal consequences for States of the continued presence of
South Africa in Namibia, the United Kingdom delegate objected
to the phrase "notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970)" on the ground that it was "based on certain assumptions
about the legal status of Namibia which ought themselves to be
examined by the Court." (102) The phrase "assumptions" referred
to the General Assembly's competence to terminate the mandate
and the right it assumed "to vest in the United Nations
responsibility for the Territory." (103)
101. The resolution was adopted on 29th July 1970
102. See Solomon Slonim, (1973), South West Africa and the 
United Nations: An International Mandate In Dispute, The John
Hopkins University Press, London p.331
103. ibid
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The Security Council Resolution 284 (1970) asked the Court
to express itself on the legality of Security Council
resolution endorsing termination of the Mandate by the General
Assembly. The main aim was to decide once and for all whether
the two resolutions were adopted beyond the legal competence of
the two organs. The Court handed down its Advisory Opinion on
21 June 1971. (104) It held that the continued presence of
South Africa in Namibia was illegal; that the United Nations
members were obliged to recognise this illegality, and to
refrain from dealing with the Government of South Africa that
would imply recognition of the legality of its presence in the
territory; and United Nations non-member States should give
assistance in any action taken by the United Nations with
regard to Namibia.
In addition, the Court discussed the substantive issues in
detail. As to whether the General Assembly acted ultra-vires
in terminating the Mandate, the Court held that the rules
governing the operation, modification and termination were the
ordinary principles governing the law of treaties. This was
incorporated in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. Under the Convention, a treaty justifies termination
upon a material breach if (1) the breach amounts to a
repudiation of the treaty,or (2) the breach involves the
104. See Legal Consequences for States and the Continued
presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) Advisory
Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16
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violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the
object or purpose of the treaty.
A "right of termination on account of breach must be
presumed to exist in respect of all other treaties." (105) The
Court went further to state that the "resolution in question is
therefore to be viewed as the exercise of the right to
terminate a relationship in case of the deliberate and
persistent violation of obligations which destroys the very
object and purpose of that relationship." (106) Furthermore, it
was not necessary to make a judicial determination before the
Mandate could be terminated because to do so could have denied
the General Assembly, which was a successor to the League "the
right to act, on the argument that it lacks competence to
render what is described as a judicial decision, would not only
be inconsistent but would amount to a complete denial of the
remedies available against fundamental breaches of an
international undertaking." (107) Finally, as to the legal
nature of the General Assembly resolutions, the Court held that
"it would not be correct to assume that, because the General
Assembly is in principle vested with recommendatory powers, it
is debarred from adopting, in specific cases within the
framework of its competence, resolutions which make
determinations or have operative design." (108)
105. ibid, paras. 46-48
106. ibid, para 47
107 ibid, para 49
108. ibid, para 50
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The legal consequences of the Court's Advisory Opinion is
that since the resolutions of the Security Council were adopted
"in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter
and in accordance with its Articles 24 and 25, [the] decisions
are consequently binding on all States Members of the United
Nations which are thus under obligation to accept and carry
them out.' (109) Thus, the termination of the mandate is valid
according not only to the general principles of international
law and treaty law, but also the charter of the United Nations.
Indeed, Prime Minister Smuts himself considered that the League
had power to terminate the mandate if it was persistently
violated by the mandatory "in case of flagrant and prolonged
abuse of this trust the population concerned should be able to
appeal for the redress to the League, who should in a proper
case assert its authority to the full, even to the extent of 
removing the mandate and entrusting it to some other State if
necessary." (110) Therefore, if the League had power to
"remove" i.e. terminate the mandate, then the General Assembly
has also the power since it inherited in full all the rights of
the League. Finally, it has already been noted that South
Africa sought permission from the United Nations to incorporate
the territory. This could have been done only if the mandate
was first terminated by the General Assembly itself.
109. ibid, para 53
110. Op.cit, Smuts J. (1918), The League of Nations: A
Practical Suggestion pp. 21-22 Emphasis added.
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3.3. Legal Status of Mining Concessions 
This section examines the legal status of the mining
concessions held by a number of mining companies in Namibia.
In order to determine legal consequences of these concessions,
it is necessary to make a distinction between mining
concessions granted before the revocation of the mandate, and
those granted after the termination. Given the fact that these
concessions raise a number of legal questions, it is also
necessary to discuss the rights and obligations of the parties
involved, namely: mining companies, South Africa, and a future
lawful government of Namibia.
3.3.1. Pre-Revocation Concession
For the purposes of our discussion, this section is limited to
discussing mining concessions which continued to be in force at
the time of the revocation of the mandate. Therefore, those
which were fully executed at the time of the revocation are not
discussed in detail mainly because we have been unable to
obtain information regarding their existence. In the absence
of any evidence to suggest that concessionaires of such
concessions did not observe their terms and conditions, they
should be regarded as lawfully acquired and fully executed.
Moreover, it may be argued that if there were irregularities in
their terms and conditions, the responsibility lies with the
South African regime. Indeed, the companies could not require
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South Africa to comply with the terms of the mandate by
ensuring that mining concessions were granted to the companies
for the benefit of the indigenous population. As long as they
observed their terms and conditions, and did not actively do
something that would suggest a conspiracy with the South
African regime to defraud Namibia of its mineral resources,
they cannot be held responsible. Furthermore, the concessions
were acquired from a de jure administering authority and became
fully executed at a time when South Africa was still a de jure 
administering authority in Namibia.
As for the mining concessions which continued to be in
force at the time of the revocation, they raise a number of
interesting legal questions. What is the legal status of the
current mining concessions acquired at a time when South Africa
was still a de jure administering authority? Are the mining
companies legally entitled to continue their mining operations
in Namibia? Are they legally entitled to continue paying taxes
and other charges to the South African regime? Are they
legally obliged to cease their mining operations until a de
jure administration is installed? These questions are
considered in detail below.
A number of major mining companies such as CMD, Tsumeb and
the South West Africa Company acquired mineral concessions at a
time when South Africa was still a de jure administering
authority. The duration of these concessions extend beyond the
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termination of the mandate until 1990 in most cases. If South
Africa withdrew from the territory immediately after the
termination of the mandate, the legal position would have been
straightforward. Their validity could not have been called
into question by the successor administration because at the
time of their grant, South Africa was still a de jure 
administering authority. However, the current legal situation
is more complicated than what has been stated above. In order
to come to a conclusion whether or not the concessions are
valid, a number of preliminary issues need to be clarified. A
distinction needs to be made between those mining companies
which suspended their mining operations when it became clear
that South Africa was intent to defy international law and
continued its illegal presence in the territory, and those
companies which continued their operations.
To those companies which suspended their operations, it is
respectfully submitted that their mining concessions are still
valid as long as they have not yet lapsed. These companies
acquired the concessions from a de jure administering
authority, and suspended their mining operations within a
reasonable time after the termination of the mandate. The
obvious legal consequence is that the enjoyment of the rights
derived from the concessions have been frustrated by the
presence of an illegal regime. They have respectfully heeded
calls from the international community to suspend their
operations while South Africa still illegally occupies the
territory. Therefore, as long as South Africa continues to
occupy Namibia, it is impossible for these companies to
continue their mining operations without lending support or
implying recognition to South Africa's presence. However, once
South Africa's withdrawal is secured, their rights will revive
and will bind a future de lure administering authority.
However, it must be noted that the rights of the companies
to enforce mining concessions will entirely depend on the
attitude of a future lawful government of Namibia. In the
exercise of its right to permanent sovereignty over its natural
resources and in accordance with the current State practice,
the government will have a discretion to determine whether
these concessions are equitable. Contemporary international
law entitles States to terminate mining concessions, revoke
certain advantages, or indeed impose additional duties on the
companies. In most cases, concessions granted during a
colonial period have been modified or terminated. This has
already been discussed above. The principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources entitles a future lawful
government of Namibia to take into account privileges enjoyed
by the companies during the colonial period. Therefore, should
a future lawful government decided to modify, amend, or
abrogate these mining concessions, privileges enjoyed by the
mining companies when South Africa was still a de lure 
administering authority will constitute pertinent circumstances
within the meaning of Article 2 of C.E.R.D.S. discussed above.
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These will include such factors as whether there has been undue
enrichment as a result of a colonial situation; whether the
companies involved recovered their investment; whether they
obtained excessive profits; and whether they made any
contribution to the economic and social development of the
territory. All these factors will influence the government to
decided one way or the other.
The defence that these privileges were lawfully granted by
a de jure, albeit, colonial administration and therefore should
be preserved is irrelevant under contemporary international
law. It will not limit the legal capacity of a future lawful
government of Namibia from modifying or indeed even to revoke
them should it decide to do so. The remedies of the companies
will be compensation taking into account pertinent
circumstances discussed above. Moreover, Namibia should be
distinguished from a colony proper, South Africa's rights and
obligations were clearly spelt out in an international
instrument. The legal consequence of this state of affairs is
that the rights of third parties are subject to South Africa's
compliance with international obligations. As will be seen
below, it is precisely this failure on the part of South Africa
to comply with international obligations that has called into
question the validity of mining concessions notwithstanding the
fact that South Africa's failure to comply is beyond the
control of the concessionaires. Furthermore, it is submitted
that the companies should be assumed to have been aware of
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South Africa's international obligations. It is usually a
standard practice among private foreign investors that before
they decide to commit their capital in a foreign country, they
undertake a comprehensive study of the country's political,
social, and economic background. Therefore, we are not here
dealing with an issue of the bona fide investor without notice.
This means that although the concessions cannot be annulled on
the basis of their knowledge of South Africa's international
obligations, this fact will constitute a material fact in
deciding the fate of these concessions.
In addition, it must be noted that contemporary
international law has come to recognise the right of every
State to decide the rights and obligations of private foreign
investors regardless of whether a predecessor State or a
previous government engaged itself, either by treaty or
contract, not to revoke or modify mining concessions. Indeed,
it has been stated by Dr. Julio Faundez that "Under the rules
of international customary law, independent Namibia will have
no obligation to maintain in force any treaty applied to its
territory prior to independence. These rules are now embodied
in the Vienna Convention on Succession to Treaties." (111) The
basis of this statement is derived from Article 16 of the
Vienna Convention on Succession to treaties. It states that a
111. See Dr - Julio Faundez, (1987), Independent Namibia: 
Succession To Treaty Riets and Obliptions Report prepared for
the United Nations Institute for Namibia, p. 83, para 1
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"newly independent State is not bound to maintain in force, or
to become a party to, any treaty by reasons only of the fact
that at the date of the succession of States the treaty was in
force in respect of the territory to which the succession of
States relates." It is important here to note that a future
lawful government of Namibia will succeed the UN Council for
Namibia since it is a de jure administering authority not South
Africa. (112) The legal consequence of this principle is that
in deciding the future of these mining concessions, a future
lawful government of Namibia will not be bound by any treaty
that purports to protect the concessions to the extent of
binding the new government. However, for reasons already
discussed, this does not mean that the concessions were not
lawfully acquired nor that they are not valid. What it means
is that a future lawful government will have a wider discretion
than hitherto was available to States in a similar situation.
As regarding mining companies which continued to operate in the
territory notwithstanding the revocation of the Mandate, the
validity of their mining concessions depends on whether they
are legally entitled to continue their mining operations
notwithstanding South Africa's illegal occupation. Our view is
that the companies are not entitled to continue their mining
operations while the South African regime continues to occupy
Namibia. It is an established fact that under the general
112. For a detailed discussion see Dr. Julio Faundez, ibid
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principle of law, rights acquired lawfully may not continue to
be valid if the person enjoying such rights continues to deal
with an outlaw State. It does not matter whether or not such
an outlaw State was once a lawful and de jure administering
authority. When the principle is applied to the mining
concessions in question, it is obvious that they are void or
voidable at the discretion of a future lawful government of
Namibia. However, our view is that by continuing their mining
operations in Namibia, the companies have forfeited their
rights and a future lawful government of Namibia will not be
bound to recognise the validity of their concessions.
It has already been discussed that the ICJ has clarified
the rights and obligations of the parties regarding Namibia.
Any conduct which lends support or imply recognition of South
Africa's presence in Namibia is illegal. Notwithstanding this
state of affairs, the companies continue to pay taxes to the
illegal South African regime, they continue to operate under
the laws and regulations passed by South Africa notwithstanding
the fact that these laws and regulations have been declared
null and void by all the principle organs of the United
Nations. Given these facts, it is impossible to hold that the
conduct of these companies does not lend support or imply
recognition of South Africa's presence in Namibia. Indeed, the
attitude and conduct of some of the mining companies
consolidates this view. For instance, in 1983, RTZ publicly
stated that "As a company we are subject to the laws of the
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countries in which we operate... The directors for their part 
believe that it is right and proper to continue in Namibia." 
(113) This attitude is also adopted by Newmont Mining
Corporation which has 29.5 per cent stake of Tsumeb Corporation
in Namibia. It argues that "normal business operations should
not be prohibited on account of unresolved 'political claims'."
(114) It is for these reasons that a future lawful government
of Namibia will be entitled to revoke these concessions. The
proper course for the companies was to suspend their mining
operations until that time that South Africa complies with
international law and withdraws from the territory. The fact
that South Africa's presence is beyond the control of the
companies is irrelevant. This cannot be used as a defence to
deal with an outlaw administration and continue to pay taxes to
an illegal regime which is not entitled to receive any benefits
from an illegal occupation.
Furthermore, it is submitted that contemporary
international law does not recognise private rights to override
the jus cogens principle of self-determination. There is no
doubt that the operations of these companies in Namibia and the
taxes they pay to an illegal regime encourages the South
African regime to defy international law. All these factors
113. See RTZ Annual Report and Accounts 1981, p. 7.
114. See Richard L. Sklar, (1975) Corporate Power in An African
State: The political Impact of Mining Companies in Zambia,
Univeristy of California Press, p.173; See also The Wall Street 
Journal 24 March 1972.
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render the concessions null and void. Another important factor
which needs to be taken into account is that a future lawful
government of Namibia will be entitled to terminate some of
these concessions on the grounds of a fundamental breach of the
terms contained in the concessions. If one applies the general
principle of law regarding fundamental breach of the contract
to the mining concessions, they can legally be terminated on
this basis alone. It has already been discussed that the
Thirion Commission found that some of the mining companies
operating in Namibia failed to comply with the terms and
conditions of their mining concessions. The general principle
of law is that if one party in a contract fails to observe a
fundamental provision of a contract or agreement, the other
party is free to regard the contract or agreement as
repudiated. Indeed, it was on the basis of the principle of
fundamental breach that the mandate was terminated, therefore,
there is no reason why the principle should not be applied to
the mining companies.
In spite of the criticisms that has been said about the
Thirion Commission, we are of the view that some of its
findings will form a basis on which a future lawful government
of Namibia will decide the legal status of these mining
concessions. Indeed, even the Financial Times (of London) has
expressed the same view by stating that "the report [i.e. the
Thirion report] has a potentially far reaching significance
which goes beyond reforms to the [mining] industry. Should
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SWAPO eventually win power in the territory, the findings of
the Thirion Commission could well provide the basis for
punitive action against companies allegedly involved in
malpractice." (115) This point is certainly not missed by
SWAPO. In commenting on the findings of the Thirion
Commission, SWAPO expressly stated that "only with the
achievement of genuine independence could the super-
exploitation and gross plundering of the Namibian people's
heritage... be checked and eliminated... transnational
corporate monopolies that are engaged in the theft of these
assets will have to be called upon to account for their
crimes." (116)
3.3.2 Post-Revocational Concessions and Other Purported Rights. 
This section discusses the legal validity of mining concessions
and other rights which South Africa purported to create after
the termination of the mandate. It also discusses briefly the
attitude of some of the capital exporting countries, notably
the UK and the US, regarding the competence of the United
Nations in terminating the mandate and in establishing the UN
Council for Namibia and declaring it as a de jure administering
authority in Namibia. The issues that are discussed relate to
the role played by the United Nations towards Namibia insofar
115. See Jim Jone, (1986) "Diamond Companies angered by
critisms in Namibian Report," in Financial Times, London, 18
March, p. 36, col. d.
116. See SWAPO Information Bulletin July, 1986, pp. 5-8 at 8
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as they affect the legality of the mining concessions.
In determining the legal basis of the mining concessions
and other rights which South Africa purported to create, a
general question which arises is whether South Africa (or her
agents) is legally competent to create property rights after
the termination of the Mandate. The general principle of law
is that an illegal entity is legally incapable of creating any
rights which can be enforced against third parties. In the
case of Namibia, it was expressly stated by the ICJ in its 1971
Advisory Opinion that South Africa's illegal presence in
Namibia "cannot remain without consequences." One of these ,
legal consequences is that the regime is legally incapable of
creating a legal title which can bind the future lawful
government of Namibia. Before we discuss the legal status of
the post-revocation concessions, it is important to discuss the
legal status of concession extensions and additional
investments.
(A) Legal Status of Concession Extensions and Additional 
Investment. 
South Africa granted concession extensions to a number of
mining companies that acquired their mining concessions when
South Africa was still a de jure administering authority. The
important factor which is worth noting is that these extensions
were granted after the revocation of the Mandate. For
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instance, CDM initially obtained a fifty year mining concession
from 1st January 1921 to 30th December 1990. (117) The duration
of the concession was later extended in 1967 after the
revocation of the Mandate to 2010. (118) The question that
arises is that are concession extensions granted after the
termination of the Mandate to be considered legal? As already
noted above, the legal position regarding South Africa's
conduct after the termination of the mandate is
straightforward. All the laws passed by the South African
regime were declared null and void when the Mandate was
terminated. The only South African acts which are recognised
under international law are those of a personal nature such as
"the registration of births, deaths and marriages, the effects
of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the
inhabitants of the territory." (119) Therefore, the extensions
have no legal basis and as such, they are null and void and of
no effect in law. Should Namibia gain independence after 1990
when mining concessions granted by South Africa while it was
still a de jure administering authority expire, a future lawful
government of Namibia will have a free hand in the mining
industry.
117. See Goldblatt, (1971), History of South West Africa From
The Beginning of The Nineteenth Century, Juta and Company Ltd.
Cape Town, p. 240
118. See Windhoek Observer. Namibia, 28th June 1985
119. See 1971 ICJ Reports 56
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As to the question of additional investment, most of the
mining companies which continued their operations after the
termination of the mandate have made additional capital
investment. One of the most significant additional capital
investments is that made by Tsumeb Corporation Ltd. In 1980,
the company purchased a 70 per cent share of Otjhase mining
property for R32 million. (120) It is submitted that after the
termination of the mandate, any additional capital investment
that is made (whether or not the company which makes such an
investment obtained a mining concession before the termination
of the mandate) is null and void, and will not bind a future
lawful government of Namibia. It has been made clear by the
Security Council in its Res. 283 (1970) that investments made
after the termination of the mandate are not subject to
protection against claims of a future lawful government of
Namibia. Moreover, additional investment implies lending
support and recognition to South Africa's occupation of
Namibia. The more the investment, the more the South African
regime receives revenue in the form of taxes and other charges
which help the regime to consolidate its illegal presence in
Namibia. It is for these reasons that additional capital
investments after the revocation of the mandate are illegal.
120. See the Thirion Commission Report, 1985, p. 147.
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(B) Concessions. 
Before we discuss the legal status of the concessions
granted by the South African regime after the termination of
the Mandate, a number of issues need to be clarified. The term
mining concession is given its wider meaning. It includes
prospecting as well as mining licences. Both prospecting and
mining constitute legal rights which entitles the South African
regime to receive rental fees, taxes and other dues provided by
law. In both cases, they are capable of creating property
rights which enables the South African regime to acquire shares
in operating companies once they are established. Moreover,
prospecting mining licences are covered by the terms of the
Security Council Resolution 301 (1971) by the use of such
phrases as "franchises, rights, titles or contracts."
Therefore, the only difference in terms of legal consequences
is that the holder of a mining licence will be liable for all
the minerals removed and taxes paid to the South African
regime. On the other hand, the holder of a prospecting licence
will be liable for minerals removed for sampling purposes and
for rental fees paid to the South African regime. These issues
are discussed in detail in the next section.
The other important issue worth noting is that it has not
been possible to obtain information relating to all mining and
prospecting licences issued by the South African regime after
the termination of the Mandate. Indeed, even if we had access
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to these licences, it would not have been possible to list them
all. For instance, it is reported that they were 36 in 1969 but
by 1974, the "number had risen to 569." (121) However, an
effort has been made to compile a few mining concessions in a
form of a table see (Table VI:2).
A number of mining companies obtained mining concessions
from the South African regime after the termination of the
mandate. These included companies such as Oamites Mining
Company; Rossing Uranium Ltd; South West Africa Company; Tsumeb
Corporation Ltd; and Imcor (pty) Ltd. (122) It must be noted
that some of the companies listed above obtained additional
prospecting and mining areas in addition to those already held
before the termination of the mandate. A good example of these
is the Tsumeb Corporation Ltd. which acquired the Otjihase mine
in addition to the mining concession obtained in 1947 when it
bought the assets from the Custodian of Enemy Property. This
has already been discussed in Chapter I. On the other hand,
companies such as Rossing Uranium Ltd. obtained mining rights
after the termination of the mandate. It is stated that
121 See the Labour Party, (1981), Statement by the National
Executive Committee, Namibia, p. 5.
122. See op.cit., Thirion Commission Report (1985), Appendix 7.
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Table VI.2 Prospecting and Mining Rights held by some of the 
Mining Companies in Namibia. 
A Pre-Mandate Termination Mining Rights. 
Deed Date	 Company Description	 Area in
No.	 of Grant	 Ha
Date of 
Commencement
CDM	 Diamond Area 1	 2,829,000	 1/1/1921
Diamond Area 2	 3,066,250	 1954
Exclusive Right to Mine precious stones until the year 2010 (2)
RTZ	 State land,	 Sept 1966
Swakopmund
Propecting Rights (3)
4/47 26/8/47 TCL
	
Bobos, Uris,	 1539
Tsumeb, Tsumeb W.
Guchab, Asis,
Gross Otavi,
Uageib,
Karawatu & Peter
No rental, to mine all base minerals only.
20/60 21/10/60 Imcor	 Okombahe	 21/101960
(Pty)	 Reserve
Ltd.(1)
No rental, to mine all minerals
10/964 8/6/64 Precious Along the Coast 	 15/5/64
Minerals between Unjab
(pty)	 and Ugab
Ltd.	 rivers
12/	 12/5/58 Ind.	 Okorusu -	 1566	 1/1/1958
1958	 Minerals Grootfontein,
Mining	 Outgo, &
Corp (1) Otjwarongo
(pty)Ltd Districts
Exculsive right to mine fluorite until 2008
Notes: 1= Subsidiaries of Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR)
1007 Govt. owned.
2= The extention from 1990 to 2010 was made in 1967
after the termination
of the Mandate.
3= See Alun Roberts, the Roasing File, CANUC p. 63
Source: Thorion Commission Report, (1985), Appendix 7, Windhoek
Advertiser, Nambia, 28 June 1985; I Goldblatt, (1971), History
of South West Africa, Juta and Company Ltd, Cape Town, p.80,
Rossing, (1979), June p. 13, and Alun Roberts, The Rossing
File, CANUC, p.63.
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B Post Mandate Termination Mining Rights 
Deed Date
	
Company	 Description	 Area in
	 Date of
No.	 of Grant	 Ha	 Commencement
30/	 5/6/72	 Oamites	 Farm Oamites 590	 14/2/1970
1970	 Mining	 53 Rehoboth
Co.(pty)	 District
Ltd.
To mine all minerals, rights to endure until minerals have been
exhausted. (1)
39/	 25/11/70 Rossing 	 State Land	 2980	 29/4/1969
1970	 Uranium	 Swakopmund
Ltd
Mining rights to endure until minerals have been exhausted. (2)
27/	 10/4/67 The SWA	 Berg Aukas	 447	 18/5/1967
1967	 Co. Ltd.	 593
34/	 16/7/76	 /I	 Block VI	 45	 2/3/1976
1976	 II	 Farm 596
15/	 10/3/78	 /I	 Kombat Mining 51	 3/8/1977
1978	 II	 Site
26/	 23/7/80	 /I	 Farm Harasib 272	 24/4/1980
1980	 It	 317
Mining rights to endure until minerals have been exhausted. (3)
42/68 29/9/68
	 TCL	 Friedenau No. 509	 6/2/1968
16
31/80	 -	 II	 Otjihase Von 351,3	 15/12/1980
Francois, Ost
60
63/
	 4/1082	 Portions of	 502	 16/7/1982
1982	 Von Francois
West and Ost
& remainder of
Hoffnung 66
Mining rights to endure until minerals have been exhuasted. (4)
26/	 12/10/77 Langer
	 Namib Desert 3750
	
8/8/1977
1977
	
Heinrich Park
To mine all source minerals, mining rights to endure until
minerals have been exhausted. (5)
36/	 2/9/70
	 Imcor	 State Land,
	 205	 8/5/1969
1970	 Zinc	 Luderitz
	
(pty)	 District, part
Ltd.	 of prospecting
Grant M4/4/70
Grant to endure until the minerals which can be profitably
mined have been exhausted. (6)
Notes: 1 to mine all minerals except natural oil, salt, gypsum,
limestone, marble and source material
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2 to mine all minerals except natural oil, salt gypsum
and marble
3 to mine all minerals except natural oil, salt, gypsum,
limestone, marble and source material
4 to mine all minerals except natural oil, salt, gypsum,
limestone, marble and prescribed material
5 to mine all source materials as defined in Act 90/1967
6 to mine all minerals except precious stones and source
material as defined in terms of Act 90 of 1967.
Source: Thirion Commission Report, (1985), Appendix 7.
"Rossing operation is illegal.., the authorization of Rossing
Uranium Ltd. was given by South Africa in 1970, four years
after the United Nations General Assembly had revoked South
Africa's mandate to administer the territory." (123) However,
RTZ obtained what is referred to as "rights to Rossing Uranium
deposit" in July 1966 before the termination of the mandate.
(124) It is not clear whether these "rights" are of prospecting
nature or mining. The official information from the Thirion
Commission seem to support the earlier view that Rossing
obtained a mining grant in 1970. (125) It is possible that
these rights may have been transferred from RTZ to Rossing.
For reasons already discussed above, these mining
concessions are null and void and of no effect in law. The
invalidity of these concessions has been confirmed, albeit
122. See op.cit., Thirion Commission Report (1985), Appendix 7.
123. See United Nations, (1982), Plunder of Namibian Uranium: 
Major Findings of the Hearings on Nambian Uranium Held by the 
United Nations Council for Nambia In July 1980. New York p. 6
124. See Alun Roberts, The Rossin3 File: The Inside Story of 
Britain's Secret Contract for Namibian Uranium, The Campaign
Against the Namibian Uranium Contracts (CANUC) p. 63
125. Op.cit. Thirion Commission Report, Appendix 7.
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implicitly, by the Security Council Res. 301 (1971) which
provides that all "franchises, rights, titles or contracts"
granted to individuals or companies after the termination of
the mandate "are not subject to protection or espousal...
against claims of a future lawful governement of Namibia."
Another Security Council resolution which specifically
discourages companies from obtaining concessions in Namibia
after the termination of the mandate is Res. 283 (1970). In
addition, the United Nations Council for Namibia, established
by the United Nations in 1967 to administer Namibia,
promulgated Decree No. I for the Protection of the Natural
Resources of Namibia. The decree was promulgated in 1974. It
states in part that "No person or entity... may search for,
prospect for, explore for, take, extract, mine, process,
refine, use, sell, export or distribute any natural resource
within Namibia without the consent and permission of the United
Nations Council for Namibia."
It must be noted that being the de lure administering
authority, the UN Council is legally competent to legislate on
matters affecting Namibia. Therefore, insofar as the decree is
part of the domestic law of Namibia, its recognition and
acceptance by a future lawful government of Namibia will be
significant. Its enforcement by a future lawful government of
Namibia against the assets of the companies (or indeed against
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the assets of the companies situated in friendly countries
recognised by the government) will render irrelevant all
current objections regarding the legal status of the decree or
the UN Council for Namibia. It will also render irrelevant all
current procedural difficulties such as recognising the UN
Council for Namibia before the decree can be enforced in
national courts of other countries. Therefore, as soon as
Namibia gains independence and a future lawful government is
recognised by other countries, the full force of the decree
against the assets of the companies will be realised. There is
nothing in law that will prevent a future lawful Namibian
government from enforcing the decree inside Namibia as well as
taking legal action in the courts of friendly countries against
the assets of the companies.
It is important to point out that some of the capital
exporting countries, notably the US, recognise the illegality
of the mining concessions granted to companies by the South
African regime after the termination of the mandate. The US
has taken steps to discourage its nationals and companies from
investing in Namibia. Even before the Security Council Res.
283 (1970) was passed, the US government announced that US
nationals and companies who invest in Namibia after the
adoption of General Assembly Res. 2145 shall not receive
assistance from the government against claims of a future
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lawful government of Namibia. (126) On the other hand, there
are states, notably the UK, which hold the view that companies
may legally operate in Namibia even though they do not accept
South Africa's presence in Namibia as legal. Countries such as
Britain have not unequivocally accepted the ICJ Advisory
Opinion. It was stated by Britain that "the World Court had
delivered an advisory opinion, not a judgment. Its opinion
deserves the highest respect, but it is not binding upon States
and does not absolve governments from making their own
assessments of the complex legal questions involved." (127)
The Labour Government even went to the extent of arguing that
South Africa's presence in Namibia "was not 'illegal' but was
'unlawful' and as the occupation was unlawful, [the Government
did] not accept an obligation to take active measures of
pressure to limit or stop commercial or industrial relations
with the South African administration of Namibia." (128)
126. See Department of State Airgram from American Consul,
Johannesburg, December 23, 1977, Ref Pretoria, A-49, A-52 and
A-56,p.6. See also The Times London,7 October, 1974, p.6, col.
e.
127. See The Times London, 7 October, 1974, p.6, col. f.
128. See Op.cit, The Labour Party, (1981) Statement by the 
National Executive Committee, Namibia, April, p. 3
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The distinction between "illegal" and "unlawful" seem very
strange because in strict legal terms, the distinction does not
exist. Furthermore, Britain does not recognise the UN Council
for Namibia and Decree No. I. The legal consequence of this
state of affairs is that the Decree will face procedural
difficulties if an action is brought against the companies
before the British Courts. The British policy on Namibia is
based on economic considerations. This was confirmed by the
Labour Party National Executive in 1981. It was expressly
stated that the main reason for not supporting UN resolutions
on Namibia was "to protect British business interests involved
with Namibia, especially the Rossing Uranium deal." (129) This
has encouraged RTZ to continue its illegal operations in
Namibia. The company has repeatedly used the UK government
policy on Namibia as a defence for its illegal mining
operations. For instance, in 1983, it stated that successive
British administration (both Labour and Conservative in spite
of Labour's attack on the Conservative Government's policy
towards South Africa) "have refused to accept [the validity of
UN-resolutions] and.., have made it clear that our activities
in relation to Rossing are not illegal." (130)
129. ibid.
130. See RTZ Annual Report and Accounts (1983), p. 7. Emphasis
added.
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It is submitted that not withstanding the attitude of these
States, the legal position is straightforward. All member
States of the UN are obliged to recognize South Africa's
illegal presence in Namibia. They are also obliged to refrain
from acts which might imply recognition of South Africa's
illegal presence. This includes abstaining from, inter alia,
entering into economic relations with South Africa where it
purports to act on behalf of Namibia. (131) Whatever
"assessments" which other States may be entitled to make on the
question of the legality of UN resolutions on Namibia, it does
not affect Namibia's international legal status under
international law. Furthermore, it does not affect the legal
capacity of a future lawful government of Namibia to take
punitive measures against the assets of the mining companies
situated in Namibia as well as in friendly countries. Indeed,
even if one was to adopt the British position that South
Africa's presence is "not" illegal but "unlawful", the obvious
legal consequences are still the same under the general
principle of law. An unlawful administration is not legally
competent to create property rights that can bind a future
lawful government of Namibia.
131. 1971 ICJ Reports, 54-56 
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3.3.3 Legal Consequences for South Africa and the Companies. 
Any discussion on the legal status of the mining
concessions cannot be complete without discussing legal
consequences for South Africa and the mining companies.
Furthermore, it is also important to discuss the remedies open
to a future lawful government of Namibia. In any illegal
situation, the primary and obvious result is that consequences
should follow. Therefore, the illegal conduct of the companies
and the South African regime have rendered other legal
consequences to follow. These are discussed in detail below.
(A) South Africa's Accountabilty. 
Over the years, South Africa has considerably benefited
from the exploitation of Namibia's mineral resources. It has
been stated by Waclaw Klimas that Namibian metal minerals such
as lead, tin, zinc, vanadium and tungsten enormously benefit
South Africa. He goes on to state that "during the 1970s,
Namibian zinc reduced South Africa's dependence on external
sources of supply by more than 80 per cent." (132) In addition
to South Africa's direct plunder of Namibia's mineral
132. See Klimas (1985), "South Africa's Occupation of Namibia:
the Exploitative Policies of South Africa and other Foreign
Economic Interests, " in United Nations, Seminar on the
Activities of Foreign Economic Interests in the Exploitation of 
Namibia's Natural and Human Resources, Ljubljana, Yugoslavia, 
16-20 April 1984 New York p.13
368
resources, the regime introduced "a whole gamut of instruments
ensuring the privileged treatment of the transnational's
economic operations. A tax system has been introduced...
economic operations in Namibia are taxed at a lower rate than 
in South Africa proper; the South African regime has allowed
tax write-offs of capital expenditure, has further permitted
the unrestricted outflow of minerals and exerted no pressure on
the mining corporations to encourage them to process minerals
locally. Furthermore, in keeping with its policy of
exploitation, South Africa has not required transnational
corporations operating in Namibia to reinvest any part of their
huge profits in Namibia itself... Indeed, to the contrary, the
bulk of the profits is regularly repatriated." (133)
Furthermore, the South African regime, through State owned
and associate companies, has indirectly involved itself in the
exploitation of Namibia's mineral resources. State owned
companies such as Iron and Steel Corporation have subsidiary
companies which own and operate a number of mines in Namibia.
Namibian operating subsidiaries such as Uis Mining Company and
the Industrial Mining Corporation of South West Africa (IMCOR)
H
are linked with Iron and Steel Corporation of South Africa
(ISOR)... it is company policy to treat the Namibian mines
merely as sources for minerals and not as a base for any
133. ibid, p.12. Emphasis added.
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industrial investment." (134) The involvement of State mining
companies has important implications in the exploitation of
Namibia's mineral resources. Far from competing with private
mining companies, they provide encouragement and direct risk
reduction in prospecting. It is for this reason that Rossing
came into being as a result of Co-opertation between the
Industrial Development Corporation and RTZ.
It is also important to note that State mining companies
function as instruments of the South African government policy
in relation to the mining industry. The knowledge, skill and
information they acquire as a result of their involvement in
the mining industry help in the formulation of government
policy. It is for these reasons that the functions of the
State corporations are not different from governmental
functions; they hold their assets on behalf of the State; some
of their activities require the approval of the government;
their capital budgets require cabinet approval; and more
generally, they take direction from their shareholder - the
South African government.
134. See Brian bolton (1985) "The Condition of the Namibian
Workers," in Unitied Nations, (1985), Seminar on the Activities
of Foreign Economic Interests in the Exploitation of Namibia's 
Natural and Human Resources, LAubljana, Yugoslavia, 16-20 
April 1984. New York p.33
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The foregoing discussion suggests that South Africa has
undoubtedly benefited at the expense of the indigenous
inhabitants of Namibia. Given this state of affairs, what are
the remedies of a future lawful government of Namibia against
the South African government? South Africa is no longer a de
jure administering authority in Namibia. It follows from this
that it has no legal right to exploit Namibia's mineral
resources, it has no legal capacity to confer a valid title or
right to any person to exploit mineral resources, and it has no
legal right to receive in a form of taxes or dividend any
income resulting from the exploitation of Namibia's mineral
resources. Although some may argue that South Africa is a de
facto administering authority and as such may have a legal
capacity to create a valid title, it must be noted that the
exploitation of the territory's natural resources under an
illegal colonial situation for its exclusive benefit has legal
consequences. Contemporary international law does not
recognise any right whose enforcement or enjoyment constitutes
an impediment to exercise a right of self-determination.
Indeed, the jus cogens status of the right to self-
determination has important legal consequences on economic or
any other rights in international law. Any right which impedes
the right to self-determination is null and void since under
the ills cogens principle of self-determination, it cannot be
legalised either by contract or treaty. Therefore, it is
submitted that the rights of a de facto administration which
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constitutes an impediment to self-determination must be
distinguished from all others.
Furthermore, there are certain marked differences between
South Africa's presence in Namibia and the de facto 
administrations in other countries. The powers of the South
African regime in Namibia originated from the Mandate, which
has been officially terminated. Moreover, all principal organs
of the UN including the ICJ have held that all States are
obliged to recognise South Africa's illegal presence in Namibia
and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of the territory.
Therefore, we submit that under contemporary international law,
such an administration incurs only obligations without, in any
way, creating rights. It is incapable of creating a valid
title which could be claimed by a third party against the
lawful successor government. We may even go further to state
that such a de facto administration does not create nor does it
preserve "acquired rights" which could be claimed from a
successor and legitimate administration or government
especially if the person who claims such rights collaborated
with the illegal administration. Finally, it is important to
note that even during the period of de jure administration,
South Africa was only legally competent to create rights which
could enable it to fulfil its international obligations.
It is against this background that a future lawful Namibian
government will have a right under international law to claim
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reparation from the South African Government for all the taxes
and dividends it has received from the companies after the
termination of the Mandate.
(B) Legal Consequences for Companies Operating in Namibia. 
South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia is a condition
for the mining companies' operations and the extraordinary
profits they reap from the territory. They have also continued
to pay taxes to the South African regime. As a result, this
has enabled South Africa to entrench its occupation. The
companies have also ignored repeated calls from the
international community to cease their mining operations while
a colonial situation continues. Their conduct has lent support
to the South African regime and has implied recognition of
South Africa's presence in Namibia. Their attitude towards the
international community and international law regarding the
international status of Namibia will have profound
consequences. They will be estopped to plead "good faith"
against claims of a future lawful government of Namibia. A
future lawful Namibian government will be entitled to claim
from them all the taxes which they have paid to the South
African regime since the termination of the Mandate. They will
also be liable for all the minerals which they have illegally
removed from Namibia without the permission of a de jure
administering authority, the UN Council for Namibia. the
effectiveness of enforcing these measures against the
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companies' assets after independence has already been
discussed, it will be unnecessary to repeat the discussion
here. Another important point worth noting is that the
companies will not use Decree No. I passed in 1974 as a defence
for minerals removed before this date. The termination of the
Mandate in 1966 has legal consequences independent of Decree
No.I. The termination, according to the general principle of
law or by implication, rendered null and void all transactions
carried out after that date.
Furthermore, it is also important to note that some of the
activities of the mining companies have gone beyond a mere
exploitation of Namibia's natural resources. According to
Brian Wood and to some of the companies' uncovered confidential
documents, notably Rossing, they have established their own
commando forces which closely co-operate and co-ordinate their
activities with South Africa's repressive security forces.
Indeed, it has been asked by the same author that "the question
arises about the liability of those companies operating in
Namibia which have materially supported South Africa's military
campaign... It will be important for a future lawful government
of Namibia to consider the liability of such companies." (135)
This provides a clear example of lending support to South
Africa's criminal acts against the Namibian population contrary
135. See Brian Wood (1984), "The Militarisation of Namibia's
Economy", Review of African Political Economy, no, 29, pp. 138-
143 at 140-143
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to international law.
Finally, the legal capacity of a future lawful government
to expropriate mining concessions has clearly been established
under contemporary international law. We have already noted in
Chapter I that some of the companies acquired mining
concessions confiscated from German mining companies by the
illegal South African regime supposedly for national
"interest"! Indeed, a question may be posed, if South Africa
had a legal capacity to confiscate mining concessions in 1920,
what will prevent a future lawful Namibian government to do the
same in 1988 and beyond given the development of international
law over the years?
4. Conclusion
Under contemporary international law, the strict theory of
acquired rights has lost its meaning. To argue that a
sovereign State can be bound in perpetuity by granting property
right guarantees to a foreign private investor would be futile,
especially under the current State practice. Were there such a
rule, future action consistent with national interest would be
fettered indefinitely. Consistent with State practice, host
States have a right to abrogate, modify, review, nationalise,
or even to require private foreign investors to transfer their
assets to the nationals of the host State in order to effect
indigenisation. The only remedy which private foreign
3?5
investors can hope for is compensation. Furthermore, the host
State is legally entitled to take into account privileges which
private foreign investors enjoyed during the colonial period.
It is no longer a defence that the privileges were granted by a
colonial government.
In the case of Namibia, we submit that international law
does not allow private profit to override the right of the
nation to exercise its right to self determination. The rights
of the Namibian people are internationally protected and should
be respected. It is for these reasons that UN resolutions and
Decree No.1 merely reflect international public opinion,
namely, the presence of the companies in Namibia constitutes an
obstacle to the territory's independence. The transition from
Namibia's present status to full internationally recognised
independence will have a number of major implications for the
current mining concessions held by a number of mining
companies. It is submitted that transfer of title to mineral
rights to the future lawful government will not involve legal
problems like those experienced in most developing countries
during the decolonisation process. Namibia's status is unique
in the sense that all South African legislative measures
purportedly applied to Namibia, including mineral concessions,
are null and void. This will enable a future lawful government
not only with a free hand in reviewing the existing agreements
in the mining sector but also to claim compensation from the
mining companies.
N6
Therefore, the so-called classical international law which
purports to accord protection to a foreign investor whose
property are expropriated by the host state does not extend to
foreign investors in Namibia. The principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources, emanating as it does from
the jus cogens principle of self-determination, is a
fundamental principle of contemporary international law.
Mining companies have largely ignored this principle, indeed,
an expert on Namibia and international law has excellently
stated that since "the termination of the Mandate foreign
economic interests have intensified the exploitation of
Namibia's natural wealth in blatant violation of both the
international legal principle that provided that all States and
peoples have permanent sovereignty over their natural resources
and Decree No.1 of the UN Council for Namibia." (136)
Finally, apart from the notion of a free hand, a future
lawful government of Namibia will be greatly influenced by the
development of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.
This has become an established feature of State practice, and
has been accepted by foreign investors compared with the early
days when such participation was seen as an intrinsic threat to
the security of their investments, and a violation of
international law.
136 See Dr Julio Faundez, International Law and Policy Making
Process: The Case for Compliance (Conference Papers on Namibia,
Oxfam, 11 May, 1987) p.3
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CHAPTER VII - MINING AGREEMENTS AND THE EXPERIENCE
OF OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
INTRODUCTION
Before any comprehensive structural transformation is
undertaken, Namibia should learn from the successes and
failures of other developing countries in general, and of
African countries in particular. Therefore, in this chapter,
we have chosen to discuss the institutional and legal
framework currently prevailing in some selected developing
countries.
As has been noted in Chapter VI, decolonisation was followed
by increasing concern by newly independent states to secure
control over mining operations. This concern is reflected in
the assertion of the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over
natural resources and has led to the development of new types
of legal arrangements. Thus, legal arrangements under which
the government retains ownership of the minerals became an
important objective in the new forms of agreements.
However, it is important to note that experience in some
developing countries shows that despite retaining public
ownership, a government may be divested of effective powers
of control through transferring extensive powers of
management to the mining companies. In such a situation, the
retention of ownership can truly be characterised as
symbolic. A comparative evaluation of mineral agreements,
therefore, must not only focus on provisions dealing with
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ownership, but involve an examination of the provisions which
provide for management and actual control of operations.
While the host government shows an interest in retaining as
large a measure of control over operations as is possible (so
as to be able to maximise benefits to the national economy
from the development of its mineral resources), the foreign
investor seeks to have as much control as possible over
mining operations. Mining companies, thus, want to enjoy the
maximum freedom of action to take decisions in pursuit of
their worldwide corporate objectives. Thus, to evaluate
mineral agreements, they must be regarded as complex
mechanism designed to secure certain interests and
objectives. This chapter examines the general features of
mining agreements between multinational mining companies and
some developing countries. Mining agreements contain
provisions of varying importance and consequence to the
parties. Since modern concessions (mining agreements) are a
significant departure from traditional concessions, their
provisions are more numerous, exacting, lengthy and
complicated. Therefore, it is beyond the scope of this
chapter to attempt to address all the issues and terms
relevant to the mining projects in which multinational mining
companies and host developing countries are involved. An
attempt is made, however, to discuss the issues which could
provide a useful lesson to a future lawful government of
independent Namibia.
In most of the mineral agreements discussed below, ownership
of minerals in the ground is firmly vested in the state.
	
In
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a number of countries, mining legislation and mining
agreements, it is specified that the development and
exploitation of mineral deposits are to be executed by means
of a joint venture in which the state or its agent (e.g.
state-owned enterprise) retains majority equity ownership.
In addition, the state usually has a voice in operations,
either by means of its position on the board of directors in
a joint venture enterprise or by way of the requirement for
prior state approval of project programmes. Furthermore,
financial terms, marketing and export policies and foreign
exchange regulations are expressly stipulated in the
agreements. Finally, the supremacy of national law and
relinquishment terms are usually incorporated in the terms of
the agreement.
2	 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND THE CHOICE OF LEGAL MECHANISMS
Mineral producing countries generally use one of three
different approaches to regulate the mining sector (a) a
general legislation system (b) individually negotiated (ad
hoc) agreements, and (c) hybrid system which consists of
general legislation and individually negotiated agreements.1
Under the general legislation system, legislation fixes in
advance conditions under which rights to prospect for and/or
mine mineral resources may be granted under standard-form
licences or leases; royalty taxes and other payments to be
1 for a general discussion see Roland Brown and
Macbul Rahim, Mining Legislation in Developing Countries 
(Commonwealth Secretariat) p.3
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made are also determined by legislation. The general
legislation system is mostly applicable in developed
countries, e.g., most mining legislation of developed
countries fixes financial provisions within the main
legislation.
	
Some of these countries include Belgium
(corporation tax 48 percent); 2 Denmark (a share of profits 55
per cent); 3
 France: (a) industrial and trading profits tax,
and (b) a fixed royalty "at a low rate on exploitation
rights; 4
 and Netherlands (48 per cent of net income from all
the companies' activities including mining). 5
Under the individually negotiated agreements system, there is
no general system of legislation (this was the case with the
early concessions granted in most African mineral producing
countries during the early days of the colonial period). In
countries where there was legislation, it was of a very
general nature, and it left it to the colonial administration
to grant rights to prospect for and/or mine mineral resources
on the basis of individually negotiated agreements. In most
African Commonwealth countries, the legislation lays down
very broad general principles and leave terms and conditions
2 EEC/University of Lille II Contract, Digest of the
Mining Regulations of the nine Member States of the
European Economic Community (CT XVII/502/78-E, First
interim report, (second year) p.16
3 ibid., p.28
4	 ibid., p.40
5	 ibid., p.63
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on which companies may be employed for mineral development to
be determined by negotiation. 6
Under the hybrid system, general legislation lays down
certain fundamental provisions and stipulates certain minimum
standards and conditions which must be satisfied by
applicants for the grant of the right to prospect for and/or
mine mineral resources but provides for certain important
terms and conditions to be settled by negotiation. Thus, the
Zambian legislation - The Mines and Minerals Act 1969
(Cap.329) - establishes a framework in which private mining
companies may obtain prospecting and mining licences
(Prospecting Licence Sections 16-26; exploration licence
Section 31, and mining licence Sections 44-59). Critical
issues such as the extent of state participation and the rate
of taxation are included in the general legislation. In the
case of joint ventures, management and control of operations
are the only aspects subject to negotiations. The principal
advantage, from the point of view of the state, in adopting a
general legislation system is that the terms - in particular
fiscal terms	 can easily be varied.	 By contrast,
individually negotiated agreements are rigid instruments
which freeze financial terms for a period of time. There is
increasing recognition among mineral producing developing
countries that because these agreements are relatively long
6
see generally Roland Brown and Mike Faber, Some
Policy and Legal issues affecting Mining Legislation and
Agreements in African Commonwealth Countries,
(Commonwealth Secretariat, 1977)
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term, they should incorporate mechanisms to allow for
adjustment of terms.
It must be noted that while private mining companies may
concede that adjustment of terms may be justified in certain
situations (which are marked by significantly changed
conditions), they may be averse to general legislation
regimes, under which the host government retains the power
unilaterally to alter the terms or to increase the financial
burden on them. They generally express a preference for
individually negotiated contracts. Even if stabilisation
clauses are included in the contract, it remains questionable
whether in law such clauses can nullify the impact of
legislation which has the effect of altering the contractual
terms embodied in an agreement.
Another advantage of the general legislation approach is that
it enables general policy objectives to be written into the
legal framework. General legislation can lay down minimum
standards and basic conditions governing rights of
prospecting for and/or mining of mineral resources. For
example, legislation can establish standards and conditions
such as: requiring companies to furnish information on their
financial resources, technical competence, and experience;
local incorporation; a limit on the maximum area of mining
activities; maximum duration of the agreement; relinquishment
requirement; maximum work and minimum expenditure requirement
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during the period of prospecting; 7 submission of information
requirement during each phase of mining operations; and
safety requirements.
The advantages of including the standards and conditions in
the general mining legislation is that it reduces the scope
for bargaining with the private foreign investors. Moreover,
if mining legislation establish a general framework for
mining agreements, foreign investors could not expect
government negotiators to deviate from this framework.
Therefore, the legislation can enable the host State to
establish a standard form of concession that can be used for
all private foreign investor concessionaires in the country.
The trend towards the application of the general mining
legislation may be reinforced as foreign investors in most
developing countries increasingly recognise that ad hoc
arrangements do not provide the long-term guarantee that they
purport to give. In addition, general legislation may, in
practice, give more certainty than ad hoc contracts that
purport to be binding for a long duration but which in
7 e.g., Section 24 of the Zambian Mines and Minerals
Act 1969 provides, among other things, that the holder
of the prospecting licence is required "to expend in
direct expenditure not less than the amount which would
result if a sum of 25 Rwacha per square mile or part
thereof of the prospecting area were expended annually
during the currency of the Licence".
Rule 18 of the General Mineral Rules, in Sierra Leone,
made under the Minerals Act (Cap.196) provides that the
holder of an Exclusive Prospecting Licence for alluvial
minerals shall spend not less than L.100 per square mile
per annum except where the Minister in his absolute
discretion imposes any other obligation whether monetary
or otherwise.
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reality are unilaterally modified as bargaining power shifts
in favour of the state. With most of the terms fixed by law,
participation in ownership becomes the principal vehicle for
the parties to reach an agreement.
Notwithstanding the advantages of the general legislative
system, it does lack flexibility. Thus, a strong case can
be made out in favour of the hybrid system.
The hybrid system sets minimum standards and conditions in
the legislation and thus protects government negotiators from
corruption and also strengthens the government's negotiating
position. The hybrid system can also enable the government
to start off negotiations with private mining companies with
the advantage that the companies must accept the statutory
minimum. This can also enable the government to invite
companies to submit competitive bids offering terms better
than the statutory minimum. Therefore, the combination of
statute and contract under the hybrid system provides a
useful approach for developing countries. The state can
produce a mining code which can set out minimum standards
leaving room for further bargaining defining the details of a
mining project under the contract.
3	 THE EVOLUTION OF MINING AGREEMENTS - TRADITIONAL
CONCESSION AGREEMENTS
The main features of a traditional concession agreement are
that the foreign private investor was the owner of the assets
used in the mining project, and the concessionaire was
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conferred the exclusive right to exploit and market certain
minerals within the concession area. The foreign investor
usually made the necessary equity investment and bore the
risks and costs of exploration, development and exploitation.
The host country shared in the return through royalties and
later taxes. Traditional concession agreements were usually
meant to remain in force for a very long time, generally 90
to 100 years. 8	This was the same pattern in Africa, for
example, 99 years in Sierra Leone, 90 years in Ghana, and 100
years in Swaziland. 9
In most cases of traditional concessions, private foreign
investors were given "plenary rights to extract all minerals
... found in the concession areas... In Zaire, the Union
Miniere virtually had sovereignty over the Copper concession
area. There was no provision for the reversion of any
portion of the concession areas to the native authorities by
way of surrender, The consideration for these exclusive
economic benefits was patently ludicrous. In many cases the
companies paid a nominal rent of say, £150 for a whole
concession, plus one or two bottles of rum". 10 It is clear
that private foreign investors had considerable advantages.
8 see United Nations Centre on Transnational
Corporations, Main Features and Trends in Petroleum and
Mining Agreements (United Nations, New York, 1983) p.62
9 see Samuel K B Asante, Restructuring Transnational
Mineral Agreements (American Journal of International
Law, vol.73, 1979) pp.335-371 at p.338
10
op.cit.,	 Samuel K B Asante,	 Restructuring
Transnational Mineral Agreements, p.339
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A feature common to most of the old concession agreements was
that the tax obligations of the concessionaire were
calculated on the basis of a fixed rate per unit of mineral
output. 11 A number of examples are given by Adede, these
include the Iraqi agreement with Rhanaqin Oil Company in 1926
which fixed the financial obligation of the company at four
gold shillings per ton of net crude oil produced; and the
1949 agreement between Saudi Arabia and Getty Oil which fixed
the financial obligations of the company at US $0.55 per
barrel of oil. Mining agreements in developing countries
followed a similar pattern. For example, the 1945 agreement
between the Government of Liberia and the Liberia Mining
Company Ltd (LMC) fixed the financial obligations of the
company at "five cents per ton on all iron ore that was
stripped" 12
Other weaknesses of the traditional concession agreements
included the following: (a) mining project programmes were
insufficiently detailed, and the mining companies were left
with virtually total discretion with respect to all stages of
mining development such as prospecting, exploration, mining
and marketing; (b) mining agreements did not include
provision for accounting and pricing procedures, these were
left to the mining companies to define in the manner best
suited to their needs; (c) little or no attention was paid to
11 see A.O.Adede, "A Profile of Trends in the State
Contracts for National Resources Development Between
African Countries and Foreign Companies", International
Law and Politics, vol.12: 479, 1980. pp.479-568.
12	 . .ibid.
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the development of forward and backward linkages; (d) the
agreements did not include provisions for renegotiation or
government participation in the mining projects; (e) in most
cases, environmental protection and safety were totally
ignored; (f) the employment and training of local labour,
especially at the technical and managerial levels, were
either ill provided for or were entirely left to the
companies; and (g) the development of infrastructure at
regional (where mining projects were located) and national
level were either ignored or received very insufficient
attention.
Therefore, it is clear that traditional concessions did not
see the mining sector as making a contribution to overall
development. Moreover, income tax generally did not exist or
was negligible.
4	 MODERN CONCESSION AGREEMENTS
After independence, the foreign investment climate in most
developing countries changed dramatically. The major
preoccupation of governments became economic development.
This meant that private foreign investors were required to
adapt themselves in order to be acceptable to the new post
colonial environment. This in turn meant that new terms
between the newly independent states and private foreign
investors had to be worked out. Indeed, as will be discussed
below, private foreign investors have adapted themselves to
the new climate which took place after political independence
in most developing countries. Most developing countries have
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eagerly sought direct foreign investment and collaboration
with multinational companies in spite of the spate of
nationalisations which followed decolonisation in some
countries.
One of the fundamental trends in most developing countries is
the enactment of mining legislation and regulations designed
to govern foreign investments. Most of the provisions are
very comprehensive, and cover such areas as prospecting,
exploration, and exploitation of the host countries' natural
resources. The laws set forth goals that reflect a departure
from former practice (the traditional concession regime) and
provide a legal framework within which developing countries
can negotiate natural resources development contracts with
foreign companies. Therefore, this section attempts to
profile the trends in modern state contracts for mineral
resources development, and highlights the provisions which
distinguish contemporary mineral agreements from the
traditional concession regime. The profile focuses on modern
mineral agreements with particular emphasis on African
countries where this is possible, but in some cases it will
be necessary to provide examples from the petroleum industry
and other countries outside Africa.
It is submitted that the interest of developing countries in
mineral resources is expressed in different policies in
regard to minerals development. As will be seen below, some
governments have adopted a policy of close control of mineral
resources, treating them as public utilities, while others
have limited themselves to policies that encourage and
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promote the development of the mineral sector through private
initiative, while others again have adopted both types of
development policies. In both cases, host governments have
tried to pursue mineral policy objectives that pursue optimum
benefits to their countries from present and future use of
minerals. It is also submitted that optimisation entails
economic, political and social factors.
The objectives reflected in various modern mineral agreements
include the following: (1) rapid and thorough prospecting;
(2) production at rates and using methods which ensure
maximum ultimate recovery; (3) to pursue best pricing and
marketing opportunities; (4) to develop a viable and
diversified mineral sector; (5) to encourage mineral
processing; (6) to ensure national self-determination in
mineral development; (7) to create employment; (8) to promote
backward and forward linkages; (9) to improve a minerals
conservation policy; (10) to strengthen the contribution of
minerals to regional and national development; (11) to take
into consideration the environmental and social impact of
minerals development; and (12) to transfer technical and
managerial skills to the nationals of the host country.
4.1 Structure and forms of Participation Agreements
There is a wide range of approaches adopted by host
developing countries. At one extreme, there are countries
where the State is still essentially a passive tax collector.
In the middle are the countries where the State essentially
becomes a partner with private foreign companies. 	 Finally,
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at the other extreme, the host government bears all the risk
of prospecting and production. Once minerals are discovered
in commercial quantities, the private foreign company is
hired to perform certain tasks on behalf of the host
government through service contract. Under this arrangement,
the state retains full control over the mineral resources.
There are three main types of mineral development agreements:
equity joint ventures, service contracts, and production
sharing agreements
4.1.1	 Equity Joint Ventures
The term joint ventures includes a variety of forms of
cooperation in which the state and the mining companies
undertake joint participation at any stage of the mining
process (e.g. prospecting, production, processing and
marketing). This type of arrangement may be classified into
several main categories, not mutually exclusive; particular
agreements frequently are a blend of several of these.
	 The
simplest form encountered is the formation of an association
between a private foreign mining company and the state. In
countries which use this system, the acceptance of the joint
venture principle by the private mining companies has become
a precondition for their continuing operation in the mining
industry.
A basic objective of state equity participation is to
increase the host country's share of the earnings in the
industry. By becoming a partner, the state normally receives
in addition to royalties and taxes, a share in the dividends
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in accordance with normal business practice. In addition,
there are a number of other important reasons why most
developing mineral producing countries require state equity
participation. These include: (1) to give the governments
through their state companies (where these exist) a voice in
the policy decisions of the operating mining companies, and
to exercise more control over their mining industry; (2) the
long-term implication of state equity participation is to
develop technical an managerial skills in the mining industry
in order to enable the host governments to be in a strong
position when the concession agreement expires or when they
decide (in future) to go it alone (i.e. to operate the mining
industry without the participation of the private foreign
investors;) and (3) State equity participation enables the
host governments to direct the utilisation of the mineral
resources and to frame short-term and long-term policies for
the future viability of domestic industry.
It is for these reasons that equity participation is seen not
only as a means of achieving economic development, but also
as a device designed to overcome obstacles to sovereign
aspirations. In most cases, the ownership of mineral
resources is vested in the state. The state, therefore,
usually establishes an association with the foreign private
investor (usually a multinational mining company). There are
several ways of implementing state equity participation or a
joint venture. The most attractive is for the legislation to
reserve to the government a minimum percentage of equity
shares on terms fixed by the government.
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This approach has been adopted by Zambia and a number of
other African mineral producing countries. Section 20 of the
Mines and Minerals Act of 1969 states that the granting of a
prospecting licence is made dependent on the private foreign
investor applicant agreeing to the condition of government
participation as soon as the mining phase is reached (the
current minimum is 51 per cent of the total equity). This
condition should expressly be included in the prospecting
licence at the time of issue. The relevant part of the
section reads as follows: "An applicant for a prospecting
licence may be granted subject to conditions, including, in
particular (a) a condition requiring the applicant to agree
to the Republic or any person nominated on behalf of the
Republic, having an option to acquire an interest in any
mining venture which might be carried on by the applicant or
by any person to whom he transfers his mining right, in the
proposed prospecting area". The same condition is imposed in
respect of an exploitation licence. 13
As a result of the 1969 Mines and Minerals Act, the ownership
and structure of the Zambian mining industry dramatically
changed. All the large mining companies in Zambia developed
from concessions granted in 1922 to two mining houses - the
Anglo American Corporation and Roan Selection Trust. These
companies controlled the copper mining industry until 1970
when the Zambian Government took 51 per cent interest in
them. This reflected sections 20, 31(a) and 46(1)(b) of the
13	
see S.31(a)
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Act which require state equity participation. As part of the
widespread restructuring which subsequently took place, two
new companies were formed, Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines
Ltd (NCCM) and Roan Consolidated Mines Ltd (RCM),
amalgamating the companies which had constituted the original
AAC and RST groups. The minority shareholding in NCCM was
held by Zambia Copper Investments Ltd, a company administered
by the Anglo American Corporation while the minority
shareholding in RCM was divided between American Metal Climax
Inc (Amax), Zambia Copper Investments Ltd and the public.14
In March 1982, the two copper mining companies were merged to
form a single new company, Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines
Ltd (ZCCM), the merger being made effective retro-actively to
1 April 1981. In 1982, all "the 'A' ordinary shares,
amounting to 60.28 per cent of the issued share capital of
the Company" were held by the State owned Zambia Industrial
and Mining Corporation Ltd (Zimco). 15
Botswana has adopted a different system. Before a mining
licence can be issued to the holder of a prospecting or
exploration licence, the holder must issue to the government
a certain percentage of all equity stock free of charge.
This is designed to maximise the net inflow of resources
14 for a detailed discussion, see generally M.L.O.
Faber and J.G. Potter, Towards Economic Independence, 
Papers on the Nationalisation of the Copper Industry in
Zambia, (Cambridge University Press, 1971)
15
see Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd 1982
Annual Report, pages 5 and 24
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resulting from mining operations. It is expressly stated
that "Government equity participation in mining projects is
now established policy and while the exact level may vary
from case to case the appropriate level is considered to be
in the range of 15 to 25 per cent with the shares granted to
Government without financial charge. Such equity
participation represents payment for the provision of
national infrastructure and geological information". 16
Another example of a joint venture is to be found in the
agreement between the Sierra Leone Government and the Sierra
Leone Ore and Metal Company Ltd (SIEROMCO), a subsidiary of
Schweizerische Aluminium AG (Alusuisse). In 1972, the
Government granted SIEROMCO exclusive rights to prospect for
bauxite. 17 By 1977, the company proved the existence of 100
million tons of bauxite. As a result of the discovery, the
Government and Alusuisse formed a joint venture company
called Sierra Leone Bauxite Mining Company Ltd to develop and
exploit the bauxite with each party holding 50 per cent of
the share capital. In return for the joint venture company
to assume SIEROMCO "responsibilities and privileges, ... the
company was to issue new shares to Alusuisse in an amount
equal to the costs incurred by SIEROMCO with respect to its
prospecting of the deposits. A like number of shares was to
16
see Republic of Botswana National Development Plan
1985-91, December 1985 (Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning, government Printer, Gaborone)
p.229
17 see op.cit. UN Centre on Transnational
Corporations, Main Features and Trends in Petroleum and
Mining Agreements, p.83
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be issued to the Government in return for which it would pay
the company their full nominal value in cash". 18
The general policy decisions of the joint venture company was
to be made by the Board of Directors comprised of six
members, three from the Government's side and three from the
private partner's side. In addition, the private foreign
partner (Alusuisse) was to manage the company during the
construction stage of the mining project "for an initial
period of 10 years after production day", and automatic three
year extensions were to be granted, "unless either party
gives one year's prior notice". The private foreign partner
was granted the following advantages, among others: "(a) Full
reimbursement for all Alusuisse employees working in Sierra
Leone, including direct and indirect costs; (b) For its
technical know-how granted in the construction phase and the
performance of duties as engineer, a fixed annual fee of 10
per cent of the actual total investment costs of the company,
plus 10 per cent of the total investment costs of any
expansion; (c) For its know-how and technical assistance in
operations and its services as the managing partner, a fixed
fee of 2.5 per cent per annum of the net invoice amount of
all sales made by the company under the terms of Alusuisse
management" 19
18	 ibid.
19	 ibid., p.84
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Finally, another example of a joint venture involving the
host state and the private foreign investor is that between
Chile and Noranda Mines Ltd entered into in 1977. As a
result, a partnership was established consisting of Empressa
Nacional de Mineria, representing the state, and Noranda.
The share ownership in the
	 partnership is as follows: the
state represented
cent) and	 Noranda
by Empressa
	 Nacional de
(51	 per cent). 20 The
Mineria
purpose
(49
of
per
the
partnership was "to effect the programme for the exploration,
development and exploitation" of the Andacollo copper
deposit.
The investment by the private foreign investor (Noranda) was
to include the following: "(a) Freely-convertible foreign
currency; (b) Capital goods and spare parts needed for
exploration, development and plant and infrastructural
construction, including electric power facilities,
transportation, housing, and educational and public service
facilities ...; (c) Feasibility and technical
	 studies;
(d) Services rendered by Noranda to the partnership and
services provided by Noranda prior to the agreement...". 21
Finally, Noranda and the partnership are granted the right to
market their copper products "directly or indirectly",
however, indirect sales require the approval of the Chilean
Copper Commission and should be consistent with the general
20	 ibid., p.120
21	 ibid.
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guidelines established by the Commission. The guidelines are
designed to ensure that copper sales are "'effected at
international market prices, such as those established by the
London Metals Market and the US producers prices'". 22
It is interesting to note that equity joint venture between
the state and the private foreign investor is also receiving
increased recognition in socialist countries. Jan Zoubek
stated in 1975 that "(it) may be reliably estimated that
there are over 1000 co-operation agreements presently in
force between eastern and western companies". 23 Although it
is reported that the first agreement was concluded in 1964,
the breakthrough came in 1971 when Rumania legislated in
favour of the establishment of joint ventures. The main aims
of establishing joint ventures are that "the joint venture is
the best guarantee for obtaining advanced technology, western
manufacturing and marketing experience, managerial know-how
and, in particular, easy and long-term access to competitive
western markets at low personnel and monetary cost .. . , . 24
The view expressed above is reflected in the Bulgarian Edict
No.535 of 25 March 1980 Concerning Economic Collaboration
between Bulgarian Juridical Persons and Foreign Juridical and
22	
•ibid., p.104
23 see Jan Zoubek, Joint Ventures in East Eur222,
(Journal of World Trade Law, vol.9, 1975) pp.472-442, at
p.427
24 ibid., p.429
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Physical Persons. 25 Section 3 reads as follows:
	 "The
economic collaboration shall be realised through agreements
for industrial cooperation and for the creation of
associations. These agreements shall be concluded under
conditions that would raise the scientific-technical level of
production, its effectiveness and the quality of production,
broaden the possibilities for export, increase the positive
foreign currency result, and more fully satisfy the needs of
the national economy". It is clear that the concept of joint
venture between socialist countries and multinational
companies or private capital represents a revolutionary
process in the sense that the idea of mixed ownership may not
correspond to the concept of the socialist ownership.
However, it is submitted that this economic liberalisation
and restructuring of decision-making and priorities does not
affect the substantive concept of a socialist society.
4.1.2	 Production-sharing agreements (contracts) 
The production-sharing contract arrangement is a fairly new
concept compared with other forms of economic development
agreements. It is reported that the concept was pioneered by
Indonesia in 1967 as a result of Law No.44 of 1960 "which
stipulated that contracts entered into by the State with
foreign companies should provide for production-sharing
25	 for details see 19 International Legal Materials
(1980) p.992
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arrangements". 26 It is also reported that the first
production-sharing contract was signed in 1960 between
Pertamina (a state company) and Kobayashi (a Japanese
consortium which showed some interest in a liquified
petroleum gas project.)27
The production-sharing contract formula was later adopted by
a number of countries, especially developing countries, and
it is now widely used in the petroleum industry. It is
reported that "production-sharing has been adopted in
countries as diverse as Egypt, Chile, the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, Nigeria, Angola and India". 28
The form and substance of production-sharing contracts vary
considerably according to the particular natural resource and
the circumstances surrounding its development. The essential
features of production-sharing contracts (with some
variations) are: (a) the private foreign contractor bears the
risk of prospecting and exploration, if there is no
commercial discovery of minerals, he bears the loss. In the
event of a commercial discovery, the contract normally
provides that he is entitled to be reimbursed out of a
percentage of the minerals produced, and he is also entitled
to share in the remainder of the minerals. (2) The private
26
op.cit., UN Centre on Transnational Corporations,
Main Features and Trends in Petroleum and Mining
Agreements, p.8
27	 ibid.
28 ibid.
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foreign investor, acting as a general contractor, undertakes
to provide all financial and technical assistance required
for the mining project. (3) It is usually the case that the
private foreign investor is entrusted with responsibility for
the management of the operations once the production stage is
reached although, in most cases, the state retains the power
to determine the overall policy of the enterprise. (4) Cost
recovery by the private foreign investor of all exploration,
development and production costs is taken from the 40 per
cent (in the case of Indonesia) of the natural resource
produced. If the expenses exceed the stipulated 40 per cent,
any recoverable excess is to be regained in succeeding
years. 29
 (5) In the case of Indonesia, title to the private
foreign investor's share of the production passes at the
point of export.
It is important to note that although the operational
responsibility is entrusted to the private foreign investor,
the management responsibility (in the case of Indonesia) is
conferred to the State company. This is a marked departure
from the service contracts or management contracts where the
private foreign investor is entrusted with the management of
the enterprise. The practical importance of the Indonesian
provision, however, is diminished by the fact that the
private foreign investor is designated as the exclusive
operator of the project. The important question to be asked
29 for a detailed formula of this arrangement, see
particularly Table I Comparison of the Pertamina/Agip
contract and the Pertamina/Conoco contract, ibid. p.10
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is whether the contractual arrangement assures the host
government effective control over the operations of the
project. The most significant aspect of the Indonesian
arrangement is the fact that the host government plays a more
significant role in all aspects of the operation.
The provision which stipulates that title to the private
foreign investor's share of the production passes at the
point of export can present anomalies. There may be legal
problems where the private foreign investor decides to sell
some of his share within the domestic market. It could also
present considerable problems in the area of taxation, it is
questionable in law whether the private foreign investor can
claim depletion allowance in a case where he does not own the
resources as long as they are still located in the host
state.
As has been already noted above, the production-sharing
contract formula has spread from petroleum to the mineral
industry. Two examples will suffice. In Africa, Niger has
adopted the production-sharing contract arrangement in the
exploitation of its uranium industry. In April 1974, the
Government of the Niger in association with the Commissariat
a l'Energie Atomique (CEA) and the Continental Oil Company of
the Niger (Conoco) entered into the agreement with the aim of
developing a joint venture for the exploration, exploitation,
processing and marketing of uranium. 30
30	 ibid., p.106
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The other example of production-sharing contract is that
between the Colombian Government and the International
Colombia Resources Corporation. 31
 The Government's share in
the contract is held by Carbones de Colombia, S.A.
(Carbocol), and the other share is held by the International
Colombia Resources Corporation (Intercor), a subsidiary of
the Excon Corporation. The agreement provides for the
creation of a 50/50 joint venture between the parties for the
purpose of exploration, development and exploitation of coal.
All exploration expenses and risks are to be born by the
private foreign investor partner, Intercor. Once the private
foreign investor establishes a commercial deposit, ownership
of all operations is to be assigned to the joint account
established by the equal interests of Intercor and Carbocol.
The parties are free to dispose of their shares in production
by separate sales contracts "in accordance with the needs of
the customer and of the reserves of the field".
Production-sharing contracts offer certain advantages to the
host state. They do not involve complex issues such as the
determination of income for tax purposes. They also minimise
transfer pricing. The determination of profit-sharing
arrangements removes a potential source of conflict between
the host government and private foreign investors, especially
over such matters as the determination of profit, computation
of tax and interaffiliate transactions involving transfer
pricing.	 In contrast with a joint-venture arrangement,
31	 ibid., p.110
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production-sharing involves arrangements whereby private
foreign investors and host governments share the output of
the operation in predetermined proportions. The advantages
of predetermined proportions are that the sharing ratio is
agreed before the commencement of production. This enables
the host State to take measures to minimise transfer pricing.
For instance, it can devise the sharing in such a way that
the proportion held by the private foreign investor can
represent net of taxes. This will prevent the private
foreign investor under-pricing his share of production
through sales to affiliates before the computation of taxes.
Furthermore, the host State can protect its share by
marketing it independently of the private foreign investor
(through a state marketing company for instance) to avoid
under-pricing through inter-affiliate sales. Indeed, the
host State can even take a small proportion of its share and
market it independently as a means of providing a check
against transfer-pricing by the private foreign investor
partner. In addition, independent sales by the host State
will provide an indication as to the approximate value of the
other portion set aside for the recovery of costs. This
seems to be the experience in Indonesia where private foreign
investors are permitted to recover their costs out of the
proceeds of a specified percentage usually 40 per cent. The
balance is then split in the ratio of 15:85 basis in favour
of the State. 32 What is more significant is the fact that
32See UN Dept. of Technical Co-operation for Dev.,
(Footnote Continued)
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the share held by the private foreign investor is "considered
to be net of taxes, and no further royalties or taxes [are]
imposed. To protect Pertamina against sales by the
contractor to affiliates at less-than-world-market prices,
there [are] provisions allowing Pertamina to take its 
• • •
share in kind and to determine a fair market value for that
portion of the petroleum which [is] set aside for the
recovery of costs." 33
In addition, another important aspect which may minimise
transfer pricing is the fact that the State company
(Pertamina) is made responsible for the 'management of the
operations' while the private foreign investor is responsible
for the 'execution of the operations. ,34
 The advantages of
this arrangement are that by virtue of its formal management
powers, the host State can insist on close supervision and
inspection of documents, reports, and other data than would
otherwise be under the usual reporting requirements in other
types of agreements.
4.1.3
	 Service Contracts
A service contract is an agreement concluded between the
state (or its agent) and the private foreign investor for the
purpose of carrying out prospecting, exploration, production
(Footnote Continued)
(1980), The Nickel Industry and the Developing Countries,
N.Y. p.84.
33. .ibid.
34 ibid. p.83.
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and marketing of the natural resource by the private foreign
investor under the close supervision and control by the host
state. Asante states that there are four main features of
the service contract namely: "(1) The state does not risk or
invest capital in the operation, and the area is entirely the
responsibility of the contractor. (2) The [natural resource]
and the reserves remain at all times the property of [the
host state] which does not renounce its sovereign rights, a
situation that is not affected by the payment in kind the
contractor receives if he is successful. (3) The State is
associated with the success from the first day on which it
occurs.
	 (4)	 The agreement	 is simple,	 clear	 and
straightforward to administer, and thus reduces supervisory
and administrative mechanisms to a minimum". 35
It is reported that in the petroleum industry, the service
contract concept was pioneered by the Government of Venezuela
when it entered into a service contract with Mobil in 1962. 36
This was later followed by other countries such as the
Islamic Republic of Iran in 1966 when a service contract was
entered into between Erap and Nioc, and the 1968 service
contract between Inoc and Iraq. 37
35 Op.cit.,	 Samuel	 K.B.Asante,
Transnational Mineral Agreements, p.361
36
op.cit., UN Centre on Transnational
Main Features and Trends in Petroleum
Agreements, p.9
37	 ibid.
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The terms of the 1968 service contract between Corpoven SA
(formerly Corpoacion Venezolana de Petroles (CVP)) provided
the following conditions among others: "(a) The contractor
should advance all funds for exploration, development and
exploitation, with reimbursement only upon start of
commercial production; (b) The contractor should receive up
to 90 per cent of production from CVP in order to recover its
investment, earn a profit and pay tax on net income, that is,
the difference between the international market price and the
cost. The market price would be agreed to jointly by CVP and
the contractor; (c) The exploitation period should be 20
years, with an exploration period of 3 years; (d) CVP should
participate in all development and exploitation programmes
through committees comprised equally of representatives of
both CVP and the contractors; (d) CVP retained the right to
acquire equity interest in the event of commercial discovery
on terms to be agreed". 38
In the mineral industry, a notable example of the service
contract is that between Sudan, represented by Ingessana
Hills Corporation and the Marubeni Corporation, entered into
in 1975. The agreement was for the "exploration, development
and production of chrome ore deposits". 39 It was also agreed
by the parties that Marubeni was periodically to send
geologists and mining engineers to the chrome mine owned by
Ingessana Hills Mines Corporation (IHM). The duty of the
38	 ibid., pp.9-11
39	 ibid, p.109
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experts is to provide "general technical advice and proposals
with respect to: (a) Effective and safe mining operations;
(b) Exploration and development of new deposits; (c) Quality
control of chrome ore; (d) Technical training of mining
engineers". The contract also provided that Marubeni was to
purchase between 15,000 and 25,000 tons of chrome ore "during
the period of July 1975 to June 1980".
It is also reported that India entered into a service
contract with the Soviet Tsvetmetpromexport, a Soviet
company. 40
 The actual contract was between Balco, an Indian
state-owned company and a Soviet company to build an
aluminium complex. The Soviet company was to perform the
following task: (a) to construct and provide technical
management of a mine; and (b) to construct a processing plant
in exchange for the annual delivery of 300,000 tons of
alumina. 41
As we have already noted above, service contracts are
essentially variants of production-sharing contracts except
in one important respect: the state remains at all times the
sole owner of the natural resource.
40
see Erick Schanze et al., Mining Ventures in
Developing	 Countries,
	 (Kluver-Deventer
	
-	 The
Netherlands, 1981) p.31
41	 ibid.
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5	 THE RELEVANCE OF MODERN CONCESSIONS TO NAMIBIA
It has been discussed above that the trend in most mineral
producing developing countries is towards new forms of
arrangements with multinational mining companies. These
arrangements have been influenced by a number of factors. On
the one hand, nationalism has forced many developing
countries to acquire (voluntarily or coercively) controlling
interests in established foreign companies or minority
interests in such companies. The objective is to secure
effective national participation and control in respect of
the activities of private foreign investors with regard to
both their existing operations and new investment
propositions. Furthermore, modern concession agreements
reflect developing countries' desire to promote mining
industries which tap technologies, local patterns of skills,
and to promote mining industries which will develop
technological and entrepreneurial skills. On the other hand,
modern mining concessions have been utilised as vehicles for
attracting and retaining foreign direct investment.
It is obvious from our discussion in the preceding chapters
that Namibia, like other developing countries, lacks the
technological component for mining projects, managerial
skills and access to markets. All these factors are likely
to force a future lawful Namibian government to depend upon
foreign sources for these inputs. This will in turn force
the government to utilise all or some of the modern
concessions discussed in section 4 above. What follows is a
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discussion of how Namibia could benefit from the utilisation
of modern concessions. Before we discuss this in detail, we
would like to state in no uncertain terms that the decision
lies with the future lawful government of Namibia. The
government will have a right to decide the future of the
mining industry without, in any way, limiting its options to
what has been discussed in this section. The options open to
the future lawful government in deciding the regulatory
framework of the mining industry will be dictated by the
circumstances prevailing at the time of independence. The
materials in this section examine the experience of Sierra
Leone, Botswana and Papua New Guinea in their relations with
private foreign investors. Its object is to explain the
relevance of this experience to the future government of
Namibia.
5.1 Management and Service Contract Options
Factors which are likely to influence the future lawful
Namibian government to enter into management and service
contracts, on the basis of new arrangements, would include
the following: (1) the government, for ideological reasons,
may prefer public ownership over foreign ownership, even if
that ownership is not accompanied by control over operational
activities; (2) sufficient local technical and managerial
skills at the time of independence will not be available to
operate the mines; and (3) the mining industry is regarded as
the backbone of Namibia's economy and as such, as a valuable
socio-economic cost benefit regardless of the nationality of
the managers.
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Management and service contracts could be utilised by the
future lawful government, at least during the early days of
independence, in all of Namibia's minerals. The success or
failure of these contracts will depend on a number of issues.
The willingness of private foreign investors to assume the
role of "manager" as opposed to "owner" or "co-owner" will be
one of these factors. However, as we have seen in section 4
above, the management contract arrangement has become one of
the means by which private foreign investors establish a
presence in some developing countries. Today, management and
service contracts provide a framework within which
fundamental interests of both private foreign investors and
host developing countries can be reconciled. For Namibia, as
in other developing countries, one of the main objectives of
management and service contracts is to pass on technical
expertise to Namibian nationals so that, over time, they will
be in a position to run mining projects. Once this is
achieved, the role of the private foreign investor will
diminish.
The success or failure of management and service contracts
will be determined partly by the extent to which Namibian
managerial and technical capability improves. The efficacy
of these management and service contracts can best be
achieved by setting deadlines by which a certain number of
Namibians should replace the expatriate staff. In addition,
the contracts may provide that the government is periodically
allowed to monitor the progress made towards such a
replacement. To this end, the approach taken by Indonesia
could prove useful. The agreement between the Government of
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Indonesia and Rio Tinto Indonesia, illustrated in Table
VII:1, indicates the minimum targets for the employment of
local personnel by job classification within the first three,
five and eight years of the operating phase.
Table VII:1
	 Training of Personnel
5 years %
	 8
years %
3 years %
Unskilled Labour 100 100 100
Skilled Labour 75 75 100
Clerical 75 90 100
Technical and Supervisory 50 75 85
Managerial and Professional 50 75 85
Source: United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations,
(1983), Main Features and Trends in Petroleum and Mining
Agreements, New York, p. 121.
During the implementation stage of management and service
contracts, conflicts of interest between private foreign
managers and the government may arise. This is mainly
because training of local personnel often conflicts with the
profit imperative of the multinational companies. In a
situation where the mining project plays a strategic part of
the multinational company's global operations, it may be
possible that frequently, less emphasis may be given to
training local personnel as compared with meeting production
targets and deadlines which would contribute to its global
operational goals.	 Therefore, managers' failure to meet
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their training obligations in a timely manner would be the
result of their reluctance to make the ultimate transfer of
authority to the Namibian nationals, the importance they
would attach to their profit motive, or other interests that
are likely to influence foreign managers. Some of these
potential conflicts could be minimised by requiring
contractors to submit general development and operating plans
for approval by the board, on which the government would be
represented. The items subject to approval should include
capital investment, production volumes, employment levels and
similar major aspects of the mining operations. The
contracts should also set a range of issues where government
approval would specifically be required. The inclusion of
these aspects in the contracts would ensure that the
government has a voice in the day-to-day operations of mining
enterprises. However, it is important that a realistic
assessment should be made of the length of time required to
complete the transfer of management to local personnel
because a short period may not necessarily be the best.
5.2 Joint Ventures and Production Sharing Options
State ownership of mineral resources by the future lawful
government is a political decision which may have several
advantages. It will enable the government effectively to
harmonise the activities of private foreign investors with
broader economic development goals. This will necessitate a
detailed framework of policies covering a wide range of
issues including the type and nature of foreign participation
in the mining industry. Therefore, it is submitted that the
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future lawful Namibian government may consider joint ventures
and production sharing contracts as useful mechanisms,
especially to the uranium and diamond industries. The major
factor which the future lawful government would take into
account is that offering minority equity participation (or a
proportion of mineral production in the case of production
sharing contract) may be a means of ensuring that the
companies will fulfil their obligations in the construction,
operation, and maintenance of facilities.
Where direct foreign investment in the form of equity
participation and production sharing would be permitted, the
government should formulate indicative guidelines regarding
levels of direct foreign investment. However, the ultimate
objective (long-term objective) should be increased domestic
participation over a period of time. If equity joint
ventures and production sharing are to be preferred by the
government, the most attractive method (especially in new
projects) is that which is applicable in Papua New Guinea.
The practice in Papua New Guinea is to acquire equity by way
of "carried interest". Under this system, the government
reserves the right, either in the general legislation or
concession, "to participate in the exploitation of a deposit
in the event of a commercial discovery. Only if it does
participate does the Government have to meet its
proportionate share of the exploration and development costs,
and these costs can initially be met by the mining company,
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while the Government repays the company out of the income
generated by future production. ,42
Insofar as Papua New Guinea's approach applies to new
projects, it seems to offer considerable advantages to the
government in that it allows a decision on participation to
be deferred (during the exploration phase) until the
commercial value of the mining project has been established.
This avoids the risk to the government because it does not
become involved in unsuccessful prospecting activities.
However, it would still be necessary for the government to
specify at the outset the maximum private investor
participation level in order to enable private foreign
investors to know the terms and conditions that could apply
in the case of a significant commercial discovery. In the
case of diamonds, equity joint venture would be most
appropriate given the complex structure of the industry
internationally. It will need specialised skills which the
government, at the time of independence, would not possess,
especially the complex marketing aspect. The same goes with
uranium as it also involves a highly complex operation right
from the mining phase to marketing. As long as the
government is in a position to effectively regulate and
control the uses of uranium by consumers in order to meet its
international obligations, a joint venture arrangement seems
to be the most appropriate.
42See United Nations Department of Technical Co-operation
for Development, (1980), The Nickel Industry and the Developing
Countries, New York, p.76.
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With regard to the production sharing option, it is submitted
that it would be more appropriate in the petroleum industry
(should Namibia ever become a major producer). The
appropriateness of the production sharing contract to the
petroleum industry stems from the fact that it is relatively
easy for the government to take its share in kind and dispose
of it on the open market.
	 If the production sharing
arrangement is applied to non-fuel minerals, the marketing of
many minerals independent of the private
	
foreign
investor-partner may not prove so easy.
	 In the case of
diamonds, this may prove particularly difficult due to
vertical integration of the industry. However, with the
establishment of a mineral marketing company, the production
sharing contract option would become a more realistic
possibility. Indeed, the Government of the Niger has
concluded a production-sharing contract with the French
Atomic Energy Agency for a uranium development project. 43
5.3 Bargaining Strength and Weaknesses of the Parties
The success or failure of the possible arrangements discussed
above will depend on a number of factors such as the
political environment and the bargaining strength and
weaknesses of the parties (see Appendix VIII:1). In any
bargaining situation, all the parties have points of weakness
and strength. The strength indicates the ways and means
435ee United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations,
(1983) Main Features and Trend in the Petroleum and Mineral 
Industry, p.
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which, during the bargaining process, permit the party to
gain more concessions from the other. The most effective way
of evaluating the success or benefits of the parties from the
mining project is to assess their bargaining strength and
weaknesses. Private foreign investors have skills,
experience, access to markets, and finance that Namibia will
need to develop its mineral resources. The future lawful
government of Namibia will possess mineral resources, will
have control over taxation that could be devised in such a
way as to produce an attractive opportunity to private
foreign investors. In a situation where the mining industry
is established (as is the case in Namibia), the government
can easily attract as many competitors as possible. The
presence of competitors can enable the government to extract
more concessions from locally established private foreign
investors.
It is clear that there is room for negotiation between the
government and private foreign investors. During the initial
period, private investors usually are in a stronger position
than the host government. The investor may have an asset
which only few other competitors can supply at a similar
price. In most cases, the private foreign investor will set
conditions before making an investment which the host State
will be forced to accept. But once the investment is made
and if it turns out to be more profitable than anticipated,
the host country's bargaining position (knowing that the
investment is sunk) improves. How is the bargaining process
likely to affect the relationship between the future lawful
417
government of Namibia and private investors? This is
examined in detail below with examples from other countries.
5.3.1 The bargaining position of the companies
It is submitted that there are a number of factors that will
favour private foreign investors in the bargaining process.
These include alternative sources of minerals; possibility of
substitution; market power; cooperation with competitors;
lack of qualified and experienced Namibians; monopoly of
mining, processing and marketing; specialisation and
technology. With regard to base metals such as copper, the
government is likely to be vulnerable because the industry is
diffused and faces a serious threat from substitutes such as
aluminium and plastics. 44 This situation is likely to force
the future government to offer more attractive conditions to
induce private foreign investors to invest in the copper
industry. With regard to the uranium industry, the picture
is perhaps even worse for the future government due to the
fact that the industry is firmly controlled by developed
countries. For instance in 1980, developed countries
accounted for about 80 per cent "of non-socialist uranium
production". 45
 During the same period, "74 per cent of
44For a detailed general discussion on substitutes see
general United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations,
(1981), Transnational Corporations in the Copper Industry, New
York, and Moran H. Theodore, (1974) Multinational Corporations
and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile, Princeton
University Press, New Jersey.
45See United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations,
(1983), Transnational Corporations and Contractual Relations in
the World Uranium Industry: A Technical Paper, New York, p.60.
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proven reserves and 87 per cent of estimated additional
resources [were] held by the developed countries." 46 The
consequence of this state of affairs is that "the bargaining
position of the developing countries in the uranium market
remains weak." 47 This situation is further complicated by
popular opposition to the use of nuclear power as a source of
energy. All these factors seem to favour private foreign
investors in the bargaining process.
As for the diamond industry, the future lawful government of
Namibia may be forced to make a deal with a specialised
private foreign investor. If De Beers' claim is true, "De
Beers Marine [is] the only company to have developed the
technology and equipment to prospect at depths of over 100
metres" under the sea. 48 Given the fact that there has been
a trend towards diamond mining from the sea in Namibia, it
will require highly specialised technical skills which the
future lawful government will not possess. In addition, the
diamond industry, monopolised by De Beers, is one of the most
vertically integrated in the world. Therefore, all these
factors would make it difficult (although not necessarily
impossible) for the future lawful government to operate the
diamond industry independent of the existing channels.
Indeed, it has been stated by Lanning that "manufacturers of
synthetic diamonds, the diggers in the West African and South
46ibid.
47ibid.
48See De Beers Annual Report, 1986, p. 8.
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American diamond rushes, and the important gemstone mines in
Tanzania and Sierra Leone have all tried to market diamonds
independently in the last twenty-five years; but on each
occasion De Beers moved swiftly to counter the threat." 49
All these factors are likely to strengthen private foreign
investors in the bargaining process.
Furthermore, it is generally costly to maintain existing
mines and to open up new ones. The experience in Papua New
Guinea bears this out. In the Ok Tedi mining project
(discussed in detail below), the consortium of Australian,
American and West German companies spent "an estimated US
$1.2 billion on opening up the jungle and establishing gold
mining as the first stage." 50 With pressing social reforms
immediately after independence, it 4.s highly unlikely that
the future lawful government will be in a position to invest
such an amount. It is likely that i would be forced to do a
deal with private foreign investors, thus strengthening their
bargaining position.
In addition, the strength of the companies stems from the
fact that at the time of independence, not enough Namibians
would have been trained to manage and operate the mining
industry. The educational system in Namibia (which is still
495ee Lanning Greg with Mueller Marti, (1979), Africa
Undermined: Mining Companies and the Underdevelopment of Africa,
Penguin Books, p. 410.
50See the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, (1985),
Business Profile Series: Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and
Vanuatua, Second edition, p. 11.
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run along apartheid lines) compounds the problem. In order
to appreciate the extent of this problem, it is necessary to
quote at length from the most unusual source. In 1982, the
Chamber of Mines appreciated the problem of skilled labour
shortage and was partly blamed on the educational system.
It was stated that the "problem essentially resolves around
the skills deficit in the economically active labour force.
Whether in Government or in industry, we are short of trained
and experienced people. In the first place, there are too
few matriculants [form fives] available for the development
of professional skills. In 1981 there were only 1620 pupils
in Standard 10. Of these 346 were black, 284 brown and 990
white ... In the case of black schools, maths and science
are seldom offered as subjects. This situation is aggravated
by the shortage of teachers, and general quality of education
across the board is not likely to improve until this problem
can be solved. Out of 4,887 teachers employed in the black
schools in 1980 at both primary and secondary levels, 2,031
held no formal teaching qualifications. Of the qualified
teachers in the black schools, only 14 held a university
degree and only 127 had completed matriculation. Pupil to
teacher ratios are uncomfortably high. Only 11 per cent of
pupils attending school ever reach the matriculation level
and if white pupils are excluded, this figure falls to 2.8
per cent.	 These figures indicate the size of	 the
problem."51
51See Chamber of Mines Report of South West Africa/Namibia
Report, 1982, p. 4.
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It must be stressed, with all the emphasis at our command,
that the concern expressed above has nothing to do with the
mining companies' genuine regard to the welfare of the black
population. This concern is expressed because the companies'
interests are at stake. One of the reasons for the shortage
of skilled personnel is that there is what the Chamber of
Mines terms "gradual drain of skilled [white] personnel ...
who [are] leaving to take up residence in South Africa."52
It was also reported that "the turnover of [white] artisans
has not increased substantially since 1981". 53 This has
forced the companies to train blacks as apprentices.
Therefore, for the purposes of our discussion, two main
reasons have contributed to the training of blacks.
	 The
companies have realised that African advancement is in their
own interest. Due to the war situation, it is becoming
increasingly difficult to attract skilled white employees.
The war makes European rates of pay, intended to attract and
retain skilled workers from abroad, to be far higher than
prevailing rates for the best qualified African workers. The
war has resulted in the white population to decrease almost
every year. Indeed, it does not make economic sense to train
an employee who is likely to leave any minute if the
political situation deteriorates.
Moreover, since it is possible for the companies to do a deal
with a future lawful government, they are forced to train
52ibid., p.3.
53 i bid.
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African employees to fill vacancies left by white employees
and at the same time to ensure continued operations of the
mines during the early years of independence. The
realisation that eventually, independence will become
inevitable and that the future government is likely to demand
what has become to be referred to as 'Africanisation' of a
number of positions of responsibility in the mining industry,
force the companies to train more blacks. Therefore, smooth
transition without affecting the operation of the mines
compels them to start training programmes before
decolonization, hence the call for "more needs to be done on
the national scale as part of the country's effort to respond
to the pre-independence challenge of preparing a corps of
competent local people to assume positions at all levels of
management." 54 This resulted in the establishment of the
Private Sector Foundation (PSF) with a stated purpose of
training Africans for skilled jobs.
However, one commentator has remarked that the scheme
"provides relatively expensive scholarships for the purpose.
The numbers involved are quite small ... Many inside and
outside Namibia see the PSF as a cheap cosmetic exercise."55
It is clear from the discussion above that the educational
system of the country makes it difficult to recruit suitable
54. .4ibid. p.4.
555ee Brian Bolton, (1985), "The condition of the Namibian
Workers", in United Nations, (1985), Seminar on the Activities of
Foreign Economic Interests in the Exploitation of Namibia's
Natural and Human Resources, Ljubljana, Yugoslavia, 16-20 April,
p. 34.
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Africans for training. This will contribute to the weakening
of the government's bargaining position and is likely to
strengthen private foreign investors' hand during the
bargaining process. The companies will demand a price for
training Namibians. The consequence will be that even if the
government were to assume complete public ownership, the
mining industry will still need the cooperation of private
foreign investors. State mining companies are likely to
experience serious personnel and manpower problems. There
will be a lack of suitably trained, experienced and
specialised personnel at practically all stages necessary to
cover the administrative and technical operations in the
mining industry. All these factors, at least during the
early years of independence, will force the government to
seek for various interim remedies to bridge the gap. This is
likely to include relying heavily on private foreign
investors to provide these inputs and will in turn weaken the
government's bargatning position.
Paradoxically, even those few who have been trained by the
companies are likely to pose a serious problem to the future
government in that they have disrupted salary scales. This
point is forcefully emphasised by Professor Green. He states
that "the efforts of large companies ... to create a stable
and skilled black labour force loyal to them will leave a
potential time bomb	 ... their pay scales of R5,000 to
12,500 a year pose serious problems. It is economically
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impossible to generalise these income levels to all
workers. ,, 56
Finally, cooperation with competitors will strengthen private
foreign investors' hand in the bargaining process. The
development and expansion of multinational mining companies
brought with it new forms of ownership. It has been
eloquently stated by Lanning that today, "the major mining
groups control their global empires through bewildering
network of directorships which link parent companies to their
subsidiaries; mines to suppliers and customers; and the major
groups to each other and to government policy-making
bodies." 57 The system of interlocking ownership among the
mining companies would reduce the government's option of
finding interested competitors in the event of an
unsatisfactory outcome of negotiations with some of the
existing operating companies. The interlocking ownership
among the companies at all levels enables them to share
information and thus, places them in a powerful position
vis-a-vis developing countries. "The cohesiveness of the
mining groups enables them to benefit from each other's
experience and to block attempts" by developing countries
which seek to obtain more concessions from them. 58
56See Professor Reginald Green, (1987), "Namibia:
Dependence, Destabilisation and Development", in Oxfam, Namibia
Conference Papers: Conference held in London 11th May, 1987, pp.
61-90 at p.66.
57See op. cit. Lanning Greg with Mueller Marti, (1979)
Africa Undermined: Mining Companies and the Underdevelopment of
Africa, p.330.
58ibid. p. 331.
425
The effect of interlocking ownership is illustrated by the
unsuccessful effort by both Zaire and Zambia to attract
interested competitors during the early days of independence.
It is reported that both countries "attempted to encourage
new consortia to take over the management of their copper
mines without success, partly because of the reluctance of
the mining companies to interfere in the sphere of influence
of another company but also because of the information,
pressures and threats that can be conveyed along the network
of interlocking directorships." 59
5.3.2 The bargaining position of the future lawful
government
Notwithstanding the strength of private foreign investors,
the government will have its areas of strength that will
enable it to bargain effectively with the companies. The
first and perhaps the most effective weapon is that most
writers and commentators on Namibia regard Namibia as a major
mineral producer with proven reserves. The list of the
country's major, medium and minor minerals has been provided
in Chapter I, reproduced mainly from ININ's comprehensive
study. In a recently published book by UNIN, Namibia is
described as "the fourth and seventeenth largest producer of
minerals in Africa and the World respectively." 60 The
territory is the source of about 50 per cent of the world's
59 i bid.
60 In value terms, see UNIN, (1987), Namibia: A Direct United
Nations Responsibility, Lusaka, p. 15.
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gem diamond production, and it is the fourth largest copper
producer in Africa. According to Hangala, Namibia is "the
second largest producer of lithium and vanadium in the world.
[It] has half of the world's reserves of germanium deposited
in the Tsumeb mines where it is produced as a by-product of
other metals. Germanium oxide is primarily used by the
electronics industry for various forms of semi-conductors,
microprocessing and laser technology [including] several
military applications ... As regards Africa, Namibia is one
of the leading producers of refined lead, second largest
producer of cadmium and fourth largest producer of both zinc
and silver." 61 It has the largest open-cast uranium mine in
the world, and "is potentially one of the world's leader
producers of high grade industrial salt. ,62
There is no doubt that these resources will provide the
future lawful government with a strong bargaining position.
It is generally agreed by most writers that one company in
particular, De Beers, is heavily dependent on the access to
Namibian diamonds for its dominant world market position. It
has been stated that although "De Beers' own mines account
for only about 30 per cent of [diamond] production, they
produce 60 per cent of the world's gemstones, largely from
61Hangala Leake S., (1985), Structure of Namibian Mineral 
Industry: A Strategy Option of Institutional Framework for 
Mineral Sector Development for Independent Namibia, University
Printing Press, Helsinki, p. 16.
62. .ibid.	 It is also stated that "Namibia is the fourth
largest lead exporter among developing countries and in the top
five for uranium oxide." See Amon J. Nsekela (ed.), (1981),
Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation, Rex Collings,
London, p. 166.
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CDM in Namibia." 63
 The contribution which CDM makes to De
Beers is enormous (this is illustrated in Chapter III). If
the Namibian source is cut off, De Beers' position is likely
to be weakened. Indeed, case studies discussed below point
to the fact that De Beers' policy is never to allow potential
competitors into the diamond trade without its approval.
Some of the counter measures against competitors have
included making significant concessions to host governments
in order to deny its potential competitors any advantage.
The experience in Sierra Leone and Botswana will suffice to
illustrate this point.
Before independence in Sierra Leone, a company called Sierra
Leone Selection Trust Ltd (SLST) had a long-term diamond
sales contract with the CSO. The arrangement was very
advantageous to De Beers. It was discovered in 1957 by SLST
that it was not obtaining a fair price for its diamonds. "We
were fortunate", said the company official, "in obtaining the
advice of a firm of New York cutters, Lazare Kaplan and Sons
Inc. [the firm] confirmed ... that our diamonds were
under-priced." 64 The discovery of under-pricing led to the
revision of the price schedules. At the same time, SLST
entered into a contract with Lazare Kaplan to sell
one-twelfth of its diamonds (once contractual obligations
63See op. cit. Lanning Greg with Mueller Marti, (1979),
Africa Undermined: Mining Companies and the Underdevelopment of
Africa, p. 410.
64See Greenhalgh P.A.L., (1985), West African diamonds
1919-1983: An Economic History, Manchester University Press,
p.255.
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with the CSO came for renewal) in order to provide a check on
prices paid by other buyers. At the expiration of the
contract with the CSO, SLST was in a strong bargaining
position due to the presence of a "well-known American
diamond dealing and cutting company, nary Winston Inc." 65
Winston had tried previously to circumvent the CSO by
contracting for Angolian production but was unsuccessful due
to political pressure from the Portuguese colonial
administration on the operating company.
Negotiations with the CSO broke down in 1961 on the question
of selling commission. The CSO was demanding 12 per cent
while SLST offered only 4 per cent. Given the presence of
Winston, SLST was not prepared to compromise. An agreement
was entered into with Hary Winston on the same terms and
conditions rejected by the CSO. However, before the
contract could be implemented, the CSO intervened. It is
reported that much "to the dismay of SLST and Winston, CSO
pressure led the Sierra Leone Government to introduce a bill
whereby SLST's production had to be sold through the
Government Diamond Office." 66 The company refused and did
not sell diamonds for 16 months. Eventually, a compromise
agreement was reached in 1962 for the GDO to sort and value
the diamonds and then sold "in fixed proportions to DICORWAF
and three American buyers: DICORWAF 50 per cent, Leon
Tempelsman and Son (a firm very close to the CSO) 27 per
"ibid. p. 257.
"ibid. the GDO had links with the CSO.
429
cent, Winston 20 per cent and Kaplans 3 per cent. DICORWAF
could purchase at a 10 per cent discount with the remaining
half sold at 4 per cent discount, whilst SLST had to pay a 5
per cent 'service fee'. SLST (and the Government) did
succeed in substantially increasing revenues received." 67 It
is clear from the discussion above that SLST managed to get
better terms due to the presence of competitors to De Beers.
Again during the early 1970s after the nationalisation of the
diamond industry in Sierra Leone, it is reported that De
Beers' monopoly was threatened by one of the most powerful
companies in Britain, Lonrho. The presence of this potential
competitor strengthened the Government's hand and bargained
for better terms than would have been possible. It is
reported that "Lonrho ... had ambitions to break De Beers'
diamond monopoly ... Lonrho's aim was to set up a rival
marketing organisation to compete with De Beers. It was
against this background that the five-year contract with the
Diamond Corporation [for the marketing of Sierra Leonean
diamonds] came up for renewal in 1972. The presence of an
eager Lonrho, ready to snap up the business, strengthened the
government's hand in the negotiations." 68
Finally, Botswana is another example whereby that country got
better terms during the renegotiation of the diamond
67 i bid.. p.258. DICORWAF is a De Beers company whose full
title is Diamond Corporation of West Africa.
68Op. cit. Lanning Greg with Mueller Marti, (1979), Africa
Undermined: Mining Companies and the Underdevelopment of Africa,
pp. 416-417.
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agreement with De Beers, mainly because of De Beers
determination to keep out potential competitors. It is
stated by Colclough and McCarthy that Botswana is "an
important diamond province ... As such [De Beers] could not
risk withdrawing from Botswana. This would have invited
Botswana to find other partners for its diamond mining,
thereby posing a potential threat to the De Beers
monopoly." 69 De Beers' attitude may be explained by the
presence of a potential rival in Botswana which has resulted
into what may be described as 'diamond prospecting war'. It
is stated by Garnaut and Clunies that private "exploration
for diamonds ... has been maintained at a high level, mainly
because of ... De Beers' anxiety to maintain its world-wide
diamond monopoly in the face of challenges from possible new
entrants. The search for diamonds became much more active
when a second company, Falconbridge of Canada, was issued
with authorities to prospect for diamonds, so that two
companies were effectively racing each other to locate any
remaining large deposits of diamond-bearing mineral." 70
In some cases, if the private foreign investor breaks down
negotiations with the government with a view to extracting
better concessions can lead to regrets. This is especially
the case if there are competitors who are ready and willing
to do a deal with the host government. 	 Kennecott's
69See Christopher Colclough and Stephen McCarthy, (1980),
The Political Economy of Botswana, Oxford University Press. pp.
151-152.
705ee Garnaut Ross and Anthony Clunies Ross, (1983),
Taxation of Mineral Rents, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 270.
431
experience in Papua New Guinea illustrates this point.
Kennecott obtained prospecting rights in Papua New Guinea.
Between 1969 and 1972, the company discovered substantial
copper in its prospecting area. The discovery was made at a
time when the Government was under pressure to renegotiate
mining concessions. After the conclusion of Bougainville
Copper Agreement 1967 renegotiations (see section 7 below),
negotiations with Kennecott began with the terms based on
those agreed with Rio Tinto Zinc's Australian subsidiary
company. It is stated that Kennecott "insisted on taxation
parameters under which additional profits tax might never
have been payable even if the mine turned out to be one of
the world's most profitable insisted on a clause on
choice of law that was politically provocative." 71
The Government was determined to obtain better terms from
Kennecott. It was also determined to seek alternative
private foreign investors if the negotiations with Kennecott
did not produce desired results. On the other hand,
Kennecott seems to have miscalculated the bargaining strength
of the Government. This was probably based on the belief
that it was not easy for the Government to bring in other
private foreign investors if Kennecott's terms were rejected.
When the negotiations broke down in 1975, Kennecott thought
that the Government would resume the negotiations and
eventually reach an agreement on its terms.
71Kennecott insisted that the agreement was to be
interpreted in accordance with 'the law of developed countries'.
ibid, p. 236.
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Instead, the Government was forced to look for alternatives.
A State owned company, the Ok Tedi Development Company,
engaged New York geological consultants, Behre Dolbear to
supervise a further prospecting programme. At the same time,
the Government found interested competitors who were willing
to take over the project on its terms. Eventually, a
consortium of Australian, American and German companies were
found and an agreement was finally reached in 1976.	 An
operating company Ok Tedi Mining Ltd. was formed. The
parties have the following share ownership: 	 Broken Hill
Proprietary Company (BHP) - Australian 30 per cent;
Kupferexplorations Gesellschaft mbH - German 25 per cent; Mt
Fubilan Development, a subsidiary of Amoco Minerals, itself a
subsidiary of Standard Oil (Indiana) - American 25 per cent;
and the Government 20 per cent. Much to the regret of
Kennecott, the Ok Tedi mine has been described in these
terms: it "is now Papua New Guinea's premier gold mine,
currently producing 21.8 tonnes	 (700.000 OZ) of	 gold
annually. More significantly, it is the largest gold mine
outside South Africa and the Soviet Union. Ok Tedi • • •
commenced gold mining in May 1984. Copper processing
capacity at Ok Tedi plant is projected to gradually increase
to 60,000 tonnes of high grade ore a day (yielding 90,000
tonnes of copper per annum) by the end of 1988."72
72See ANZ Banking Group (PNG) Ltd, (1986), Papua New Guinea,
International Economics Department, Australia and New Zealand
Banking Group Ltd, December, p. 3.
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It is clear from our case studies that the strength of the
host government to extract adequate terms from private
foreign investors should not be underestimated. Factors such
as abundance of mineral resources, and interested competitors
provide a powerful weapon to the host government. There is
no doubt that the case studies will provide a useful lesson
for Namibia. It must briefly be added here that some of the
legal issues discussed in Chapter VI will also significantly
strengthen the government's hand vis-a-vis the existing
private foreign investors operating in Namibia.
5.4 The changing attitude: the move towards cooperation for
mutual benefit
In contrast to the "bitter" days of nationalisations of
private property, multinational mining companies have
generally adapted to a new environment of host country
company relationship. Some of the private foreign investors
even prefer a situation whereby the host government owns
shares in operating subsidiary companies. For instance, H.
Oppenheimer said in 1968, before the nationalisation of
copper in Zambia that the "desire of Zambians to play a
larger part in the modern sector of their economy is
understandable, and I would certainly favour a policy of
partnership between private business and the Zambian
State." 73	In the case of Bougainville copper mine, it is
73See Anglo American Corporation of South Africa Ltd,
Statement by the Chairman, Mr. H.F. Oppenheimer, May 15, 1968.
See also Richard Sklar, (1975), Corporate Power in an African
State.
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reported that the private partner favours the government to
own shares in the project. It is stated that the "view was
... expressed that ... Conzinc Rio Tinto of Australia Ltd.,
would see the disposal of the Government's holding as a vote
of no confidence by the Government in the project and in the
management of the Company; in fact the private sector
shareholders see an advantage to Government in having a
direct stake in this Company in terms of ensuring continuity
of the company, and maintaining reasonably sympathetic
policies to the Company."74
It is clear from the examples above that in some cases,
private foreign investors actually prefer the host government
to acquire equity in the operating company as a tangible
guarantee of the State's commitment to the project. It also
provides an ongoing support by the host state in areas such
as infrastructure, taxation and income policies, reduced risk
of nationalisation, etc. Therefore, State participation is
regarded as a guarantee that the host State will remain
favourably disposed to the mining project than might
otherwise prove to be the case.
Perhaps the most recent example of private foreign investor
adaptability is the experience of Angola's oil industry. In
contrast to the experience in both Cuba and Chile where there
was harmonization of policies between capital and the
74See Michael Trebilcok J., (1982), Public Enterprises in
Papua New Guinea, Discussion Paper No. 9., Institute of National
Affairs, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, p. 162
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American government, there is a fundamental difference
between the policies of the American companies and their home
government vis-a-vis Angola. It is stated that the "State
Department told Chevron and a score of other US firms [others
include General Tire, Boeing, Lockheed, Texaco, Mobil,
Conoco, Marathon, and Cities Services] doing a booming
business in Angola that it was time that they started
thinking about the national interest as well as their balance
sheets. In February, while the CIA was dispatching Stinger
anti-aircraft missiles to Savimbi's headquarters in Jamba,
the executive vice-president of Citicorp was in Luanda,
telling the government that in the eyes of the US business
community Angola remained a good credit risk. US firms
have nothing but praise for the MPLA government for its
business-like attitude towards foreign investment." 75 It is
further stated by Alagiah that it is "one of the ironies of
the Angolan situation that a primary task of the Cuban
military contingent is to protect the US-managed oil complex
... It is a point that is not lost on the Gulf Oil
management in Luanda: 'Frankly I could not give a damn
whether it is Cuban or Vietnamese soldiers who are out there
guarding our installations, just as long as they do it well
... Our government should not be talking about arming the
rebels. They could achieve a lot more by opening up an
embassy here.'
	
Gulf officials point out that their joint
755ee Jekyll, et. al, (1986) "Washington's two-track policy
in Angola moves into the realms of the Surreal," South, April,
p.84, col. b.
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venture with the Angolan government works better than in
similar arrangements elsewhere." 76
The foregoing discussion shows that if the parties are
committed to the equitable arrangement for mutual benefit,
there can be a smooth relationship between the host State and
private foreign investors despite their ideological
differences. It is for these reasons that it will be
possible for a future lawful government to work together, on
an equitable basis, with private foreign investors within the
framework of a modern mining concession. Naturally, it will
be up to the government to decide the terms for the operation
of foreign mining companies in Namibia.
6. SINGLE CHANNEL STATE MINERAL MARKETING COMPANIES
State control over the sales of its mineral resources has
been a priority for many developing countries. In some
cases, marketing and sales contracts between developing
countries and multinational mining companies have caused some
disquiet.
	
There are several reasons for this.
	
Control by
private foreign investor over marketing is likely to decrease
the host country's control over its mineral resources. The
main goal for the State in establishing a State monopoly
marketing company is therefore to reassert control over its
commercial policy so as to be in a position to take all
76See George Aligiah, (1986), "A Frontline Casualty digs
in," South, February, p. 27, col. c.
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decisions relating to prices, terms of sales and marketing
contracts, and other decisions relevant for effective control
over the disposal of the country's mineral resources.
Several developing countries such as Zaire, 77 Peru, 78 Chile79
and Zambia have established State marketing companies. This
section evaluates the performance of Zambia's monopoly State
marketing company.
6.1 Background to the establishment of a State marketing
company in Zambia
Prior to the nationalisation of the copper industry in 1969,
Roan Selection Trust (RST) and Anglo-American Corporation
(AAC) handled sales and marketing of Zambia'a copper.
Following the nationalisation of the industry in 1969, each
of the two private foreign investor companies (RST and AAC)
entered into sales and marketing contracts with the newly
established joint venture operating companies (NCCM with AAC,
and RCM with RST). Under the contracts, each of the private
companies were appointed exclusive agents of the joint
venture companies. The private companies continued to carry
77 A national copper-marketing corporation was established
in 1973 to take over functions previously handled by the
Belgian company, Societe Generale des Minerais.	 For
details see United Nations Centre on Transnational
Corporations, (1981), Transnational Corporations in the
Copper Industry, New York, p.68.
78 Minero Peru was established in 1971 and was given
responsibility for the marketing of the country's entire
copper production including production from private
companies, ibid.
79 A State marketing monopoly was established in 1952 to
market all copper produced in the country, ibid.
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out their marketing activities through existing sales
facilities.
The contracts proved to be of considerable value to foreign
investors appointed as marketing agents since they were
protected from government interference in sales and marketing
activities. The companies were granted exclusive rights to
market all Zambia's minerals for a period of 10 years.
Termination of these contracts depended on the redemption of
the Bonds and Loan Stock. After a period of 10 years, the
contracts could be ended on two years notice or upon
redemption of the bonds and loan stock whichever was later. 80
While acting as agents, the private companies were
remunerated at 0.75 per cent of gross sales proceeds of all
copper metal and 2.5 per cent on cobalt sales. 81 The
resulting consequence of the contracts meant that the two
private companies and their subsidiary and associate
companies were ensured control of production, distribution
and marketing. Notwithstanding the disadvantages, two main
factors persuaded the Zambian Government to enter into these
contracts. Firstly, the contriicts served to ensure smooth
mining operations and marketing of copper during the early
years of nationalisation. 	 Secondly, the Government lacked
80 For details see United Nations Economic and Social
Council, (1984), Transnational Corporations in the Copper 
Industry of Zambia, New York, 19 March, E/ECA/UN CTC/6,
p.22.
81 See Potter, J.G., (1971), "The 51 per cent
Nationalisation of the Zambian Copper Mines", as Chapter IV
of Faber M.L.O. and Potter, J.G., (1981), Towards Economic
Independence: Papers on the Nationalisation of the Copper 
Industry in Zambia, Cambridge University Press, p.112.
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expertise in the marketing of the country's mineral
resources. This meant that sales and marketing services of
foreign companies were indispensable since at the time of
nationalisation, they could not be replaced without
disastrous consequences.
Notwithstanding the Government's dependence on the services
of the private companies, doubts began to be voiced. The
Government soon discovered that the contracts "were working
against the interests of the country." 82 It is reported
that there were ways in which private companies diverted
proceeds at the expense of the Government. First, in order
to protect themselves, the companies used to contract "about
80-90 per cent of planned production to 'firm' end-use
outlets. The balance, 10-20 per cent, would be contracted
on a bolster basis to the affiliated merchanting companies.
If and when the merchanting companies received the metal,
they sold it on an ad hoc basis, thereby realising prevailing
ad hoc premiums which could be as high as $50 per ton." 83
Secondly, consumers were grouped into two categories: Credit
risk consumers (i.e. consumers who are likely to default on
payment for the delivered copper) and non-credit risk
consumers. Contracts with non-credit risk consumers were
made directly between marketing companies and end-users at
82 Op.cit United Nations Economic and Social Council,
(1984), Transnational Corporations in the Copper Industry of
Zambia, p.22.
83	 . .lipid p.23.
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LME prices C.I.F. at European and Japanese ports. Contracts
with credit risk consumers were made "first with the in-house
merchanting companies who in turn resold the metal to the
fabricators at LME prices plus cost of insurance and freight.
The price differential sometimes as high as $80 per ton
accrued to AAC and RST's private accounts. ,84 The companies
argued that the arrangement was intended to protect them from
credit risk but as it was later discovered, "in fact, risks
were limited by the opening of irrevocable letters of credit
long before each shipment was made." 85
Thirdly, end-users outside Europe in short supply of copper
would contact LME merchant who would sell the metal at LME
prices "plus prevailing ad hoc premium and cost of freight
and insurance. The merchant would subsequently arrange for
the copper to be shipped from Zambia while he made his
payment to the in-house merchant." 86 Finally, the system
used by the company regarding the quality of metal and time
of delivery worked to the detriment of the Zambian
Government. It was discovered that a "non-critical user, a
brassmill for instance, would be persuaded to accept delivery
of 102 quality copper, thus freeing the high quality product
for selective customers fine wire drawers, for instance,
willing to pay a premium price. 	 A customer with large
inventories would be persuaded to accept delivery at a later
84	 ibid.
85	 ibid.
86	 ibid.
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date, thus freeing the shipment for a customer requiring
immediate delivery at a premium price. Impure copper was
also sold at a discount to affiliated merchant houses and, in
turn, resold to refineries in Europe and elsewhere."87
In addition to the disadvantages noted above, it was
generally agreed that the commission or fees provided for in
the contracts were too high. During the press conference on
the redemption of Zimco's bonds on 31st August 1973, the
President Dr. K. D. Kaunda was able to state that the
"Agreements give the minority shareholders the sole and
exclusive right to provide sales and marketing services for
the metals and minerals at a very high fee." 88 It is clear
that by 1973, the Government had made preparations and was
able to terminate the sales and marketing contracts. The
president was able to state that "a new copper marketing
company wholly owned by the Government should be established
here in Zambia." 89 This resulted in the formation of Metal
Marketing CorporatLon of Zambia Ltd (MEMACO), wholly owned by
the Government to take over functions previously handled by
the two private conpanies. The company is owned by Zambia
87	 ibid.
88 See Rahim MacBul and Broad Juliet, The Legislative
Framework, Agreements and Financial Impositions Affecting
the Mining Industry in African Commonwealth Countries,
Commonwealth Secretariat, p.7.39.
89 Address by His Excellency The President Dr. K. D.
Kaunda, at a Press Conference on the Redemption of Zimco
Bonds, State House, Lusaka, 31st August 1973.
	 For details
see op.cit Rahim MacBul and Broad Juliet, The Legislative
Framework, Agreements and Financial Impositions Affecting
the Mining Industry in African Commonwealth Countries,
p.7.40.
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Industrial and Mining Corporation which is in turn wholly
owned by the Government.
6.2 Performance
MEMACO has played a significant role in the marketing of
Zambia's mineral resources. The most significant
development is that Zambia is now in a position to ship its
minerals directly to its customers. 	 Major exports are
electrolytic copper wirebars followed by electrowon cathodes
(highly refined copper)." The company is making a
significant effort to export more electrowon cathodes because
according to the company's chairman, the copper industry is
experiencing "structural changes" and has resulted into
"outlets for wirebars to shrink". 91 As illustrated in Table
90 Chairman's Statement, Metal Marketing Corporation of
Zambia Ltd. Annual Report, 1984, p.6.
91	 ibid. -
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TABLE VII:2
	 Zambia's copper sales to leading customer
countries 1976 - 79 
Country	 1976	 1977
	 1978	 1979 
Japan	 125	 127	 123	 143
France	 56	 66	 •63	 87
West Germany 122
	 107	 89	 75
United Kingdom 93
	 101	 79	 72
Italy	 74	 73	 51	 56
India	 38	 13	 28	 42
U.S.A.	 108	 57	 41	 22
China
	 20	 23	 22	 21
Source:	 United Nations Economic and Social Council, (1984),
Transnational Corporations in the Copper Industry of
Zambia, New York, p.24.
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the company sells minerals to eight major customers, namely
Japan, France, West Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, India, U.S.A.
and China. 92 Other customers include Belgium, Greece,
Yugoslavia, Sweden, Indonesia, Pakistan, Kenya, Egypt, Malaysia
and Zimbabwe. 93
One of the most important aspect is that most of the country's
lead and zinc products are sold to consumers in neighbouring
countries.	 It is stated by the company's Chairman that most
lead and zinc annual contracts "were concluded with customers in
neighbouring countries who are showing a phenomenal growth
potential as consumers of these metals. This is a welcome
development as it augurs well for inter-regional trade in our
part of the continent." 94	In order to be effective in the
performance of its sales and marketing function, the company has
sub-agents in a number of developed countries, e.g. Societe
Commerciale de Metause et Minervais (Rene Aumas) in France; Metal
Distributors (UK) Ltd. in India; Mario Alberti S.P.A. in Italy;
Mitsubishi Corporation in Japan; Mitsubishi International
Corporation (forwarding agents) in the US; and Metallgesellschaft
A.G. in West Germany. 95
 In the United Kingdom, it has a
subsidiary company called Memaco Services Ltd.96
92	 ibid. p.8.
93	 ibid. pp.8-9.
94	 ibid.p.6.
95	 ibid. p.32.
96 The company is incorporated in the U.K.
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6.3 Evaluation
Although it could be said that the company has been successful,
it is submitted that it faces a number of limitations.	 It is
particularly difficult for a state marketing company, whose
success depends on the capacity of the international market to
offer better terms such as high prices, to influence the
international market in favour of the developing mineral
producing country. 	 There is intense competition at the
international copper market. The industry is also facing a
serious threat from substitutes such as aluminium and plastics
which serve as a deterrent to higher prices.	 Indeed, even major
private copper mining companies have attempted to influence the
market in their favour with little success. 	 It is reported that
in 1946, seven companies controlled 70 per cent of copper
production and marketing.	 By "1978, ... their share had
declined to 25 per cent." 97 Several factors contributed to
this.	 First, during its early years, the copper industry was
extremely profitable mineral.	 It is reported that copper
companies, such as Kennecott in Chile, were able to realise a 40
per cent profit per year. 98 As a result, new entrepreneurs were
attracted into the industry.	 Secondly, consumers and end-users
97 op.cit. United Nations Centre on Transnational
Corporations, (1981), Transnational Corporations in the
Copper Industry, p.l. The companies are: Kennecott Copper
Corporation (U.S.); Anaconda Company (U.S.); Phelps Dodge
Corporation (U.S.); Roan - AMC Group (U.S.); Anglo-American
Group (S.A.); Union Miniere (Belgium) and Inco
(International Nickel, Canada).
98	 See Moran H. Theodore, (1974), Multinational
Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in
Chile, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, p.29.
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were able to finance the growth of new small copper mines in
Africa, South America, Canada, and Asia. 99 Finally, due to the
fact that ownership at the different stages of copper production
is relatively diffuse, "Absence of marketing possibilities cannot
be considered as constituting a substantial barrier to entry into
the international copper industry" compared to certain other
mineral industries.100
The consequence of these developments was considerably to weaken
the monopoly power and influence of the original seven giant
companies.	 Intense competition brought about by new entrants
resulted into diminishing copper prices and earnings. Even if
there was co-ordination among producers, it would be very
difficult to introduce effective control over production. 	 All
these factors put more pressure on State marketing companies such
as MEMACO. Giant private companies have failed to influence the
market in their favour, it is inconceivable that State marketing
companies can succeed. Lower copper prices benefits consumers
who are mostly situated in developed countries while developing
copper producing countries continue to experience diminishing
earnings since they are dependent on the capitalist world market
of the developed countries.	 In contrast, vertically integrated
private mining companies are relatively secure. 	 For instance,
in the US, "about 70 per cent of copper production is sold to
99	 .ibid. p.34.
100 op.cit. United Nations Centre on Transnational
Corporations, (1981), Transnational Corporations in the
Copper Industry, p.2.
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subsidiary fabricators by the copper companies." 101 This
enables the companies to sell the locally produced copper at
prices set by the companies themselves. Under such a situation,
prices are stabilised since this serves the interests of a
vertically integrated industry.
The most serious threat to the copper industry of developing
countries is substitution.	 In contrast with the private
companies, developing countries are the most exposed in that they
are dependent on the developed countries for their markets. 	 It
is stated by Sklar that the "European industry is becoming less
copper-oriented and more inclined to use substitute
materials." 102 The threat from substitutes force copper
producing developing countries to introduce a producers price
system in order to temper the inroads made by substitutes for
copper. 103 This strategy in turn means diminishing earnings for
developing countries. 	 Notwithstanding these dilemmas, however,
State marketing compan:_es serve a useful purpose. 	 They serve to
satisfy nationalistic aspirations of the host developing
countries in that the countries can feel that they have control
and monitoring capability from the production phase right through
to the marketing phase.
101 See Richard L. Sklar, (1975), Corporate Power in An
African State, University of California Press, p.75.
102 ibid.
103 For a detailed discussion on the attempt of giant
private copper companies to starve off substitution, see
op.cit United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations,
(1981), Transnational Corporations in the Copper Industry,
p.3.
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7	 MODERN MINING TAX FORMULAE
The main objective of mineral taxation is to maximise revenue to
the mineral producing country. The financial gain which host
developing countries expect from their mineral resources
constitutes a major factor in the development of the mining
industry. The most appropriate way for capturing the maximum
rent is for the State to own and operate its own mines. Where,
however, the development of mineral resources is placed largely
in the hands of private foreign investors, the influence of
government policies on the private sector of the industry can be
of major consequence. With regard to fiscal provisions, the host
State must develop the most effective taxation system designed to
capture the maximum rent from mining projects.
It is generally recognised by both the host country and private
foreign investors that fiscal provisions constitute one of the
most important aspects in mining agreements. The allocation of
expected profits by the parties largely determine the advantages
and losses of the parties in any mining agreement. A number of
factors determine the distribution of benefits. These include
the bargaining power of the parties; the determination of which
party bears the initial costs and risks of prospecting and
exploration; the financing and construction of the
infrastructure; and the economic circumstances of the project
(i.e. the profitability of the mining project). The resulting
consequence is that fiscal regimes cannot be rigid and immutable
schemes. They will always reflect the changing bargaining
strength and weaknesses of the parties and the economic
circumstances surrounding mining projects.
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Mineral taxation has taken a variety of forms. Where mining
operations are conducted by private foreign investors, the
revenue the host country derives from such operations is
generally in the form of fees, rentals and royalties, which are
usually embodied in the general mining legislation, and taxes
provided in the tax laws (or in some cases in individual mining
project agreements). In most cases, income taxes have included
taxes on interest, dividends, capital gains, and excess profits.
For purposes of our discussion, taxation systems are discussed
under seven main headings: fixed fee, royalties, income tax,
dividends tax and capital gains tax, higher rates of income tax,
progressive profit tax, and resource rent tax. Rentals or
surface taxes and stamp duties are not discussed as they are
considered to be less important. Moreover, rentals tend to cease
immediately when commercial mineral production commences. The
experience of three developing countries, namely Botswana,
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea is discussed in detail.
7.1 Preliminary Issues
Before we discuss taxation systems in detail, a number of
preliminary issues associated with taxation generally need to be
pointed out. Major issues include problems associated with the
computation of income tax generally, and deductions allowed by
tax laws and mining project agreements in calculating net income.
Each of these issues are briefly considered below.
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7.1.1 Problems associated with computation of income tax
Most developing countries have enacted tax laws which contain
complex clauses designed to realise a growing share of revenue
from mining operations. The imposition of taxes has resulted in
a significant increase in the burden on the administrative
capacity of host states. In order effectively to assess income
tax, host states must be able to verify the sales price of the
minerals and the calculations for deductions of expenses that are
charged against gross income. In many cases, the transactions
which lead to the income or expenses are with entities affiliated
with the foreign private investor. Furthermore, in order to
arrive at taxable income, taxing authorities must calculate not
only gross income based on the selling price of the minerals but
also gross operating costs. The computation of operating costs
may present some problems especially when large volume of sales,
purchases of goods and services, and even loans are arranged with
other vertically integrated companies. 104
Under such circumstances, taxing authorities have used various
methods to approximate arm's length prices in order to determine
the affiliate's taxable income. For instance, the mining
agreement between Indonesia and P.T. Rio Tinto Indonesia provides
that all mineral sales made to affiliates are to "be made only at
prices based on or equivalent to arm's-length sales and in
accordance with such terms and conditions at which such agreement
104For details see David Smith N. and Louis T. Wells,
(1975), Negotiating Third-World Mineral Agreements, Bellinger
Publishing Company.
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would be made if the parties had not been affiliated." 105 The
terms of the agreement further state that open market price is to
be used in the calculation of gross income. If the private
foreign investor sells mineral products to affiliates at a price
different from the open market price, the price to rule for tax
purposes is that which would have ruled on the open market if the
open market price is higher than the recorded transfer price.
However, there may be some obstacles in situations where a
meaningful quoted market price does not exist. Indeed, even in a
situation where free market prices exist, these may turn out to
be marginal in the sense that the major volume of transactions
are based on long-term, unquoted contract. 106 This is likely to
present considerable obstacles to the host government. Some host
countries have attempted to minimise this problem by adopting a
formula based on what has become to be referred to as "cost plus
reasonable profit or reasonable return on capital." 107
7.1.2 Deductions for calculating net income
Most taxation legislation and mining project agreements contain
provisions which determine deductions to be allowed in the
1055ee United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations,
(1983), Main Features and Trends in Petroleum and Mining 
Agreements, New York, p.119.
106See Richard L. Sklar, (1975), Corporate Power in an
African State: The Political Impact of Multinational Mining 
Companies in Zambia, University of California Press, p.52.
107See United Nations Centre On Transnational Corporations,
(1978), National legislation and Regulations Relating to
Transnational Corporations, New York, p.4.
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calculation of net income subject to taxation. The deductions
vary considerably from country to country and from industry to
industry. Therefore, there is no established list of standard
deductions because much depends on the particular industry and
the tax system of the relevant host country. These deductions
include depreciation, amortization, and depletion. Also some
payments made by private foreign investors to their affiliates
may be accepted as deductible items.
In the case of depreciation, taxation legislation and mining
project agreements allow private foreign investors to take as an
expense of doing business each year a sum that is intended to
represent a cost of capital equipment. The reasoning behind the
concept of depreciation is that capital deteriorates in value,
therefore, the loss of value should be charged against profits.
This has resulted in cash outflow for taxes being reduced since
profits stated in the books of the private foreign investor
become lower than they would otherwise be. The common practice
has been to estimate the life of an asset and allow the write-off
to occur in equal amounts each year until the asset reaches its
scrap value. For instance in Papua New Guinea, the mining
project agreement between the Government and Dampier Mining
Company Ltd provides that for income tax purposes, "during the
past 10 years of commercial production the life of the mine will
not be considered to be longer than 15 years." 108 In contrast,
the agreement between Indonesia and P.T. Rio Tinto Indonesia
108Op. cit., United Nations Centre on Transnational
Corporations, (1983), Main Features and Trends in Petroleum and
Mining Agreements, p.93.
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provides that depreciation (and amortization) rates are to be
computed" on a straight-line basis of 12.5 per cent per year;
there is allowance also for electing an accelerated depreciation
rate in any one year of the first four years of possession of the
assets." 109
In most cases, depreciation is used for purposes beyond those
that simply reflect the using up of assets. It is used to grant
incentives to private foreign investors to postpone taxes in
order to allow the write-off of assets quickly. Apart from
allowing depreciation for fixed assets (capital equipment), most
tax laws allow deductions in recognition of the decline in value
of intangible assets, including the costs of developing the mine.
Such deductions, in most cases, have often been referred to as
amortization and depletion deductions. Therefore, for the
purposes of our discussion, amortisation is used to describe the
write-off of capitalised expenditures that do not represent fixed
tangible assets subject to depreciation. Some agreements specify
the number of years over which development costs may be
written-off, while others provide for the write-off of those
costs in equal annual installments over the life of the mining
project . 110
The agreement between Indonesia and Rio Tinto, cited above,
provides the company with an investment allowance of 20 per cent
of the total investment, deducted from taxable income at the rate
109. .ibid.
110 .ibid.
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of 5 per cent per year. 111 In addition to the 20 per cent
deduction which may be referred to as depletion allowance,
amortisation rates are computed at 12.5 per cent per year. The
agreement between Chile and the Campania Minera San Jose, S.A.
provides the company with an option "to treat all pre-production
expenses as start-up expenses and to amortise them in equal
installments over five years from the commencement of commercial
production. ,112 Finally, the uranium agreement in Niger,
discussed above, provides that the company is "entitled to a
depletion allowance that is not to exceed 10 per cent of total
shares, or 33 per cent of net taxable income" on condition that
such allowances are reinvested within three years otherwise they
can be considered as taxable income. 113
It is important to note that the difference between amortisation
and depletion is very minimal. In most cases, depletion refers
to the cost of acquiring and bringing up a natural resource
deposit into production. The cost may include, for example,
geological surveys, exploration expenses, costs of constructing
the infrastructure and any costs incurred up to the commercial
production phase.
7.2 Types of Mineral Tax
111ibid.
112 1 bidi . p.115.
11 3ibid. p.108.
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There are several ways of capturing mineral rents from the
exploitation of minera; resources. It is important to note that
there is no standard format for mineral taxation. Furthermore,
it is also important to note that mineral taxes have been
referred to by several names, therefore, the names used in this
section may differ from names used by other authors. However,
what is important is to describe and analyse substantive issues
involved in mining taxation. As long as the concepts discussed
are the same, names ascribed to them do not matter much. What
follows is a discussion of different types of taxes employed by
States in order to capture mineral rents.
7.2.1	 Fixed Fee (FF) System
The fixed fee system is mainly applied to the petroleum industry.
As applied in the US, the fixed fee is a charge paid by the
private investor for the rights to undertake exploration and
development in a given area.	 It is submitted that the charge is
analogous to rental fees and royalty charges. The only
difference is that in the case of a fixed fee system, private
investors have an option to pay a lump sum. However, it is
stated by Garnaunt and Clunies that payment "may be spread over
time." 114 The fixed fee system has a number of limitations.
In most cases, the State may not be in a position effectively to
evaluate the potential of the area being charged. Furthermore,
the system is likely to result in serious political consequences
in that any subsequent discovery of a commercial mineral deposit
114	 . .ibid, p.91
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by the private foreign investor is likely to be interpreted by
government opponents as a give away. Moreover, the host State
is likely to be put at ' a disadvantage because it generally does
not have the technical capability to evaluate the potential of
mineral resources in its territory.
	 In addition, the fixed fee
system seems to resemble the discredited traditional concession
system in that the government is likely to sell the nation's
mineral resources without evaluating their potential value.
Given the fact that it is possible for the investor to pay for
his rights in a lump sum, the government is likely to exhaust the
revenue while the private investor continues to make super
profits from the exploLtation of the mineral resources.
	 It has
been stated that the fixed fee system may only be appropriate
"for the sale of exploration, as distinct from extraction, rights
and for small-scale unorganized mining activity." 115 The fixed
fee system is used in the US "as a means of distributing the
rights to extract offshore oil and gas, and also onshore oil and
gas from established fields.
	 It is commonly regarded as a
successful method off the US mainland." 116 The system may only
be appropriate for a developed country where political pressure
may not be experienced by the government once the discovery of
minerals turns out to be far valuable than the fee paid by the
private investor.
	 Indeed, even here, the success of the system
will depend on a number of factors such as the "high degree of
competition among investors" to enable the state to introduce
115	 . .ibid
116	 .ibid
457
competitive bidding, and reasonable certainty of the property
which is being sold) 1 1
 However, these problems may be
minimised by raising the rate of income tax once production
commence.
7.2.2.	 Royalties
The royalty system is based on ownership. As owner of the
minerals, the State has a right to impose a levy for the
depletion of its mineral resources. Another important feature
of a royalty system is that it guarantees a certain payment to
the State for the depleted mineral resources, regardless of the
mining projects' profit or the world market price for the
minerals. As long as production and sales last, the State
continues to receive revenue. The royalty may be based on a
physical unit of production or shipment, or on the value of
minerals produced. There is no standard format for levying
royalties.	 There is also limited standards for appropriate
levels of royalties even within particular industries.
	 In
addition, royalties have been used by States to achieve a number
of objectives such as encouraging domestic processing of minerals
by offering lower rates, and encouraging private investors not to
ignore low-grade ore. 	 Furthermore, the royalty rate variations
reflect the complexity of tax arrangements since royalties have
been combined with income tax. All these factors partly explain
why there is wide variations in methods and rates of levying
royalties.	 These are briefly discussed below.
117 ibid, p.92
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A number of developing countries still levy royalties based on a
physical unit of production. These include Sierra Leone - Le
0.55 for each ton produced 118
 and Jamaica -
produced. 119 On the other hand, countries
royalties on value include Papua New Guinea
the sum of f.o.b. revenue; 120 Tanzania - 5 per cent of the sales
value; 121 Indonesia - 3.6 per cent, (in some cases, a
sliding-scale royalty is employed. The rate is increased or
decreased "in the direct proportion that the current sales prices
differ from the reference prices set out in the agreement" );122
Botswana - 3 per cent on sales revenue; 123 and Colombia - 15 per
cent. 124 Royalties based on physical units of production are
easiest to administer since they do not involve price
determination.
	 The only drawback is that they are likely to
decrease in real value, especially in the face of inflation over
the life of a mining project.
	 It is mainly for this reason that
many developing countries have abandoned the physical unit basis
118 Op.cit, United Nations Centre on Transnational
Corporations, (1983), Main Features and Trends in Petroleum
and Mining Agreements, p.85
119 ibid, p.91
120 ibid, p.94
121 Op.cit, Garnaut Ross and Anthony Clunies Ross, (1983),
Taxation of Mineral Rents, p.273
122 Op.cit, United Nations Centre on Transnational
Corporations, (1983), Main Features and Trends in Petroleum
and Mining Agreements, p.118
123 Op.cit, Garnaut Ross and Anthony Clunies Ross, (1983),
Taxation of Mineral Rents, p.271.
124 Op.cit, United Nations Centre on Transnational
Corporations, (1983), Main Features and Trends in Petroleum
and Mining Agreements, p.111
$J 0.50 for each ton
which base their
- 1.25 per cent on
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in favour of a royalty based on value. However, the
administration of a royalty based on sales price is likely to
present considerable problems. Many private foreign investors
sell their output to affiliated customers. The price at which
such a transfer takes place within the enterprise is likely to
affect the amount due to the host country.
Finally, the royalty system has a number of limitations. 	 In
practice, royalties have seldom represented a significant portion
of State revenue. 	 In addition, a commitment to a high rate of
royalty is not favoured by private foreign investors since this
is likely to represent an additional cost of extraction.	 It is
the cost that is incurred whether the mining project is
profitable or not.
7.2.3.	 Income Tax
The general shift from royalties to income taxation was probably
the most significant development in the history of mining
taxation. In contrast to royalties and other fixed payments,
payments based on net income or profit are regarded by private
investors as the least onerous means for capturing mineral rents.
The main reason for this is that income tax does not
significantly affect the profitability of mining projects in the
same way as other payments discussed above. The concept of
income taxation presumes that profits will be made and seeks to
increase taxation on higher yield. If there are no profits,
private investors are under no obligation to pay tax to the host
State. Private investors incur significant obligations only if
profits are high.
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It is important to note that in some cases, higher income tax
rates do not necessarily mean a higher income for the host State.
The government take, in most cases, depends on how the taxable
base is calculated. Factors that determine the benefits of the
parties include the form, timing, and manner of deductions.
Faster depreciation and early write-off of expenses means quicker
capital recovery by the private investor and reduced income to
the host State during the initial period of the mining project.
Therefore, the allowances and deductions available to private
investors on gross income may result in very little State income
in the early years of the mining project. The philosophy behind
this state of affairs Ls that private investors should be
attracted by a minimum rate of return on invested capital and
cost recovery before profit sharing with the host State takes
place.
Most developing countres are tempted to raise income taxes to
the highest level in order to obtain revenue to effect social
reforms and economic development. It is for this reason that
income taxation has become the most important element in the
mining agreements between host States and private foreign
investors. It is stated that initially, income tax rates were
low "25 to 30 per cent and were conceived merely as an additional
readjustment of royalties, taxes rapidly became the main device
for income-sharing. Today, virtually every new mining project is
taxed at approximately 50 per cent." 125 However, if income tax
is raised, this is likely to discourage private foreign investors
125
op. cit., Erich Schanze and Others, (1981), Mining
Agreements in Developing Countries, p. 158.
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from investing in the country. The high rate of taxation is also
likely to raise operat4ng costs of the mining projects.
In Botswana, taxation of income is governed by the Income Tax Act
Chapter 52:01. Income tax is based on income after deducting
such items as capital and operating costs (or costs of
production). All companies, resident and non-resident are taxed
at the same rate of 35 per cent of their taxable income. Taxable
income is defined as "the gross income less any amounts exempt
from tax (the assessable income) less the cost of production of
assessable income (chargeable income) less any dividends paid by
a resident company to resident shareholders who are chargeable to
tax on such dividends." 126 Items included in the calculation of
gross income are commercial royalties; entertainment fees;
management and consultancy fees; and dividends and interest
arising in Botswana or "in the Rand Monetary Area". 127
The following deductions are allowed (1) operating costs - in the
case of mining companies, these can be written off and carried
forward indefinitely; (2) interest on loans incurred in the
production of the taxable income - provided the interest rate is
reasonable; (3) payments made to approved pension funds and
annuities paid to retired employees; (4) expenditures incurred in
scientific research; (5) legal expenses, trade union and
association subscriptions; (6) excess value of any stock held at
126See United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations,
(1986), National legislation and Regulations Relating to
Transnational Corporations, vol. IV, New York, p. 10.
127 . •ibid.
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the beginning of the tax year over the value at the end of the
tax year; and (7) costs incurred in acquiring rights to use
designs and trademarks. The amount claimed annually is 4 per
cent of the total or the total amount divided by the number of
years of use, whichever is the greater. 128
The imposition of income tax has created conflicts between
private foreign investors and host developing countries. Income
tax is a species of long term contract which has to reconcile two
apparently conflicting needs: stability and evolution. These two
needs are, in fact, two interdependent conditions in any mining
project agreement.
	 The need for stability arises from the
importance of income tax to the parties concerned, namely, the
host State and private foreign investors. To the host State,
economic development and social progress, in most cases, largely
depend upon their mineral income and production. However, a
fixed rate of income tax can work at the disadvantage of both
parties. If mineral prices are high and income tax rate is low,
the host State tends to lose out. On the other hand, if income
tax rate is raised and prices fall, the private foreign investor
tends to lose out. Some countries, including Botswana, have
attempted to minimise these problems by establishing a stable
fiscal framework that strives to obtain a high share of mineral
rent to the host State while at the same time ensuring private
foreign investors an equitable return on their investments
commensurate with their risk. This is discussed in detail under
relevant sections below.
128. .8ibid.
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7.2.4	 Dividends Tax and Capital Gains Tax
Dividends paid abroad are usually subject to tax generally known
as withholding tax. There is a wide variation of rates from
country to country. For instance, the Ivory Coast and Nigeria
are among the countries which levy a lower rate, 12 per cent and
12.5 per cent respectively. 129 On the other hand, Kenya, Egypt
and Brazil are among the countries which levy the highest rate.
Kenya and Egypt levy 20 per cent and 40.55 per cent
respectively. 130 In Brazil, the lowest rate is 25 per cent.
However, this rate is conditional to the fact that "profits
remitted abroad do not exceed 12 per cent of the registered
investment." 131 If the profits remitted abroad constitute more
than 12 per cent of the registered investment, then "a graduated
dividend tax, ranging from 40 per cent to 60 per cent, comes into
effect. ,, 132
Finally, some countries regard capital gains as normal corporate
earnings and therefore taxable. There are two methods of levying
capital gains tax. Some countries employ a fixed rate, for
instance, in Egypt and Nigeria, capital gains tax is levied at
1295ee United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations,
(1983), National Legislation and Regulations to Transnational
Corporations, New York, p. 28.
130 i bid.. For Egypt, see also Law No. 157, 1981.
131Op. cit., United Nations Centre on Transnational
Corporations, (1983), National Legislation and Regulations
Relating to Transnational Corporations, p.38.
132 .ibid.
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39.7 per cent and 20 per cent respectively. 133 Other countries
vary the rate "depending on the period of time the asset involved
has been held." 134 In Ghana, the rate is 55 per cent for assets
held "less than five years, and 15 per cent for those held over
years. ,,135
7.2.5	 Higher Rate of Income Tax (HRIT) 
A number of developing countries have opted to tax an additional
tax on mining by taxing profits "at a higher-than-normal
rate." 136 This section discusses the system of HRIT as it is
applicable in a developing country, namely, Botswana.
In Botswana, the most important mining project agreement was
entered into between the Government and De Beers (through its De
Beers Botswana Mining Company Ltd of which it owns 50 per cent -
the other half is owned by the Government). The agreement was
negotiated between De Beers and the Government of Botswana and
ratified by the National Assembly in 1970. 137 The mining project
agreement led to the development of a diamond mine at Orapa.
Commercial production began in 1971. The initial fiscal
provisions were negotiated ad hoc between the Government and De
133 ibid.
134. .ibid.
135 i bid.
1360p. cit., Garnaut Ross and Anthony Clunies Ross, (1983),
Taxation of Mineral Rents, p. 94.
1375ee Christopher Colclough and Stephen McCarthy, (1980),
The Political Economy of Botswana, Oxford University Press, p.
151/
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Beers. It set out the royalty and taxation provisions, and
provided for the Government to acquire a 15 per cent equity free
of consideration and the remainder owned by De Beers. Another
important aspect of the agreement is that it incorporated a
clause which provided for renegotiation in "abnormal
circumstances". 138 In 1974, the Government evoked the clause and
demanded a renegotiation. Although it is not possible fully to
assess the fiscal provisions of the agreement because such
information is regarded by both the Government and De Beers as
confidentia1, 139
 some of the information is available.
Renegotiations centred on four main issues: the extent to which
the Government was entitled to acquire additional equity in the
operating company; the royalty payable by the company; the tax
structure; and the sharing of excess profits in the event of the
project being more profitable than anticipated. After what has
been described as "hard and acrimonious bargain," 140 the
Government and De Beers reached an agreement in 1975. The rate
of royalty payments was not specified because, according to some
sources, "the Government considered this the most suitable
instrument to share in any excess profit, above the target rate
138 •ibid.
139It has been stated that due "to the relationship between
the government and De Beers over the economics of the diamond
mining industry in Botswana, it is not possible to estimate
accurately the rents or the revenues, that accrue to government
from the diamond mines." See Stephen R. Lewis Jr, (1981), "The
Potential Problems of Diamond-Dependent Development" as chapter 2
of Charles Harvey (ed.), (1981), Papers on the Economy of
Botswana, Heinemann, London, p. 15.
140See op. cit., Christopher Colclough and Stephen McCarthy,
(1980), The Political Economy of Botswana, p. 151.
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of return, which the company might make." 141 With regard to
income taxation, it has been stated that the Government "used its
negotiating strength to avoid any special tax arrangement at
all." 142 De Beers is currently subject to normal tax
legislation as it apples from time to time.
	 In addition, the
Government acquired an additional 45 per cent of equity in the
operating company free from consideration, bringing the total
share held by the Government to 50 per cent.
In order to avoid any potential conflict in the future, it is
reported that the Government reached an agreement with De Beers
and set up an undisclosed target rate of return. It is believed
that the target rate of return is about 25 to 33 per cent. It is
stated by Hartland Thunberg that "Others in the Gaborone business
community contended that De Beers had already recovered its full
investment in Orapa at the time of renegotiation. They argued
that 25 to 33 per cent of operating profits after the full return
of principal was still a tidy yield. ,143 The Government
considered that once the target rate of return was reached and if
the project turned out to be more profitable, then taxation rates
should be adjustable from time to time. It is believed that the
Government receives 65 to 70 per cent of the gross profits
through a combination of royalties, dividends, and income
taxation. 144
141ibid, p. 153.
14 2ibid.
143See Hartland Thunberg Penelope, (1978), Botswana: An
African Growth Economy, Westview Press, p. 50.
144.
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The mining project has been extremely profitable than was
anticipated. This is partly due to the fact that diamond prices
have been unusually high.
	 It is stated that "diamond prices
have risen by leaps and bounds, being in 1978 about three times
what they were in 1971. ,145 As illustrated in Table: VII:I,
during the six year period from 1971 to 1976, gross profit has
been p.102 million, "of which the Government has taken 52 per
cent in taxes, dividends, and royalties. ,146 It has also been
stated by Lewis that the "economic rents accruing to government
from diamonds represent 6 - 7 per cent of GDP. ,147
TABLE VII:3 Operations of De Beers Botswana
Gross Profit less retained
profit in P. Million 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Accruals to Bot. Govt. 0.2 2.8 6.2 9.7 18.2 15.6
Accruals to De Beers 0.7 11.0 10.3 4.8 4.9 5.2
Source:	 Christopher Colclough and Stephen McCarthy, (198), The Political
Economy of Botswana, Oxford University Press, p.150.
145 Op.cit, Christopher Colclough and Stephen McCarthy,
(1980), The Political Economy of Botswana, p.149
146	 . .ibid
147 Op.cit, Stephen R. Lewis Jr, (1981), "The Potential
Problems of Diamond - dependent Development" as chapter 2 of
Charles Harvey (ed.), (1981), Papers on the Economy of 
Botswana, p.16
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7.2.6	 Progressive Profit Tax (PPT) 
The shortcomings oT the conventional income tax system has
forced a number of developing countries to look for
alternatives to improve it. The major disadvantage of
income tax is that it suffers from the cyclical
volatility. 148 Prices for most mineral resources such as
copper, for instance, are subject to considerable fluctuation
which in turn affects the level of profits. As a
consequence, if income tax rates are fixed, the private
foreign investor is likely to incur a loss or make minimal
profits when mineral prices are low. On the other hand,
when mineral prices are high, the private foreign investor is
likely to enjoy what has come to be referred to as 'windfall
profits'. In an attempt to redress this potential conflict,
a number of developing countries, notably Indonesia and Papua
New Guinea, have adopted the progressive profit tax (PPT)
system.
It is important to understand the concept of the PPT before
we discuss it in detail. The PPT is imposed by the State on
pure profit or income which represents exceptionally high
returns on mineral exploitation. There are two main
instances under which the tax is imposed, namely when returns
148 Op.cit, United Nations Centre on Transnational
Corporations, (1983), Main Features and Trends in Petroleum
and Mining Agreements, p.76
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are exceptionally high and when profits are high due to
increases in mineral prices. If the tax is imposed as a
result of high returns, the tax is usually referred to as
'excess profit tax'. 149 On the other hand, if the profits
are due to a "substantial rise" in the price of minerals, the
tax is usually referred to as 'windfall tax, . 150 Therefore,
the PPT may be defined as a tax that is triggered by income
in excess of a stipulated rate of return. The common
principle underlying this tax is that any income which
exceeds a reasonable rate of return will be subject to
additional tax.
	 This serves as a means of government
participation in the income of private investors that exceeds
a reasonable rate of return. In its simplest form, it may
be regarded as taxation of profits that remain after
deduction of the normal company income tax and an additional
income which corresponds to the minimum rate of return
necessary to attract private investment.
The PPT offers a number of advantages. It is mainly based on
the concept of minimum rate of return on invested capital.
This offers some advantages to both private foreign investors
and host countries. The minimum rate of return offered by
the PPT is usually preferred by private foreign investors
since it ensures stability of the rate of return on invested
capital. In addition, it provides a fixed framework which
149 For a general discussion see generally Kameel Khan I.F,
(1988) 1 "Petroleum Taxation and Contracts in the Third
world: A Law and Policy Perspective", Journal of World
vol.22 No.1, February, pp.67-88 at p.78Trade'
150 ibid
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may be adjusted to different levels of profitability. If
universally applied by the host State, negotiations over each
mining project or with each investor becomes no longer
necessary. Moreover, it has a potential of encouraging
prospecting and exploration as private investors know in
advance the tax which will apply to them.
Furthermore, the PPT system enables private foreign investors
to repay capital loans within a short period of time as it
affords lower initial tax rates during the period of
investment recovery. The tax rate is then increased after
the private foreign investor has recovered his initial
investment capital and has also achieved a minimum rate of
return. The tax system also guarantees the private foreign
investor against unilateral future tax increases by the host
State. It also offers some advantages to the host country in
that it ensures the State an equitable rate of return from
the exploitation of its mineral resources. Similarly, it
minimises potential conflicts between private foreign
investors and host developing countries that
	
are
characterised by the conventional income tax system.
	
In
order to appreciate the effect of PPT, it is necessary to
discuss how it operates in reality.
	 The experience of two
countries, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea is discussed.
In Indonesia, mining companies are taxed at the standard rate
of 45 per cent. The mining project agreement entered into in
1977 between the Government and P.T. Rio Tinto Indonesia (the
equity of the company is held by Conzinc Riotinto of
Australia Ltd and Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation Ltd) introduced
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the PPT system into the agreement. The tax provision
provided that the company was to be subject to prevailing
Indonesian rate. 151 During the first 10 years after the
commencement of mining operations, the company is subject to
35 per cent annual corporate tax rate, increased to 45 per
cent thereafter. An investment allowance of 20 per cent is
provided and is deducted from taxable income at the rate of 5
per cent per year. Interest payments on loans are also
deductible provided that such interest does not exceed "the
generally applicable market rate at the time of
borrowing." 152 In order for the deduction to be eligible, at
least 40 per cent of the mining project's long term capital
should be treated as equity.
The most important provision refers to the payment of
additional profits (windfall profits) tax "when high profits
resulting from extraordinary increases in the price at which
the company's products are sold are realized." 153 The tax
becomes payable when the company's profits exceed a 15 per
cent rate of return "on total funds invested." 154 For the
purposes of the PPT, total funds invested is defined to
include (1) total invested capital at the commencement of
operations, depreciated at 10 per cent; (2) replacement
151Op. cit., United Nations Centre on Transnational
Corporations, (1983), Taxation of Mineral Rents, p. 222.
152ibid.
153 i bid,lip  119.
154i bid, see also op. cit, Garnaut Ross and Anthony Clunies
Ross, (1983), Taxation of Mineral Rents, p. 222.
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capital; (3) the capitalised and depreciated exploration
expenditures; (4) net current assets at the end of the year
of liability; (5) initial capitalised value of
non-replaceable infrastructure outside the mining area and
the value of replacement capital; and (6) an annual
adjustment of initial capital (1) and replacement capital (2)
"based on the export price index of manufactured goods
reported in the United Nations Bulletin of Statistics." 155
The additional profits tax is assessed at the rate of 60 per
cent on any profits in excess of a 15 per cent rate of return
(See Appendix VII:1).
In the case of Papua New Guinea, a conventional income tax
was applicable before the introduction of the PPT system.
The first significant mining project agreement was the
Bougainville Copper Agreement negotiated in 1967 by the then
Australian colonial administration. 156
	The Bougainville
copper and gold mine is owned by Conzinc Riotinto of
Australia (a subnidiary of Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation)
through its operat i ng company called Bougainville Copper Ltd.
After the discovery of a commercial ore, construction began
in 1969 and by 1972 the mine began production. 157
	Before
155Op. cit, United Nations Centre on Transnational
Corporations, (1983), Main Features and Trends in Petroleum and
Mining Agreements, p. 119.
156For a detailed discussion see Caroline Studholme, (1981),
The Legal Regulation of Mineral Exploitation in Developing
Countries: A Study in Dependent Development, June, unpublished
LL.M. dissertation submitted to the University of Warwick,
Coventry, UK.
157Op. cit, Garnaut Ross and Anthony Clunies Ross, (1983),
Taxation of Mineral Rents, p. 228.
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the renegotiation in 1974 the agreement was extremely
advantageous to th company. It provided for a fixed royalty
of one and a quarter per cent of the sale price of minerals
and for 20 per cent government equity. 158 Furthermore, it
provided for a three year tax holiday and 20 per cent of the
company's income was exempt from income taxation. The entire
capital expenditure could be written off at the end of the
tax holiday period. After this period, the company was
required to pay a low rate of tax at 25 per cent for a period
of ten years and rise gradually to 50 per cent thereafter.
In actual fact, the effective rate could have been 20-40 per
cent if the 20 per cent income tax exemption is taken into
account. 159 Import duty on "items purchased by the company
were frozen at their low 1967 levels, as were a wide range of
other taxes and charges." 160 Finally, the government
provided a substantial subsidy to infrastructure for the
benefit of the company and no withholding tax was provided.
It has been observed that had the agreement been preserved,
the company could have recovered its capital including
interest by 1974. In addition, no income tax would have been
payable "until the early 1980s. ,161 Not surprisingly, the
agreement could hardly have survived the demise of
colonialism.
	 In , 1972, the new government introduced a
158ibid. p. 234.
159ibid.
160ibid.
161ibid.
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dividend-withholding tax at the rate of 15 per cent. Serious
negotiations began in 1973, after the granting of internal
self-government, with a view to effect radical changes of the
fiscal provisions. An agreement was finally reached in 1974
and introduced radical changes.
Under the 1974 Bougainville Amendment Agreement Act,
financial provisions were incorporated under Clause 7. 162
The agreement abolished the automatic 20 per cent exemption
from income taxation; abolished the three year tax holiday;
and introduced a completely new system of taxation, the PPT.
The Government was enabled to introduce income tax in general
legislation. Mining taxation introduced by the Government
combines income tax with progressive profit tax. Mining
income or corporation tax is assessed at the rate ruling
generally from time to time. Before the initial investment
is recovered, the rate of corporation tax is limited to 35
per cent. After the recovery of the initial capital, the
rate rises to 36.5 per cent. Capital is defined as "sales
revenue less the sum of capital expenditure and operating
costs." 163 In addition, the agreement provides for PPT.
The part of income in excess of 15 per cent "of an agreed
'capital base' [is] taxed at a total rate of 70 per cent."
The 'capital base' is an "agreed figure roughly corresponding
to capital expenditure incurred up to the beginning of 1974,
162For details see op. cit, Caroline Studholme, (1981), The
Legal Regulations of Mineral Exploitation in Developing 
Countries: A Study in Dependent Development, pp. 225-227.
163Op. cit., Garnaut Ross and Anthony Clunies Ross, (1983),
Taxation of Mineral Rents, p. 233.
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net of interest capitalised during construction and of
depreciation on items being replaced. ,164 The sum is varied
each year according to the formula having the effect of
adjusting the 'capital base' for changes in the average value
of the country's currency against the US dollar, augmented by
the "amount of new capital expenditure, and deducting from it
depreciation on capital items being replaced." 165
It has become clear that the PPT system has some advantages
in that it automatically captures, for the hose State, a high
share of the resource rent. If applied nationally, it has a
potential of reducing the administrative burden. Finally,
another major attraction of the PPT is that marginal projects
are not threatened by the introduction of the tax system
because they are taxed according to their level of
profitability.
7.2.7 Resource Rent Tax (RRT) 
The concept of a resource rent tax is similar to the PPP
discussed above.
	 Indeed, in some cases, it has been
described as the PPT. For instance, the United Nations
Centre on Transnational Corporations refers to it as RRT or
"additional profit tax." 166 Even Garnaut and Clunies who are
16 4ibid, p. 235.
165.ibid.
166See United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations,
(1987), Financial Aspects of Petroleum Exploitation, New York, p.
23. Kameel also states that "A tax which has become well known
(Footnote Continued)
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regarded to have initiated the application of the tax to
mineral resources seem to regard it in the same way. For
example, in their discussion under the PPT, they state that
the "principle of the PPT has been applied recently to the
copper, gold, and silver project of Bougainville Copper Ltd.,
in Papua New Guinea (since 1974). ,167 And yet when
discussing mineral rent taxation in Papua New Guinea, it is
stated that "RRT rate is (70 - n) per cent of net cash flow
after income tax, where n is the rate at which income tax is
assessed." 168 Under the same section, it is stated that
"Company income [i.e. Bougainville Company] was to be subject
to a PPT, so that the part of income in any year that was in
excess of 15 per cent of an agreed 'capital base' would be
taxed at a total rate of 70 per cent." 169
However, it is subnitted that the difference between the two
tax systems is that the PPT operates together with
corporation tax whereas the RRT operates independently of any
other tax. It has been stated that the RRT "allows the
investing company to achieve a threshold rate of return on
its investment before tax is payable. ,170 Like the PPT, the
(Footnote Continued)
over recent years is Re5ource Rent Tax. This is also called an
additional profits tax.' See op. cit, Kameel Khan I.F., (1988),
"Petroleum Taxation and Contracts in the Third world," p. 78.
167Op. cit, Garnaut Ross and Anthony Clunies Ross, (1983),
Taxation of Mineral Rents, p. 97.
168ibid. p. 233.
169ibid. p. 235.
170Op. cit., United Nations Centre on Transnational
Corporation, (1987), Financial and Fiscal Aspects of Petroleum,
p. 25.
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RRT is levied on the private investor's net cash flows after
the specified rate of return has been achieved. This is done
by employing a specified threshold rate of return to compound
forward the private investor's net cash flows. The cash
flows will "initially be negative as they represent the
exploration appraisal and development activities. The
accumulated total thus becomes a larger and larger negative
figure. When production starts, the compounding process
continues and the accumulated total figure attains a lower
and lower negative value. Eventually the accumulated total
becomes positive. When this happens, the RRT is levied.
	 It
continues to be levied on the positive annual net cash
flows." 171
 This is illustrated in Appendix VII:2.
The RRT has the following features "(1) no deductions for
interest payments, (2) immediate 100 per cent deduction of
all capital expenditure, and (3) unlimited carry-forward of
losses bearing interest at the threshold rate of return. ,172
The threshold rate of return is usually specified in two
parts, namely the market rate currently available and the
return to reflect the risks of the investment. For instance,
Tanzania employs the US Consumer Price Index plus a "real
return of 17 per cent." 173
 Another method is the same US
17	 .libid.
172See Parlmer Keith F., (1980, "Mineral Taxation Policies
of Resource Rent Tax," International Monetary Fund Staff Papers,
vol. 27, pp. 517-542 at p. 527.
173Op. cit, United Nations Centre on Transnational
Corporation, (1987), Financial and Fiscal Aspects of Petroleum,
p. 25.
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price index plus 22 per cent. 174 On the other hand, Papua
New Guinea employees the US prime rate. In addition, the RRT
enables the State to devise a multi-tier scheme whereby
further tax is levied as the achieved rate of return
increases. This will mean that rates of return will be
higher than that employed by the first tier. For instance,
if the first tier uses a threshold rate of 15 per cent and
taxable at 50 per cent, the second tier could use a higher
threshold of say 25 per cent which could be taxed
additionally at say 70 per cent. This means that in
principle, there can be several tiers of RRT.
This tax offers a number of advantages. It enables private
investors to recover their capital plus profit return before
the tax is levied. Since it taxes only the economic rent of
a mining project, it enables the host State to take a large
part of the profit without jeopardising the investment. In
addition, it enables all mining projects to be viable
economic propositions and be profit creating. Marginal
projects are not affected because there is a guaranteed
return on invested capital. Another advantage of the RRT is
that it has an in-built self-adjusting mechanism. It
automatically changes to allow profitability to the private
investor regardless of changes in the price of minerals and
cost conditions.	 Therefore, the RRT incorporates both
flexibility and adjustability into a fiscal regime. It is
174 ibid.
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also an attractive incentive for the private investor
especially during the period of uncertain mineral prices.
Notwithstanding the advantages which the RRT system offers,
it also has a number of limitations. First, the effective
application of the RRT, as is the case in all taxes, requires
effective monitoring of intra-firm transactions of vertically
integrated private multinational companies. Monitoring is
likely to impose an additional burden on the administrative
machinery of the host country. Secondly, the minimum rate of
return (supply price of investment) may not necessarily be
universal in all situations. Different investors perceive
the adequacy of the supply price of investment at different
rates. In addition, the supply price of investment may not
necessarily be the same in all minerals, or even within the
same industry since the location of the project, the cost of
production, the size, and ore grade will all have an impact
in determining the supply price, Thirdly, the application of
the RRT without being supplemented by other taxes may be
politically unacceptable to most developing countries. A tax
free period especially when profits and mineral prices are
high is likely to put pressure on the government
notwithstanding the fact that the RRT is likely to obtain a
large share of revenue in the future. The other danger is
that mineral prices may dramatically drop immediately after
the private foreign investor has obtained his minimum rate of
return. It may also be possible that minerals may be
exhausted before the host government receives revenue from
the mining project, especially if mineral prices fall and
prolong the tax free period.
	 For these reasons, it is best
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to combine the RRT with the standard company income tax,
deductible when assessing the RRT.
In spite of the limitations discussed above, the RRT meets
most of the criticisms that have been said about the
conventional income tax. It offers the possibility of being
able to extract economic rents while, at the same time,
ensuring that private investors are not deterred from
investing in the mining industry. It also strives to
increase mutual goodwill and understanding between the
parties. It can make it possible, in most cases, for the
parties to solve their problems and conflicts of interest in
an orderly manner. In sum, although there may be no tax
system that can eliminate the tensions between developing
countries and private foreign investors, a properly designed
tax system such as the RRT can do much to minimise and
improve the environment for a stable and mutually beneficial
relationship between the parties.
8	 CONCLUSION
It has become clear from our discussion above that mining
agreements, regardless of their form, are an important symbol
of the changing relationship between foreign investors and
host developing countries. It has also become clear that the
objectives of host developing countries are not merely to
require government participation and to maximise financial
returns while remaining dormant partners in the industry.
Rather, host developing countries seek to be active partners
in mineral exploitation, retaining control of the nation's
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mineral resources and assuring future development for maximum
ultimate benefit. This means that there is a requirement to
integrate mining projects into the local economy and to
promote national socio-economic development. Indeed, the
contractual provisLons in the mining agreements with respect
to these issues are the means by which developing countries
seek to maximise the positive and minimise the negative
social and economic impact of foreign investment.
It has become an accepted fact that today, almost all mining
agreements between private foreign investors and host
developing countries recognise the fact that the promotion of
national interest is an initial premise in contracting a
mining agreement. However, it is important to note that
effective participation policies presuppose agreements
calculated to make the mining project suitably staffed to
implement the basic decisions of the joint management board.
Only participation at all stages of the joint operations can
attain the host government's objectives.
A notion that the host government's majority share-holding in
a joint venture is indicative of the effectiveness of its
participation policies is erroneous. How far majority equity
ownership ensures control is a question whose answer depends
upon the actual implementation of the agreement. In some
cases, decisions would naturally reflect the views of the
private foreign mining companies whose technical superiority
is sufficient to overcome the consequences of the host
government's majority board representation and to keep
de facto control notwithstanding their minority position.
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The minority partner would then be in a position to exploit
fully his role as operator. Therefore, the real balance of
forces is to be found in how the enterprise is operated and
the parties' day-to-day relations and management. The
private minority partner, being the sole supplier and source
of technical and commercial assistance, becomes in effect the
marketing channel of the joint enterprise and purchase/seller
of the minerals produced, thereby controlling completely the
parameters of the joint operations.
Furthermore, the resources which mining companies command,
such as information and technical expertise give them
considerable advantage that can prove difficult for the host
government to over come. The transfer of technology is vital
in order to acquire the ability to manage and operate the
mineral resource projects. However, this is one of the most
difficult goals to achieve, since mining companies have a
vested interest in protecting their role as providers of the
indispensable specialised and managerial services necessary
for the development and operation of a mine. Indeed, the
bargaining power of the private foreign investor is partly
dependent on the monopolisation of technology. This means
that until such time when the transfer of technology is
completed, developing countries will not be able to exercise
full control over their mineral resources that is implied in
the mining agreements discussed above. Indeed, the evolution
of service contracts are a manifestation of developing
countries' inability to manage their mineral projects alone.
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Notwithstanding the above obstacles, it is clear from our
discussion that developing countries no longer regard mining
agreements as mere questions of private concern.
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CHAPTER VIII -  RECOMMENDATIONS AND OPTIONS FOR NAMIBIA
1	 INTRODUCTION
Any newly independent country needs to exercise control over
its natural resources. It needs to adopt legislation
governing the allocation, use, disposal, development and
distribution of its natural resources. Furthermore, it
should have a right to amend, repeal, and introduce new
legislation to regulate the mineral industry. Finally, it
needs to establish institutions and administrative framework
to carry out mineral development.
This chapter outlines the mineral policy which the future
lawful government of an independent Namibia should adopt. As
a developing country, Namibia will adopt policies not unlike
those of many other developing countries.
2	 DECOLONISATION, MINERAL RESOURCES AND
	 PRACTICAL
CONSTRAINTS
The trend at present in most developing countries is towards
domestic majority participation in the mining enterprises.
This has become possible following efforts taken by these
countries to increase their direct control 	 in the
exploitation of their natural resources. Furthermore, the
tightening of the initial terms of private foreign investment
agreements and the increased government participation in the
ownership of mining enterprises has produced a variety of
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modern agreements or concessions. 	 In some cases, the
traditional pattern of transnational operating affiliates in
developing countries 	 wholly or	 majority-owned	 by
transnational corporations has noticeably given way to joint
ventures with State-owned mining companies. In addition,
multinational mining companies increasingly operate in
developing countries on the basis of non-equity participation
and co-production agreements.
Modern concessions have come about as a result of a
compromise between the principle of permanent sovereignty
over natural resources, and the demanding realities of access
to technology, capital, skills and markets which private
foreign investors can offer. Therefore, the ultimate
political goal of modern concessions is thus to emphasise the
conception of the developing countries' control over their
natural resources while at the same time permitting private
foreign investors a role to play in their exploitation.	 A
great majority of these countries realise that mere
possession of natural resources and the assertion of
permanent sovereignty over their natural resources would do
very little for their effective exploitation.
It is submitted that given the experience of other developing
notwithstanding
Indeed, once the
(politically or
prevent a future
different course.
that Namibia would opt for a
This is likely to be the case
what has been discussed in Chapter VI.
issues discussed in Chapter VI are resolved
otherwise), there is nothing that will
lawful government of Namibia from entering
countries, it is unlikely
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into mining agreements with private foreign investors on the
basis of a new arrangement. This could be with the existing
multinational mining companies as well as other companies
that may be willing to accept the terms set by the
government. Therefore, in the exercise of permanent
sovereignty over its natural resources, the future lawful
government will be entitled to consider whether to limit the
exploitation of mineral resources to government-owned
companies or to allow its nationals as well as private
foreign investors to take part. These and other matters
deserve full and serious consideration if Namibia is to
derive full benefit from its mineral resources.
Before the government decides the future of the mining
industry, the following questions should be considered.
First, who will run the newly acquired enterprises? Will the
government have a source of skilled personnel, either from
its own population or from friendly countries, to replace the
transnational corporations' employees? Will the government
be able to sell minerals without assistance from previous
owners? This problem may emerge particularly in highly
concentrated mining industries such as diamonds where De
Beers control worldwide marketing. Who will supply crucial
inputs of technology which may be essential to keep the
mining industry operating? These questions should be faced
before, rather than after the acquisition of the mines.
The right of a state to permanent sovereignty over its
natural resources is well established under international
law. However, it should be noted that this right is not, as
487
it were, self-executing. The capacity of a state, especially
a newly independent state, to exercise the right depends in
large measure upon external and internal political climate.
In the case of Namibia, there are several factors which could
influence the future lawful government to opt for full public
ownership. These include the following: (1) for political
reasons, full public ownership may be one of the effective
controls over the mineral resources essential for national
economic development; and (2) the full public ownership
option may be the only solution to some of the companies
operating in Namibia mainly because of South African
connection. These include operating subsidiaries of State
companies such as the Industrial Development Corporation of
South Africa and Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation.
These companies own and operate a number of mines in Namibia,
and they also have equity shares in the mining enterprises
operated by private companies such as Rossing.
Furthermore, the future lawful Namibian government may view
full public ownership as a continuation of a revolutionary
struggle which calls for the people to be masters of their
own destiny, not only their political destiny but also their
economic destiny. Therefore, the political and economic
struggle would be viewed, in a revolutionary sense, as
inseparable from one another. Indeed, Article III(b)(7) and
(8) of the Constitution of South West Africa People's
Organisation, SWAPO, states that "(7) to ensure that the
people's government exercises effective control over the
means of production and distribution and pursues a policy
which facilitates the way to social ownership of all the
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resources of the country; (8) To work towards the creation of
a non-exploitative classless society". This has been
reaffirmed on several occasions by the SWAPO President
Comrade Sam Nujoma.
In an interview held in August 1979 with Professor Reginald
H.Green, among others, the President expressly stated that:
"The basic ideological principle of SWAPO is to build a
classless non-exploitative society which allows no room, no
loophole, for the exploitation of man by man. As one of the
fundamental tasks of the new African government would be to
destroy all colonial institutions aimed at exploiting and
plundering Namibia's mineral wealth, logically, foreign
investment would be allowed only in governmental joint
ventures based on the principle of mutual respect and of 
benefit to the Namibian people".1
It has already been noted above that public ownership does
not mean exclusion of private foreign investors. It is
possible that private foreign investors can still play an
important role within the context of modern concessions
discussed in Chapter VII. 	 Therefore, an important policy
issue should relate to foreign ownership. The main
objective should be to secure effective participation and
control in respect of the activities of private foreign
investors.	 The government should clearly spell out the
maximum level of foreign participation that will be permitted
1
see Reginald H.Green (Editor), Namibia - The Last
Colony, (Longman, London, 1981) p.180, emphasis added
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in both existing mining enterprises and new investment
propositions.
3	 FORMULATING A MINERALS POLICY FOR NAMIBIA
It is important that those who will formulate the policy
should have a sound understanding of the mining industry
generally and its practices.	 This will be necessary in
order to formulate a realistic mining policy. Furthermore,
they should bear in mind that a mineral policy for Namibia
can only be developed in the context of a general strategy
for economic liberation, self-reliance, and satisfaction of
the basic material needs of the Namibian population.
Therefore, Namibia's mineral resources have an essential role
to play in such a strategy. Here follows a list of the main
components of the strategy:
(1) Establishment of a new mining code.
(2) A government owned enterprise company should be
established.
(3) The policy should ensure that the future lawful Namibian
government receives equitable share of the revenue from
mining operations.
(4) Mineral exploitation should be accompanied by adequate
provision for training and employment of indigenous
personnel.
(5) The mineral policy should provide for mineral
conservation measures, increasing orebody recovery and
minimising waste.
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(6) Provision should be made for procurement, maintenance,
and dissemination of geological and mineral resource data.
3.1 Establishing a mining code
The relationship between private investors and the government
should evolve within the framework of the mining legislation.
Therefore, the primary objective of the mining legislation
should be to ensure that foreign investment contributes more
effectively to the realisation of the government's economic
objectives. The legislation should cover such issues as
preconditions for investing in the mining industry; rights
and obligations of the private foreign investors and the
state; and tax provisions (fiscal regime). It is submitted
that without a mining code, no legal mining rights can be
established and without such right, very few foreign
investors (if any) would venture to commit their capital in
an uncertain legal environment. Stability and confidence can
only be established if the needs and requirements of the host
government and the rights and obligations of the private
foreign investor are set out in clear and definite terms.
The mining code must also fit into the entire national
economic plan in order to guarantee its effectiveness during
the implementation phase. It is against this background that
the success or failure of the mining code will have to be
judged.
The mining legislation must be effective at every phase of
mining activities.
	 There is a need to introduce
comprehensive mining legislation to remedy some of the
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current problems discussed in the preceding chapters.
Current mining concessions obtaining in Namibia are
characterised by large areas and long periods. There is
also a comparative moderateness of the financial terms and
the slow evolution in the terms and conditions of the
concessions which are tantamount to stagnation and rigidity.
Therefore, the legislation should: (1) state fully and
precisely, without any ambiguity, the rights and obligations
of the mineral rights holder. (2) Provide a clear and
exhaustive list of the causes for termination and forfeiture
of mining rights.
	 These may include prolonged and
unjustified	 inactivity
	 (subject	 to	 force
	 majeure),
non-payment of taxes, serious infringement of the laws or
non-fulfilment of obligations.
	 (3) Maximise the rate of
prospecting and mine development. (4) Discourage
speculation by taking precautions, by means of satisfactory
work programmes and substantial expenditure commitments
against unnecessary tying-up of large areas where no
satisfactory prospecting or production operations are
conducted. The legislation should specify in some detail
the nature of the prospecting work to be carried out.
Mining rights holders should also be required to furnish
information acquired in the course of prospecting.
	
There
should also be mandatory relinquishment and surrender
provisions. (5) Grant to the holder of an exclusive mining
right the assurance of enjoying full possession of the
granted rights as long as legal and other agreed obligations
are complied with.	 The duration of the mining concession
must be compatible with modern concessions.
	 (6) Provide for
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the protection of the subsurface, the conservation of the
mineral resources nd the safety of the operations.
3.1.1	 State participation
The emancipated Namibian nation would be deeply
suspicious if private foreign capital were allowed to operate
without state participation. Participation by the government
could also help to boost the morale of the Namibian workers
since it would . be
 regarded as a major step towards
localisation, and foreign investment would assume a local
character and status.
In addition, it would make it easier for local employees
to integrate their loyalties, with a consequent reduction in
tension with private foreign investor partners. It would
also help to improve work performance and productivity among
the local employees. Therefore, the overriding consideration
for state equity participation in the mining projects should
be to control mining activities so that they operate within
the overall econoinic, social, and political policy of a
future Namibian government. Furthermore, state equity
participation offers an additional advantage in the sense
that government directors in the board of directors are
placed in a better position. They can scrutinise the
activities of the mining enterprise in accordance with
government policy. Important issues such as transfers and
repatriation of foreign capital and environmental protection
can be scrutinised by government directors.
It is also important to note that state equity
participation enables the government through government
directors, to control the extent to which mining companies
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allow their parent companies to profit from their
relationship with their subsidiaries (as is the case today
especially with regard to the diamond industry). Government
directors would be in a position to scrutinise purchasing and
marketing arrangements, fees for provision of technical and
consultancy services, and investment of surplus funds, all of
which are currently being used by the mining companies in
order to avoid ta:cation. It is further submitted that a
state equity participation provision in the mining
legislation could help to develop a nucleus of experienced
managerial personnel in the public sector in that local
labour becomes directly involved. Finally, in addition to
skills, state equity participation could be used as a
mechanism for the transfer of technology.
There are a number of factors which would dictate or
influence the govetnment to opt for partial public ownership
(i.e., joint ventures) as opposed to complete ownership
(although this may not be necessarily the case in all
situations, it could be possible for the government to
completely own some enterprises or even all enterprises with
an option for service contracts). These include the
following: (1) whether the parent company of the operating
firm to be partially owned has an absolute world-wide
monopoly over the technology of production and over marketing
to the extent that its co-operation would be absolutely
necessary for the maintenance of production and outlets; (2)
whether political and diplomatic circumstances for full
public ownership would be such that it would cause an
unacceptable political risk should the product of the
enterprise be boycotted at the international market (this
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would only arise where such public ownership takes place
without the support of the former private foreign investor);
(3) whether full public ownership would cause considerable
difficulties for the government in raising capital from the
international financial market (this again would depend on
whether the former owner agrees with the terms and conditions
set by the government in acquiring the enterprise); and (4)
whether full public ownership would cause considerable
difficulties in the management and operation of the mining
projects due to lack of trained Namibian personnel.
3.1.2	 Fiscal Provisions
The basic premise of a mineral policy of the future
lawful Namibian government should be that the returns from
mining activities should first and foremost benefit the
country.
To correct and remedy the current adverse effects of
taxation laws and 'regulations, future laws and regulations
governing taxation in the mineral industry should contain the
following provisions, among others:
(1) Administrative fees - these are the fees which are
normally charged by the host government to mineral rights
holders for its services. These include granting
prospecting, exploration and mining rights; registration of
documents (e.g., in the Mines Registry); and any other
administrative services which the government may render to
the mineral rights holders.
(2) Surface taxes - these are usually charges for the mining
rights holders' exclusive right to explore or exploit a
specific area covered by the prospecting and/or exploration
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licence. The main objective for these charges, in most
cases, is to ensure continuous and effective development work
on the area in which these rights are exercised, and to
effect speedy prospecting and exploration so that mining can
begin as soon as possible in order to discourage speculation.
It is for the above reasons that the main purpose of these
charges is not to produce revenue for the host government,
therefore, they are usually not high although in some cases
they could be high enough to discourage the locking up of
large areas (as is the case in Namibia) for speculative
purposes when the host government is anxious to develop its
mineral resources. Finally, since the main aim of these
charges is an inducement to explore and produce minerals,
they tend to cease as soon as commercial production of the
minerals begins.
(3) Royalty charges - these are the charges which are
payable to the host government purely on the basis of
ownership of the minerals. There could be a number of
options left to the government, it could choose to specify
royalty rates in the mining code, or negotiate them project
by project, or even both. The rates may vary according to
the type of the mineral being mined (e.g., source materials -
such as uranium, precious stones and metals - such as
diamonds and silver, and base metals - such as copper) or
according to the value and grade of minerals. We have
already discussed in the preceding chapter that early
royalties in most developing countries were based on a
physical unit of production or shipment. Royalties based on
physical unit of production has one advantage in contrast to
that based on value, namely, it is the easiest to administer
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in the sense that they do not involve price determination for
purposes of calculating the amount due to the host
government. However, a royalty system based on physical
unit of production is diminishing in value because it has
tended to decrease in real value in the face of inflation
over the life of a concession agreement, especially if the
rate is fixed by legislation.
	 This has already been
discussed in detail in Chapter VII.
Therefore, it is recommended that the future lawful
Namibian government should seriously consider a royalty
system based on value. This would help to minimise the
erosion of value, and to capture for the government some of
the increased profits from mining operations, especially when
mineral prices rise.
(4) Income taxes - this is one of the most important issues
which needs to be settled as soon as the territory gains its
internationally recognised independence. In order to
minimise loss of revenue to the state, the law should clearly
define the accounting and valuation procedures, for purposes
of levying income tax. In order to minimise some of the
problems discussed in Chapter IV, it would be useful to adopt
some of the modern tax formulae discussed in Chapter VII.
Important issues that need to be considered should include
pricing, loan finance from affiliates and interest charges on
such loans. /ntra-firm transactions such as charges for
services rendered by affiliates should be given primary
consideration in the legislation.
3.1.3	 Renegotiation and phase-out provisions
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It would be useful to stipulate in the mining
legislation that in the event of unforeseen circumstances,
the state should be entitled to renegotiate with any foreign
investor to change any of the provisions which may be
contained in the contract. The legislation should be as
explicit as possible to specify some of the events which
would entitle the government to renegotiate the contract.
The legislation could refer to the benefits obtained by other
states in the region (or internationally) from comparable
mining ventures. Furthermore, it would be useful for the
legislation to include provisions which would prescribe
periodic consultations and review of the contract with the
private investor.
It must be noted that renegotiation between foreign
investors and host states in developing countries has taken
place in spite of specific clauses which existed in most
traditional concession agreements debarring the state from
changing the agreement terms in any manner whatsoever. It
suffices to state that such stipulations have now lost their
significance, and a more realistic approach has taken their
place. It is in this context that Namibia may not face
considerable opposition from private foreign investors.
The legislation should also include phase-out
provisions. This is important in that the government may not
wish to be tied in perpetuity to the private foreign
investors. Although mining projects have a limited life, it
sometimes happens that additional ore is discovered and added
to reserves as mining proceeds and the operation may continue
far beyond the years commonly used in planning mining
projects. It is assumed that after such a long period of
498
time (about 15-30 years), the state or its nationals would
have acquired the technical and financial capability to
continue the mining operation on its own. There are a number
of ways which the legislation could take in order to effect
transfer of equity ownership from the private foreign
investor to the state. One method is to make provision in
the legislation for an automatic reversion of ownership to
the state at the expiration of the agreement (if the duration
is fixed). A variation of this may be to include a provision
in the legislation for renegotiation during the duration of
the agreement, and a new agreement after this could require a
greater shareholding by the state.
3.1.4	 Default, termination and surrender provisions
The legislation should include provisions which allow
the state to terminate the contract with the private investor
in case of default or if certain circumstances arise. It
would also be important for the legislation to include
clauses concerning the state's right to terminate and the
procedure to be adopted before such termination is effected.
The private investor could be disqualified if he loses
certain qualifications which enables him to obtain mineral
rights within the terms of the legislation. The grounds for
disqualifications may include insolvency, bankruptcy and
liquidation. In addition, effective sanctions should be
introduced to safeguard against false information by the
private investor prior to the conclusion of the contract.
The legislation could provide that upon termination, all
rights and obligations of the parties to the contract should
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lapse (except the obligations and liabilities incurred by the
parties under the agreement prior to its termination).
Termination provisions would ensure that mineral
development is actively pursued in accordance with the
legislation. It would also serve as an effective and
necessary deterrent against mal-performance. The legislation
should also include provisions dealing with the distribution
of assets upon termination. There should be a distinction
between pre- and post-production termination, and between
movable and immovable assets. The private foreign investor
should be given a reasonable period to remove from the
prospecting or mining area any structures and installations
placed on the area.
The most important provision should cover restoration
and safety. This should also cover environmental protection.
Therefore, the legislation should not only contain provision
protecting the environment during mining operations, but
there should also be appropriate provisions committing the
private investor to restore the land after termination. The
provisions should stipulate that the private investor should
leave the mining area, and everything thereon, in a safe
condition. He should be obliged by legislation to make safe
all holes and excavations to the satisfaction of the state.
He should also be required to take all reasonable measures to
restore the surface and all structure thereon to their
original condition. In order to fulfil this obligation, he
should be given access to his former mining area for a
reasonable period after termination of the prospecting and
mining rights.
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4	 INSTITUTIONS FOR MINERAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
The future lawful Namibian government should establish a
state exploitation company to participate in the exploitation
of the mineral resources. The institution could be used to
undertake mining operations and to form joint ventures with
multinational mining companies (on the majority equity
participation basis). Some of the joint ventures could be
with state companies owned by other African mineral producing
countries and possibly with state enterprises from socialist
countries.
The features of state exploitation companies are that they
pay taxes to the state as any other company, they transfer
earnings to the state in the form of dividends, they are free
from political interference in their day-to-day operations
(at least this is the assumption but the practice may be
different), 2 they recruit staff on a professional basis, and
they are headed by people who, though they are usually
political appointees, are professionally competent to run the
company. In addition,the companies are accountable to their
board (the board usually consists of government
representatives, trade unions, and any other persons who may
be appointed on their professional qualifications) for their
2
see generally, A.J.Kawana, State Holding Companies
as Instruments of Government Policy: The Rise and Fall
of the British National	 Enterprise Board	 (NEB),
(September	 1984)	 unpublished LL.M.	 dissertation
submitted to the University of Warwick - U.K.
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investment
	 program,
	 production	 performance,
	 and
profitability.
The state mining company could be involved in regional
integration. This implies a certain degree of regional
collaboration in the field of domestic productive resources
including mining. This could take the form of regional as
well as binational projects, combining the production factors
of two or more Southern African countries and joining
together the skills of domestic public enterprise mining
companies. It is submitted that the promotion of public
enterprises created and controlled by national governments in
the region could be an important way of achieving national as
well as	 regional control and bargaining power
	 in
international investment relations. The formation of joint
ventures in the region could lead to a possible new strategy
in terms of collective self-reliance and strengthening the
negotiating capabilities of the countries involved vis-a-vis
transnational corporations.
There are several advantages in promoting regional
cooperation. The cooperation could increase the number and
types of alternatives available in the context of the region
or international markets. Furthermore, public enterprises in
most developing countries differ from the multinational
mining companies
	 in several respects such as size,
organisational structure, motivations and strategy. In
general, joint investment originating from the region may be
more responsive to certain priorities and objectives of the
host governments (e.g., greater national participation and
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control).	 In addition,	 these joint enterprises	 could
undertake certain mining projects, the financial, technical
or marketing implications of which may be beyond the
capabilities of individual countries in the region. These
joint enterprises could then be used to counteract the
presence of or replacing multinational mining companies in
strategic sectors (or activities) of the mineral industry.
They could also serve to improve negotiating conditions for
the acquisition of foreign input, with or without the direct
participation of multinational mining companies. Finally,
various alternatives could be developed for collaboration
among public mining enterprises of two or more countries,
with multinational mining companies acting as suppliers of
specific input.
The future lawful government should play an active role in
marketing the mineral products through a state marketing
company (preferably wholly owned).
It is important to note that although public ownership
through State companies (which could then form an association
with private foreign investors) offers certain advantages, it
also suffers from a number of limitations. Experience shows
that majority State ownership in a joint venture does not
necessarily give more management control. The extent of the
governments' share of control may be in proportion to its
share of equity ownership. However, in many instances, this
may not be the case. One device for dissociating equity
ownership from control may be the assignment of different
classes of shares to the private foreign investor and the
503
host government. It is possible that the holder of a
particular class of shares may be empowered to appoint a
certain number of directors regardless of the claims on the
assets of the enterprise represented by the shares.
It may be a big mistake to think that a mere acquisition of a
majority equity interest in a mining enterprise can extricate
the mining industry from the global network of the
multinational mining companies. It is for these reasons that
multinational mining companies have shown a willingness to
adapt to a new legal arrangement such as a joint venture
formula. In addition, taking into account political
aspirations of the host developing countries, the companies
have realised that joint ventures may effectively defuse
nationalist objections to foreign control of the mineral
resources without substantially diminishing the companies'
actual control of their financial returns.
Furthermore, since most joint venture formulas include the
presence of important government officials on the board of
directors, it can assure the companies easy access to local
capital and other numerous advantages such as peaceful
industrial relations. Finally, a joint venture formula may
also help to improve communications between the government
and the companies. Therefore, unless transfer of majority
ownership is matched by a meaningful transfer of crucial
managerial powers and the acquisition and mobilisation of
technical expertise for the purpose of effective management,
effective control of the mining industry by the future lawful
Namibian government would prove to be illusory.
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It is for these reasons that the concept of ownership has
lost some of its significance in the eyes of multinational
mining companies. They have adapted themselves to a new
contractual environment in which they can have sufficient
control over critical decisions and continue to receive
attractive financial benefits with little direct claim to
ownership.
In order to minimise some of the problems discussed above, a
number of suggestions have been put forward, some of which
include evaluating contractors before a decision is made as
to whether or not to enter into a contract with a particular
private foreign investor. For example, Professor Green
recommends the following factors to be taken into account:
(a) the reputation of the contractor in both home and host
country; (b) the experience of the contractor; (c) technical
know-how of the contractor; (d) willingness to train local
personnel; (e) fees charged; and (f) other alternative
sources.
3
The main functions of the state exploitation company should
include the following: (1) To intervene in the international
trade in minerals so as to maintain or expand markets for
Namibian minerals, and to prevent or combat any action
designed to control or restrict her markets; (2) To supervise
3
see Professor Reginald H.Green, A Guide to
Acquisition and Initial Operation: Reflections from
Tanzanian Experience 1967-74, as Chapter II of Julio
Faundez
	 and	 Sol	 Picciotto,
	
(editors),	 The
Nationalisation of Multinationals In
	 Peripheral
Economies, (The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1978) p.64.
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purchases in Namibia and the utilisation of services in the
territory by mineral producing companies. Regarding
purchases, preference should be given to domestic products;
(3) To supervise the purchase of mining equipment and the
utilisation of services abroad; (4) To advise the government
on all matters relating to the production and sale of
minerals, in any form, within the territory and abroad, and
particularly in relation to technical, social, economic and
financial conditions of domestic production, their markets,
uses, and processes; (5) To promote the production of
minerals, and to be authorised to participate in and to
establish companies; and (6) To promote the use of Namibian
minerals and their by-products throughout the world.
5	 SOCIAL ASPECTS
We have already discussed in the preceding chapters that the
commanding heights of the current Namibian economy is the
preserve of the international capital. This state of affairs
leaves the mass of the African population terrorised,
repressed, and savagely exploited. It must be noted that the
independence struggle has raised the political consciousness
of the Namibian masses into a new mould. This would force
the government to restructure social, economic and political
relationships in a fundamental way.
	 The struggle has an
important educative impact, and as the confrontation
continues, the masses have become aware of the complicated
network of imperialist forces. They have become fully aware
as to why the present oppressive and exploitative system is
being sustained by the presence of the multinational
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companies. The understanding of all these factors has
resulted in the crystallisation of a much more meaningful
anti-imperialist ideology.
Therefore, the struggle should not only be seen in the
context of national liberation, but it should also be seen in
the context of economic and social revolution. This is
clearly reflected in SWAPO's political programme which is
vehemently against entrepreneurial aggrandisement. It is in
this context that a future mining legislation should take
these aspirations into account. One of the principal
benefits which Namibia could expect to derive from a mining
venture is that of the creation of enhanced opportunities for
employment and training of local personnel. Another such
benefit is in the form of the generation of ancillary
economic activities such as the production of goods and
services for the use in the mining and related activities and
the generation of new industries in the region.
The mining legislation should aim at achieving the following
benefits among others: (1) infrastructures must be so
designed to meet the reasonable requirements of the
government for the orderly development of the country and the
integration of the mining community into the local community,
which infrastructure should include adequate facilities for
the health, safety and material well-being of all local
persons employed or living in the vicinity of the mines. (2)
The maximum utilisation of locally produced goods and
services. (3) The minimum interference with or pollution of
the physical environment of the area of operations. (4)
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Restoration of all affect areas so as to afford their maximum
subsequent utilisation in the interest of the nation.
It is submitted that in the case of Namibia, environmental
and health provisions could be incorporated in the mining
legislation in order to be effective and generally applied to
all mining projects. The legislation could contain detailed
provisions spelling out the steps to be taken with regard, in
particular, to the disposal of waste materials and to the
restoration of mined and waste disposal areas. The
legislation could also require the submission of detailed
proposals as to the manner in which the mining operation is
to be conducted and how the mined areas are proposed to be
restored as well as the methods proposed to be adopted to
prevent damage resulting from water run-off and the avoidance
of soil erosion. Provision should also be made to ensure
that the restoration programme proposed by the companies is
such as will ensure that the restored areas are so restored
as to render them readily utilisable for such purposes as the
government would reasonably require.
In order to minimise reliance on expatriate labour,
localisation clauses should be included in both mining
legislation and joint venture agreements. The establishment
of formal training programmes should also be encouraged.
Detailed training provisions should be included in the joint
venture agreements. Time programmes should be fixed in the
joint venture agreements for the progressive localisation of
employment in the enterprise. For instance, there may be a
requirement for the reduction of expatriate personnel to a
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fixed percentage by a certain year with subsequent further
fixed reductions at pre-determined intervals of time. The
success of this arrangement would partly depend on extensive
training programmes for Namibians in all aspects of the
enterprise operation.
6	 CONCLUSION
Namibia has a lot to learn from the experience of other
African mineral producing countries. We have already noted
that just as sovereignty has now been acknowledged to be
meaningless without economic control, so ownership of mineral
resources has litt:e significance,in economic terms, unless
it is translated into effective control and concrete
financial benefits reinforced by sound managerial and
technical skills. While the adoption of the legal
arrangements discussed above in the mining legislation would
be helpful, such devices would not by themselves assure
Namibia its development goals.
The future Namibian government may encounter formidable
difficulties in restructuring the mining industry. It may be
possible that no amount of revision in contractual
arrangements could effectively deter the companies from
realising their desired return or retaining a de facto
control in Namibia's mineral industry. As long as the
companies enjoy worldwide monopoly of such vital resources as
capital, technological and managerial skills, and
distribution outlets, the institutional arrangement may not
serve any useful purpose since the companies would always
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find ways of ensuring that Namibia pays an appropriate price
for the vital resources at their command.
However, although these dangers cannot be entirely
discounted, it may be possible to follow the example of other
African countries which have adopted measures designed to
achieve economic control of their natural resources. It is
important to note that economic control by the future
Namibian government cannot be achieved by legal craftsmanship
alone, there are other aspects such as political, economic,
and the mobilisation of skills that are the essential
preconditions of economic self-sufficiency. However, it
would be a big mistake to dismiss the importance and
relevance of legal and institutional arrangements. .
As for the companies, they should realise that they have done
enormous injustice to the Namibian people. As long as this
cruel injustice and inequality persists, there would
certainly be a permanent state of antagonism and distrust
which may continue to menace the future relationship between
the Namibian government and the companies. The government
would always face powerful pressures from the African
population to intervene in order to remove the inequities of
the current arrangement. Therefore, unless the current
arrangements are reformed to ensure a more equitable system,
the confrontation between the Namibian people and the mining
companies would persist. Our discussion shows that the only
effective approach to public ownership is the complete
exclusion of the existing mining companies from all
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operations in production,	 management, distribution and
finance.
There are certain preconditions that have to be fulfilled in
order to achieve a successful public ownership. First, in
order for complete nationalisation to be successful, Namibia
should be placed outside the capitalist camp. Second, the
future Namibian government must be in a position to run the
mining operations with local technical and managerial
personnel. This may not be possible for reasons noted above.
The illegal South African racist regime has precluded the
development of a technical and managerial intelligentsia
among the African population, and it is likely to take a long
time to produce them on large enough scale to manage the
industry.	 The mining legislation must contain certain
important objectives. It must ensure that mineral rights
should only be granted to a foreign mining company in
partnership with the government in return for specific
obligations. It should ensure that there is rapid and
thorough prospecting of mineral resources, and in the case of
significant discoveries, their production should be in a
manner consistent with the national interest. Furthermore,
the legislation should ensure that mining activities are
effectively monitored at each stage of the mining operations.
Finally, the legislation should include a clause to the
effect that in negotiating mineral agreements, the state
should require mining companies to accept as binding all
legislative and regulatory changes which may be enacted from
time to time in the future.
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The success of the relationship between the government and
private foreign investors will depend on the recognition by
the private foreign investor of the national aspirations of
the state; and the recognition by the state of the private
foreign investor's requirement of a reasonable opportunity to
recover his investment with a fair return. In short, there
should be mutual recognition of each other's rights. Indeed,
this is what Comrade President Sam Nujoma had in mind when he
stated that private "foreign investment would be allowed only
in governmental joint ventures based on the principle of
mutual respect and benefit to the Namibian people" (supra).
512
APPENDIX I:1 
The Distribution of GDP by Sectors of Economy % 
YEAR AGRICULTURE	 MINING	 INDUSTRY	 SERVICES
& FISHING
TOTAL GDP
R MILL
1920 13	 59	 3	 25 100 13
1925 12	 49	 6	 33 100 11
1930 5	 44	 8	 43 100 10
1935 46	 13	 7	 34 100 8
1940 48	 4	 6	 42 100 10
1945 46	 13	 6	 35 100 20
1950 34	 33	 6	 27 100 61
1955 26	 39	 6	 29 100 129
1960 15	 34	 13	 38 100 142
1965 20	 47	 8	 25 100 214
1970 16	 31	 14	 39 100 379
1975 16	 27	 17	 40 100 674
1977 18	 33	 14	 35 100 1,135
Source:
(1981),
Reginald H.Green, Kimmo Kiljunen, Marjalusa
Namibia The Last Colony, Longman, p.65.
Kiljunen,
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APPENDIX 1-2
LIST OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY INVOLVED IN
THE MINERAL INDUSTRY OF NAMIBIA
COUNTRY AND COMPANY
1 USA
1.1 Bethlehem Steel
Corp
1.2 Davy Inc
1.3 Energy Minerals
Corp
1.4 Fluor Corp
1.5 The Hanna Mining
Company
1.7 International
Minerals and
Chemical Corp
1.5 Midwest Uranium
Corp
1.8 Newmont Mining
Corp
1.9 Nord Resources
Corp
1.10 Phelps Dodge
Corp
1.11 Southern Uran-
ium Corp
1.12 Superior Oil
Company
1.13 Tomm Oil and
Gas Exploration
Company
1.14 Tristate
Nuclear Inc
1.15 Union Carbide
Corp
1.16 Zapata Corp
2 UK
2.1 Alpine Holdings
Ltd
2.2 Charter Consol-
idated Ltd
2.3 Davy Corp Ltd
2.4 RTZ Ltd
2.5 Selection Trust
Ltd
SUBSIDIARY OR ASSOCI-
ATE OPERATING IN
NAMIBIA
Ebco Mining and Ex-
ploration Company
A G McKee and Company
Tsumeb Corp Ltd
Newmont Holding Co of
SWA (Pty) Ltd
0 1 0kiep Copper Co
Nord Mining and Ex-
ploration (Pty) Ltd
Western Nuclear Inc
Falconbridge Nickel
Mines Ltd
African Coast Diamond
& Minerals (Pty) Ltd
Zapata Mining (Pty)
Ltd
Kiln Products Ltd
Power Gas Ltd Davy
Inc
Rossing Uranium Ltd
Tsumeb Corp Ltd
South West African
Selection Trust (Pty)
Ltd
PRODUCTS/ACT W ITIES
Krantzberg tungsten
mine
Development of Ros-
sing Uranium mine
Mining & Prospecting
Mining & Prospecting
Mining & Prospecting
Mining & Prospecting
Uranium Prospecting
Mining of base metals
Joint ventures in
copper, tungsten, tin
& wolfram mining &
prospecting
Uranium Prospecting
Uranium Prospecting
Mineral & exploration
Mineral rights
Uranium Prospecting
Uranium Prospecting
Onganja Copper Mine
Mining
Mining
Construction of
Ross ing Uranium mine
Uranium mining
Base metal mining
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COUNTRY OF COMPANY SUBSIDIARY OR
ASSOCIATE OPERATING
IN NAMIBIA
PRODUCTS/ACTIVITIES
3 FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY
3.1 Kraftwerk Union
AG
3.2 Metallgesell-
schaft AG
3.3 Norddeutsche
Affinerie
3.4 Ohlthave Gruppe
3.5 Urangesellschaft
MBH
3.6 Veba AG
4 SOUTH AFRICA
4.1 Anglo American
Corp of South
Africa Ltd
4.2 De Beers Consol-
idated Mines Ltd
4.3 Diamond Mining
and Utility Co
(SWA) Ltd
4.4 Federale Mynbou
BPK
4.5 Federick Volk-
sbeleggings BPK
4.6 General Mining
Union Corp Ltd
4.7 Gold Fields of
South Africa
4.8 Industrial De-
velopment Corp
of South Africa
4.9 Iron and Steel
Corp of South
Africa Ltd
(ISCOR)
4.10 Johannesburg
Consolidated In-
vestment Company
Ltd (JCI)
4.11 Moly Copper
Mining and Exp-
loration Company
SWA Lithium Mines
(Pty) Ltd
Khan Mine (Pty) Ltd
Uran-Isotopentrennungs
-GMBH (URANIT)
Minerals & Resources
Corp Ltd, SWACO, Kiln
Products Ltd, Gold
Fields of South Africa
Ltd, Anglo American
Coal Corp Ltd, & LTA
Ltd
CDM
Klein Aub Roper
Maatskappy BPK
Otjihase Mining
Company Ltd Klein Aub
Koper Maatskappy BPK
Klein Aub Koper
Maatskappy BPK
Trekkopje Exploration
& Mining Co (Pty) Ltd
Rossing Uranium Ltd
Uis Mining Company
(SWA) Ltd
Otjihase Mining
Company (Pty) Ltd
Uranium enrichment
Lithium, aluminium
phosphate, bismuth
Copper refining
Copper mining
Development of Ros-
sing Uranium Mine
Uranium processing
Prospecting and
mining of base metals
and uranium
Diamond mining
Copper mining
Mining
Copper mining
Mining and
Propsecting
Uranium mining
Tin mining
Mining
Mining
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COUNTRY OF COMPANY
5 FRANCE
5.1 Compagnie Fran-
caise de
Petroles
5.2 Imetal SA
5.3 Pierrelatte and
Narbonne Uran-
ium Plants
5.4 Pechiney-Ugine
Kuhlann
5.5 Vendome SA
6 CANADA
6.1 Comines Ltd
6.2 Consolidated
Mining and
Smelting
6.3 Dolman Indus-
tries Ltd
6.4 Falconbridge
Nickel Mines Ltd
6.5 Novanda Mines
6.6 Rio Algom Ltd
7 NETHERLANDS
7.1 Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co
8 AUSTRALIA
8.1 Dave Ltd
8.2 Leichardt Exp-
loration
8.3 Steller Mining
9 PORTUGAL
9.1 Erongo Rocks and
Gems
SUBSIDIARY OR
ASSOCIATE OPERATING
IN NAMIBIA
Minatome SA
Le Nickel Penarroya
Minatome SA
Eland Mining and
Exploration (Pty) Ltd
Futura Mining
Oamites Mining Co
(Pty) Ltd, Falcon-
bridge of South West
Africa Pty Ltd. Ranch
Mining Co (Pty) Ltd
Zapata Mining (Pty)
Ltd
Rossing Uranium Ltd
Billiton Exploration
SWA (Pty) Ltd
PRODUCTS/ACTIVITIES
Petroleum & Uranium
Prospecting
Metals
Uranium enrichment
Uranium enrichment
Silver and copper
mining
Mineral exploration
Mineral exploration
Mining
Prospecting and
mining of base
metals
Onganji Copper mine
Uranium mining
Mining and
Prospecting
Diamond concessions
Diamond concessions
Diamond concessions
Diamond processing
Sources: United Nations, (1983), International Conference in Support of
the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris 25-26 April,
1982, A/Conf.120/8, 4 April; UN Centre on Transnational Corporations,
(1982), Role of Transnational Corporations in Namibia, August; United
Nations, (1982), Plunder of Namibian Urnaium, New York; SWAPO, (1982),
Trade Union Action On Namibian Uranium, London; Gail Hovey, (1982),
Namibia's Stolen Wealth: North American Investment and South African
Occupation, The Africa Fund; and United Nations, (1985) Reference Book 
on Major Transnational Corporations Operating in Namibia, New York.
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APPENDIX III:1
PRODUCTION OF GEM DIAMONDS IN NAMIBIA, 1951-1955
YEAR	 1951	 1952	 1953
	 1954	 1955
THOUSAND 478,075
	
541,027
	 617,411
	 688,536
	 797,207
CARATS
Source: US Dept of the Interior, Bureau of Mines - Minerals
Yearbook, vol.1 - Metals and Minerals, p.489
PRODUCTION OF GEM DIAMONDS IN NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA
(THOUSAND CARATS), 1963-1983
TOTAL AFRICA WORLD TOTALYEAR NAMIBIA SOUTH AFRICA
1963 1,076 1,797 5,550 6,424
1964 1,387 1,790 6,553 7,449
1965 1,491 1,948 6,631 7,201
1966 1,583 2,485 7,493 8,024
1967 1,700 2,000e 7,449 9,093
1968 1,552 3.399 9,931 10,600
1969 1,923 3,612 11,240 13,063
1970 1,772 3,758 11,361 13,297
1971 1,566 3,169 10,342 12,454
1972 1,516 3,370 11,492 12,688
1973 1,520 3,448 10,130 12,462
1974 1,491 3,440 9,341 11,689
1975 1,660 3,435 7,916 10,264
1976 1,609 3,340 7,416 9,675
1977 1,901 3,862 7,996 10,400
1978 1,950 4,000 6,790 11,000
1979 1,850 3,670 7,529 10,657
1980 1,482 2,812 7,506 10,446
1981 1,186 3,429 7,664 10,261
1982p 963 3,442 7,614 10,182
1983e2 915 4,554 14,565 20,837
p = preliminary
e = estimated
2 = includes near-gem and cheap-gem qualities
Source: US Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of Mines: 1963-1966 see
Minerals Yearbook, 1966, volume 1-11, Metals, Minerals and
Fuels, p.484; 1967 - Minerals Yearbook, 1967, p.520;
1969-1978 Minerals Commodity Summaries 1979, pp.59 and 356;
1979, see Mineral Facts and Problems, 1980; and 1980-1983,
see Bureau of Mines Bulletin 675, 1985
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APPENDIX 111:2
PRODUCTION OF GEM DIAMONDS IN AFRICA (THOUSAND CARATS) 
1965-1966
COUNTRY 1965 1966
NAMIBIA 1,491 1,583
SOUTH AFRICA 1,948 2,485
ANGOLA 878 964
CENTRAL AFRICAN REP 268 270
CONGO 1,	 e2,
ZAIRE 2
318
14
318
15
GHANA 225 282
GUINEA e 21 21
IVORY COAST 119 110
LIBERIA e 277 343
SIERRA LEONE 658 629
TANZANIA 414 473
TOTAL AFRICA 6,631 7,493'
WORLD TOTAL 7,201 8,024
e = estimate
1 = exports
2 = probable origin, Zaire. Zaire produces 70 per cent low
quality industrial, 20 per cent near gem quality, and only
10 per cent gem quality, see The Times (London) 4th June
1981, p.17, col.f
Source: US Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of Mines - Minerals
Yearbook, (1966, vol. 1-11, Metals, Minerals, and Fuels) P.484
APPENDIX 111:3
WORLD PRODUCTION OF NATURAL DIAMOND, 1979-1982 (MILLION
METRIC TONS) 
COUNTRY 1979 1980 1981 1982 QUALITY
ZAIRE 15.5 14.0 12.5 12.2 (92% INDUSTRIAL)
USSR 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 (80% INDUSTRIAL)
SOUTH AFRICA 8.6 8.7 9.5 8.9 (60% INDUSTRIAL)
BOTSWANA 4.4 5.1 4.96 7.77 (85% INDUSTRIAL)
ANGOLA 0.84 1.5 1.40 1.3 (75% GEM)
NAMIBIA 1.6 1.56 1.25 1.0 (98% GEM)
GHANA 1.5 1.1 1.25 1.0 (85% INDUSTRIAL)
VENEZUELA 0.8 0.8 0.75 0.75 (70% INDUSTRIAL)
LIBERIA 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 (60% GEM)
BRAZIL 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.38 (50% GEM)
TANZANIA 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 (50% GEM)
C.A.R. 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 (66.6% GEM)
IVORY COAST 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 (60% INDUSTRIAL)
Source: Leake S.Hangala - Structure of Namibian Mineral
Industry (1985) p.17, quoted from Mining Annual
Review, 1983
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Tenth Floor. CDM Centre
10 Sirlow Street
Windhoek 9000
Telephone (061) 35061
Tel. Add.: "Dlboswa -
P.O Box 1906
Windhoek
9000
South West Africa
AP22/14.11-111.112.-
DIAMOND BOARD FOR SOUTH WEST AFRICA
5th August 1982
Mt Eric Lang
P 0 Box 11132
WINDHOEK	 9000
Dear Mr Lang
You have asked this Board to answer a number of questions which you put
to us in our discussion on 21st July 1982. Your questions cover a wide
range but in general they are directed towards an enquiry as to whether
the State is exercising adequate control over the production and sale
of diamonds in this country and in particular whether the State is
satisfied that there are no malpractices which might result in the State
getting less than the full amount of taxes and imposts properly due to
it arising from diamond production. You have also raised questions in
regard to the duties of the Secretary of the Diamond Board for S W A.
The answers to certain of your questions would involve giving detailed
descriptions of the way diamonds are recovered, weighed, recorded,
handled and transported at the C D M Mine at Oranjemund, and details as
to which individuals attend to these duties.. The answers would also
involve giving details of the checks which are conducted to ensure the
accuracy and integrity of records and procedures, and the honesty of
personnel. These answers would reveal security procedures followed
by the S W A/Namibia Police including the Diamond and Gold Branch, as
well as C D M personnel at the mine and elsewhere, and for obvious
reasons it would not be in the interests of the State to make them
publicly known. I am sure you will appreciate that it would be very
unusual to give an ordinary member of the public such privileged
information, and I regret it cannot be made available to you.
On behalf of this Board, I have no hesitation in giving you an
absolute assurance that proper and adequate controls, in the interests
of the State, :are in force from the time the rough stones are
extracted from the mining propertyuntil they are sold into the
diamond markets of the world, and that the appropriate taxes andduties due to the State are collected in full.
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1r Eric Lang	 - 2 -	 5zo	 1982
The interests of the State in this matter are protected by a
diverse number of bodies and organisations which act directly on
behalf of Government and for its benefit. The interests of the State
are protected not only by the functions of this Board, whose members
are all appointed by the State, but also by the Chief Inspector of
Mines and the officials of his Departme:t, who are responsible to the
Secretary for Economic Affairs and throu .: him to the Chairman of
'the Minister's Council. The Auditor General has access to the books,
reports, minutes, correspondence, sales and production statistics
and other information which he may require. The Revenue Authorities
have access to the books and all records of the diamond producers.
The South West Africa Police and members of its Gold and Diamond
Branch play a vital part on behalf of the State in regard to diamond
security matters, not only on mining property but elsewhere as'well.
At C D M comprehensive methods are employed by internal and external
auditors to monitor the procedures for the recording of diamond =
production and for the handling and transport of diamonds from the
various sources on the mine right through to the stages where they
are exported out of Namibia and sorted, valued and sold. The
internal control and security measures adopted throughout these
procedures are in our opinion effectively implemented and they are
conducted in a conscientious manner by all the parties concerned.
In short, we are satisfied in regard to the State's control over
the diamond industry in this country and in particular in regard to
the procedures for the calculation and collection of its due
entitlement of duties and taxes arising from diamond production in
the territory.
The procedures followed in Namibia are similar to those in practice
in the Republic of South Africa and elsewhere in Southern Africa.
They include refinements and modifications which have been made as
a result of advances in modern technology and practical experience
in the diamond industry gained over many years, which has produced
an efficient system for the control of diamond mining and marketing
in the best interests of the State.
Some of your questions were critical of the fact that the Secretary
of the Diamond Board is an employee of De Beers and that the Board's
offices are located in the same premises as those of C D M. We are
satisfied that this is the most efficient way of handling the
secretarial affairs of the Board and that no malpractices have
resulted from these arrangements. The duties of the Secretary
involve specialist expertise and judgment which would be difficult
to find outside the diamond industry. The auditors of C D M are
different to •those of the Diamond Board itself, whose books and
records are subject to audit by the Auditor General. Confidential
statistics relating-t6 Diamond - BOaYd -matters such
	 production,
sales, export duty and the like are kept separately. Special
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confidential documents are kept in the personal safe custody of the
Secretary. In view of the audit checks and controls exercised over
Diamond Board records by the Auditor General, the Board is satisfied
that it would not be possible for a De Beers employee to falsify
information in favour of C D M or any other party without detection.
You appear to have some information in connection with incorrect
statistics or documentation which you say were submitted to the Board
by the Secretary. We do not know where you obtained this information,
but we can inform you that there was one occasion when statistics
were incorrectly reported to him by an outside source, and con-
sequently reported to the Board but these were rectified at a
following Board meeting. The Secretary himself discovered the
errors.
Two further matters were raised by you. You asked whether any
transfer pricing was taking place (relating to t:2 production of
C D M) and whether overmining was taking place on' the C D M
property. The answer is "no" in both cases. In regard to your
question on overmining, this subject is fully dealt with in the
letter to you dated 4th August 1982 from C D M (Pty) Limited.
We enclose a copy of our letter of today's date to Mr J Putz, for
your information.
Yours sincerely
P J MALHERBE
CHAIRMAN
Hr PUtz '
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CDM (Proprietary) Limited
4th August 1982
Mr Eric Lang
P 0 Box 11132
WINDHOEK
	 9000
Dear Mr Lang
We are writing in response to our discussions with you at our offices
on 23rd July 1982, when you enquired about the mining policy followed
at C D M. The background to the Company's mining policy is explained
in this letter, from which you will see that a computer planning model
has been developed and that modern operations research techniques
are in use to ensure that no pay ore will remain at the end of the
life of the mine. You also enquired as to the date when the "F"
Blocks were mined and the rate of mining.
The C D M mine is very old in the sense that it has been operating for
over sixty years. The mining policy has therefore had to be adapted
to the ore reserves available from time to time and, 'of course, also
to prevailing market conditions relating to carats, the size of
diamond produced, and the quantities required. Indeed in the
depression of the thirties the mine was effectively closed down and
again there was very little production in World War Two. In the
interests of the Company and its shareholders production was rapidly
built up after the War until it exceeded one million carats in 1962.
A high point was reached in 1969 when 1.84 million carats were pro-
duced, at the height of the very buoyant conditions prevailing at
that time in the diamond market. Production continued at around
1.6 million carats per annum thereafter and in the year 1976 it was
1,69 million carats. A peak of 2 million carats was Xca...led the
following year - for one year only - when market conditions were
unusually strong. Since then, annual production has been steadily
declining and last year it fell to 1.2 million carats, partly as a
2/ 	
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.The:. "F" Blocks (which you referred to as "F" Fields in our
discussion) were mined during the 1950s, 60s and 70s as part of the
general plan for the orderly mining of all exploitable areas within
the Company's property. The blocks were mined at varying rates
over these years, as and when required in terms of the overall
mining policy.
The declining production rates at C D M in 1979, 1980 and 1981
reflect the downturn in the diamond market. In particular, with a
view to reducing costs without reducing sales in terms of the
quota, C D M closed one of its four main plants in May 1981, as
well as ceasing production from two sample plants. The resulting
reduction in working costs minimised the decrease in contributions
payable to the State. These policies were and are clearly in the
interests of the shareholders and the State and they are totally
incompatible with your accusation that the Company is following a
"scorched earth" policy.
C D M is an old mine nearing the end of its life and as such it
must be expected that it is unlikely that production could be
maintained at the peak levels of its heyday. Present ore
reserves indicate a life between twelve to fifteen years but
because prospecting continues one can be reasonably confident that
barring unforeseen circumstances, C D M will continue in pro-
duction at least until the turn of the century. Substantial sums
are being spent on prospecting for diamonds both within and out-
side C D M's present concession areas. Such expenditure has for
some five years been running at over 210 million per annum.
Incidentally, C D M has also been spending over R1 million per
annum on prospecting for other minerals in Namibia and it is also
in the process of completing a 25 million general minerals survey
in certain lesser-known parts of Namibia which are not considered
prime prospecting areas, because of the nature of the surface
geology and the expense involved. The information from this
survey is placed on open file at the offices of the Geological
Survey in Windhoek for the benefit of the nation.
In recent years a major mine sampling programme by means of 10
meter wide trenches has resulted in reclassifying large volumes of
previously unpay ore in the Southern area. Low grade dumps
containing conglomerate from the old field screening plants have
also been sampled and most have been brought into reserves. In
terms of the overall life of mine plan some are being treated at
present, as on their own they would be uneconomic.
The construction of the modern H M S plants and the constant
review of marginal reserves and old tailings dumps have justified
the introduction and development of a computer planning model for
'orderly mine planning based on modern operations research
techniques. This will ensure that no pay ore will remain at the
end of the life of the mine.
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In conclusion, I am sorry to say that it will not be possible tc
arrange for you to visit the mine at Oranjemund. In coming to this
decision we have had to take into account the fact that you have
no business connections with C D M nor the diamond industry, nor
indeed with any organisation with whcm we have dealings.
Yours sincerely
D B HOFFE
RESIDENT DIRECTOR
APPENDIX III 
SILVER, AND CADMIUM
OF COPPER, REFINED
COMPARED WITH OTHER
LEAD, ZINC, TIN, 
AFRICAN PRODUCERS
NAMIBIA'S PRODUCTION
COPPER 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
(000 TONS)
NAMIBIA 37.7 41.9 39.2 44.3 48.8 54.2
ZAMBIA 643.0 588.3 595.8 587.4 529.6 514.9
ZAIRE 423.8 399.8 459.7 504.8 502.8 502.8
S .A. 209.3 204.2 211.9 210.6 207.1 210.8
BOTSWANA 14.6 14.6 15.6 17.8 18.4 20.3
MOROCCO 4.3 8.3 7.2 7.6 20.9 19.0
ZIMBABWE 33.8 29.6 27.0 24.6 24.8 19.0
OTHER 5.4 1.4 1.5 0.4 0.3 0.1
TOTAL 1371.9 1287.1 1347.9 1397.5 1352.7 1340.8
NAMIBIA'S 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.2 3.6 4.0
SHARE IN %
REFINED LEAD
(000 TONS)
NAMIBIA 39.5 41.7 42.9 41.7 40.6 35.4
MOROCCO 30.0 36.8 42.4 52.3 58.6 57.6
S .A. 23.6 23.3 35.4 26.9 30.4 29.6
TUNISIA 16.6 17.7 19.2 17.8 15.1 12.2
NIGERIA 1.5 2.0 2.0 0.4 0.4
ZAMBIA 12.9 12.8 10.0 9.9 14.6 14.6
OTHER 3.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.5 5.5
TOTAL 125.6 138.8 156.7 155.6 165.2 155.3
NAMIBIA'S 31.4 27.2 26.8 24.6 22.8
SHARE IN %
ZINC
(000 TONS)
NAMIBIA 36.6 29.0 25.4 36.4 35.7 35.9
S.A. 68.7 56.5 81.7 86.7 90.5 108.4
ZAIRE 82.8 73.0 67.0 75.6 82.1 81.9
ZAMBIA 50.5 53.7 42.9 39.7 52.5 43.0
ALGERIA 4.1 9.2 7.6 20.0 22.0 21.6
OTHER 17.3 13.7 15.1 16.1 14.0 -
TOTAL 260.0 235.1 239.7 274.5 303.5 304.8
NAMIBIA'S 14.1 12.3 10.6 13.4 11.8 11.8
SHARE IN %•
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TIN 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983(000 TONS)
NAMIBIA 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.6
S.A. 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.8 3.0 1.5
ZAIRE 3.4 3.3 3.2 2.3 2.2 1.0
NIGERIA 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.4 1.7 0.7
RWANDA 1 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.2 0.6
ZIMBABWE 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.2 0.6
OTHER 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
TOTAL 12.8 12.2 11.7 11.1 10.3 5.1
NAMIBIA'S 7/8 8.2 8.5 8.1 7.8 11.8
SHARE IN %
SILVER
METRIC TONS
NAMIBIA 46.1 53.5 51.3 58.7 49.9 60.1
S.A. 96.6 100.7 232.0 235.4 216.0 72.9
ZAIRE 89.1 91.7 78.8 80.1 59.2
MOROCCO 97.4 102.1 98.1 99.6 100.0
ZIMBABWE 2 34.5 30.4 29.5 26.7 28.6
ZAMBIA 33.3 28.4 23.8 22.2 27.6 29.1
OTHER 7.2 8.7 10.4 5.7 3.6
TOTAL 404.2 415.5 523.9 528.4 484.9
NAMIBIA'S 11.4 12.9 9.8 11.1 10.3
SHARE IN %
CADMIUM
METRIC TONS
NAMIBIA 79.0 81.0 70.0 0.0 110.0 47.0
ZAIRE 186.0 212.0 168.0 230.0 281.0 281.0
ALGERIA 34.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
TOTAL 299.0 289.0 289.0 280.0 441.0 387.0
NAMIBIA'S 24.4 24.2 24.2 0 24.9 12.4
SHARE IN %
1 = includes Burudi prior 1980
2 = smelter production
Source: Leake S.Hangala Structure of Namibian Mineral 
Industry (1985) pp.40-43. Quoted from World Metal
Statistics, June 1984
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Exploration
Mining
Produces
Uranium Ore
Milling
Produces U308
Concentrate
(Yellowcake)
Appendix 111:9
THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE 
Conversion to
Uranium
Hexafluoride (UF6)
UF6 Enrichment(eUF6)
Waste
Disposal
Pu02
Fuel
Reprocessing
Fuel Fabrication
Produces Uranium
Plutonium Dioxide
(UO2 and Pu02)
Nuclear
Reactor
Operation
Source: United Nations Centre on TrIbnsnational Corporations (1983)
Transnational Corporations and Contractual Relations in the World 
Uranium Industry: A technical Paper, New York, p.2
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Appendix: 111:10 
Lucers reply
The MmigrerofSme
Richard Luce MP
I am writing in reply to your letter of
3 December to the Prime Minister with which you presented a
petition about the supply of uranium from Namibia to the
United Kingdom.
Successive governments have for some years con-
sidered that, while South Africa's administration of
Namibia is unlawful, the arrangements under which uranium
from Namibia is imported into this country do not conflict
with any of our international obligations. When critics
suggest that our purchases of uranium from Namibia are in
contravention of international law,they usually refer to
Decree No 1 of the UN Council for Namibia which purports
to prohibit - for the time being - exploitation of the
natural resources of Namibia. We do not recognise the UN
Council's claim to be the legal administering authority
of Namibia, since the UN General Assembly acted beyond its
competence under the UN Charter in establihsing a subsidiary
body with the powers which it purported to confer on the
Council. In addition, the contract for the importation of
uranimum to the United Kingdom is between Rossing Uranium
Limited and the Central Electricity Generating Board. It
is not a Government contract, and we could not therefore
'cancel' it as you suggest in your letter.
We believe that a peaceful solution of the Namibia
problem could be the key to ending the cycle of violence in
the area. That is why we continue to work, with our partners
in the WesternFive, for an internationally recognised
settlement. The responses we have received to our proposals
for Constitutional Principles to guide the Namibians
Constituent Assembly are encouraging, although we do not
underestimate the difficulties which could face us in the
next phase of negotiations. In case you have not already
seen it, I enclose a copy of the communque issued after the
meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Five in Brussels on
10 December.
I am sending copies of this letter to tbe co-signatories
of yours.
E
rlijr* ..
299.
..._n
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Anpendix 111111
TRADE UNION SEMINAR ON
NAMIBIAN URANIUM
to stop the illegal trade in Western Europe
LONDON, 29-30 JUNE 1981
SWAPO'S HISTORIC POSITION ON THE CONTRACTS
FOR NAMIBIAN URANIUM. 
During the last six years, SWAPO of Namibia has consistently
and strongly opposed the contracts of various Western countries
for the illegal importation and processing of Namibian uranium.
In a statement to the United Nations Council for Namibian's
Uranium Hearings in July 1980, Cde.Theo Ben Gurirab, SWAPO
Representative at the United Nations, linked the Decree Number
1 on the protection of Namibia's natrual resources with the
fundamental reality that SWAPO's own 'struggle for liberation,
justice and national independence is above all a struggle
about natural resources on land and under the sea and about
the related question of who owns and controls them.'
Thus SWAPO's opposition to the illegal contracts is fundamental
to the Namibian liberation struggle and our people's quest
for effective control of their own resources. As SWAPO stated
in April 1981 (Guardian 15.4.1981), mining of uranium in Namibia
today is of no benefit to our people. On the contrary, the only
benefactors of this illegal undertaking are the companies involved,
the Western governments and the South African regime. Apart
from recognising immediate costrto the workers at the mine, pointed
out by Cde. Gurirab in July 1980 - 'we are ... gravely traumatized
when we anticipate the immense health hazards and the dangers
of radioactivity that threaten the well-being of our people
and the environment' - SWAPO's central concern is the fact that the
uranium contracts serve to perpetuate the oppression of the
whole Namibian nation. As we stated on 11.3.1980, 'defiance
of international law through the contracts not only encourages
the (South African) regime's violation of United Nations resolut-
ions demanding its withdrawal from Namibia, but actually
facilitates its attempts to entrench itself in our country.
Taxes paid to the illegal administration, together with
profits accruing through is own share in Rossing Uranium Ltd.,
effectively finance the war against the NAmibian people. In
this way, the contracts fund a massive army of occupation...'.
Likewise, the contracts have implications for Western diplomacy over
N mibia. It is no accident that the countries involved in
negotiations over the future of our country are those with large
stakes in the mining of Namibian uranium. As we stated in
January 1981, 'Western collusion in the theft of Namibian
uranium and other natural resources contradidts the professed
role adopted by the Western Contact Group in negotiations for
an 'internationally acceptable solution' to the Namibian
situation. It can only be regarded as hypocritical for Western
diplomats to make pious utterances about their commitment to
'self determination' for our people while Western multinationZIS
with the tacit approval of their governments, continue to fuel
South Africa's war.'
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Organised by SWAPO in co-operation with Namibia Support Committee
188 North Gower St., London NW1 2NB.Te1(01)388 5539.
SWAl'O's position on the exploitation of Namibian uranium has
the full backing of internationM law, most specifically defined
in United Nations Decree No.1 on the Protection of Namibia's
Natural Resources. On every occasion that SWAPO has called
for an end to the illegal trade in Namibian uranium we have
invoked the relevant provisions in international law. These
provisions include the right of a future Government of Namibia
to demand reparations for materials illegally stolen from
Namibia under South African occupation. On 11.3.1980, SWAPO
reasserted its position on this:'SWAPO of Namibia as the
legitimate representative of the Namibian people regards the
exportation of Namibian uranium as theft, and, as is provided
for in Decree Nol of the United Nations Council for Namibia,
SWAPO will claim compensation for it as the Government of an
indvendent Namibia with the full authority of international
law behind it
SWAPO has repeatedly condemned the operations of Rio Tinto
Zinc, Britain's largest mining multinational, in Namibia.
In 1976, we insisted that Western governments take steps to
terminate the contract, stating that 'in this there can be no
question of trying to maintain a position on the fence. Those
who have relations with the South African regime in Namibia
and actively contribute by trade and revenues to the regime
are helping to perpetuate the illegal occupation of Namibia
and South Africa's cruel exploitation of our people.'
SWAPO has also called on the labour movement internationally
to take steps to implement Decree No. 1, even in the absence
of governmental compliance with international law in this
regard.
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APPENDIX IV:1 
Government Revenue derived from taxation of income from mining
1974-78
Category 1974/76 1976/77 1977/78(d)
R.Mill R.Mill %(c) R.Mill
1	 Diamonds 57.1(a) 51.5 27.6 73.1
1.1 Income Tax 41.1 27.3 45.0
1.2 Profits Tax 7.0 9.2 12.2
1.3 Export Duty 9.0 15.0 15.9
2	 Other mines(b) 8.0 0.6 0.3 1.0
Notes:
(a) total revenue from diamonds
(b) excluding Rossing Uranium Ltd
(c) percentage to total Government revenue
(d) estimate
Source: Wolfgang H.Thomas, (1978), Economic Development in Namibia 
Towards Acceptable Development Strategies for Independent Namibia,
Kaiser Grunewald, p.250.
TCL's Contribution to Government revenue and dividends paid
to shareholders
R.MILL 1966 1971 1974 1978 1981
Gross Revenues 81.6 50.18 107.3 86.5 99.76
Taxation 12.6 7.28 11.9 5.8 0
Net Income	 (loss) 31.0 14.5 21.02 11.57 (5.89)
Dividends 28.0 21.0 19.34 12.7 0
Source: Gail Havey, (1872), Namibia's Stolen Wealth, The Africa Fund
p.31.	 534
(3)GrIndlng
(5)Sand/Slime Separation
(2) Crushing
(4)Leaching
(6)Thickening
(I)Mining
Appeadix V:1 Rossing operations: from mining to yellowcake 
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(7) Continous Exchange Plant-CIX(11) 	 (0)Solvent Extraction Plant SX(12)
(9)Precipitation	 ( 10 )Fil tration
(11)Drying (12)Loading and Despatch
(13) 
Cloud of radioactive dust from open
cast mine which contaminates the sur-
rounding environment.
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APPENDIX V1
Notes: I = mining by drilling, blasting, loading and haulage.
2 = Ore is delivered to the primary crushers and then to
the coarse ore stockpile. It then passes through further series
of crushers and screens until the particles are - 14 mm, and then
fine ore is stored on another stockpile.
3 = Grinding - crushed ore is reduced into further slurry.
4 = leaching and oxidation process in large mechanically
agitated tanks, the pulped ore is oxidised by manganese dioxide
and dissolved by sulphuric acid at elevated temperatures.
5 = Cyclones separate sand and slime, the sand is pumped
through pipes to a tailings disposal area.
6 = Counter current decantation thickeners wash the
slimes. A clear uranium-bearing solution (pregnate solution)
overflows from the No. 1 thickner while the washed slime is mixed
with the sands and pumped to the tailings area.
7 = The pregnate solution comes into contact with beads of
specially-formulated resin. Ions containing uranium are absorbed
onto the resin and are preferentially extracted from the
solution.
8 = The acidic eluate from the ion exchange plant is mixed
with an organic solvent which takes up the uranium bearing
component, the organic solution is mixed with a neutral aqueous
ammonium sulphate solution.
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9 = The addition of gaseous ammonia to the Ok liquor
coupled with the PH adjustment, precipitates ammonium diuranate
which is then thickened for a yellow slurry.
10 = The ammonium diuranate is recovered on rotating drum
filters as a yellow paste - "yellow cake".
11 = Drying and roasting drives off the ammonia leaving
uranium oxide.
12 = The product is packed into metal drums, the drums of
uranium oxide are then loaded and exported to overseas customers
for further processing.
13 = Dust caused by blasting.
Source: Rossing Uranium Ltd, An Introduction to Rossing the
largest uranium mine in the world, pp. 6-7; Photo No. 13 taken
from Namibia Support Committee pamphlet "Working on the Nuclear
Chain Gang" p.14.
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APPENDIX V:2
Employment Estimates by Economic Activity, 1977 
Economic Activity Blacks(1)	 Whites Total % of total
Small agriculture 240,000 - 240,000 50.3
Large agriculture 50,000 6,500 56,500 11.8
Fishing & Fish processing 7,000 500 7,500 1.6
Mining 19,000 3,500 22,500 4.7
Manufacturing 9,750 2,750 12,500 2.6
Transport & Communication 11,500 1,000 12,500 2.6
Commerce & Finance 20,000 5,000 25,000 5.2
Government 15,000 15,000 30,000 6.3
Domestic service 35,000 - 35,000 7.3
Construction 12,500 1,750 15,000 3.2
Others(2) 20,500 500 21,000 4.4
TOTAL 441,000 36,500 477,500 100
Notes:
(1) Blacks includes coloureds.
(2) Others includes unemployed and self-employed.
Source: UNIN, (1986), Namibia Perspectives for National Reconstrution
and Development, p.635.
APPENDIX V:3 
Skill Levels in the Mining Industy 1985 
Managerial/Administrative(1)	 Professional(1)
Black White Total	 Black White Total
N(2)	 500	 500	 N	 1,250	 1,250
Skilled/Para Professional	 Semi Skilled/Clerical
Black White Total	 Black White Total
2,000 1,750 3,750 	 6,000 N	 6,000
Unskilled
Black White Total
4,200 N(2)	 4,200
Notes:
1 = estimates
2 = negligible
Source: Professor Reginald H.Green, (1987), "Namibia: Dependence,
Destabilisation and Development", Conference Paper presented
at a Conference on Namibia, 11 May, oxfam, pp.21-22.
540
Appendix v1:1 
UNITED NATIONS
DECREE No. 1
FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF NAMIBIA
Conscious of its responsibility to protect the natural resources of the people of
Namibia and of ensuring that these natural resources are not exploited to the detriment of
Namibia, its people or environmental assets, the United Nations Council for Namibia
enacts the following decree:
DECREE
The United Nations Council for Namibia.
Recognizing that, in the terms of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27
October 1966 the Territory c ,f Namibia (formerly South West Africa) is the direct responsi-
bility of the United Nations,
Accepting that this responsibility includes the obligation to support the right of the
people of Namibia to achieve self-government and independence in accordance with
General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,
Reaffirming that the Government of the Republic of,South Africa is in illegal pos-
session of the Territory of Namibia,
Furthering the decision of the General Assembly in resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14
December 1962 which declared the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty
over their natural wealth and resources,
Noting that the Government of the Republic of South Africa has usurped and inter-
fered with these rights,
Desirous of securing for the people of Namibia adequate protection of the natural
wealth and resources of the Territory which is rightfully theirs,
Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971,'.
Acting in terms of the pk,wers conferred on it by General Assembly resolution 2248
(S-V) of 19 May 1967 and all other relevant resolutions and decisions regarding Nimibia,
'Legal Consequencesfyr States of the Continued Presence of South Africa inNamihia (South
West Africa) notwithstandipg Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisor4Opinion, 1.0 J. -
Reports 1971. p. 16.
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Decrees that
I. No person or entity, whether a body corporate or unincorporated, may search for,
prospect for, explore for, take, extract, mine, process, refine, use, sell, export, or distribute
any natural resource, whether animal or mineral, situated or found to be situated within
the territorial limits of Namibia without the consent and permission of the United Nations
Council for Namibia or any person authorized to act on its behalf for the purpose of giving
such permission or such consent;
2. Any permission, concession or licence for all or any of the purposes specified ii.
paragraph 1 above whensoever granted by any person or entity, including any body pur-
porting to act under the authority of the Government of the Republic of South Africa or
the "Administration of South West Africa" or their predecessors, is null, void and of no
force or effect;
3. No animal resource, mineral, or other natural resource produced in or emanating
from the Territory of Namibia may he taken from the said Territory by any means whatso-
ever to any place whatsoever outside the'territorial limits of Namibia by any person or
body, whether corporate or unincorporated, without the consent and permission of the
United Nations Council for Namibia or of any person authorized to act on behalf of the
said Council;
4. Any animal, mineral or other natural resource produced in or emanating from the
Territory of Namibia which shall be taken from the said Territory without the consent and
written authority of the United Nations Council for Namibia or of any person authorized
to act on behalf of the said Council may be seized and shall be forfeited to the benefit of
the said Council and held in trust by them for the benefit of the people of Namibia;
5. Any vehicle, ship or container found to be carrying animal, mineral or other natural
resources produced in or emanating from the Territory of Namibia shall also be subject to
seizure and forfeiture by or on behalf of the United Nations Council for Namibia or of
any person authorized to act on behalf of the said Cbuncil and shall be forfeited to the
benefit of the said Council and held in trust by them for the benefit of the people of Namibia;
6. Any person, entity or corporation which contravenes the present decree in respect
of Namibia may be held liable in damages by the future Government of an independent
Namibia;
7. For the purposes of the preceding paragraphs 1, 2, 3,4 and 5 and in order to give
effect to this decree, the United Nations Council for Namibia hereby authorizes the
United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, in accordance with resolution 2248 (S-V), to
take the necessary steps after consultations with the President.
The foregoing is the text of the Decree adopted by the United Nations Council for Namibia at
its 209th meeting on 27 September 1974 and approved by the General Assembly of the United
Nations at its 29th Session on 13 December 1974. For additional copies and information, please
communicate with the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, Room DC-328, United Nations,
New York, N.Y. 10017 or at the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia'. Box
33550, Lusaka, Zambia.
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Appendix VII:1	 A Sample of Fiscal Impositions Levied by 14
Developing Countries
Country'	 Tax Systems
Royalties Income Tax	 Dividends Tax CGTE PPT & RRT
DF% 33%5Argentina	 4	 17.5%	 15%	 15,20,25%
Botswana	 3%	 35%	 15%	 65 - 70%c
Brazil 35% 25-60% 40%
Columbia 40% 20-40%
Egypt 40-55% 39.7%
Indonesia 3.6% B5%	 4	 A5%3 10% 15R=60%
Ivory Coast 10% 12-18%
Jamaica $J 0.5%/t 35% 15-37.5% 10%
Kenya 45%D 52.5%F 20% 7.2 -
22.5%
Malaysia 40%	 50%P 5%M
Nigeria 45% or 2% of
turnover
12.5% 20%
Papua New 1.25% fob 35%B 36•5%A 15% 20R=70%
Guinea
Sierra Leone Le 0.55/t 70%
Tanzania 5% 22.5%N 45% Z
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Notes: 1
In addition to the taxes indicated above, a number of taxes such
as interest tax, stamp tax, and royalties and management tax are
levied.	 In broad terms, most of the countries referred to have
the same categories of expenditure for the purposes of granting
capital allowances for income tax purposes. These include
permanent buildings, plant and machinery (used for exploration,
development or mining), and intangible assets (e.g. rights,
licences, surveys, administrative and other charges incurred
prior to mining).
A= After capital recovery; H = Before capital recovery; C = taxes
and dividends on diamonds; D = domestic companies; E = Capital
gains tax; F = foreign companies; G = Progressive profit tax; H =
Resource Rent Tax; M = 5 per cent excess profits where the
company's chargeable income exceeds $M 200,000 a year and if such
company has no resideni:e office, branch, agent or representative
in the country; N = 22,5 per cent for the first 5 years; P =
Petroleum tax; R = Rate of return on invested capital; T = Access
profits tax of 15 per cent on profits of over 12 per cent to 15
per cent of capital, 20 per cent on profits of over 15 per cent
to 20 of capital, and 25 per cent on profits in excess of 20 per
cent of capital; and Z = 45 per cent in subsequent years.
Sources: Garnaut Ross and Anthony Clunies Ross, (1983), Taxation
of Mineral Rents, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 220, 233, 271, and
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273; United Nations Department of Technical Co-operation for
Development, (1980), The Nickel Industry and the Developing 
Countries, New York, pp. 72 & 80; United Nations Centre On
Transnational Corporations, (1983), National Legislation and
Regulations Relating to Transnational Corporations, New York, pp.
88-91, 129-130, 203-205, 216-219, 234-239, 265-267, 278-279,
282-283, and 313-316; United Nations Centre On Transnational
Corporations, (1986), National Legislation and Regulations
Relating to Transnational Corporations, vol. IV, New York, pp.
8-12, 179, 181-182, 185, 220-222, and 233-234; United Nations
Centre On Transnational Corporations, (1986), National 
Legislation and Regulations Relating to Transnational 
Corporations, vol. V, New York, p. 133; United Nations Centre On
Transnational Corporations, (1983), Main Features and Trends in
Petroleum and Mining Agreements, New York, pp. 85, 91, 94, 111,
and 116; and Dave Stevens, (1978), "Taxation in the Mining
Industry," paper presented to the workshop on Mining Legislation
and Mineral Resource Aiireements, Gaborone, Botswana 9-13 October,
UNCTC and Commonwealth Secretariat, pp. 227-233.
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Appendix Val:2 Example of the Calculation of the Resource Rent
Tax
Net cash	 Accumulated net cash Taxable cash Resource
Year flow
	 flow (previous year flows
	 Rent Tax
$ millions amount (if negative) (positive
	 (4) x 50%
brought forward &	 values of
compounded at 20%
then added to (2))
(3))
1 -100 -100
2 -100 -220
3 -50 -314
4 +10 -367
5 +130 -130
6 +180 -192
7 +180 +50 50 25
8 +230 +230 230 115
9 -200 -200
10 +150 -90
11 +130 +22 22 11
12 +100 +100 100 50
Explanation: In the example, the rate of return is 20%. Income
is first earned in year 4 but the accumulated total net cash flow
at 20 per cent continues to be negative until year 7 when the
private investor achieves a 20 per cent rate of return on his
investment. In year 7, the surplus after deductions is $50
million (4) taxed at 50 per cent so that the host State receives
$25 million (5). The following year (year 8) the surplus is $230
million divided by 50 per cent the revenue which accrues to the
State is $115 million.	 No income is earned in year 9 and 10
(e.g. due to additional investment) but surplus revenue is earned
548
in year 11 $22 million and 12 $100 million and again divided by
50 per cent comes to $11 million and $50 million respectively.
Source: United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations,
(1987) Financial and Fiscal Aspects of Petroleum Exploitation,
New York, p. 24.
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APPENDIX VIII:1
BARGAINING POWER AND WEAKNESSES OF THE PARTIES
FACTORS FAVOURING NAMIBIA	 FACTORS FAVOURING THE
COMPANIES
1 ABUNDANCE OF MINERALS
2 LACK OF SUBSTITUTES
3 ORE QUALITY MINERALS
4 HIGH WORLD MARKET PRICES
5 INTERESTED COMPETITORS
6 DEPENDENCE OF COMPANIES ON
MINERALS (eg GEM DIAMONDS)
7 SUPPORT BY WORLD OPINION
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(eg UN, OAU, AND DECREE
NO.1)
8 DIVERSIFIED EXPORTS
9 LINKS TO OTHER PRODUCING
STATES
1 ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF
MINERALS
2 POSSIBILITY OF SUBSTITUTION
3 COSTLY MINING
4 MARKET POWER, SPECIALISATION
AND TECHNOLOGY
5 MONOPOLY OF MINING,
PROCESSING AND MARKETING
6 LACK OF QUALIFIED NAMIBIAN
WORK FORCE
7 POLITICAL SUPPORT BY HOME
COUNTRIES
8 COOPERATION WITH
COMPETITORS
CONFLICTING INTERESTS
1 SUBJECTION TO NATIONAL LAW
2 ADJUSTMENT OF CONTRACT
TERMS
3 NATIONAL PARTICIPATION
4 REINVESTMENT OF PROFITS
5 DOMESTIC PROCESSING
6 DEVELOPMENT OF DOMESTIC
SUPPLY INDUSTRIES
7 LOCALISATION OF LABOUR
8 LABOUR-INTENSIVE
TECHNOLOGY
9 SHORT CONTRACT DURATION
1 INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
PROTECTION
2 MINIMUM NATIONAL
INTERFERENCE
3 PROFIT REPATRIATION
4 PROCESSING ABROAD
5 PURCHASE ABROAD
6 DEPENDENCE ON EXPATRIATES
7 CAPITAL-INTENSIVE
TECHNOLOGY
8 LENGTHY DURATION OF
CONTRACT WITH PRECISION
AND COMPREHENSIVENESS, AND
EXCLUSION OF LEGISLATIVE
CHANGES
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